Turkish Forum

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  • Azerbaijan Wins Security Council Seat, While Armenians Remain Idle

    Azerbaijan Wins Security Council Seat, While Armenians Remain Idle

     sassounian3
    Pres. Aliyev was celebrating last week his country’s historic victory at the United Nations. With an overwhelming number of votes, Azerbaijan was elected for the first time to the prestigious UN Security Council for a two-year term.
    This column shall address three questions: 1) how did Azerbaijan manage to get elected to such an elite body? 2) what will Azerbaijan accomplish with its newly-acquired seat? 3) what actions did Armenians take to counter Azerbaijan’s candidacy?
    Azerbaijan, Hungary and Slovenia were competing for a non-permanent seat reserved for the Eastern European region in the Security Council. Normally, Azerbaijan would have no chance of getting elected to such a distinguished body, since it is the least qualified of the three countries in fulfilling the requirements of the UN Charter, due to its failure to contribute to international peace and security, and lack of participation in the work of UN agencies.
    According to knowledgeable sources, Azerbaijan made up for its deficiencies by offering tour packages and monetary incentives to UN delegates, and economic inducements to financially strapped nations in return for their votes at the UN General Assembly which elects the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council. By hook or by crook, Azerbaijan acquired the support of Islamic countries, the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and CIS (former Soviet) countries, including Russia. Yet, despite these unusual lobbying tactics, it took Azerbaijan 17 rounds over a two-day period to garner the necessary votes, and only after Slovenia, its main rival, withdrew in protest from the race. Slovenia’s Foreign Minister Samuel Zbogar complained that his country “did not approve the way this campaign was held.” Although he did not elaborate, he was referring to Azerbaijan’s lavish gift-giving spree.
    Naturally, gaining a seat on the powerful UN Security Council accords Azerbaijan international prestige and a new venue to pursue its incessant Armenophobic campaigns. Nevertheless, there is little chance that Azeri officials will be able to succeed in their announced objective of placing the Karabagh (Artsakh) conflict on the Council’s agenda. The Minsk Group co-Chairs — France, Russia and the United States — as three of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, have made it amply clear that this matter will be handled by the Minsk Group, outside the UN framework. Hence, Azerbaijan’s leaders risk disillusioning their people, having reassured them that the Security Council will take up the Karabagh issue. Azerbaijan could also get entangled in precarious situations, being forced to take sides when voting on confrontational issues involving Iran, Israel, and Syria, among others.
    While the Aliyev regime was turning the world upside down to come up with votes for its Security Council bid, what were Armenians doing to counter Azerbaijan’s efforts?
    Opponents at home criticized the Armenian government for not declaring Armenia’s candidacy for the Security Council, arguing that this would have taken away votes from Azerbaijan. Such a strategy, however, may not have been in Yerevan’s best interest, because Armenia could not compete with Baku’s vote-buying spree, and would have drawn votes away from Slovenia, assuring a bigger victory margin for Azerbaijan.
    In an earlier column, I had suggested that Armenian organizations and prominent individuals in the Diaspora, in consultation with Armenia’s Foreign Ministry, launch a global campaign to counter Azerbaijan’s candidacy. I had urged Armenians around the world to ask their respective governments not to support Azerbaijan’s Security Council bid.
    Regrettably, neither the Armenian Foreign Ministry nor the Diaspora leadership initiated such a coordinated effort. Two months ago, when delegates from 50 countries gathered at a Pan-Armenian Conference in Yerevan, Foreign Ministry officials should have taken the opportunity to strategize with activists and heads of organizations on how to counter Azerbaijan’s candidacy. Ironically, one of the topics on the conference agenda was “mechanisms for the development of Armenia-Diaspora partnership.” Such discussions are only useful if they are followed up by concrete actions.
    Fortunately, a mechanism for global Armenian coordination is in the works for the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. For this purpose, a preliminary meeting was held in Yerevan several months ago. Turkey has already announced its UN Security Council candidacy for 2015, at a time when Armenians will be commemorating the centennial of the Genocide. The question is: Will Armenians be better prepared to counter Turkey’s candidacy in four years than they were Azerbaijan’s this year?

