Turkish Forum

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  • A Reality Check On US-Turkish Relations

    A Reality Check On US-Turkish Relations

    A Reality Check On US-Turkish Relations

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 223
    December 8, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    US Vice President, Joe Biden, paid a working visit to Turkey, which provided an opportunity for a reality check of the current condition of US-Turkish bilateral relations. In addition to meeting with Turkish leaders, Biden attended the Global Entrepreneurship summit, which was developed as a new platform by the Obama administration to foster dialogue and cooperation with the Muslim world. Throughout his public appearances, Biden praised Turkey’s economic and political achievements, highlighting its potential to serve as a model for other nations.

    Beyond these words of praise, his contacts largely served to reiterate the growing consensus between the two countries, rather than breaking new ground on any major issue. While seeking to mobilize Ankara’s support for key US strategic interests in the Middle East, Biden at the same time worked to assure his Turkish counterparts about the continuation of US strategic involvement in ensuring regional stability. In charge of the Obama administration’s Iraq portfolio, Biden’s visit to Ankara was preceded by his earlier stopover in Iraq. In many ways, the US experience in Iraq was also a major turning point for Turkish-American relations. Following the disagreements caused by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, bilateral relations cooled, resulting in serious questioning on both sides concerning the future of the alliance that tied both nations together. Over time, the two countries adjusted their policies in Iraq, as they soon realized that they have major stakes in the stabilization of this country. Their coordinated action in Iraq has been an important development that helped maintain strategic cooperation in recent years. In an environment where the region is in flux in the wake of the Arab Spring and the US military withdrawal is imminent, however, Turkish concerns over the future of Iraq have become even more worrisome. In that regard, Biden largely worked to convey the message to Turkish leaders that the United States will remain committed to that country after the military withdrawal.

    Obviously, another issue of shared concern is the evolving situation in Syria, which runs the risk of destabilizing the region. Despite its initial argument for a controlled transition under Assad’s watch, Turkey has increasingly criticized the Syrian government forces’ brutal crackdown against the opposition and emerged on the frontline of the international efforts to prevent further killing of civilians. As Turkey recently announced a new round of sanctions against the Assad regime in similar fashion with Western powers, the visit provided an opportunity for exchanging information and discussing ways to further coordinate policy on Syria. However, this convergence is putting the Turkish government in a risky situation as Turkey moves to initiate economic sanctions, which might hurt certain constituents and especially local economy. Therefore, although Turkey has followed a policy in tune with the Western and US position, it has to tread a fine line to avoid being seen as too closely aligned with the United States. Most opposition parties and nationalist circles in Turkey view the government as implementing a program in Syria imposed upon it by the United States and interpret Biden’s visit as Ankara’s submission to Washington in its regional policies (Yenicag, December 4).

    Iran was another major item on Biden’s agenda. Biden reportedly sought to convey the message that the US policy of isolating Tehran through coercive measures was effective and they needed to be pursued vigilantly (Hurriyet, December 3). Yet another source of friction in the bilateral relationship once, the recent change in Turkey’s policy on Iran has pulled Ankara and Washington together, also leading to a series of threatening statements coming from Tehran. Granted, Turkey remains reluctant to impose new sanctions against Iran, in an effort to avoid putting further strain on its relations with Iran.

    In return for Ankara’s more cooperative position on issues of interest to the United States, Washington has been more forthcoming in its support for Turkey’s fight against the terrorist campaign by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has seen escalation in recent years. Biden reiterated recent steps undertaken by the United States, including the stationing of Predator drones in Incirlik to increase Turkey’s information gathering capacity, and selling three Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey. Moreover, Turkish President Abdullah Gul seemed content with Biden’s statements that even after the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, Turkey would continue to receive support from not only the United States, but also Iraqi groups in its fight against the PKK , December 2). Though such statements obviously are important signs of commitment from a symbolic and political point of view, the level of military contribution is unlikely to bolster Turkey’s operational ability against the PKK and change the situation on the ground decisively in favor of the Turkish army.

