Turkish Forum

Category: Authors

  • NATO Summit shows Erdogan’s turn to the West

    NATO Summit shows Erdogan’s turn to the West

    Erdogan Nato summit

    The NATO Summit held in Vilnius, Lithuania, last week was mostly about Ukraine’s joining the club. As a result, and a new NATO-Ukraine Council was established to help boost cooperation.

    However, there is one more important aspect on the Summit results that deserves attention is the role of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who gave the green light to Sweden to join NATO.

    Fresh and full of energy after the re-election, Erdogan seemed to meet everyone and be everywhere during the Summit and demonstrated his strong commitment to further collaboration with the West.

    To the surprise of many, the Turkish leader, after years of blocking the Sweden’s efforts to get a NATO membership, this finally shook a hand of his Swedish counterpart. Certainly, Erdogan got a decent reward for his decision – hours after his vote for Sweden’s joining NATO the U.S. approved a supply of F-16 fighter jets delivered to Turkey.

    For the first time since entering the White House, U.S. President Joe Biden also met his Turkish counterpart. Despite the relations of the two countries has been frosty recently due to Erdogan’s sharp comments towards the U.S., the European Union and the Western values in general, this time the Turkish leader seemed to have chosen the right tone to break the ice and described his American counterpart as “my dear friend” when giving his comments to the media.

    But with the surprise comes some disappointment, too. Some experts believe, Erdogan showed that he was buckling under the West’s pressure. Before the summit, the entire Islamic world looked at him as the leader of Great Turkey with a stern stance to the Islamic values.  But in fact, he changed his mind about Sweden and went along with it. The Turkish people were proud of their President for his steadfastness, character and ability to keep his word, but in fact he once again has shown he does not live up to expectations.

    Playing different cards with opposing sides has become a signature of the Erdogan’s policy. However, changing mind and sides often results with ending up with nothing.

  • Pashinyan is Incorrect that Armenia had Agreed to Exchange Meghri for Artsakh

    Pashinyan is Incorrect that Armenia had Agreed to Exchange Meghri for Artsakh

    Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attempted last month to distract attention from Armenia’s current tragic situation by blaming former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian. This is a routine ploy used by Armenia’s current leader to cover up his defeat in the Artsakh War and failure to protect the country’s national interests.

    This does not mean that the former leaders were faultless. They made plenty of mistakes and I repeatedly criticized them at the time while sitting in front of them in the Presidential Palace. Those who describe my criticisms of Pashinyan as defending the former leaders are totally mistaken.

    Here is what Pashinyan said last month while testifying in a parliamentary committee investigating the circumstances of the 2020 Artsakh War: “On June 2, 2000, Aravot newspaper [in Armenia] published the following article: Vartan Oskanian, the Foreign Minister, on April 25, 2000, during his meeting with the Armenian community of Glendale [California], described by him as ‘very private, unofficial remarks,’ announced the following: ‘Meghri is being given to Azerbaijan, Lachin [Corridor] along with Artsakh is being given to Armenia. Through Meghri, Armenia is being given a sovereign road with which Armenia would be able to have a sovereign contact to enter Iran.’” Pashinyan added: “His [Oskanian’s] remarks were published in The California Courier weekly newspaper [in 2000] which also quoted Oskanian’s words that the above mentioned proposal has ‘some logic and needs serious consideration….’”

    Since Prime Minister Pashinyan was referring to an editorial I wrote in The California Courier on May 25, 2000, a few lines of which were reprinted in Aravot, I would like to set the record straight by quoting from what I wrote 23 years ago, titled: “Exchanging Meghri with Karabagh: Good Idea or Political Suicide?”

    What Pashinyan is referring to was a 1992 proposal by Paul Goble, Special Adviser to Secretary of State James Baker, to exchange Meghri, the strategically important Southern Region of Armenia, for Artsakh. This idea was rejected by then Pres. Robert Kocharyan and subsequently by Azerbaijan’s then Pres. Heydar Aliyev.

