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  • Turkey Reiterates Commitment to Southern Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline

    Turkey Reiterates Commitment to Southern Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline

    Turkey Reiterates Commitment to Southern Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 1
    January 3, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding that will facilitate the transit of Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe, changing the calculations over the EU-backed Southern Corridor concept. In October 2011, the two countries signed numerous agreements regulating the volume and price for Turkey’s gas imports from Azerbaijan as well as the transit terms for Azerbaijani gas exports to Europe through Turkish territory (EDM, November 1, 2011). Among these documents they agreed to work on a dedicated pipeline that will transport gas from the second phase of the Shah Deniz gas field through a pipeline from Turkey’s eastern frontier to its western border, in addition to using the existing Turkish grid for transiting Azerbaijani gas.

    On December 26, 2011, Turkey’s Energy Minister Taner Yildiz and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Natig Aliyev, signed a memorandum of understanding on the construction of the Trans-Anadolu natural gas pipeline. The Trans-Anadolu consortium will be formed by the State Oil and Gas Company (SOCAR) and Turkey’s BOTAS and TPAO. While the Azerbaijani side will hold 80 percent of the shares, the Turkish participants will control the remaining 20 percent, but the stakes might change over time, as the consortium will be open to participation by other international energy companies. The construction work is scheduled to start in 2012 and be completed in 2017, when the Shah Deniz-II is also expected to become operational. The pipeline will have an initial annual capacity of 16 billion cubic meters (bcm), which could be increased to 24 bcm. The 6 bcm capacity will be used for consumption in Turkey’s western regions, while the rest of the throughput will constitute Azerbaijan’s exports to Europe. Since Turkey will retain the re-export rights for its imports from Azerbaijan, the total volume of gas available for European markets could increase depending on the market conditions. Though the construction costs will be determined after feasibility studies, Yildiz estimated these costs at around $5 billion (Anadolu Ajansi, December 26, 2011).

    This development raises many interrelated issues about the future of bilateral relations, as well as the EU’s Southern Corridor project seeking to diversify European natural gas supplies tapping into Caspian basin reserves.

    With this decision, Turkey and Azerbaijan took another step to cement their evolving strategic partnership, while Ankara also reconfirmed its Baku-centered South Caucasus policy. Energy occupies a major place in both countries’ ambitious foreign policy agendas. While Azerbaijan is eager to capitalize on its developing hydrocarbon reserves to emerge as a major regional actor in the South Caucasus, Turkey has sought to use its geographic location as an asset to establish itself as a major transportation corridor for oil and gas from the Caspian basin and Central Asia as well as the Middle East.

    Given Azerbaijan’s need for a reliable export route and Turkey’s interest in sustainable throughput to feed its ambitions to become an energy hub, there are economic and strategic imperatives forcing the two countries to forge a closer partnership in the energy sector, which is further strengthened by overlapping perspectives on regional issues. Such a shared vision led to the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline marketing Azerbaijani oil globally and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline exporting Azerbaijani gas to Turkey, part of which is re-exported to Greece by using the Turkish grid. With the successive energy deals signed in recent years, including a rising volume of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey’s energy sector, and deepening political dialogue such as the establishment of a high level strategic cooperation council, the two countries are healing the frictions caused by Turkey’s thwarted normalization efforts with Armenia.

    Currently, there seems to be a strong determination to develop joint energy projects and turn this partnership into a solid axis in the South Caucasus and beyond. Natig Aliyev’s remarks that with the trans-Anatolia project the two countries will work in European energy markets together reflected this shared vision (www.ntvmsnbc.com, December 26, 2011).

    Moreover, the implications of this development for the EU-backed Southern corridor remain a matter of controversy. The competing projects including Nabucco, Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) submitted their bids to the BP-led consortium operating the Shah Deniz field in October 2011. While Azerbaijan and the consortium were expected to make their decision, the trans-Anatolian project has altered the equation in the ongoing competition to secure access to Azerbaijan’s export volumes.

    To complicate these calculations even further, Turkey also moved to sign an accord with Russia by the end of 2011. An agreement finalizing Turkey’s approval for the construction of South Stream in its territorial waters in the Black Sea was signed in Moscow by the heads of BOTAS and Gazprom, overseen by Yildiz and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. With this decision, which Russia had been expecting for over one year, Turkey removed its objections to the South Stream project, which Russian sources expect to be completed by 2015. In return, Yildiz claimed that he secured guarantees from the Russian side to resolve the dispute over the western pipeline in terms favorable to Turkey, especially including a reduction in the price for gas imports from Russia (Anadolu Ajansi, December 29, 2011).