    Granted, the accelerating pace of the US-Turkey security partnership has been an issue of concern in terms of the ongoing process of domestic transformation inside Turkey. Some commentators who have grown critical of the AK Party government’s democratic credentials and its commitment to fundamental rights have been expecting the West and the United States to act as a restraint against the “authoritarian tendencies” of the government. Troubled by the new realignment between Ankara and Washington, they have expressed concern that the US might turn a blind eye to the government’s conduct in domestic politics. One commentator argues that “the Turkish government takes it as carte blanche to be careless about political freedoms, to limit free speech and to crush the Kurdish opposition in return of its ‘great’ role in regional politics” (Hurriyet Daily News, November 15).

    Partly in an effort to allay such concerns, US delegations visiting Turkey and US diplomats based in Ankara often emphasize the importance of respecting basic rights. Maintaining the same tradition, Biden highlighted the need for a free political climate, and urged Turkey to maintain the momentum for rewriting a more civilian and democratic constitution (Anadolu Ajansi, December 4). It remains to be seen if such statements will be followed by deeds in the coming months and whether the US will observe the AK Party’s domestic conduct in a manner to satisfy its critics.

    https://jamestown.org/program/a-reality-check-on-us-turkish-relations/
  • US Court to Rule on Turkish Banks’ Motion to Dismiss Armenian Lawsuits

    US Court to Rule on Turkish Banks’ Motion to Dismiss Armenian Lawsuits

     

    sassounian3
    Two separate lawsuits were filed last year in US Federal Court in Los Angeles against the Republic of Turkey and two of its major banks demanding compensation for properties confiscated from Armenians after the 1915 Genocide.
    The first is a class action lawsuit seeking what could amount to billions of dollars from the Turkish Republic, T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, and the Central Bank of Turkey for unjust enrichment from liquidation of properties belonging to Armenians deported and exterminated during the Genocide.
    The second lawsuit, filed by three Armenian-Americans, seeks $64 million for their confiscated properties in Adana, Turkey, and millions more for accrued rent and interest paid by the U.S. government in the past 60 years for use of the strategic Incirlik Air Base, built on land taken from families of the Armenian plaintiffs.
    When these lawsuits were initiated, the Turkish government and its two banks ridiculed the charges, claiming that US courts have no authority to judge the actions of other governments. In order to block the lawsuits, the Turkish entities refused to be served with the legal documents, which is the first step in filing a lawsuit. After lengthy cat and mouse games, Turkish officials finally received the court documents transmitted to them by the US Embassy in Ankara at the request of the State Department.
    After grudgingly accepting the court papers, the Republic of Turkey refused to appear in US Federal Court, despite warnings from the State Department that it risked a default judgment. The Turkish banks, however, fearing a similar fate, rushed to the court and filed a motion to dismiss the pending lawsuits.
    In their filings, the banks objected to the lawsuits, claiming that American courts lacked jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. They argued that the lawsuits should not go forward because of the Ankara Agreement of 1934, the “political question doctrine,” potential harm to U.S.-Turkish relations, lack of evidence that the plaintiffs are heirs of the owners of the confiscated properties, and the expiry of the statute of limitations.
    Surprisingly, the Turkish banks conceded that even if the Republic of Turkey did confiscate Armenian properties, international law precluded the filing of such lawsuits, since Turkey had taken “the property of its own nationals.”
    The banks’ lawyers made the outrageous suggestion that the wills of Armenian Genocide victims be reviewed to determine the legal heirs of the confiscated properties. In case these victims did not have a will, the lawyers proposed that the relevant laws be examined to see who was really entitled to their properties!
    The attorneys for the Armenian plaintiffs countered the Turkish objections and asked the court to deny the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs asserted that the Ziraat bank branch in the United States is a private commercial bank and has no reason to enjoy sovereign immunity. Moreover, “genocide and the associated plunder of property is never deemed a legitimate act of the state. There is no application of a political question, as this case focuses on the return of unjust gains from the sale and/or rental of property held in trust. Finally, the statute of limitations does not apply because the properties were held in trust, and the failure to return them is a continuing injury.” The attorneys further asserted that there are no statutes of limitations for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.
    Contradicting the Banks’ claims, the lawyers for the class action lawsuit maintained that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act does not preclude the prosecution of foreign entities engaged in commercial activity in the United States which both the Republic of Turkey and the two banks have done for many years. The lawyers also asserted that the defendants falsely claimed that international law does not apply to foreign countries “for wrongs perpetrated against their own nationals.” On the contrary, “international law prohibits states from expropriating property of nationals conducted during genocide and human rights abuses.”
    A hearing is scheduled in Federal Court on December 19 to determine the validity of the Turkish banks’ motion to dismiss the two lawsuits. Should the court reject the Turkish motion, and the Armenian plaintiffs end up winning their lawsuits during a subsequent trial, the court may order that the US assets of both Turkish banks be seized, up to the value of the claims, and turned over to the heirs of dispossessed Armenian victims as fair compensation.
  • The secret flotilla negotiations between Turkey and Israel