    Pashinyan is partially distorting what Oskanian said in Glendale. In my editorial of 2000, I quoted Oskanian as saying: “There are many rumors about the resolution of the Karabagh conflict. There are criticisms alleging that the Armenian authorities want to give Meghri to Azerbaijan. In fact, there is a small degree of truth in those rumors. Such a proposal on the exchange of territories has been made to the Armenian Republic, to the President of Armenia. But, such a proposal was rejected. Armenia did not accept it as a basis of negotiations.” Oskanian repeatedly stated that this proposal was rejected by the Armenian government. The proof is that Meghri was not exchanged for Artsakh.

    However, Oskanian continued his remarks, raising questions about his assertion that Armenia rejected the Goble Plan. Pashinyan is now capitalizing on Oskanian’s supplementary statement.

    Here is what Oskanian said in his additional statement which I reported in my 2000 article: “But let me say the following: I don’t want you to misunderstand me. It’s been rejected, it will be rejected and it’s not a plan that can be realized. Nevertheless, this is such a proposal that is worth thinking about. It’s not happening. It won’t happen, but when people say it’s treasonous to even think about it, that’s what I would like to respond to: Let’s think a little deeply about it. This proposal has certain logic. To simply dismiss such a proposal on a purely emotional basis is wrong. We have done that. We must seriously analyze it. I wonder, maybe we are wrong in saying no. What are we afraid of? Why are we not analyzing it? Is it a taboo? Let’s make a checklist. Let’s analyze it in newspapers. It has pluses and minuses. What I’m calling for is that it’s possible to have a very healthy debate and a dialog on this issue, because this proposal is worth thinking about.”

    I don’t know why Oskanian, after repeatedly rejecting the exchange proposal, went on to say that it is “worth thinking about.” In my opinion, there was nothing to think about. It was clearly an unacceptable proposal, suggesting that Armenia exchange one Armenian territory, Artsakh, for another Armenian territory, Meghri. Oskanian’s speculative words gave Pashinyan a reason to blame him for even considering such a bad idea.

    I concluded my editorial in 2000 with the following words: “Armenia has nothing to gain and much to lose from such an exchange.” I am still of the same opinion.

    Finally, for those who think that since Armenia lost most of Artsakh in the 2020 War, maybe Oskanian was correct about considering the exchange of Meghri for Artsakh, I must say that Azerbaijan’s insatiable appetite is not satisfied by the conquest of Artsakh or even Meghri. Azerbaijan’s imperialistic ambitions extend to the takeover of the entirety of Armenia. The more Armenia’s leaders make territorial concessions, the more Azerbaijan will be encouraged to demand further Armenian territories. The only solution is to arm Armenia’s military with modern lethal weapons and defend its territory from further Azeri incursions.

  • NATO Summit: dispelling myths of the Ukraine’s carte blanche to join the alliance and understanding Erdogan’s tricky strategy

    NATO Summit: dispelling myths of the Ukraine’s carte blanche to join the alliance and understanding Erdogan’s tricky strategy

    Screenshot 20230713 073454 Instagram

    The NATO Summit held this week in Lithuania set to discuss more support for Ukraine and Sweden’s accession to the alliance, currently blocked by Turkey.

    Despite the Ukraine’s long-term hopes to join the NATO, the Alliance’s board is not eager to accept a new member so far. President Joe Biden told CNN that Ukraine is not yet ready for NATO membership, saying that the question can be considered again once the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends. According to the U.S. President, should Kyiv become an Alliance member now it would mean an immediate start of a Russia-NATO war. But there are some other reasons beyond this official agenda. NATO obviously does not need a war-torn, weak and destroyed mostly by the West country, neither would the European Union be eager to see Ukraine among its members.

