Turkish Forum

Category: Authors

  • Federal Appeals Court Issues Futile Order on Insurance Lawsuit

    Federal Appeals Court Issues Futile Order on Insurance Lawsuit

     

     sassounian32
    Before the Genocide, thousands of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire bought life insurance from American and European companies, so that after their death, their heirs would receive a lump sum payment.
    Regrettably, many of these companies refused to keep their end of the bargain when Armenian policyholders perished along with their entire families during the course of the Genocide. In most cases, no next of kin was left behind to file an insurance claim on behalf of the victims. A few families who did file a claim were turned down due to the lack of proper paperwork. Clearly, these companies broke their contractual obligations and enriched themselves by keeping the funds owed to the heirs of insured genocide victims.
    Almost a century later, the State of California stepped in to restore justice to the wronged policyholders. Considering the tragic and unnatural circumstance of these deaths, the State approved two successive extensions to the statute of limitations in 2000 and 2011, to allow the heirs of genocide victims additional time to file claims against delinquent insurance companies.
    Recognizing the negative publicity that such a lawsuit would generate, the New York Life and AXA Insurance companies quickly reached out of court settlements and paid a total of $37.5 million to the heirs of Armenian policyholders and charitable organizations. In contrast, German insurance companies Victoria and ERGO, backed by the Turkish government, decided to continue ducking their legal and moral responsibilities towards their ill-fated Armenian policyholders and refused to settle their long overdue claims. The German firms demanded that the lawsuit filed against them in 2003 be dismissed because the California statute included a reference to the Armenian Genocide, which allegedly conflicts with the foreign policy of the federal government on this issue.
    A highly unusual series of court decisions ensued after Federal Judge Christina Snyder’s rejection in 2007 of the German insurance companies’ motion to dismiss. In 2009, a three-judge panel of the federal appeals court initially sided with the German companies, but then reversed itself in 2010, finding no legal problems with the California statute. Earlier this year, the German companies appealed once again, this time to a larger panel of 11 federal judges. That hearing, granted on November 7, is to be held in San Francisco during the week of December 12.
    Rehearing this case for the third time is unnecessary because the California statute does not violate federal government’s stand on the Armenian Genocide. Indeed, there is no federal policy that bans states from recognizing the Armenian Genocide. Not a single complaint was lodged by any federal official, while more than 40 states adopted resolutions acknowledging the Genocide. In fact the California statute is in line with the federal government’s clear record on this issue. One should not forget that the U.S. House of Representatives adopted two resolutions in 1975 and 1984 recognizing the Armenian Genocide, and Pres. Reagan issued a Presidential Proclamation on this subject in 1981. In addition, the U.S. Justice Department recognized the Armenian Genocide in a document filed with the World Court in 1951, citing the Armenian mass killings as one of the “outstanding examples of the crime of genocide.”
    Even though this latest appeal has absolutely no legal merit, the consequences of a negative court decision would not only harm the interests of life insurance claimants, but more importantly, the collective interests of the Armenian people, should the federal appeals court find California’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide to be in conflict with the federal government’s foreign policy. Such a ruling would negate several decades of Armenian-American political activism by reversing all the resolutions on the Armenian Genocide adopted by more than 40 American states.
    The federal appeals court should rule in favor of the Armenian plaintiffs. The court could also uphold the California statute by separating the insurance aspect of the case, which is a prerogative of the states, from the unrelated issue of State vs. Federal powers on Genocide recognition. Should the judges rule against the California statute, however, the Armenian-American community would have no choice but to appeal that verdict to the U.S. Supreme Court.
    There is one issue here that is crystal clear: the federal court should force the German insurance companies to make good on their contractual obligations to all policyholders, particularly those who are genocide victims!
  • US-Turkish Security Cooperation Deepens

    US-Turkish Security Cooperation Deepens

    US-Turkish Security Cooperation Deepens

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 206

    November 8, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    The US-Turkish bilateral relationship is entering a new period of cooperation. While part of the positive mood characterizing the relationship is attributable to the US-Turkish coordinated action in the context of the Arab Spring, the recent changes in Turkey’s threat perceptions have also played a role. Overall, although the rejuvenation of the partnership might be welcome news, the manner in which it has come about reflects an underlying weakness in US-Turkish ties, i.e., it is still characterized by a security-dominant discourse.

