Category: Authors

Erdogan Confronts Official History

Erdogan Confronts Official History

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 216

November 29, 2011

By: Saban Kardas

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took a groundbreaking step, by issuing a state apology for the killings committed by the state security forces in the historical Dersim – today’s Tunceli – region, predominantly populated by Alevis. The 1937 massacres were long considered a dark part of the Republican history, mirroring also many other repressive practices undertaken by the Republican elite as part of the modernization and nation building project. Until very recently a healthy debate on the subject was difficult. While Erdogan’s apology is a vindication of the progress achieved in the democratization and liberalization of Turkish political culture in recent decades, it also comes as a carefully calculated political maneuver that seeks to bolster his party’s position in the domestic balance of power.

In parallel to issuing the apology, Erdogan made public the state documents that lay out the details of the Dersim events. In response to what it claimed to be a rebellion led by a local chief of a Zaza-speaking tribe in the Dersim region, the Turkish government used heavy force including air strikes which cost the lives of thousands of people (Anadolu Ajansi, November 23). Erdogan’s call for confronting that brutal episode with courage has immense repercussions for the official political narrative in Turkey.

Since its inception in the wake of the First World War, the modern Turkish republic has sought to forge an ethos of a modern state that is formed around a common national identity. Through education and other institutions, the republican state apparatus sought to eliminate ethnic and religious differences in an effort to develop an official Turkish identity to which arguably all people living in Anatolia voluntarily subscribed. As the documents released by Erdogan attest, the state at times resorted to coercive instruments against the groups that resisted the policies of the early republican era.

This official acknowledgement largely shatters the image of a somewhat mystified Turkish state and the idea of unitary nation joined around a common fate. As an immediate effect, the relatives of the victims, some of whom recently launched a legal battle to restore the rights of their family, welcomed the state apology (www.haberaktuel.com, November 23). Beyond this, other groups that traditionally felt victimized by the Turkish state also expressed satisfaction with the soul searching by the Turkish government. The members of the Armenian and Greek communities and other non-Muslim groups as well as followers of various Sufi brotherhoods that were subjected to a variety of repressive practices now feel empowered to demand a more open and freer debate on those dark episodes throughout the history of republican Turkey. As Turkey prepares to engage in a new period of intense debate on rewriting its constitution, the dismantling of the authoritarian official political narrative is seen as an opportunity by liberal forces.

There are obviously also political calculations behind Erdogan’s move, given its timing and the manner it is framed. While announcing the historical documents, Erdogan also pointed to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) as the culprit of the crimes. Erdogan was obviously drawing a parallel between today’s CHP and the Turkish statesmen of the time, since Turkey was governed by a single-party rule of the CHP until the transition to democracy in the 1950s. Erdogan called on the CHP’s current leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who himself is also an Alevi from Tunceli, to apologize for the massacres on his party’s behalf.

Erdogan’s remarks immediately resonated through the ranks of the CHP. Erdogan’s announcement came against the background of a heated debate on the Dersim events that had already started inside the CHP. Although differing views on Dersim events occasionally led to frictions inside the CHP, the recent debate was triggered quite unexpectedly. A CHP deputy, Huseyin Aygun, contested the official history and claimed that the Turkish state planned the massacres in Dersim. In his account, the people there were simply defending themselves, not leading a rebellion, as claimed by official history (Today’s Zaman, November 10). Aygun had in fact challenged Erdogan earlier through a parliamentary inquiry to release the state documents and invited him to issue an apology (Anka, September 14).

While, in the ensuing debate inside the CHP, some deputies even called for Aygun’s expulsion from the party, Erdogan and his AK Party skillfully took advantage of this crack in their opponent’s ranks. Erdogan and key AK Party figures increasingly raised the pressure on Kilicdaroglu to confront the history and acknowledge his party’s misdoings by opening the party’s own classified archives and agreeing to initiate a parliamentary inquiry, prior to Erdogan’s announcement of the documents. Kilicdaroglu’s ambivalent reaction to Erdogan satisfied neither those revisionists who are calling for confronting with the Dersim incident nor the opposition who sharply oppose to opening such a debate. However, this debate provided yet another opportunity for the anti-Kilicdaroglu figures to work for regrouping themselves into a formidable counter-block inside the party (www.ahaber.com, November 26).

