Turkish Forum

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  • Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 186

    October 11, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s decision to host a NATO early warning radar in the US-led missile defense program continues to reverberate, especially for its relations with Iran. High ranking Iranian officials repeatedly criticize not only Turkey’s cooperation with the United States on the missile shield, but also Ankara’s recent foreign policy initiatives. These include the Turkish government’s efforts to set a model for the transformation of the regional countries in the wake of the Arab Spring, Ankara advocating a two-state solution for the Palestinian problem, or its increasingly assertive position on Syria.

    The decision on radar deployment apparently was a tipping point for Iranian officials, who now vocally criticize Turkey on a myriad of issues (EDM, September 20). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said during a live TV interview that Iranian officials told their Turkish counterparts it was wrong to grant such permission and it would not benefit Turkey , October 5). Major-General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the military advisor to the Iranian supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also maintained that Turkey had recently committed various strategic mistakes and would pay a heavy price if it failed to change course (Hurriyet, October 9). The Deputy Head of Iran’s Armed Forces’ Joint Chiefs of Staff Brigadier-General Massoud Jazayeri joined the wave of protest and urged Turkey to rethink its long-term strategic interests and side with Muslim nations instead of the West (www.presstv.ir, October 10).

    Iranian officials criticize Turkey on a range of issues of substantial importance. First, Iranian leaders increasingly label the missile shield as a project that is designed to boost Israel’s security against a counter-attack from Iran in case Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, considering that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly rebuff such claims, which were also raised by Turkish opposition parties, it appears that the Iranian campaign is driven by a concern to discredit Turkey in the eyes of regional countries.

    In order to contextualize Iran’s accusations against Turkey, it might be useful to recall Erdogan’s recent criticism of Israel’s nuclear program. As late as last week, Erdogan continued his recent criticism of Israel, going as far as arguing that he saw Israel as a threat to the region and surrounding countries, because it possessed the atomic bomb. Moreover, Erdogan raised a related criticism, when he pointed to the double standards of world powers: while Iran came under international scrutiny because of its nuclear program, there had been a lack of comparable debate on Israel’s nuclear weapons (Anadolu Ajansi, October 5). Iranian officials’ lambasting of Turkey through manipulative accounts, despite Erdogan’s staunch position on Israel at the expense of harming relations with the West, reveals their intent and approach toward Turkey.

    Iranian officials have recently expressed differences of opinion on the Palestine issue. Erdogan’s stance on Israel’s treatment of Palestinians has not necessarily contributed to forging common ground with Iran. Erdogan devoted a large portion of his address at the UN General Assembly last month to the rights of the Palestinians, supporting their bid for recognition. While Turkey has invested a great deal of political capital advocating a two-state solution in international venues, Khamenei, in a recent address at an international conference on the Palestinian Intifada, labeled this formula as tantamount to capitulation to the demands of “Zionists.” Rejecting the Palestinians’ bid for statehood at the UN, Khamenei argued that any solution based on the recognition of Israel’s right of existence would threaten the stability and security of the Middle East. Describing Iran as the greatest defender of the Palestinians, Khamenei criticized other regional powers that maintain close relations with Washington , October 1).

    Moreover, Turkish-Iranian divergence exists in an undeclared rivalry for regional leadership over the Arab Spring. For some time this rivalry was only evident in the realm of speculation by analysts. While Iran has been working to put its imprint on the regional transformation, by labeling the popular uprisings as an “Islamic awakening,” Turkish government sources or analysts close to the government have highlighted how Turkey’s democratic and capitalist model inspired the Arab revolutions. Perhaps in the first ever direct affirmation of this rivalry, Rahim-Safavi criticized Erdogan’s recent visit to the region. In Cairo, Erdogan stressed a secular-democratic form of government, which seems to have angered the Iranian leadership, sparking their more direct confrontation with Turkey.

    A related area of tension is over competing positions on the Syrian uprising. Faced with the continuation of the Baath regime’s violent campaign to suppress the popular uprising, Turkey has progressively downgraded its ties with Damascus, as well as providing shelter to the Syrian opposition. Turkey’s imposition of sanctions might also negatively affect Damascus’s direct ties to Tehran. Iran, viewing the maintenance of the current regime in Syria as vital to its penetration to Lebanon and Palestine, has grown anxious over Turkey’s policy on Syria, again reflected in Rahim-Safavi’s reactions.