    After many years of confrontation during the Bush Presidency, epitomized by Turkey’s resistance to US plans prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkish leaders welcomed the election of President Barack Obama (EDM, November 7, 2008). Although Obama’s call for a fresh approach to US foreign policy in the Middle East excited the Turks, both parties were often involved in disagreements and clashed over many issues. Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with Israel caused discomfort on the part of US policy makers, and the US policy of pursuing punitive measures against the Iranian nuclear program angered the Turkish government. The resulting frictions were not limited to the Middle East, as Turkey and the United States diverged on other issues, such as Turkey’s stalled rapprochement with Armenia or Turkey’s posturing in NATO.

    In the wake of the Arab Spring, both parties increasingly coordinate their policies. Ankara and Washington have given up their initial silence and increasingly supported the popular uprisings in the region. On Egypt, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan maintained close dialogue with Obama, as he adopted a pro-democracy position and called for the end of Mubarak’s rule. Despite Erdogan’s initial criticism of NATO’s military intervention in Libya, Turkey later joined the coalition and became an ardent supporter of the opposition that eventually toppled Gaddafi. On Syria, Turkey, in line with the Western world, has advocated regime change, moving in the direction of imposing sanctions on the Baath regime (EDM, July 20, August 10).

    The changing threat perceptions have also drawn the two countries together. For the US, the planned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan make Turkey an indispensable partner in the region. As the entire region experiences a period of turmoil, with its constructive policies toward these war-torn countries, Ankara emerges as an element of stability that can help fill the security vacuum and safeguard some US interests. Turkey’s constructive attitude in Iraq has been known for some time, as it had helped contain the deepening of civil conflict and extended assistance to facilitate US withdrawal from the country. In the context of Afghanistan, Turkey has also actively worked to mobilize the regional and international actors for the reconstruction of this country, a goal the United States deeply appreciates. In this context, Turkey hosted the latest round of the trilateral summit in Istanbul in the first week of November, which brought together the Afghan and Pakistani presidents under the Turkish President’s watch (Anadolu Ajansi, November 3).

    For Turkey, the primary motivation for reinvigorating the relationship is its immediate security concerns, which have been heightened in recent months. In response to the acceleration of the PKK’s terrorist campaign, Turkey’s military shortcomings in counter-terrorism increasingly underscore its ongoing dependence on the US for its defense procurement needs. Moreover, as the Middle East has been more volatile – characterized by a heightened risk environment – Turkey obviously needs a more solid anchor. These new conditions apparently resulted in Ankara reevaluating its ties with Washington, and abandoning its confrontational rhetoric, which resulted in a series of recent decisions.

    Indeed, Turkey-US security cooperation has remarkably increased recently. The most visible indication for this policy shift came with Ankara’s decision to host the NATO early warning radars on its soil (EDM, September 20). Later, the United States committed to Turkey’s fight against the PKK, by agreeing to the basing of US unmanned Predator drones at Incirlik base to supply Turkey with actionable intelligence. Moreover, an interagency delegation led by US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Alexander Vershbow, to discuss how to improve the joint struggle against the PKK was another major development (Anadolu Ajansi, October 28).

    Furthermore, Washington finally decided to sell three Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey, which Turkey had requested for some time in order to use against the PKK (www.ntvmsnbc.com, October 30). The fact that the sale is unlikely to encounter opposition from the Senate, despite many lawmakers’ discomfort with Turkey’s harsh policy on Israel, has underscored how largely the administration’s views on Turkey is shared in the US policy community.