    The Turkish government has faced the criticism that by taking these controversial steps it is effectively killing the Nabucco project, which it claimed to have deemed as a strategic priority (Hurriyet, December 31, 2011). For its part, the Turkish government has been arguing that the trans-Anatolian project was in fact complementary to Nabucco and Southern corridor projects, as it will reduce the costs of the other projects (Anadolu Ajansi, December 26, 2011; Yeni Safak, November 19, 2011).

    Ankara considers that it has fulfilled its responsibilities towards the Nabucco project by granting the necessary permissions earlier for its construction on its territory. The recent deal on the trans-Anatolian project in that context reiterates that Turkey would not be the deal-breaker in Southern corridor projects, as it effectively resolves issues pertaining to the transit of Azerbaijani gas. More importantly, the willingness of the BP-led Shah Deniz consortium, for Azerbaijan and Turkey to undertake a major portion of the transportation corridor might allow Nabucco and other projects to redesign themselves on scalable terms. Now it will be up to other Nabucco partners to do their part, readjust to the new conditions, and find a supply source, which remains the main obstacle before the project.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-reiterates-commitment-to-southern-corridor-with-trans-anatolia-pipeline/
  • Decorating Pine Tree was a Turkish Ritual

    Decorating Pine Tree was a Turkish Ritual

    Famous all around world Sumerian specialist Dr. Muazzez İlmiye Çığ said pine tree which used Christmas tree was a Turkish ritual. Pine tree which used Christmas tree spreads to Christian world at century 16. And Turks had been celebrated new year at 22 December when the longest night of year. They had been celebrated new year while decorate pine tree.
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    Sumerian specialist Dr. Muazzez İlmiye Çığ talk about a tree which named “Akçam’. It is a kind of pine tree. Akçam just used to grew at Turkistan. Turks used to bring Akçam to homes and they used to put some gifts for God under that tree. They used to bind some doeks to boughs. They used to give thanks to God because of God had been given them a good life at pass year. Families used to wear good clothes and visit each one of them and elders. “This ritual reached to Europe. Pine tree isn’t about Noel. Christians accepted as Jesus birth the pine tree at İznik Concile. But Christians didn’t decorate pine tree. This ritual has begun in Germany century 16. It reached to France and spread all around world” said Dr. Çığ.

    Turks still have been featured to tree. They decorate with some doeks not only pine but some others trees too. They make some vows. Some Turks perceives the making vow means paganism. This tradition attends with local people. More High-educated, high-income and city people see this tradition at some movies, stories or ads. Some of city people buy noel tree and decorate them at Turkey. All these appear that Dr. Çığ’s claims may be right. Turks left all Shamanist totems after adopt Islam. I think decorating pine tree and putting some gift under that were perceived against Islam. And they began to celebrating the New Year according to Islam. They left celebrating December 22. And noel tree turned back Turkish high-level people as Europe and American ritual after centuries.

  • Analysis: Turkey helps pull the rug from under Nabucco

    Analysis: Turkey helps pull the rug from under Nabucco

    By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.
    Houston, Texas

    Judging from the press reports, one would not know it, but Turkey, the presumed supporter of the Nabucco gas project, recently helped kill the project.

    It was not to be so. After all, the Nabucco project was designed not only to supply natural gas to the EU from the Caspian region and the Middle East, but also help Turkey meet its domestic needs. The intergovernmental agreement signed in Ankara amid media publicity in July 2009, followed by parliamentary seal of approval in March 2010, gave all the indications that Turkey would stand by the project.

    Turkey’s BOTAS was one of the 6 partners that developed the project. The Vienna-based NIC (Nabucco International Company) represented the consortium formed by the partners. The 3,900 km-long pipeline’s planned destination was Baumgarten in Austria.

    Not that the project was ideal for Turkey (). But compared to its rivals ITGI (Italy-Greece Interconnector) and TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), not to mention a host of “exotic” Black Sea options flagged by Azerbaijan, it was the most mature and most comprehensive gas pipeline project to connect Turkey and the EU to the supply sources to the east. Strategically it deserved Turkey’s support. It was the only project among its rivals that aimed to transport Azeri as well as non-Azeri gas. Turkmen gas was a high-priority objective.

    Surely, with its ambitious design capacity of 31 billion m3 (bcm)/year, Nabucco was under stress. What was holding the project from implementation was the lack of feed (throughput) gas. The feed gas problem caused delays in the project, and the capital costs soared (up to EUR 14-15 billion by most recent estimates). The Azeri Shah Deniz-II gas was identified as the initial start-up gas as from 2017-2018.