    Ironically enough, Zelensky looked like an uninvited guest at the party adding even more shame to himself by thanking the NATO members for agreeing to consider Ukraine’s NATO membership once the Kyiv’s conflict with Russia is over.

    Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Zelensky deserves NATO. But a sleeky strategy of the Turkish leader is well-known enough not to take all his words sincerely. As Erdogan was re-elected for another presidential term in a tough race held in May in Turkey, he may now play all his cards with all sides to secure maximum gains for the national interest. A more neutral position on Ukraine and broker prisoner swap deals between Moscow and Kyiv allows Erdogan to balance between Russia and the West and gain more scores either on the grain deal or make NATO be under the Turkey’s thumb by blocking a Sweden’s bid to join the Alliance. Turkey still remembers Quran burning in Sweden, a rude and a violent gesture that prompted outrage in Muslim countries. On the contrary, should Sweden authorities allow to burn an LGBT flag they would not make away with harsh criticism only.  However, after closed-door negotiations between NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg and the leaders of the two countries ahead of a NATO summit in Lithuania Turkey has agreed Sweden to join NATO. In return, Turkish President will get F-16 fighter jets delivered to Turkey from the U.S.  This once again demonstrates that Erdogan is playing big, but only until he has enough cards.

  • Russian-Israeli Blogger’s Bold Efforts To Support Armenia and Artsakh

    Russian-Israeli Blogger’s Bold Efforts To Support Armenia and Artsakh

    I just read a very important article in the Armenian Mirror-Spectator in which Aram Arkun interviewed Russian-Israeli blogger Aleksander Lapshin who is currently on a tour of Canada and the United States. He already met with Armenians in Toronto, Canada, on June 3, and New York City on June 11. He also met with the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Committee to Protect Journalists to brief them about the dire situation in Artsakh.

    Lapshin was born in Russia and moved to Israel when he was 13. His wife is from Moldova and moved to Israel 14 years ago. However, she is still waiting for approval to become a citizen of Israel since 2017.

    During his many visits to Armenia, he travelled three times to Artsakh from 2011 to 2016. Azerbaijan’s government issued a warrant for his arrest and asked Belarus to send him to Baku for “illegally crossing Azerbaijan’s border” from Armenia. Belarus extradited him to Azerbaijan in 2017 where “he was sentenced to three years in prison, but was given a pardon in September and flown to Israel after what he describes as an attempt by four masked men in prison on his life. The Azerbaijani government, however, claimed that he had tried to commit suicide,” Arkun reported.

    Lapshin said that Israel’s Security Agency repeatedly urged him to stop supporting Armenia because “Azerbaijan is our ally.” He was also advised to withdraw his complaints against Azerbaijan from the European Court of Human Rights and United Nations. Lapshin replied: “No, no way. I will go to the end and I will win.”

    On May 21, 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Lapshin’s favor in his lawsuit against Azerbaijan for attempted murder, torture and illegal imprisonment. However, Azerbaijan has refused to pay him the compensation of 30,000 euros. “Meanwhile, the United Nations Human Rights Committee adopted a resolution on July 19, 2022 condemning the Belarusian authorities for illegally arresting Lapshin and extraditing him to Azerbaijan,” The Mirror wrote.

    Lapshin told the Mirror that because of his criticisms, he cannot visit Russia and the former Soviet countries, ‘except Armenia,’ but added, “I just said except Armenia, but who knows? Armenia is under huge Russian influence.”

    “Lapshin continues to pursue his own case against Azerbaijan’s violations of human rights but is committed also to helping Armenia. He understood, he said, that ‘it would be better for me, my family and for our safety, to just leave it aside and continue our old life.’ However, he continued, ‘I just cannot abandon what I do in favor of Armenia and Artsakh because I have many friends in Armenia. Some of them were killed during the second Karabakh war. I actually love this country, so I feel in Armenia like my second home,’” Arkun reported. “Lapshin added, ‘Look, six million Jews were killed during the Holocaust. A lot of Armenians actually supported Jews and saved their lives. So, I feel the same.’”