    The secret flotilla negotiations between Turkey and Israel

    Claire Berlinski, one of the best observers and reporters out of Turkey, has a must-read article on what happened during the negotiations between Israel and Turkey over the Palmer report on the flotilla:

    The Turkish journalist Kadri Gürsel published an interesting piece the other day inMillyet about the failure of the negotiations between Turkey and Israel to normalize relations in the wake of the Mavi Marmara fiasco. Kadri Gürsel is a journalist whose work and opinions I take seriously; here, for example, he’s written a thoughtful piece in Turkish Policy Quarterly that will help you locate him in the spectrum of Turkish political opinion.

    Gürsel first places the blame for the failure of the negotiations on the Turkish foreign ministry’s incompetence (he uses the more tactful phrase “lack of experience,” but the Turkish foreign ministry is hardly inexperienced, so I assume we’re to read between the lines). He then moves to what has become something of a standard narrative in Turkey and elsewhere: that the deal was “95 percent completed,” but fell through only because of Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman’s intransigence:

    But the deal was never “100 percent complete” because in Israel, the obstacle, the extreme of the extreme Lieberman was not overcome. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not persuade Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman for an apology and compensation. And the Turkey-Israel secret negotiations that started after the U.N. Investigation Panel was formed in August 2010, collapsed in June following the days when the draft agreement was prepared.

    Matters in this “duplex channel” were held tight. The Israeli member of the U.N. Investigation Committee, Joseph Ciechanover and Ambassador Özdem Sanberk, who represented Turkey on the panel, were also negotiating through the duplex channel. The head of the panel Geoffrey Palmer and his deputy Alvaro Uribe, even if they were aware of that secret negotiations were conducted between the two countries, they did not know that Ciechanover and Sanberk were the participants. The “duplex channel” held meetings in Geneva, Bucharest and Rome.

    Despite all, this draft agreement could be the operational basis for a new normalization process between Turkey and Israel. Of course, if it is possible to persuade Lieberman in the light of new situations in the Middle East.

    I asked an Israeli official who was close to these negotiations–and who has thus far never provided me with information that has proved unreliable–for comment. This is what he said:

    I’ve seen the “draft deal” and the formula for apology includes indeed the English word “apologize”, though the phrase “operational mistakes that caused life losses and injuries to Turkish people” was preceded by an “if.” (I can’t remember the exact wording, but it went something like: Israel apologizes if there were any operational mistakes etc … ) This was the mutually agreed formula, and by using the conditional mode, it was possible for us to apologize without admitting that we actually did something wrong, which of course we believe we didn’t.

    It is also correct that we agreed to pay compensations (through a bi-national fund, not directly), though the Turks did not specify at that point how much they thought would be reasonable. We thought the details and the sum could be worked out later on, based on mutual trust that would arise from the approval of the package deal.