    But Azerbaijan, that owned the gas, and the Shah Deniz consortium that would share and produce it, were non-committal about supplying gas. That meant major headache for Nabucco. Turkmen gas input required the cooperation of Azerbaijan, and would be added to the gas stream at a later date.

    In the meantime, the rival projects ITGI and TAP emerged. Like Nabucco, these also counted on Shah Deniz-II gas for throughput. A winner-take-all pipeline contest was in the works.

    Still, Nabucco had a good fighting chance. On October 1, 2011, NIC submitted its proposal to the Shah Deniz consortium tabling transport terms. The rival projects ITGI and TAP did the same. A high-stakes waiting game would then start, during which the Shah Deniz consortium would pick the winner.

    The spoiler project

    All that changed when BP (British Petroleum), at the last minute before the October 1 deadline, came up with a new, “in-house” project: SEEP (South-East Europe Pipeline). It was a shrewd move, and immediately caught the attention of the Shah Deniz consortium – where BP is the operator and a major (25.5%) stake holder. The Azeri partner SOCAR, in particular, quickly warmed up to BP’s proposal.

    Instead of building a new pipeline across the Turkish territory, SEEP envisioned the use of BOTAS’ existing network (with upgrades) in Turkey and construction of new pipelines and their integration with existing interconnectors past Turkey. Azeri gas would be the feed gas. The destination would still be Austria, but the cost would be much less than that of Nabucco.

    Nabucco had come under threat.

    Behind the scenes

    Events behind the scenes further undermined Nabucco. On October 25 Ankara and Baku signed an intergovernmental agreement in Izmir in western Turkey. Details released to the press were sketchy, but one of the accords reached was to use initially BOTAS’ existing network in Turkey, and later build a new pipeline when needed, to ship Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey and the EU. Starting in 2017 or 2018, of the total 16 bcm gas to be produced annually from the Shah Deniz-II phase, Turkey would receive 6 bcm, and the rest 10 bcm would be shipped to the EU.

    Azerbaijan would be the direct seller of gas to the EU, with Turkey being a mere bridge or transit route.

    No mention was made of Nabucco, ITGI, TAP, or SEEP in the press release, but the footprints of SEEP were unmistakable.

    Demise of Nabucco

    Still worse news followed. On November 17, during the Third Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum held in Istanbul, SOCAR chief Rovnag Abdullayev announced that a new gas pipeline, which he named “Trans-Anatolia,” would be built in Turkey from east to west under the leadership of SOCAR. The new pipeline would deliver Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey and Europe.

    Azerbaijan and Turkey had already started working on the pipeline project, he said, and others could possibly join later. The planned capacity was at least 16 bcm/year –large enough to absorb all future Azeri exports after depletion of Shah Deniz II.

    While not stated so, the announcement made Nabucco effectively redundant. The announcement was an offtake from the Izmir agreement, and signaled a surprising, 180-degree turn on the part of Turkey on Nabucco.

    Turkey’s energy minister Yildiz Taner tried to put the best face in the press by claiming that Trans-Anatolian would “supplement” Nabucco, while the NIC chief Reinhard Mitschek expressed his “confidence” in Nabucco.

    More recently SOCAR’s Abdullayev maintained that Nabucco was still “in the race,” and NIC started the pre-qualification process for procurement contractors.

    For all these business-as-usual pronouncements, however, there was little doubt that Nabucco had received a fatal blow. If Trans-Anatolia, dedicated to Shah Deniz II gas, is built, Nabucco will lose its start-up gas, and with it the justification for a new infrastructure across Turkey.

    Without synergy from the Azeri gas, a full-fledged Nabucco project dedicated solely to Turkmen gas will also have a virtually zero chance of implementation.

    Nabucco, in its present form, was dead. (See also . A much-modified, “truncated” version of Nabucco, starting at the Turkey-Bulgaria border, may well emerge, however.

    Conclusion

    With Nabucco frozen in its tracks, the geopolitics of energy in Turkey and its neighborhood has changed dramatically ). What is surprising is that Turkey assisted in undermining a project that it had long supported. It was a project that encompassed both Azeri and Turkmen gas. To reduce its dependence on Russia for its gas exports, Turkmenistan has been eager to ship its gas to the West.

    Azerbaijan, apparently viewing Turkmen gas exports to the West a threat to its own gas exports, has been reluctant to cooperate with Ashgabat on this issue.