    Some common themes are emerging in Iranian views on Turkey. First, there is a continuous and sustained reaction to Turkey, and it is worth noting that the mounting criticism of the country came from the religious leadership and the Revolutionary Guards. Second, Iranian officials work hard to present Ankara’s recent foreign policy initiatives as simply following the dictates of the US, in order to sustain their oft-repeated argument that they are the only genuine independent power in the region.

    Finally, there is a deliberate attempt to discipline Turkey by sending harsh messages as to how the country should behave. It is unclear whether this rhetoric reflects self-confidence on the part of the Iranian leadership or anxiety over Turkey taking an anti-Iranian position and siding with the US, which might lead to Iran’s isolation in the region. The Iranian side appears ready to exploit economic ties if necessary, in an effort to discipline Turkey. They daringly refer to Turkey’s gas purchase contracts with Iran as well as Ankara’s plans to boost the bilateral trade volume to $20 billion, going as far as sending veiled threats that Ankara might suffer if it fails to reverse its current position and accommodate Iranian concerns.

    https://jamestown.org/program/arab-spring-sees-turkish-iranian-rivalry-take-a-new-turn/

     

  • A Tight Wide-open Space: Finding love in a Muslim land

    A Tight Wide-open Space: Finding love in a Muslim land

    wide open spaceIn 2003, when the shockwaves of 9/11 still echoed through the US and the country was fighting two wars in Muslim countries, Matt met a beautiful woman on an airplane and decided to follow her to Turkey. This is the story of what happened there.

    BUY THE BOOK: Paperback

    Book trailer from Matt Krause on Vimeo.

  • Dr. Charny Deserves Much Credit Should Israel Recognize the Armenian Genocide

    Dr. Charny Deserves Much Credit Should Israel Recognize the Armenian Genocide

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    Armenians have good reason to be offended by the Israeli government’s failure to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide. It is unconscionable that some victims of the Holocaust can be so insensitive about those who have suffered a similar fate. Israel’s callous denial has been motivated by its unethical desire to appease Turkey — its “strategic ally.”

     

    Dr. Israel Charny, like so many Israeli citizens, vehemently opposes his government’s shameful stand on the Armenian Genocide. He is the longtime Director of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem and former president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. On numerous occasions, Dr. Charny has taken a strong stand against Israeli officials, rebuking them for their deplorable position on the Armenian Genocide.

     

    Earlier this year, the President of Armenia awarded Dr. Charny a Presidential medal and a $10,000 prize for his lifelong efforts to champion recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

     

    Since Dr. Charny did not have the opportunity to make a speech during the award ceremony in Yerevan, I wish to present key excerpts from his prepared remarks:

     

    “Denials of genocide are very unfair, unjust and ugly. They are also extremely dangerous not only to the victim people, but to our human civilization. Denials of genocide are disgusting attempts to humiliate the victim people once more, and hurtful reopening of wounds of stigmatizing and persecuting the victim people once again.

     

    “Moreover, denials of genocide are also loud and clear affirmations of the legitimacy of violence; they are retroactive justifications of the specific violent killing that was done in the genocide; and they are warnings and calls for renewal of violence — whether towards the same victim people or to other peoples. In fact, it has become clear that denials of genocide often are messages from the deniers that they are already engaged in or preparing to be violent once again.

     

    “It is not at all by chance that [Turkish Prime Minister] Erdogan in the last year twice has threatened to expel 100,000 Armenians from Turkey; and it is not at all by chance that Erdogan’s Turkey — a regime that is bizarrely devoted to denials of the Armenian Genocide — continues to be violent towards the Kurdish people who have suffered thousands of destroyed villages, tens of thousands of dead, and who are frequently not allowed by the Turkish government to use their language or celebrate their culture.

     

    “Israel has been attempting to have a good relationship with Turkey very much at the expense of the truth of the Armenian Genocide. I am convinced this policy has been deeply wrong. Of course, I do not believe that nations — especially small ones — can afford not to evaluate political realities and security risks, but I think that in the long run there must be limits to the extent of realpolitik and that denials of the history of a genocide are beyond the limit that should be acceptable.