The growing infighting in the CHP since then also attests to how deeply the Dersim question affects the CHP’s identity, especially its controversial relationship with the Alevis. Despite the persecution at the hands of the CHP-governed Turkish state, the Alevis have come to evolve as strong supporters of the CHP. The CHP’s advocating of a secular political platform and life style appealed to the Alevis, who historically felt victimized by the Sunni majority and in recent years viewed the CHP as a bulwark against the “Islamization” of Turkish society and politics under right-wing parties.

Although the AK Party wanted to make inroads into the Alevi constituencies, its so-called “Alevi opening” had failed to pay any significant dividends. The CHP still enjoyed support among the Alevi voters in the latest parliamentary elections. Erdogan’s recent move, though admirable, is unlikely to swing the Alevi voters to his party, but many Alevi associations are already demanding the CHP engage in a more sincere discussion on their identity and the not-so pleasant history of their encounter with the Turkish state (Haberturk, November 28). Even the very fact this debate is taking place in the CHP’s ranks is likely to set the CHP on an inward trajectory. Subsumed with yet another round of internal debates, the CHP will find it difficult to launch a credible opposition to the AK Party for some time.

https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-confronts-official-history/

November 30, 2011
Sassounian’s column of Dec. 1, 2011

No one should be Fooled by Erdogan’s

Empty Apology for Kurdish Massacres

Turkish society was thrown into turmoil last week when Prime Minister Erdogan issued an unexpected apology for the hitherto taboo topic of the Kurdish massacres in southeastern Turkey in the 1930’s.

There are many striking similarities between the Kurdish massacres and the Armenian Genocide. Under the guise of quelling a rebellion, the Turkish government, led by Kemal Ataturk, ordered the killing and deportation of tens of thousands of Alevi Kurds from Dersim, now known as Tunceli. Turkish warplanes dropped bombs and sprayed poisonous gases on Kurds hiding in mountain caves.

Ironically, taking part in the bombing raids was Sabiha Gokcen, Turkey’s first female pilot, who was an Armenian orphan adopted by Ataturk. Gokcen was unwittingly participating in the killing of not only Kurds, but also fellow Armenians who had sought refuge in the remote region of Dersim, after having survived the 1915 Genocide.

Erdogan’s surprise admission of the “Dersim killings” was prompted not by an honest desire to lift the veil of secrecy from a long concealed state crime, but by the intent to discredit his main political opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) which was in power during the Kurdish atrocities.

Erdogan shrewdly scored a major public relations coup when Kilicdaroglu, a native of Dersim who had lost many members of his family, refused to reverse the CHP’s long-standing cover up of these massacres.

Seeing an opportunity to deliver a bigger blow to his reticent rival, Prime Minister Erdogan went on national TV, revealing a series of documents from the state archives that provided chilling details of the brutal torture of Kurdish men, rape of women and mutilation of children. In a dramatic gesture, he tore up the government’s falsified report on the Dersim carnage.

To counter Erdogan’s attacks, Kilicdaroglu came up with a surprise announcement of his own. Despite his failure to acknowledge the Dersim massacres, Kilicdaroglu claimed that an apology was not enough! He challenged Erdogan to release all archival documents on this subject, and return the properties confiscated from the Kurdish victims.

The Prime Minister’s surprise apology generated a major national debate in Turkey. Some media commentators viewed Erdogan’s acknowledgment of the Dersim massacres not only as an effort to undermine Kilicdaroglu’s support with millions of Alevi voters, but also to tarnish Ataturk’s legacy. Others saw hopeful signs that Erdogan was preparing to face other dark chapters of Turkey’s history, including the Armenian Genocide.