    Turkey, however, did not guarantee that “Turkish citizens and their legal representatives would not take legal action against Israel.” It agreed to promise not to prosecute Israelis, but explained it could commit itself on behalf of private citizens in Turkey or abroad. This made some Israelis suspicious: what would happen if we endorsed the deal, and then had to face suits by members of the Turkish public, maybe even with covert assistance by the government? What guarantee did we have that the “deal” would actually end all claims and enable Israel and Turkey to reconcile and restart their relationship? This suspicion grew stronger in light of Turkey’s insistence that the text should state that Israeli soldiers killed activists “intentionally.” Why insist on this admission of guilt if not to enable legal action? As Gürsel himself says, this text which the Israeli government was supposed to approve was not completely agreed upon by Turkey, because they still wanted to include the intentionality wording. Even if the Israeli government had approved the draft, it would have left us with Turkish disavowal and discontent.

    Another condition set forth by the Turks, and agreed to by Israel, was shelving the Palmer Report. Strange that Gürsel should say nothing of this, since he starts his discussion with the meaning of the Report to Turkey. The Turks were very keen on making the report disappear …

    Finally, when it all came down to a discussion in the Israeli Cabinet, it wasn’t just Lieberman who was reluctant to approve the whole package deal. Others, too, did not exactly trust Erdoğan, and raised doubts as to his real intentions: what would we get in return for the (indirect) apology, the compensations and the shelving of the report? Restoring ties with Ankara and an “end of conflict.” But what if, after all was said and done, Erdoğan would claim that not all of his conditions were met? That Israel did not fulfill the requirements? All of a sudden, he speaks about lifting the siege on Gaza as a condition – but it was never mentioned in the negotiations nor in the draft! How easily it could have served as a pretext not to restore ties. And as for taking legal action against Israelis, well … With the intentionality clause still open, and with Turkey’s non-commitment to stop private suits, and with the Palmer Report scrapped, where would it all lead us? Certainly not to an end of conflict, but rather to a further deterioration, with us in an inferior position.

    This is the reason why quite a few ministers refused to endorse the draft. The Turkish anger at the leak of the Palmer Report, and Davutoğlu’s hot-headed reaction and statements, only seemed to confirm our worst doubts: they were never in earnest to begin with.

  • Erdogan Confronts Official History

    Erdogan Confronts Official History

    Erdogan Confronts Official History

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 216
    November 29, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took a groundbreaking step, by issuing a state apology for the killings committed by the state security forces in the historical Dersim – today’s Tunceli – region, predominantly populated by Alevis. The 1937 massacres were long considered a dark part of the Republican history, mirroring also many other repressive practices undertaken by the Republican elite as part of the modernization and nation building project. Until very recently a healthy debate on the subject was difficult. While Erdogan’s apology is a vindication of the progress achieved in the democratization and liberalization of Turkish political culture in recent decades, it also comes as a carefully calculated political maneuver that seeks to bolster his party’s position in the domestic balance of power.

    In parallel to issuing the apology, Erdogan made public the state documents that lay out the details of the Dersim events. In response to what it claimed to be a rebellion led by a local chief of a Zaza-speaking tribe in the Dersim region, the Turkish government used heavy force including air strikes which cost the lives of thousands of people (Anadolu Ajansi, November 23). Erdogan’s call for confronting that brutal episode with courage has immense repercussions for the official political narrative in Turkey.

    Since its inception in the wake of the First World War, the modern Turkish republic has sought to forge an ethos of a modern state that is formed around a common national identity. Through education and other institutions, the republican state apparatus sought to eliminate ethnic and religious differences in an effort to develop an official Turkish identity to which arguably all people living in Anatolia voluntarily subscribed. As the documents released by Erdogan attest, the state at times resorted to coercive instruments against the groups that resisted the policies of the early republican era.

    This official acknowledgement largely shatters the image of a somewhat mystified Turkish state and the idea of unitary nation joined around a common fate. As an immediate effect, the relatives of the victims, some of whom recently launched a legal battle to restore the rights of their family, welcomed the state apology (www.haberaktuel.com, November 23). Beyond this, other groups that traditionally felt victimized by the Turkish state also expressed satisfaction with the soul searching by the Turkish government. The members of the Armenian and Greek communities and other non-Muslim groups as well as followers of various Sufi brotherhoods that were subjected to a variety of repressive practices now feel empowered to demand a more open and freer debate on those dark episodes throughout the history of republican Turkey. As Turkey prepares to engage in a new period of intense debate on rewriting its constitution, the dismantling of the authoritarian official political narrative is seen as an opportunity by liberal forces.