     

    “I cannot take leave without a further reference to the State of Israel’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Israel has been entirely wrong in not recognizing the Armenian Genocide. At the same time, thank heaven I have been able to say now for many years that we have won the battle for recognition of the Armenian Genocide in Israeli culture, our media, and in our public. When a few years ago a delegation of four of us — Prof. Yair Auron, Prof. Yehuda Bauer, Former Minister Yossi Sarid, and myself — came to lay wreaths at the Armenian Genocide Memorial [in Yerevan], we indeed represented our larger Israeli society.

     

    “At this very writing we have been informed that the Knesset will hold a major hearing on recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The overall Knesset has already voted — now for the third time in Israeli history — to hold hearings on possible recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Each of these votes has represented some progress towards our goal. In the Israeli system a proposal then has to be reviewed and decided by a major committee of the Knesset. Politics are not simple, as you know, and our opponents have succeeded in the past in defeating the recognition at this level.

     

    “This time the proposal will go to the Committee on Education where, unlike proceedings in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security where a proposal even can be buried without any discussion at all and no one knows what happened, discussion and voting in the Education Committee will be publicly known to us. My closest colleagues and I have not been too hopeful of success, but now there is more possibility of success than we previously estimated. In truth, the possibility of recognition is greater now that Turkey has shown its vicious side to Israel, and there are many of us who will be ashamed if we now achieve recognition for this reason rather than on the basis of a real correction of Israel’s error all these years.”

     

    As Israeli journalist Raphael Ahren accurately pointed out in a recent Haaretz article: “If Israel recognizes the Turkish genocide of over 1 million Armenians in the near future, it may be largely due to the decades long efforts of American-born scholar Israel Charny.”
  • Turkey Pursues Mixed Aims Over Supply Contract Cancellation With Russia

    Turkey Pursues Mixed Aims Over Supply Contract Cancellation With Russia

    Turkey Pursues Mixed Aims Over Supply Contract Cancellation With Russia

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 182
    October 4, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    After the failure of Turkey’s apparently last-ditch effort to renegotiate the price for Russian gas, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced Turkey would not renew the supply contract through the “Western pipeline,” scheduled to expire at the end of the year. The contract was originally signed in 1986, which was a major turning point for Turkish-Russian relations, as Turkey went ahead with this deal in Cold War conditions. Since then, Turkey’s energy ties with Russia have flourished, in parallel with the overall improvement of bilateral relations.

    Under the contract, Turkey imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas through the Balkans, which is distributed in Istanbul and the surrounding areas. Turkey also has other supply agreements with Gazprom through the same pipeline and the Blue Stream pipeline, and additional supply agreements with Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as importing LNG from Algeria and Nigeria. Granted, Turkey’s imports from Russia account for almost two-thirds of its total gas consumption.

    In addition to its concerns over the strategic liability generated by this overdependence, Turkey has raised several demands vis-à-vis Gazprom for some time. Ankara has confronted the problem of over-contracting, which emerged as a major issue following the contraction of its energy consumption in the wake of the global financial crisis. As Turkey had to incur penalties resulting from take-or-pay provisions, it has been demanding an easing of the supply terms. Moreover, given the calculation indexes linking gas and oil prices, Turkey, along with other importers, has been complaining about the hike in its energy bills. Again, Turkey’s demand for price revision has largely fallen on deaf ears, which became an issue during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s trip to Moscow earlier this year. His Russian counterparts only deferred the issue for further discussion (EDM, March 18).

    The parties were expected to notify their decision for the cancellation of the 1986 agreement six months prior to the expiration date, or it would be renewed automatically. Gazprom responded positively to Ankara’s request for the postponement of the date for notification to the end of September. Gazprom’s concession to Italy’s ENI in a similar plea partly encouraged BOTAS to expect a similar outcome (Sabah, July 25). Yet, Gazprom, instead, raised the price in its quarterly revision (Radikal, August 10).

    While an agreement was not forthcoming in the lingering talks and the deadline was approaching, Yildiz threatened not to renew the contract, citing a 39 percent increase in prices over the last 29 months. In a swift reaction, Gazprom officials downplayed the minister’s remarks, arguing that they received no confirmation to that effect from BOTAS, which was their partner in Turkey (Hurriyet, September 29; EDM, September 30). However, Gazprom officials apparently undervalued some nuances: after all BOTAS was a public corporation and the Turkish government was very sensitive to energy issues, not to mention the fact that Turkey’s concerns were long on the agenda.