    Turkey acceded to the aspirations of the Azeri brethren, while ignoring those of the Turkmen brethren. Over the past year, as the EU delegates approached repeatedly Ashgabat for Turkmen gas (vis-à-vis a TCGP or Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline), Turkey chose to stay on the sidelines. This was a strategic mistake.

    Both Baku and Ashgabat could benefit from a synergy between the Azeri and Turkmen gaz exports, and Turkey could use gas from both sources to enhance its energy security. Being pro-active on TGCP and nudging Azerbaijan in that direction would have been a wise move for Turkey. On balance, there is little doubt that on the gas issue Azerbaijan has played its cards well – perhaps too well!

    [email protected]

  • The French impasse in Turkish-Armenian relations

    The French impasse in Turkish-Armenian relations

    sarkozy armeniaThe most important thing that French President Nicolas Sarkozy emphasized during a visit to Yerevan in October 2011 was that France will introduce sanctions against Turkey if it fails to recognize the Armenian genocide by the end of the year. (more…)

  • Congress Urges Turkey to Return Churches:

    Congress Urges Turkey to Return Churches:


    First Successful Attempt at Restitution
     sassounian32
     
    Turkey suffered a major setback last week when the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved a landmark resolution calling on the Turkish government to return over 2,000 confiscated Christian churches and other properties “to their rightful owners.”
     
    This victory is particularly significant as it comes at a time when Turkey is said to be at the apex of its power both regionally and internationally. Yet, despite its considerable political and economic clout, neither the Turkish regime nor its high-powered lobbyists could openly oppose a congressional resolution intended to protect the religious rights of Christian minorities in Turkey. This is the reason why, when the resolution was first submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 20, as an amendment to the State Department’s Foreign Relations Authorization Act, it was easily adopted by a vote of 43-1.
     
    Just before the resolution came up for a vote on the House floor on December 13, the State Department, at Turkey’s request, made discreet but ultimately futile efforts to derail it. Turkish-American groups also unsuccessfully lobbied against the resolution. Neither the House Republican majority nor the Democratic minority heeded their denialist demands. The strong bipartisan consensus paved the way for the resolution to overcome the hurdle of needing over two-thirds of the House votes for passage, since the motion was presented under a special parliamentary procedure known as the Suspension Calendar.
     
    The Turkish government and its high-priced lobbying firms were greatly embarrassed when only one member of Congress rose on the House floor to speak and vote against the resolution. Even then, Cong. Ed Whitfield (R-KY), a co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Turkey, readily acknowledged that not “very many people would oppose” this bill! He then added: “The mere fact that the resolution is being introduced would leave an objective observer with the intent (sic) opinion that religious freedom is being systematically denied in Turkey!” After rambling on for a few more minutes and running out of things to say, Cong. Whitfield yielded the balance of his time to his opponents — the supporters of the resolution!
     
    After such a devastating defeat, the Turkish Foreign Ministry did not have much to say, except to express its disappointment. This is standard Turkish practice — initially
    applying heavy pressure and making threats to prevent an unfavorable decision, and after losing the vote, dismissing the bill as being unimportant, in order to hide their embarrassing failure. If the Turkish government did not think the bill was important, why did it turn the world upside down in trying to defeat it?
     
    In attempting to fool the unsuspecting public, Turkish officials claimed that the resolution was merely adopted by two to one vote, without explaining that during voice votes, most House members are not usually in the Chamber. Once the leadership of the two parties comes to an agreement on an issue, only a handful of members are then required to adopt the bill. The real question that Turkish authorities must answer is why only one Congressman out of 435 voted against the resolution? This episode demonstrates that the new Ottoman emperor has no clothes!
     
    Even though this resolution is not binding, unless the Senate also adopts it and the President signs it into law, it is still a significant breakthrough for all Christian minorities in Turkey whose properties have been confiscated for decades. Encouraged by this positive development, the Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek communities will continue their active collaboration to pressure Turkey to restore their historic rights.
     
    For Armenians worldwide, this is the first time that the U.S. Congress has demanded restitution from Turkey, rather than mere recognition of the Genocide. This resolution could serve as an impetus for other countries and international organizations to follow suit, demanding the restoration of property rights in Turkey. Henceforth, the Turkish government has to be much more cautious when trampling on these rights, knowing full well that the international community is keeping a watchful eye on its recurring violations.
     