    There are obviously also political calculations behind Erdogan’s move, given its timing and the manner it is framed. While announcing the historical documents, Erdogan also pointed to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) as the culprit of the crimes. Erdogan was obviously drawing a parallel between today’s CHP and the Turkish statesmen of the time, since Turkey was governed by a single-party rule of the CHP until the transition to democracy in the 1950s. Erdogan called on the CHP’s current leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who himself is also an Alevi from Tunceli, to apologize for the massacres on his party’s behalf.

    Erdogan’s remarks immediately resonated through the ranks of the CHP. Erdogan’s announcement came against the background of a heated debate on the Dersim events that had already started inside the CHP. Although differing views on Dersim events occasionally led to frictions inside the CHP, the recent debate was triggered quite unexpectedly. A CHP deputy, Huseyin Aygun, contested the official history and claimed that the Turkish state planned the massacres in Dersim. In his account, the people there were simply defending themselves, not leading a rebellion, as claimed by official history (Today’s Zaman, November 10). Aygun had in fact challenged Erdogan earlier through a parliamentary inquiry to release the state documents and invited him to issue an apology (Anka, September 14).

    While, in the ensuing debate inside the CHP, some deputies even called for Aygun’s expulsion from the party, Erdogan and his AK Party skillfully took advantage of this crack in their opponent’s ranks. Erdogan and key AK Party figures increasingly raised the pressure on Kilicdaroglu to confront the history and acknowledge his party’s misdoings by opening the party’s own classified archives and agreeing to initiate a parliamentary inquiry, prior to Erdogan’s announcement of the documents. Kilicdaroglu’s ambivalent reaction to Erdogan satisfied neither those revisionists who are calling for confronting with the Dersim incident nor the opposition who sharply oppose to opening such a debate. However, this debate provided yet another opportunity for the anti-Kilicdaroglu figures to work for regrouping themselves into a formidable counter-block inside the party (www.ahaber.com, November 26).

    The growing infighting in the CHP since then also attests to how deeply the Dersim question affects the CHP’s identity, especially its controversial relationship with the Alevis. Despite the persecution at the hands of the CHP-governed Turkish state, the Alevis have come to evolve as strong supporters of the CHP. The CHP’s advocating of a secular political platform and life style appealed to the Alevis, who historically felt victimized by the Sunni majority and in recent years viewed the CHP as a bulwark against the “Islamization” of Turkish society and politics under right-wing parties.

    Although the AK Party wanted to make inroads into the Alevi constituencies, its so-called “Alevi opening” had failed to pay any significant dividends. The CHP still enjoyed support among the Alevi voters in the latest parliamentary elections. Erdogan’s recent move, though admirable, is unlikely to swing the Alevi voters to his party, but many Alevi associations are already demanding the CHP engage in a more sincere discussion on their identity and the not-so pleasant history of their encounter with the Turkish state (Haberturk, November 28). Even the very fact this debate is taking place in the CHP’s ranks is likely to set the CHP on an inward trajectory. Subsumed with yet another round of internal debates, the CHP will find it difficult to launch a credible opposition to the AK Party for some time.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-confronts-official-history/
  • Sassounian’s column of Dec. 1, 2011

    Sassounian’s column of Dec. 1, 2011

    No one should be Fooled by Erdogan’s
    Empty Apology for Kurdish Massacres
     sassounian36
     
    Turkish society was thrown into turmoil last week when Prime Minister Erdogan issued an unexpected apology for the hitherto taboo topic of the Kurdish massacres in southeastern Turkey in the 1930’s.
     
    There are many striking similarities between the Kurdish massacres and the Armenian Genocide. Under the guise of quelling a rebellion, the Turkish government, led by Kemal Ataturk, ordered the killing and deportation of tens of thousands of Alevi Kurds from Dersim, now known as Tunceli. Turkish warplanes dropped bombs and sprayed poisonous gases on Kurds hiding in mountain caves.
     