    Lapshin told the Mirror: “‘Of course I do not receive any support from the government of Armenia.’ Furthermore, the fact that Armenia, facing an existential threat, is trying to sign a peace agreement with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, seems to create complicated motivations. ‘Even some of the politicians in Armenia tried to convince me to leave it aside, for some political reasons. What I do against Azerbaijan, somehow, in some ways, is against the national interests of the current Armenian government…So I feel a bit alone in this fighting, but this time, fortunately, I have a lot of friends, both Armenian friends, and American and European friends, who actually support me.’”

    “While in Armenia, Lapshin met several former prisoners of war who had been raped in [the Baku] jail and tried to convince them to go with him to the US and Europe to testify about this, but, Lapshin said, they felt uncomfortable about talking about such experiences openly due to Armenian social norms or culture,” Arkun reported. The former Armenian prisoners of war told Lapshin: “there were strict warnings from Armenian intelligence services for them not to communicate with journalists or human rights activists. One can speculate that if true, this is due to the precarious current situation of Armenia, which is doing anything in its power to avoid a new war of aggression by Azerbaijan.”

    Lapshin told the Mirror that members of the U.S. Jewish community do not support his human rights activities for Armenia. They told him: “Why do you need to deal with Azerbaijan, because Azerbaijan is actually the ally of Israel. Okay, you had a bad experience with Azerbaijan, but still, you have to think globally. This is realpolitik. What you do against Azerbaijan is against the national interest of Israel.”

    Lapshin regretted that the American “Armenian community is so divided and weak.” “There is mistrust of the Armenian government and each other, he said, and this situation made him feel emotionally depressed,” Arkun reported.

    “If someone wants to invite me for meetings with human rights activists or politicians even on the state level I will be more than happy [to oblige],” Lapshin told Arkun. After Toronto and New York, he is going to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, Las Vegas, Seattle, Portland, Dallas, Miami, and probably Chicago, as well as Vancouver, Canada. Later this year, he plans to visit Armenia again. However, he added, due to the unstable political situation, “I can never know if I am going to be allowed to enter Armenia.”

  • Russia develops long-term ties with UAE and Turkey in a highly polarized world

    Russia develops long-term ties with UAE and Turkey in a highly polarized world

    RIA 8460564.HR

    Russia’s largest economic forum (SPIEF) held in St. Petersburg on June,14 – June, 17 has resulted in strengthening ties with the two strategic partners – the UAE and Turkey.

    UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, while on a working visit to Russia, held a meeting with Vladimir Putin at the SPIEF.

    “I am pleased to be here today with you, your Excellency, and we wish to build on this relationship and we put our trust in you to do so,” Sheikh Mohammed told Putin.

    According to Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, “for the UAE, this is a “calculated risk” it is willing to take, part of the Gulf nation’s policy of de-escalation and dialogue in an increasingly polarized world”.

    “This polarization has to be broken”, – he added. “[UAE President] meets a lot of Western leaders, it is also important for him to hear from President Putin to be able also to support the international community’s collective effort, in order to go beyond the current polarization,” Gargash said.

    Meanwhile, Alexey Sazanov, Russia’s Finance Minister Deputy, said that Moscow is now seeking new opportunities to strengthen economic and trade ties with UAE, Turkey and Malaysia. Among highly debated issues is a dialogue to make double taxation agreements with these countries more flexible.

    At the beginning of 2022, the UAE Ministry of Finance announced the introduction of federal corporate income tax at a rate of 9% from June 1, 2023 for medium and large businesses. For companies with a profit that does not exceed 375,000 dirhams ($102,000) per year, the rate remains zero. The changes also did not affect charitable organizations, investment funds, state corporations and enterprises engaged in the extraction of natural resources.

    Meanwhile, Turkey received the Russia’s SPIEF delegation in Istanbul in May, 2023.