  • France’s scramble to grab a role for itself in Armenia

    France’s scramble to grab a role for itself in Armenia

     

    sarkozy sargsyanAn early October visit paid to the Armenian capital Yerevan by French President Nicolas Sarkozy has triggered not only a new predicament in terms of Turkey’s relations with Armenia, but also marked an important turning point regarding France’s regional influence. (more…)

  • Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    by Şaban Kardaş*

    The deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and Israel has become a conspicuous element not only of Turkey’s foreign policy but also the overall course of recent affairs in the Middle East, raising questions about the future of the region’s security.
    The most immediate issue of contention in the relationship is Turkey’s demand that Israel apologize and compensate appropriately for the killing of eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American by Israeli commandos aboard the Mavi Marmara humanitarian aid ship in May 2010. The ship was part of a flotilla which was trying to break Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip and raise awareness of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the blockade. A proper explanation of the causes of the current stalemate, however, requires going beyond this singular event and undertaking a more nuanced analysis into the underlying dynamics shaping Turkish-Israeli relations in recent years, which also paved the way for the Mavi Marmara raid and the subsequent rapid deterioration of bilateral ties.

    The Mavi Marmara incident and the ensuing crisis grew out of a complex background characterized by the Turkish government’s constant criticism, increasing in recent years, of Israel’s Palestinian policies, which especially gained momentum after Israel’s brutal offensive into the Gaza Strip in the winter of 2008-2009. Other events in the intervening period, including the Davos incident and “low chair” crisis, only accelerated the tensions. Efforts to find a solution through mediation or secretly discussing the ways in which Israel could issue an apology to Turkey failed.

    Given the high-level domestic stakes involved, both parties refrained from backing down and instead opted to continue their confrontational approach. Apparently, given their lack of urgency about reaching a compromise, they must also have calculated strategically that they could tolerate the costs of a breakdown in the relationship.

    Looking at the Palmer report

    Complicating matters further, the conclusions reached in the Palmer report, commissioned by the UN secretary-general to bridge the parties’ competing claims, have to the contrary risked deepening the divisions. The report’s controversial findings not only undermined Turkey’s efforts to internationalize the issue but also argued dubiously for the legality of the naval blockade of Gaza. In response, Turkey announced a series of punitive measures, intended to hold Israel accountable for the Mavi Marmara incident and challenge the legality of the blockade. Turkey’s statement that it would deploy its navy to ensure safe passage in the eastern Mediterranean was arguably the most contentious measure, as it could potentially escalate into a direct military confrontation.

    To understand Turkey’s perspective in the sequence of events culminating in the current standoff, one must look at a number of interrelated factors pertaining to the transformations of the strategic outlook of the Turkish foreign policy elite towards the new Middle East, and Israel’s role and place in it.

    First, Turkey has been working to redefine its priorities in response to what it perceived as a shift in the regional balance of power to its advantage. Second, Turkey viewed the declining influence and power of the United States, as well as President Barack Obama’s promise of a new American foreign policy in the Middle East, as an opportunity for regional powers to assert their influence. Third, and related to these points, Turkey has operated on the assumption that it has not only more space in which to maneuver but also a greater ability to develop autonomous policies in the region. Fourth, Turkey’s perception of threats from the Middle East has declined, reflected in the famous “zero problems with neighbors” policy, as Turkey pursued economic and political rapprochement with countries in the region.

    All these interrelated factors have coalesced in ways which have fostered a perception on the part of Turkish decision makers that a new Middle East is being built, one that is based on justice, equality and freedom, whereas Israel, with its power-based policies, remains stuck in a mentality representing the old Middle East. Turkish leaders saw themselves tasked with a project to build a peaceful and stable regional order based on principles of cooperative security, economic interdependence and universal moral standards. In this environment, the state of exception that Israel represented in the region, as reflected in Israel’s unjust policy toward the Palestinians, its defiance of UN decisions, its noncompliance with the non-proliferation regime and its protection by the US, was construed as an obstacle to Turkey’s regional aspirations. Unable to adapt to the new reality, Israel, in the Turkish perception, has increasingly isolated itself in the region and emerged as the source of regional instability.

    Believing that Israel can no longer afford to act in a business-as-usual fashion in the new Middle East, Turkey has moved to adopt moral politics, seeking to correct Israel’s policies. Consequently, the shared ground and joint strategic outlooks that enabled the Turkish-Israeli partnership of the 1990s has been replaced by a rather confrontational and competitive dynamic, which provide the background for the recent successive crises, especially since 2008. Through its moral politics, Turkey hoped that it could publicize Israel’s inhumane treatment of the Palestinians in various international forums, make it accountable before the international community, and eventually force it to recognize the Palestinians’ rights. Turkey somehow hoped the new foreign policy vision promised by the Obama administration would facilitate its pursuit of a moral politics with regard to Israel.