    With the Russian side’s failure to meet the expectation for discounts, Yildiz announced that BOTAS conveyed to its partners the decision to end the contract (Anadolu Ajansi, October 1). While the decision seems to halt about 15 percent of Turkey’s supplies, Yildiz sought to allay concern that it might lead to gas shortages, citing the ongoing supply contracts with Russia and other countries, as well as the import contracts signed by the private sector. Alexander Medvedev, the Director-General of Gazprom Export, also confirmed this development, noting that Gazprom will continue to supply the same volume to Turkish end-users through existing and new customers, including those from the private sector (www.cnnturk.com, October 3).

    This development was possibly sparked by various interrelated considerations, which is hidden in Yildiz’s remarks. First, there seems to be strategic reasoning. Through this move, Turkey wants to send a signal that it is determined to break its over-reliance on natural gas (especially for electricity generation) on the one hand and Russian gas on the other. It is instructive that Yildiz explained in detail how Russia was unresponsive to Turkey’s demands for price revision for a long time, and added that with this move Turkey demonstrated that it was not devoid of options for supply diversification. Granted, for Turkey, Gazprom has been a reliable supplier and will likely remain a major supplier in the years to come. Given that Yildiz also acknowledged that point and added that the private sector would likely sign new contracts with Russia, it seems that this move largely seeks to enhance Turkey’s bargaining position in the future.

    A second and related point suggests that this development is driven by Turkey’s ongoing project of liberalizing its energy markets. In particular, the Turkish government has been criticized for its slow pace in decoupling BOTAS’s transportation grid and its monopoly on imports. Private companies have already secured supply contracts in some instances, and it was reported that Gazprom did not concede to the transfer of contracts to private importers. With this decision, the government hopes private companies will take over the contracts with Gazprom, hopefully on more favorable terms, while simultaneously reducing BOTAS’s market share, which is also a requirement the EU has put before Turkey. It remains to be seen, however, if this move will enhance Turkey’s bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Russia and other suppliers. There is reason to doubt whether private companies bidding for smaller volumes of gas will be able to gain a better bargaining power than what BOTAS has accomplished so far vis-à-vis Gazprom.

    Third, the decision seeks to contain BOTAS’s losses, which has been selling gas to domestic consumers below its actual costs. On the same day that Yildiz announced the termination of the contract, BOTAS issued new prices for residential and industrial consumers, which implied price hikes of over 10 percent. While BOTAS cited the declining value of the Turkish Lira and increases in gas prices in international markets, this major price adjustment came as a shock to consumers. Instead of paying for unused gas, BOTAS had kept the prices constant in order not to curb consumption. The latest price hike, accompanied by efforts to reduce BOTAS’s market share and its take-or-pay obligations, seeks to improve the company’s financial standing, which has been running huge losses due to such practices in gas sales. But Turkish consumers – who became accustomed to this indirect subsidy – are unlikely to welcome the development.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-pursues-mixed-aims-over-supply-contract-cancellation-with-russia/
  • Turkey Threatens Greek Cypriots Against Unilateral Oil and Gas Exploration In the Eastern Mediteranean

    Turkey Threatens Greek Cypriots Against Unilateral Oil and Gas Exploration In the Eastern Mediteranean

    Turkey Threatens Greek Cypriots Against Unilateral Oil and Gas Exploration In the Eastern Mediteranean

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 177
    September 27, 2011 01:53 PM Age: 1 days
    By: Saban Kardas
    Amidst growing concerns about the escalation of Turkish-Israeli tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara’s decision to undertake seismic exploration for oil and gas – in retaliation for the Greek Cypriot administration’s ongoing exploration activities – further raised tensions in the region. Recently, the Greek Cypriots issued a license to a US firm, Noble Energy, to launch exploratory offshore drilling for gas off Cyprus. Turkey condemned immediately this development, viewing it as an attempt to undermine the rights of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, since the resumption of reunification talks on the island has recently reappeared on the agenda, Turkey believes this move will be potentially damaging to further diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot side should avoid such unilateral provocative actions, and delay discussing drilling projects until after a political solution to the existing division is found (Hurriyet, September 13).

    Later, Ankara went as far as issuing warnings that it would undertake its own exploration work and boost its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, should the Greek Cypriots proceed with their plans. Energy Minister Taner Yildiz also added that the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), in cooperation with a Norwegian firm, was preparing to carry out seismic surveys off Northern Cyprus. To this end, Turkey started talks with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to conclude a continental shelf delineation accord to determine the areas for exploration (Anadolu Ajansi, September 19).