    It was against this background that Turkey’s Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz, while attending the American-Turkish Council’s annual conference in Washington, argued that Turkey and the US are rediscovering each other and are going through a unique period (Anadolu Ajansi, November 2).

    Despite this positive mood, however, the reinvigoration of the US-Turkish partnership in many ways resembles the dynamics of bilateral relations in the Cold War and early post-Cold War era, when security-related considerations formed the basis of the alliance. Various efforts to bolster the volume of economic ties and foster closer societal dialogue still continue but the prevalence of security issues is undeniable. It remains to be seen how sustainable this new cooperative phase is, especially if one factors in the possible change of administration following the US presidential elections. Even the current administration continues to accentuate the need for Turkey to mend ties with Israel, which currently remains uncertain and an element of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nor is it clear if the efforts to pass a resolution in the US Congress on the genocide allegations might spoil the relations again, as the centennial of the 1915 events is approaching. But, at any rate, currently the United States acknowledges Turkey’s quest for a more autonomous foreign policy course in the Middle East, which it views as beneficial to US interests. Turkey, for its part, is aware of the US interests in the region and refrains from engaging unduly confrontation, as was the case in the Iranian nuclear issue.

    https://jamestown.org/program/us-turkish-security-cooperation-deepens/

  • Sassounian’s column of Nov. 10, 2011

    Sassounian’s column of Nov. 10, 2011

    Genocide Denier Condoleezza Rice
    Unworthy to Teach at Stanford
     sassounian31
    In her newly published 750-page book, “A Memoir of My Years in Washington: No Higher Honor,” former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proudly describes her efforts to defeat Armenian Genocide resolutions on two separate occasions. With great relish, she brags about her success in undermining the acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide by the U.S. Congress in 1991 and 2007.
    A close scrutiny of Rice’s arguments exposes her flawed judgment and ethical lapses. In her memoir, she relates that her first experience “with this problem” was in 1991, when she worked in the White House as acting special assistant to Pres. George H. W. Bush. Her task was “to mobilize an effort to defeat the resolution in the House of Representatives.” Gloating over her triumph, she depicts herself as battling “the powerful Armenian American lobby” that “has for years pressured Congress to pass a resolution branding the Ottoman Empire’s mass killings of Armenians starting in 1915 as genocide.” In reality, she had no need to counter what had already been acknowledged by the House of Representatives in 1975 and 1984, and by Pres. Ronald Reagan in 1981.
    Rice proceeds to maintain that “there are many historical interpretations of what happened,” which is totally untrue, as there are no historical disputes on the Armenian Genocide — a universally acknowledged fact. Furthermore, Prof. Rice does not seem to realize that when she describes the Armenian “killings” as “clearly a brutal, ethnically motivated massacre,” she in fact is recognizing them as genocide, as defined under Article 2 of the UN Genocide Convention.
    In her memoir, Rice attempts to justify her obstructionist maneuvers by explaining that the Turks “were outraged at the prospect of being branded for an event that had taken place almost a century before — under the Ottomans!” Instead of behaving as the spineless official of a banana republic, Rice should have sternly admonished the Turks that the United States would not distort historical facts to appease the paranoid leaders of an autocratic state!
    Boasting about how well she “had succeeded” in her “assigned task,” Rice callously describes her appalling efforts in “fighting off the dreaded Armenian genocide resolution.” She makes a half-hearted attempt to minimize her ethical transgression by stating that no one denies “the awful events or the tragic deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent Armenians,” which even Turkish officials acknowledge. If she was aware that no one was denying the mass murder of Armenians, why was Rice so fervently determined to kill the resolution? She then parrots the nonsensical Turkish propaganda that this issue should be left to “historians — not politicians — to decide how best to label what had occurred.” Rice should have known that reputable historians the world over have already declared that the Armenian killings constituted genocide.
    As Secretary of State in 2007, Rice once again battled against the adoption of an Armenian Genocide resolution. She reports that she “begged” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to prevent the House from voting on the resolution, but the Speaker rejected her request. Rice and Defense Secretary Bob Gates then delivered a press statement against the resolution, standing in front of the White House. She also got eight former secretaries of state to sign a joint letter opposing the resolution.
    Rice proudly states in her memoir that she managed to block the vote on the resolution, in keeping with her promise to the Turks. Once again, instead of defending the noble values and high principles on which America was founded, the secretary of state of the most powerful nation on earth caved in to the diktats of a third world bully!
    Concluding her narrative, Rice makes false accusation against Armenia’s leaders, claiming that “the democratically elected Armenian government had little interest in the resolution. In fact, it was engaged in an effort to improve relations with Turkey, and it didn’t need it either.” Rice is contradicting the U.S. government’s public announcement that the 2003 Armenian presidential elections did not meet international standards. Furthermore, the then Pres. Kocharian did not oppose the genocide resolution and was not seeking to improve Armenia’s relations with Turkey. In fact, a State Dept. official reported that during his meeting with Kocharian in Yerevan, the Armenian President was “in a foul mood” because the White House had just blocked the genocide resolution.
    Rice is now a professor at Stanford University. Ironically, another Armenian Genocide denier, former Secretary of State George Shultz, is also at Stanford. Faculty members, students, alumni and donors should advise Stanford University officials that genocide deniers are not welcome at one of America’s most distinguished institutions of higher learning.
    Readers are urged to fax Prof. Rice at             1-650-721-3390      , expressing displeasure at her appalling efforts against U.S. acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide.
  • Azerbaijan Wins Security Council Seat, While Armenians Remain Idle