    Unwilling to yield to Turkey’s new posture, however, Israel refused to back down. At the same time, the complex dynamics of Israeli domestic politics limited the prospects for a negotiated settlement with Turkey, including some form of an apology and compensation to the victims of the Mavi Marmara raid. In this environment, Turkey’s insistence on linking the Mavi Marmara dispute with its demand that the Gaza blockade be lifted further pitted the two countries against each other, as the Israeli side was apparently unconvinced that the closure of the Mavi Marmara incident alone would settle the dispute. Last but not least, though the United States has not come out against Turkey’s increasingly assertive stance against Israel, it has not joined Turkey’s bandwagon either, rendering Turkey’s moral politics largely ineffective. The declining influence of the US has in effect meant that there is no actor capable of mediating between the parties. Turkey’s constructive role in the recent Hamas-Israel prison swap deal and its implementation raised expectations that the Turkish-Israeli tension might ease, as well. After all the events that have transpired, however, there will be no easy going back, and it will be hard to salvage the relationship without a significant transformation in the strategic outlooks of both sides. Turkey expects Israel to change drastically, which is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

    *Şaban Kardaş is an assistant professor of international relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara.

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  • Istanbul’s Harem-Gebze Minibus

    Istanbul’s Harem-Gebze Minibus

    One of my favorite activities in Istanbul is mentioned in very few guidebooks: riding the Harem-Gebze minibus.

    HAREMGEBZEMINI

    The Harem-Gebze is a semi-public bus seating about 15 people. I don’t know how many passengers fit in the bus if you include those standing, but during rush hour, drivers seem to always believe there is room for one more.

    The buses ply the D-100 highway, a busy road running about a mile inland from the Marmara Sea. One of the Harem-Gebze line’s terminals is in Harem, a major transportation hub on Istanbul’s Asian side, the other in Gebze, an industrial suburb east of the city.

    Much of the Harem-Gebze line is now served by a new commuter train, so the minibus activity is certain to dwindle in the years to come. However, the drivers stop wherever the passengers ask them to, so the minibuses can serve local traffic in a way a train never can.

    When I tell visitors this bus line is one of my favorite sights in all of Istanbul, residents look at me like I must be joking. Why on earth, they ask, would I recommend a tourist take a bumpy, uncomfortable, erratic, potentially dangerous bus ride through a particularly ugly, crowded, stinking part of the city?

    I recommend it because after three days of touring the Aya Sofya, the Blue Mosque, the Grand Bazaar, and maybe Istiklal and Ortakoy, visitors have seen Istanbul as it was, and maybe Istanbul as it likes to relax, but they haven’t seen Istanbul as it is.

    In just half a day’s time, the Harem-Gebze minibus will take them past the tall Unilever building standing between the neighborhoods of Icerenkoy and Bostanci, a reminder that one of the world’s largest consumer goods companies uses Istanbul as a center from which to conduct business throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

    After Bostanci, the bus passes an infantry training center located right in the middle of the city. The training center is little-used these days, leapfrogged by newer, larger bases further from the city, but it serves as a visible symbol of the military’s prominent, but decaying, role in Turkish political life.

    The bus also passes the squat, utilitarian headquarters of Efes Pilsen, a beer manufacturer supplying 85% of the beer consumed in Turkey. From its unassuming offices just off the highway, the company runs an empire that reaches into Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The company even owns breweries in Russia.

    Just across the highway from Efes Pilsen is a large satellite office for Turkcell, Turkey’s biggest provider of cell phone and wireless communication services.

    From this building the company runs many of its business operations, including almost all of its call center activity and some of its financial planning. Like Efes Pilsen, Turkcell is a major player not only in Turkey but throughout the region, and like Microsoft has in Seattle, Turkcell in Istanbul has spawned startups that bring the company’s technological and marketing prowess to markets throughout Asia, Europe, and northern Africa.

    As the bus draws closer to Gebze, it passes the shipyards of Tuzla and the automobile factories of Hyundai/Assan. They are certainly not as huge or as world-renowned as the shipyards and car factories of Korea or Japan, but they are a reminder nonetheless that Turkey maintains significant heavy manufacturing capacity and supplies ships, cars, and trucks to the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean.

    When the bus makes its last stop in Gebze, there is little to do except have lunch and hop the same bus for the ride back to Istanbul. Gebze, like almost all of the sights passengers can see from the minibus, does not exist for visitors; it exists for residents, the people who work in the breweries and the call centers and the car factories.