    Despite Ankara’s threats of retaliation, the first phase of Noble’s drilling activities started on September 18. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted harshly to this development, adding that Turkey would dispatch naval and air force assets to the area. While in New York to attend the UN General Assembly, Erdogan raised the issue during his talks with President Barack Obama. More significantly, he signed the continental shelf agreement with the leader of the TRNC, Dervis Eroglu. Erdogan argued “to caution international oil/natural gas companies that have and will undertake business with Greek Cypriots. Our Ministry of Energy is working to ban admission of these companies from energy projects in Turkey and impose a series of sanctions upon them” , September 21). The Greek Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias described Turkey’s actions as provocations and sought to highlight the issue during his address at the UN General Assembly (Hurriyet, September 23).

    In a demonstration of determination, a Turkish ship set off for seismic exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean sea, escorted by frigates and submarines (www.haberturk.com, September 23). As the issue was internationalized and risked militarization, especially coinciding with the UN General Assembly, efforts were made to cool down the tensions. While the Greek side seemed disinterested in Erdogan’s proposal for the simultaneous renouncement of the exploration work, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also intervened to resolve the dispute. As a more concrete proposal, Eroglu presented to Ban Ki-moon another plan which would involve mutual suspension of such exploration (Anadolu Ajansi, September 25). While Ankara expressed support for this proposal, the Greek Cypriot side has yet to accept it.

    A promising step toward achieving a diplomatic solution was the telephone conversation between Erdogan and his Greek counterpart Yorgo Papendreu. While discussing the agenda for the next high level strategic cooperation council, the two leaders expressed their desire to address bilateral tensions (Anadolu Ajansi, September 26). However, in the absence of any concrete steps by the Greek Cypriots to halting their exploration plans, Yildiz said that the Turkish seismic exploration ship will start its operations today (September 27). Yildiz also added that the TPAO was in touch with the firms interested in carrying out drills in partnership with Turkey (Cihan, September 27).

    Exploration of the underwater energy resources around Cyprus has been a matter of controversy for some time, as it has been intermingled with the unresolved Cyprus issue and, by implication, Turkey-EU relations. The EU admitted into membership the government on the Greek part of the island as the sole representative of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004, but Turkey has protested against this decision because it ignored the rights of Turkish Cypriots who established the TRNC as a separate state. Turkey remains the only country to recognize the TRNC, though the Turkish government has supported talks for the reunification of the two communities on the island. However, at least since the collapse of the Annan plan in 2004, which was backed by Turkey, there is a line of thought in Turkish politics that views a two state-formula as the most viable solution for the Cyprus dispute. If the current tensions continue to escalate, with each side carrying out unilateral drilling projects, this development might de facto pave the way for a two-state solution. Whether the Turkish government has moved in the direction of adopting such a position remains to be seen.

    At the same time, Ankara’s refusal to recognize the Greek Cypriot administration’s claim for full sovereignty over the island poses a major obstacle to the Turkish bid for EU membership, further complicating the issue. Turkey has sought to delay the exploration of energy resources by linking it to the resolution of the dispute, which has angered the Greek Cypriot side. For instance, in protest over what it viewed as Turkey’s veiled threats against exploring their energy resources in the Mediterranean, the Greek Cypriot administration has been vetoing the opening of the Turkish-EU accession talks in energy and other chapters. As Turkey reacts to such policies, Turkish-EU relations have already become deadlocked.

    Only recently, Erdogan threatened to freeze Turkey’s relations with the EU, if the Greek Cypriot government is allowed to assume the EU presidency in 2012 before a political settlement is found on the future of the island (Anadolu Ajansi, July 20). Such statements by Turkish leaders continue to present obstacles to Turkey’s EU accession process, which is already stalled due to numerous issues. However, Ankara’s brinkmanship over the drilling issue shows that it is increasingly unconcerned with the EU’s negative reactions, perhaps indicating the degree to which Turkey is keen to pursue unilateral policies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-threatens-greek-cypriots-against-unilateral-oil-and-gas-exploration-in-the-eastern-mediteranean/
  • Reflections of Israeli Crisis in Caucasus

    Reflections of Israeli Crisis in Caucasus

    israel armeniaThe recent tension between Turkey and Israel has over the last year affected the fronts of alliances in the region, leading to pursuits for new forms of alliances subsequent to the current crisis. (more…)