    The successful passage of this bill will energize Armenians around the world to continue the struggle for restitution of their losses during the Genocide. Regrettably, no clergyman or official in Armenia has said a single word on this important issue, as if the fate of Armenian churches in Turkey is of no interest to them! Wouldn’t it be in Armenians’ best interest if Armenia joined with the Diaspora to seek restitution, particularly in view of Pres. Sargsyan’s recent declaration in Marseille, France, demanding “justice” from Turkey?
  • Pres. Sargsyan Makes Major Strategic Shift in Armenia’s Demands from Turkey

    Pres. Sargsyan Makes Major Strategic Shift in Armenia’s Demands from Turkey

    sassounian31

     
     
    Pres. Serzh Sargsyan delivered a major speech in Marseille, France, last week, during which he introduced a new strategy for the resolution of Armenia’s demands from Turkey. Until now, the Armenian government had merely pursued the recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
     
    For the first time, the President spoke about Armenia’s demand for “justice.” To ensure that his message was received loud and clear, he repeated the word “justice” three times in three separate sentences:
    — “Every Armenian demands justice, whether he or she lives in Armenia, Artsakh or the Diaspora.”
    — “We were strong enough to survive the Meds Yeghern [Great Calamity], and we are just as strong now to demand justice.” The President used the term “Armenian Genocide” six times in other parts of his speech.
    — “That was the joyful news for justice, not revenge,” Pres. Sargsyan stated, describing the joy of Marseille Armenians in 1921, when they heard the acquittal of Soghomon Tehlirian, Talat’s assassin, by a German court.
     
    Surprisingly, not a single political commentator in Armenia, Turkey or elsewhere took note of the significant shift in the approach articulated by Pres. Sargsyan. Seeking “justice” for the victims of genocide is a completely different objective than simply attaining recognition. In this context, the word “justice” encompasses the undoing of as much of the damage as possible, by demanding the restitution and return of all looted assets, confiscated properties, and occupied territories.
     
    While advancing a more comprehensive set of demands from Turkey, Pres. Sargsyan expressed his conviction that the day would come when Turkey’s leaders would acknowledge the mass crimes committed by their predecessors: “We are confident that Turkey will repent. That is neither a precondition nor a desire to exact revenge. Turkey must face its own history. Someday, Turkey’s leadership would find the strength to reassess its approach to the Armenian Genocide. Our position has not changed — it is clear cut. We are prepared to establish normal relations with Turkey, befitting neighboring countries. For example, neighboring countries Poland and Germany led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, acknowledging his country’s terrible crimes, dropped to his knees at the Warsaw Ghetto. Sooner or later, Turkey, a self-described European country, will have a leadership worthy of being called European, which will bow its head at the Tsitsernagapert [Genocide] Memorial. The sooner the better, but, that’s the prerogative of the Turkish people. We cannot impose anything on them. They should do that for the sake of the Turkish people, just as Willy Brandt did for the sake of the German people.”
     
    Egemen Bagis, Turkey’s Minister for European Union Affairs, perhaps not comprehending the far reaching consequences of Pres. Sargsyan’s demand for “justice,” reacted angrily to other parts of the Armenian President’s remarks. Bagis arrogantly stated: “There is no power in the world that could bring the Turkish people to its knees. On the contrary, the Turkish people know full well how to bring to their knees those who make such ill-informed statements.”
     
    I fully endorse Pres. Sargsyan’s new approach to the pursuit of Armenian demands from Turkey. Through my columns, speeches, interviews, and private meetings, I have repeatedly urged Armenia’s leaders to demand “justice” from Turkey, rather than simply seeking genocide recognition. One of my articles on this topic, “Genocide Recognition and Quest for Justice,” was published last year in The International & Comparative Law Review of the Loyola Law School of Los Angeles.
     
    Armenia is better off presenting its claims from Turkey in terms of seeking “justice,” to avoid the danger of making official territorial demands from a powerful and menacing neighbor. Nevertheless, the demand for “justice” is a code word or shorthand for a comprehensive set of claims from Turkey. Not even Turkey’s denialist leaders would dare challenge the universally-accepted notion of “justice” based on the rule of law, specifically, international law.
     
    While Pres. Sargsyan’s remarks in Marseille are highly commendable, it remains to be seen how this newly articulated concept of seeking justice for the Armenian Genocide will be translated into action. What practical steps will the Armenian government, particularly the Foreign Ministry, take to demand justice from Turkey? Will Armenia back the lawsuits filed by Diaspora Armenian communities in American and European courts against Turkey, demanding restitution for Armenian losses during the Genocide or will Armenia bring its own lawsuit against the Republic of Turkey in the World Court?