    In less than one day, tourists will have seen not the Istanbul of museums, mosques, and retail shops but the Istanbul that distributes consumer goods to a billion of the world’s people, the Istanbul that makes ships and cars for Europe, and the Istanbul that helps farmers in Kazakhstan communicate with markets in Poland. They will see Istanbul at work, and that is why this bumpy, smelly, crowded minibus ride tops my list of things to do when you visit the city.

    Matt’s new book, “A Tight Wide-Open Space: Finding Love in a Muslim Land” is now available in Paperback and on Amazon Kindle. You can purchase it at his website, . Watch the trailer for the book below.

    Book trailer from Matt Krause on Vimeo.

    via Istanbul’s Harem-Gebze Minibus | JetSettlers Magazine.

    Source :

  • 96 Years Later, Turkey Still Pays A Price for Genocide Denial

    96 Years Later, Turkey Still Pays A Price for Genocide Denial

     sassounian33
    Almost a century after the fact, the Republic of Turkey continues to be disgraced for its persistent denial of the Armenian Genocide.
    During his visit to Armenia earlier this month, French President Nicolas Sarkozy condemned Turkey by declaring that 96 years is long enough for Ankara to come to terms with its genocidal crimes. He also threatened to pass a law punishing denial of the Armenian Genocide, unless Turkey recognized it in the near future.
    Rather than heeding Pres. Sarkozy’s sound advice, Turkish leaders retaliated by attacking him and insulting his country. Here are some of their rejectionist statements:
    — Prime Minister Erdogan: “He should first listen to his own advice. He is different in France, different in Armenia, and more different in Turkey. There cannot be a political leader with so many faces. Politics requires honesty…. You should know that Turkey is not an easy bite to swallow.”
    — Foreign Minister Davutoglu: “France should confront its own history. I consider such remarks as political opportunism.”
    — Turkey’s European Union Minister Egemen Bagis: “If Sarkozy worked on how his country could come out of economic turbulence instead of assuming the role of a historian, it would be more meaningful for France and Europe.”
    — Devlet Bahceli, leader of the opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP): The French President is a “rude and ill-mannered” man. “Our advice to Sarkozy is that if he wants to see an example of genocide, he should look back at his history. He will clearly see the atrocities committed in Algeria and will notice explicit or implicit massacres in North Africa.”
    The Turkish attacks on France included demonstrations in front of the French Consulate in Istanbul last week, where protesters carried portraits of Pres. Sarkozy with Adolph Hitler’s mustache and denounced alleged crimes committed by France in the Algerian war.
    Uncharacteristically, Turkish officials did not go beyond mere words to denounce Pres. Sarkozy’s statements on the Armenian Genocide. Missing were the customary recall of the Turkish Ambassador and threats to boycott French goods. There was no bite in their bark!
    The French President was unfazed by the Turkish outbursts. Upon returning to Paris, he sent a letter to Pres. Serzh Sargsyan reconfirming his earlier statements in Armenia: “Rest assured that France will not cease its commitment, as long as the massacres have not been properly recognized by the descendents of the perpetrators.” Pres. Sarkozy went on to state that he was “most of all deeply moved at the Genocide Memorial Monument while paying tribute to the memory of the victims of the death sentence carried out against your people on April 24, 1915.” When the French President learned of the angry Turkish reaction to his statements in Yerevan, he told his aides that he had no regrets: “The Turks have always hated me, so it’s no problem.”
    Some French Parliamentarians were incensed, however, upon hearing that Prime Minister Erdogan had accused Pres. Sarkozy of being two-faced. They greeted the Turkish leader’s insulting words with loud and derisive exclamations in the French Parliament.
    Former Ambassador Omer Engin Lutem expressed his concern that if France were to ban denial of the Armenian Genocide, it would trigger other European countries to follow suit. He cautioned the Turkish public that such a development on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide would constitute a significant victory for Armenians.
    Murat Belge, an outspoken Turkish human rights activist, took issue with the negative reaction of his country’s leaders. He boldly condemned all those who claimed that “Turks are good people; we do not kill or commit genocide.” Such statements are “slanderous,” Belge stated.
    Another prominent scholar and columnist, Ahmet Insel, rebuked Prime Minister Erdogan for telling Pres. Sarkozy to look at France’s own colonial past. Insel wondered if Erdogan would indeed recognize the Armenian Genocide if France faced its own history? And what would Turkey do if the same suggestion came from a country that did not have dark pages in its history? Insel observed that this is the same Prime Minister who was claiming that all Ottoman archives are open, as his government was blocking the posting of these documents on the Internet.
    As an Iranian diplomat recently noted: “The Armenian Genocide is a Damoclean Sword hanging over Turkey’s head.” Sooner or later, a wise Turkish leader would come to realize that acknowledging the Armenian Genocide is more beneficial to Turkey than its continued denial.