    Ironically, taking part in the bombing raids was Sabiha Gokcen, Turkey’s first female pilot, who was an Armenian orphan adopted by Ataturk. Gokcen was unwittingly participating in the killing of not only Kurds, but also fellow Armenians who had sought refuge in the remote region of Dersim, after having survived the 1915 Genocide.
     
    Erdogan’s surprise admission of the “Dersim killings” was prompted not by an honest desire to lift the veil of secrecy from a long concealed state crime, but by the intent to discredit his main political opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) which was in power during the Kurdish atrocities.
     
    Erdogan shrewdly scored a major public relations coup when Kilicdaroglu, a native of Dersim who had lost many members of his family, refused to reverse the CHP’s long-standing cover up of these massacres.
     
    Seeing an opportunity to deliver a bigger blow to his reticent rival, Prime Minister Erdogan went on national TV, revealing a series of documents from the state archives that provided chilling details of the brutal torture of Kurdish men, rape of women and mutilation of children. In a dramatic gesture, he tore up the government’s falsified report on the Dersim carnage.
     
    To counter Erdogan’s attacks, Kilicdaroglu came up with a surprise announcement of his own. Despite his failure to acknowledge the Dersim massacres, Kilicdaroglu claimed that an apology was not enough! He challenged Erdogan to release all archival documents on this subject, and return the properties confiscated from the Kurdish victims.
     
    The Prime Minister’s surprise apology generated a major national debate in Turkey. Some media commentators viewed Erdogan’s acknowledgment of the Dersim massacres not only as an effort to undermine Kilicdaroglu’s support with millions of Alevi voters, but also to tarnish Ataturk’s legacy. Others saw hopeful signs that Erdogan was preparing to face other dark chapters of Turkey’s history, including the Armenian Genocide.
     
    Kilicdaroglu, in turn, tried to damage Erdogan’s reputation by accusing him of planning to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide, and likened his mentality to that of Diaspora Armenians. Erdogan promptly distanced himself from what he considered to be an insulting comparison, and sharply rebuked and warned his political opponent for drawing such a parallel!
     
    Erdogan’s racist reaction did not bode well for those who claimed that “the genie is out of the bottle,” hoping that the Prime Minister’s apology to the Kurds would set a precedent for Turkey’s eventual acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide. When one carefully examines the Prime Minister’s distorted statements on the Dersim massacres, one cannot help but note the eerie similarities with Turkey’s denialist views on the Armenian Genocide:
     
    1) Minimizing the Kurdish death toll from tens of thousands to 13,800;
    2) Describing the Kurdish massacres merely as “killings” or “events”;
    3) Placing the blame for the “killings” on a rival political party rather than the Turkish state; and
    4) Offering no compensation and no restitution to heirs of the Kurdish victims.
     
    All those hoping that Erdogan would issue a similar apology for the Armenian Genocide probably do not realize the futility of their expectation. In reality, a Turkish apology would do more harm than good to the Armenian Cause, as it would discourage some Armenians from pursuing restitution from Turkey, mislead the international community into thinking that Armenian demands are now completely fulfilled, and deprive Armenians from attracting further political support for their national cause.
     
    Furthermore, should Erdogan apologize for the Armenian Genocide, the international community would shower him with praise, nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize, and support Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union.
     
    The international community should rather demand that Erdogan fully acknowledge the genocides of Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, and Kurds, issue a genuine apology, offer compensation, and return the confiscated properties to the heirs of millions of innocent victims.
  • MISREADING INTENTIONS IN THE SYRIA CRISIS

    MISREADING INTENTIONS IN THE SYRIA CRISIS

    Wednesday, November 23, 2011, 8:50 AM
    STRATFOR
    —————————
    November 23, 2011

    George Freidman Chairman STRATFORD

    Summary
    The aim of the Sunni army defectors who make up the Free Syrian Army is to sow divisions within the military that will ultimately bring down the Syrian regime from within. A number of foreign players share this agenda, but they are reluctant to provide military cover for an opposition still struggling under the weight of the Syrian security apparatus. A closer examination of the dilemmas faced by the main stakeholders in the conflict reveals how the current dynamics of the conflict leave ample room for error as each tries to read the other’s intentions.