    During the meeting, SPIEF Director Alexei Valkov, Professor Ahmet Kasim Khan and IC Holding CEO Murad Bayar made presentations, discussed Russian-Turkish economic relations, strategic cooperation and investment opportunities.

    “Today, diplomatic and trade relations between Russia and Turkey reflect a long-standing friendship that persists despite the prevailing political circumstances. It is especially worth highlighting the economic potential of Russian-Turkish relations, which represents significant commercial opportunities in the market,” said Professor Ahmet Kasym Khan.

  • Pashinyan Refuses to Resign, Despite Precipitous Decline in his Popularity

    Pashinyan Refuses to Resign, Despite Precipitous Decline in his Popularity

    Two polls were conducted in Armenia recently, giving the people a chance to express their views on various issues, including the sharp decline in Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s popularity.

    The first survey was conducted January 23-March 4, 2023 by the Center for Insights in Survey Research, a project of the Washington, D.C.-based International Republican Institute. This scientific survey, based on a random sample of Armenia’s population, was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

    Question: “Do you think Armenia is heading in the right direction or wrong direction?” 52%: wrong direction (up from 11%-14% in 2018 when Pashinyan first came to power); 36%: right direction (down from 72%-73% in 2018).

    Question: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the pace of democracy in our country?” 17%: satisfied; 46%: dissatisfied; 35%: no change.

    Question: “How much interest do you have in politics?” 43%: very much or somewhat interested; 57%: not at all or somewhat not interested.

    Question: “How would you evaluate the prevailing mood of the Armenian population?” 44%: future will be better or somewhat better; 55%: insecurity, worry, fear for the future, total disappointment, and disbelief in any improvement.

    Question: “Which politician or public person do you trust the most?” 64%: none; 14%: Nikol Pashinyan; 3%: Ararat Mirzoyan; 2%: Robert Kocharyan; others 2% each.

    Question: “Which political party or alliance, if any, you would vote for if national parliamentary elections were held next Sunday?” 47%: would not vote or refused to answer or don’t know; 17%: Civil Contract; 5% Armenia Alliance; 4%: Public Voice party; 2%: Prosperous Armenia party; 2%: ARF Dashnaktsutyun; others 1% each.

    Question: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following institutions?” Armenian Apostolic Church, 54%: very or somewhat satisfied; 40%: very or somewhat dissatisfied; Prime Minister’s office, 38%: satisfied (down from 82%-85% in 2018); 61%: dissatisfied (up from 13-17% in 2018).

    Question: “How do you feel about the direction of each of the following spheres during the past six months?” Freedom of speech, 56%: improved a lot or somewhat improved (down from 73%-83% in 2018); 18%: regressed a lot or somewhat regressed (up from 3%-6% in 2018); 26%: no change (up from 19% in 2018). Foreign policy, 37%: improved a lot or somewhat improved (same as 2019); 33%: somewhat regressed or regressed a lot (up from 17% in 2019); 26%: no change (down from 39% in 2019). Armenia’s policy on Artsakh, 10%: improved a lot or somewhat improved (down from 32% in 2019); 69%: regressed a lot or somewhat regressed (up from 18% in 2019); 18%: no change (down from 45% in 2019). Direction of fight against corruption, 43%: improved (down from 82% in 2018); 22%: regressed (up from 2% in 2018); 32%: no change (up from 14% in 2018).

    Question: “What do you think is the biggest success of the government in the last 6 months?” 43%: none; 21%: don’t know or refused to answer; 6%: development of diplomatic relation; other minor issues.

    Question: “What do you think is the biggest failure of the government in the last 6 months?” 21%: don’t know or refused to answer; 15%: closure of Lachin Corridor; 9%: overturning the Artsakh issue; 8%: national security of Armenia and border issues; 7%: loss of territories; other minor issues.