     

  • Pres. Sarkozy Says ‘Tseghasbanoutyoun’ A Word Obama has yet to Utter

    Pres. Sarkozy Says ‘Tseghasbanoutyoun’ A Word Obama has yet to Utter

     sassounian32
    Flying to Armenia, French President Nicolas Sarkozy confided to his top aides last week: “I am going to toss a live grenade!” He was revealing his readiness to act firmly if Turkey continued to deny the Armenian Genocide.
    Shortly after arriving in Yerevan, Pres. Sarkozy courageously declared before journalists assembled at the Armenian Genocide Monument: “The Armenian Genocide is a historic reality that was recognized by France. Collective denial is even worse than individual denial.” When asked if France would adopt a law to prosecute those who deny the Genocide, the French President stated: “If Turkey revisited its history, faced its bright and dark sides, this recognition of the Genocide would be sufficient. But if Turkey will not do that, then without a doubt it would be necessary to go further.”
    As presidential candidate in 2007, Sarkozy promised to support the Senate’s adoption of a law criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. The French Parliament had already approved such a bill in 2006. Yet, despite his pledge, Pres. Sarkozy’s ruling party blocked the bill’s adoption last May. While the French government banned denial of the Holocaust in 1990, it did take a similar action on the Armenian Genocide, even though France had recognized it in 2001.
    French-Armenians were incensed by Sarkozy’s betrayal. Singer Charles Aznavour publicly warned him that he would lose the support of 500,000 French-Armenians in next year’s presidential elections. Last month, the ARF of France endorsed the probable presidential candidacy of Socialist Francois Hollande after he promised that his party, which had recently gained majority of seats in the Senate, would vote for the bill banning denial of the Armenian Genocide. Hollande is currently far ahead of Sarkozy in opinion polls.
    During his visit to Armenia last week, Pres. Sarkozy conveyed several important messages: He reassured Armenians of his intent to keep his initial pledge on the Genocide denial bill; warned Turkey to stop denying the Armenian Genocide; and indicated his clear sympathy for the Armenian position on Artsakh (Nagorno Karabagh).
    The French President’s trip to the three Republics of the Caucasus was clearly lopsided in favor of Armenia — where he stayed overnight, while spending only three hours in Azerbaijan and Georgia. His brief stops in these two countries were simply an attempt to display a semblance of impartiality. Sarkozy’s first ever visit to Armenia was filled with festive events and dramatic gestures of friendship — planting a tree in memory of Armenian Genocide victims; laying a wreath at the Genocide Memorial, where he wrote in the Book of Remembrance — “France does not forget;” warning Turkey to acknowledge the Genocide by the year’s end; uttering the Armenian word “tseghasbanoutyoun” (genocide) which Pres. Obama has declined to use; lighting a candle in Etchmiadzin; rejecting Turkey’s membership in the European Union; opening the Aznavour Museum overlooking Mt. Ararat; and donating a priceless Rodin statue to the Republic of Armenia.
    Finally, a world leader has dared to put Turkey’s bullying rulers in their place! Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reacted angrily by telling the French President to confront his country’s colonial past and not to teach Turkey a history lesson. Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev, gave a cold shoulder to the French leader during his visit to Baku. An aide to Aliyev declared that his country does not share Sarkozy’s views on the Armenian Genocide. Davutoglu’s condescending words against France could well incite the French Senate into adopting the new Genocide law.
    French Armenians are now in a win-win situation. Both leading presidential candidates are committed to supporting not only the law criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide, but also backing other pro-Armenian initiatives. No matter which one of the two candidates wins in next year’s French presidential elections, Armenians stand to gain!
    However, given politicians’ long trail of broken promises, French-Armenians should not trust their word. They should make it clear to both candidates that Armenians would support whoever helps pass the genocide denial bill BEFORE next April’s presidential elections. It would be ideal if both candidates instructed their party’s Senators to vote for the bill now, leaving the French Armenian community with the pleasant dilemma of choosing between two supportive candidates in the presidential elections.
    French-Armenians and American-Armenians may want to reverse the long-established but failed approach of supporting candidates first by trusting their promises, hoping that they would come through after the election. The new strategy should be: Once the President is elected and carries out his promises, only then the community would reward him with its support.