    Azerbaijan Wins Security Council Seat, While Armenians Remain Idle

     sassounian3
    Pres. Aliyev was celebrating last week his country’s historic victory at the United Nations. With an overwhelming number of votes, Azerbaijan was elected for the first time to the prestigious UN Security Council for a two-year term.
    This column shall address three questions: 1) how did Azerbaijan manage to get elected to such an elite body? 2) what will Azerbaijan accomplish with its newly-acquired seat? 3) what actions did Armenians take to counter Azerbaijan’s candidacy?
    Azerbaijan, Hungary and Slovenia were competing for a non-permanent seat reserved for the Eastern European region in the Security Council. Normally, Azerbaijan would have no chance of getting elected to such a distinguished body, since it is the least qualified of the three countries in fulfilling the requirements of the UN Charter, due to its failure to contribute to international peace and security, and lack of participation in the work of UN agencies.
    According to knowledgeable sources, Azerbaijan made up for its deficiencies by offering tour packages and monetary incentives to UN delegates, and economic inducements to financially strapped nations in return for their votes at the UN General Assembly which elects the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council. By hook or by crook, Azerbaijan acquired the support of Islamic countries, the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and CIS (former Soviet) countries, including Russia. Yet, despite these unusual lobbying tactics, it took Azerbaijan 17 rounds over a two-day period to garner the necessary votes, and only after Slovenia, its main rival, withdrew in protest from the race. Slovenia’s Foreign Minister Samuel Zbogar complained that his country “did not approve the way this campaign was held.” Although he did not elaborate, he was referring to Azerbaijan’s lavish gift-giving spree.
    Naturally, gaining a seat on the powerful UN Security Council accords Azerbaijan international prestige and a new venue to pursue its incessant Armenophobic campaigns. Nevertheless, there is little chance that Azeri officials will be able to succeed in their announced objective of placing the Karabagh (Artsakh) conflict on the Council’s agenda. The Minsk Group co-Chairs — France, Russia and the United States — as three of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, have made it amply clear that this matter will be handled by the Minsk Group, outside the UN framework. Hence, Azerbaijan’s leaders risk disillusioning their people, having reassured them that the Security Council will take up the Karabagh issue. Azerbaijan could also get entangled in precarious situations, being forced to take sides when voting on confrontational issues involving Iran, Israel, and Syria, among others.
    While the Aliyev regime was turning the world upside down to come up with votes for its Security Council bid, what were Armenians doing to counter Azerbaijan’s efforts?
    Opponents at home criticized the Armenian government for not declaring Armenia’s candidacy for the Security Council, arguing that this would have taken away votes from Azerbaijan. Such a strategy, however, may not have been in Yerevan’s best interest, because Armenia could not compete with Baku’s vote-buying spree, and would have drawn votes away from Slovenia, assuring a bigger victory margin for Azerbaijan.
    In an earlier column, I had suggested that Armenian organizations and prominent individuals in the Diaspora, in consultation with Armenia’s Foreign Ministry, launch a global campaign to counter Azerbaijan’s candidacy. I had urged Armenians around the world to ask their respective governments not to support Azerbaijan’s Security Council bid.
    Regrettably, neither the Armenian Foreign Ministry nor the Diaspora leadership initiated such a coordinated effort. Two months ago, when delegates from 50 countries gathered at a Pan-Armenian Conference in Yerevan, Foreign Ministry officials should have taken the opportunity to strategize with activists and heads of organizations on how to counter Azerbaijan’s candidacy. Ironically, one of the topics on the conference agenda was “mechanisms for the development of Armenia-Diaspora partnership.” Such discussions are only useful if they are followed up by concrete actions.
    Fortunately, a mechanism for global Armenian coordination is in the works for the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. For this purpose, a preliminary meeting was held in Yerevan several months ago. Turkey has already announced its UN Security Council candidacy for 2015, at a time when Armenians will be commemorating the centennial of the Genocide. The question is: Will Armenians be better prepared to counter Turkey’s candidacy in four years than they were Azerbaijan’s this year?