    Analysis
    With months of demonstrations failing to dislodge the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, military defectors who make up the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are trying to exploit Alawite-Sunni divisions in the army to bring the regime down from the inside while asking outside powers for military assistance. Though no outside country has intervened in Syria on the FSA’s behalf, a number would like to see the end of the Iranian-allied regime in Damascus. Turkey has been particularly aggressive in condemning the Syrian regime, even threatening to create a buffer zone extending into Syrian territory.

    The FSA hopes to convince Ankara that helping Syrian defectors can prevent border instability — Turkey’s primary concern. Meanwhile, al Assad and Iran may use their influence over Kurdish militant proxies as leverage to forestall Turkish involvement. Though the Syrian regime appears for now to be holding together, the confusion surrounding each party’s intentions has the potential to lead to miscalculations and bring about the very situation each player hopes to avoid.

    The Free Syrian Army

    The Free Syrian Army loosely refers to a group of mid- to low-ranking Sunni army defectors. They are led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, who is believed to be based in Turkey. The FSA claims it has 22 “battalions” of soldiers throughout Syria capable of launching attacks on symbolic targets; in the past week, the FSA has claimed to have attacked an air force intelligence facility and Baath Party offices. The FSA’s leadership has said its main strategic aim is to elicit further defections and, by splitting the army, cause the regime to collapse from within. With Syria’s Alawite-dominated army units concentrated on urban opposition strongholds, the FSA has been able to transmit messages, facilitate cross-border travel and coordinate defections among the mostly Sunni army soldiers manning checkpoints and border posts. The attacks claimed by the FSA so far suggest the group is not receiving arms from outside the country but is waging its resistance primarily using the arms and ammunition with which members defect.

    A significant propaganda campaign is part of the FSA’s efforts to seek assistance, but the group is still operating under the weight of Syria’s pervasive security and intelligence presence. In reaching out to countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia that may want al Assad to fall, the FSA has stressed the need for military cover — much like that provided by NATO in Libya, which allowed rebels time and space to develop their resistance in the eastern stronghold of Benghazi. This is why FSA leadership has emphasized the Syrian regime’s allegedly heavy use of the air force to bombard civilians — the FSA hopes to create a justification for humanitarian intervention. (STRATFOR has not seen any indication that the regime has chosen to use its air force against demonstrators, likely out of fear of Sunni air force pilot defections.)

    The exact nature of this proposed military intervention is deliberately ambiguous, varying from the implementation of buffer zones extending into Syrian territory to air cover provided by no-fly zones. Though the FSA has sought to avoid creating the perception it is inviting foreign “occupiers” into Syria, the group undoubtedly hopes to bring about a replication of the Libya model of intervention. In the FSA’s view, if the opposition can draw external forces into forming buffer zones in Syrian territory, it will bring them one step closer to receiving the more significant tactical support they are seeking, such as the insertion of foreign special operations forces, to help split the army and topple the regime.

    Turkey’s Reluctance

    The FSA is having trouble finding military powers willing to intervene. Turkey has been the most vocal in pressuring al Assad, with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Nov. 22 calling for al Assad’s resignation and on numerous occasions threatening to implement a buffer zone extending into Syrian territory. Turkey also openly hosts FSA leadership, along with other defectors who have fled into Turkey. However, while Ankara has a broad spectrum of options for supporting the opposition from its own side of the border,  Turkey has not indicated it will follow through on its threat of military intervention.

    Rather than deal with the near-term security implications of hastening al Assad’s fall, Turkey prefers to gamble on the regime’s inability to crush the resistance. Turkey could use a protracted political crisis in Syria to cultivate an opposition to Ankara’s liking, while avoiding direct involvement. The risk for Turkey is that al Assad will survive the crisis with Iranian aid. But Turkey also wants to avoid the near-term threat of becoming vulnerable to Syrian and Iranian militant proxy attacks, especially as the country has recently seen a significant rise in Kurdish militant activity.