    Question: “What are the things Pashinyan’s government must achieve in the next 6 months?” 23%: improvement of army conditions; 22%: protection of Armenia’s national security and borders; 16%: creation of jobs; 15%: establish peace; 13%: opening of Lachin Corridor; 13%: Pro-Armenian settlement of the Artsakh issue.

    Question: “To what extent is corruption a problem?” 73%: very large or somewhat large problem; 25%: somewhat small, very small or no problem.

    Question: “How do you evaluate the relationship between Armenia and…?” 96%: France (very good or somewhat good); 91%: Iran; 88%: United States; 86%: European Union; 84%: China; 80%: Georgia; 50%: Russia; 44%: Ukraine; 23%: Turkey; 4%: Azerbaijan. The relationship between Armenia and Russia has gone down from 87%-92% in 2018 to 50% good in 2023. The relationship between Armenia and Turkey has gone up from 1%-11% in 2018 to 23% good in 2023, while 75% of Armenia’s citizens (down from 85% in 2018) consider the relationship bad.

    A second poll was carried out in May 2023 by the Marketing Professional Group, affiliated with Gallup International. This is a scientific survey based on a random sample of Armenia’s population.

    Question: How do you evaluate Nikol Pashinyan’s recognition of Artsakh as a part of Azerbaijan? 3.8%: definitely positive; 5.4%: rather positive; 63.4%: not positive; 18.5%: rather not positive; 8.9%: no answer.

    Question: Do you think it is possible for Artsakh Armenians to exist as an ethnic minority in Azerbaijan? 2.8%: yes; 5.6%: rather yes; 77.7%: no; 8.7%: rather no; 5.1%: no answer.

    Question: “Which of these judgments do you agree with?” 32.8%: Pashinyan is trying to conduct a balanced policy with the West and Russia; 20.5%: Pashinyan is trying to integrate Armenia with Europe, the West and NATO circles; 14.7%: Pashinyan is aiming to bring Armenia closer to Azerbaijan and Turkey; 12.9%: Pashinyan’s actions are directed to push Russia out of Armenia; 19%: no answer.

    Question: “Given Armenia’s internal and external challenges, is it necessary to hold extraordinary parliamentary elections and form a new government?” 41%: definitely necessary; 18.9%: rather necessary; 12.2%: rather not necessary; 19.5%: not necessary; 8.5%: no answer.

    Question: “Turkey expressed its displeasure at the placement of the Nemesis statue in Yerevan and as a first step closed its airspace to Armenian flights. Do you think the Armenian government or city officials should give in to Turkish pressures and dismantle the memorial dedicated to the Nemesis heroes?” 82.5%: definitely no; 7.7%: rather no; 2.6%: definitely yes; 3.5%: rather yes; 3.5%: no answer.

    Question: “Did you participate in the 2018 revolution?” In the 2023 survey, 62.6%: no; 37.4%: yes. In the 2018 survey, 91%: yes; 9%: no.

    Question: “Is it right for protesters to block streets and movement of cars?” In the 2023 survey, 44.5%: yes; 50.8%: no. In the 2018 survey, 87.1%: yes; 8.7%: no.

    Question: “Five years have passed since the revolution: In the meantime, how well were your expectations realized?” In the 2023 survey, 3.8%: fully realized; 21.5%: partially realized; 18%: partially not realized; 52.1%: not realized. In the 2018 survey, 14.4 %: fully realized; 64.2%: partially realized; 7.6%: partially not realized; 10.9%: not realized.

    Question: “Evaluate Prime Minister Pashinyan’s performance.” In the 2023 survey, 5.4%: fully positive; 13.4%: rather positive; 24.2%: rather negative; 47.1%: negative; 10%: no answer. In the 2018 survey, 45.4%: positive; 46.2%: rather positive; 3.9%: rather negative; 2.4%: negative.

    We all have our personal opinions, but it is important to know what the citizens of Armenia think about these issues. There are major changes in their perceptions from 2018 to 2023.