  • France’s scramble to grab a role for itself in Armenia

    France’s scramble to grab a role for itself in Armenia

     

    sarkozy sargsyanAn early October visit paid to the Armenian capital Yerevan by French President Nicolas Sarkozy has triggered not only a new predicament in terms of Turkey’s relations with Armenia, but also marked an important turning point regarding France’s regional influence. (more…)

  • Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    by Şaban Kardaş*

    The deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and Israel has become a conspicuous element not only of Turkey’s foreign policy but also the overall course of recent affairs in the Middle East, raising questions about the future of the region’s security.
    The most immediate issue of contention in the relationship is Turkey’s demand that Israel apologize and compensate appropriately for the killing of eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American by Israeli commandos aboard the Mavi Marmara humanitarian aid ship in May 2010. The ship was part of a flotilla which was trying to break Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip and raise awareness of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the blockade. A proper explanation of the causes of the current stalemate, however, requires going beyond this singular event and undertaking a more nuanced analysis into the underlying dynamics shaping Turkish-Israeli relations in recent years, which also paved the way for the Mavi Marmara raid and the subsequent rapid deterioration of bilateral ties.

    The Mavi Marmara incident and the ensuing crisis grew out of a complex background characterized by the Turkish government’s constant criticism, increasing in recent years, of Israel’s Palestinian policies, which especially gained momentum after Israel’s brutal offensive into the Gaza Strip in the winter of 2008-2009. Other events in the intervening period, including the Davos incident and “low chair” crisis, only accelerated the tensions. Efforts to find a solution through mediation or secretly discussing the ways in which Israel could issue an apology to Turkey failed.

    Given the high-level domestic stakes involved, both parties refrained from backing down and instead opted to continue their confrontational approach. Apparently, given their lack of urgency about reaching a compromise, they must also have calculated strategically that they could tolerate the costs of a breakdown in the relationship.