    Turkey’s primary interest in Syria is to ensure that instability there does not cause a refugee crisis or encourage Kurdish separatist activity within Turkey’s borders. Any eventual military intervention by Ankara — and its absorption of the associated risks — would be driven mainly by these concerns and not by the welfare of Syrian citizens. The United Nations estimates that roughly 7,600 Syrians currently live in Turkish refugee camps, but Turkey does not face an imminent crisis from thousands more refugees flooding across the border. This is largely because Syria has concentrated military crackdowns in opposition strongholds further south in the cities of Homs, Hama and Daraa.

    (click here to enlarge image)

    Constraints in Creating a Refugee Crisis

    The FSA could try to spur Turkey to militarily intervene by creating just such a refugee crisis. By focusing activity in and around the northern strategic cities of Aleppo (an opposition stronghold) and Idlib, the FSA could draw harsher crackdowns by the Syrian army that would send civilians fleeing toward the Turkish border. This would also fixate Syrian forces on one location while thinning out the concentration of forces in other areas where the FSA may be trying to operate.

    Similarly, the FSA could attempt to draw Jordan into the Syrian conflict by provoking stronger crackdowns in the southwest, where Syrian forces have concentrated much of their strength since the beginning of the uprising. Rumors circulated in the past week that the Jordanian government was also contemplating a “safe zone” on the Syria-Jordan border in the event of a refugee crisis, but a STRATFOR source in the Jordanian government strongly denied this. At the same time, the source said Jordan might have to contemplate such a measure if tens of thousands of refugees came across the border and if Jordan’s forces were augmented by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) troops.

    This is unlikely in the near term. An estimated 3,000 Syrians have fled to Jordan, and the Jordanian government is just now starting to set up refugee camps. Jordan does, however, share an interest in weakening the al Assad regime. STRATFOR has received indications from Syrian sources that GCC money and supplies have moved through Jordan to opposition forces in Daraa and the Damascus suburbs. But despite significant opposition activity near the Jordanian border, the refugee flow in the south has not reached the level that would warrant a Jordanian intervention, and Amman likely will continue to exercise caution when it comes to escalating its limited involvement in Syria.

    While the FSA needs to accelerate a crisis to compel outside intervention, potential interventionists have a strategic interest in staving off such a crisis. Though Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United States all share an interest in supporting the Syrian opposition and sowing rifts within the regime, none appear ready to step up their involvement. Should a neighboring country like Turkey (or possibly Jordan) detect that the FSA is trying to create a refugee crisis on its border, that government could take measures to restrict FSA activity on its territory to avoid being led toward military confrontation with Syria. In the meantime, it remains unclear whether the FSA can survive without a refuge near the main areas of resistance and solely with the weapons taken when they defected, while at the same time trying to lure the Syrian army into intensifying its crackdowns.

    Al Assad’s Dilemma

    Syria and Iran want to prevent further support from reaching Syrian dissidents by making clear to Turkey that there are repercussions for trying to split the Syrian regime. The most direct way to capture Turkey’s attention is through Kurdish militancy. Syria and Iran may not have the ability to directly orchestrate attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party core based out of the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, but they can potentially exploit splinter factions. The Turkish government takes this threat seriously and it is likely a major factor in Turkey’s reluctance to escalate its confrontation with Syria. But Syria and Iran would also need to exercise a great deal of caution — using Kurdish militant proxies could inadvertently give Turkey a compelling reason to intervene in Syria.

    Al Assad’s strategic interest is simple: to ensure the survival of the regime. This is an interest shared by Iran, which needs Syria to complete an arc of influence running from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. Though the Alawite-dominated forces are so far holding together, they are being stretched thin trying to maintain intensive security operations across the country. This strain does not bode well for the regime’s ability to bring an end to the crisis soon. At the same time, the amorphous FSA does not appear able to threaten the Syrian regime without significant outside help. This dynamic gives Turkey and others time to develop a more coherent strategy on Syria, but it will leave the FSA in a tenuous position as it attempts to get its insurgency off the ground with limited foreign backing.

    Copyright 2011 STRATFOR.