    Looking at the Palmer report

    Complicating matters further, the conclusions reached in the Palmer report, commissioned by the UN secretary-general to bridge the parties’ competing claims, have to the contrary risked deepening the divisions. The report’s controversial findings not only undermined Turkey’s efforts to internationalize the issue but also argued dubiously for the legality of the naval blockade of Gaza. In response, Turkey announced a series of punitive measures, intended to hold Israel accountable for the Mavi Marmara incident and challenge the legality of the blockade. Turkey’s statement that it would deploy its navy to ensure safe passage in the eastern Mediterranean was arguably the most contentious measure, as it could potentially escalate into a direct military confrontation.

    To understand Turkey’s perspective in the sequence of events culminating in the current standoff, one must look at a number of interrelated factors pertaining to the transformations of the strategic outlook of the Turkish foreign policy elite towards the new Middle East, and Israel’s role and place in it.

    First, Turkey has been working to redefine its priorities in response to what it perceived as a shift in the regional balance of power to its advantage. Second, Turkey viewed the declining influence and power of the United States, as well as President Barack Obama’s promise of a new American foreign policy in the Middle East, as an opportunity for regional powers to assert their influence. Third, and related to these points, Turkey has operated on the assumption that it has not only more space in which to maneuver but also a greater ability to develop autonomous policies in the region. Fourth, Turkey’s perception of threats from the Middle East has declined, reflected in the famous “zero problems with neighbors” policy, as Turkey pursued economic and political rapprochement with countries in the region.

    All these interrelated factors have coalesced in ways which have fostered a perception on the part of Turkish decision makers that a new Middle East is being built, one that is based on justice, equality and freedom, whereas Israel, with its power-based policies, remains stuck in a mentality representing the old Middle East. Turkish leaders saw themselves tasked with a project to build a peaceful and stable regional order based on principles of cooperative security, economic interdependence and universal moral standards. In this environment, the state of exception that Israel represented in the region, as reflected in Israel’s unjust policy toward the Palestinians, its defiance of UN decisions, its noncompliance with the non-proliferation regime and its protection by the US, was construed as an obstacle to Turkey’s regional aspirations. Unable to adapt to the new reality, Israel, in the Turkish perception, has increasingly isolated itself in the region and emerged as the source of regional instability.

    Believing that Israel can no longer afford to act in a business-as-usual fashion in the new Middle East, Turkey has moved to adopt moral politics, seeking to correct Israel’s policies. Consequently, the shared ground and joint strategic outlooks that enabled the Turkish-Israeli partnership of the 1990s has been replaced by a rather confrontational and competitive dynamic, which provide the background for the recent successive crises, especially since 2008. Through its moral politics, Turkey hoped that it could publicize Israel’s inhumane treatment of the Palestinians in various international forums, make it accountable before the international community, and eventually force it to recognize the Palestinians’ rights. Turkey somehow hoped the new foreign policy vision promised by the Obama administration would facilitate its pursuit of a moral politics with regard to Israel.

    Unwilling to yield to Turkey’s new posture, however, Israel refused to back down. At the same time, the complex dynamics of Israeli domestic politics limited the prospects for a negotiated settlement with Turkey, including some form of an apology and compensation to the victims of the Mavi Marmara raid. In this environment, Turkey’s insistence on linking the Mavi Marmara dispute with its demand that the Gaza blockade be lifted further pitted the two countries against each other, as the Israeli side was apparently unconvinced that the closure of the Mavi Marmara incident alone would settle the dispute. Last but not least, though the United States has not come out against Turkey’s increasingly assertive stance against Israel, it has not joined Turkey’s bandwagon either, rendering Turkey’s moral politics largely ineffective. The declining influence of the US has in effect meant that there is no actor capable of mediating between the parties. Turkey’s constructive role in the recent Hamas-Israel prison swap deal and its implementation raised expectations that the Turkish-Israeli tension might ease, as well. After all the events that have transpired, however, there will be no easy going back, and it will be hard to salvage the relationship without a significant transformation in the strategic outlooks of both sides. Turkey expects Israel to change drastically, which is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

    *Şaban Kardaş is an assistant professor of international relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara.

    *.html