Kilicdaroglu, in turn, tried to damage Erdogan’s reputation by accusing him of planning to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide, and likened his mentality to that of Diaspora Armenians. Erdogan promptly distanced himself from what he considered to be an insulting comparison, and sharply rebuked and warned his political opponent for drawing such a parallel!

Erdogan’s racist reaction did not bode well for those who claimed that “the genie is out of the bottle,” hoping that the Prime Minister’s apology to the Kurds would set a precedent for Turkey’s eventual acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide. When one carefully examines the Prime Minister’s distorted statements on the Dersim massacres, one cannot help but note the eerie similarities with Turkey’s denialist views on the Armenian Genocide:

1) Minimizing the Kurdish death toll from tens of thousands to 13,800;

2) Describing the Kurdish massacres merely as “killings” or “events”;

3) Placing the blame for the “killings” on a rival political party rather than the Turkish state; and

4) Offering no compensation and no restitution to heirs of the Kurdish victims.

All those hoping that Erdogan would issue a similar apology for the Armenian Genocide probably do not realize the futility of their expectation. In reality, a Turkish apology would do more harm than good to the Armenian Cause, as it would discourage some Armenians from pursuing restitution from Turkey, mislead the international community into thinking that Armenian demands are now completely fulfilled, and deprive Armenians from attracting further political support for their national cause.

Furthermore, should Erdogan apologize for the Armenian Genocide, the international community would shower him with praise, nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize, and support Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union.

The international community should rather demand that Erdogan fully acknowledge the genocides of Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, and Kurds, issue a genuine apology, offer compensation, and return the confiscated properties to the heirs of millions of innocent victims.

November 29, 2011
MISREADING INTENTIONS IN THE SYRIA CRISIS

Wednesday, November 23, 2011, 8:50 AM
STRATFOR
—————————
November 23, 2011

Summary
The aim of the Sunni army defectors who make up the Free Syrian Army is to sow divisions within the military that will ultimately bring down the Syrian regime from within. A number of foreign players share this agenda, but they are reluctant to provide military cover for an opposition still struggling under the weight of the Syrian security apparatus. A closer examination of the dilemmas faced by the main stakeholders in the conflict reveals how the current dynamics of the conflict leave ample room for error as each tries to read the other’s intentions.

Analysis
With months of demonstrations failing to dislodge the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, military defectors who make up the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are trying to exploit Alawite-Sunni divisions in the army to bring the regime down from the inside while asking outside powers for military assistance. Though no outside country has intervened in Syria on the FSA’s behalf, a number would like to see the end of the Iranian-allied regime in Damascus. Turkey has been particularly aggressive in condemning the Syrian regime, even threatening to create a buffer zone extending into Syrian territory.

The FSA hopes to convince Ankara that helping Syrian defectors can prevent border instability — Turkey’s primary concern. Meanwhile, al Assad and Iran may use their influence over Kurdish militant proxies as leverage to forestall Turkish involvement. Though the Syrian regime appears for now to be holding together, the confusion surrounding each party’s intentions has the potential to lead to miscalculations and bring about the very situation each player hopes to avoid.

The Free Syrian Army

The Free Syrian Army loosely refers to a group of mid- to low-ranking Sunni army defectors. They are led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, who is believed to be based in Turkey. The FSA claims it has 22 “battalions” of soldiers throughout Syria capable of launching attacks on symbolic targets; in the past week, the FSA has claimed to have attacked an air force intelligence facility and Baath Party offices. The FSA’s leadership has said its main strategic aim is to elicit further defections and, by splitting the army, cause the regime to collapse from within. With Syria’s Alawite-dominated army units concentrated on urban opposition strongholds, the FSA has been able to transmit messages, facilitate cross-border travel and coordinate defections among the mostly Sunni army soldiers manning checkpoints and border posts. The attacks claimed by the FSA so far suggest the group is not receiving arms from outside the country but is waging its resistance primarily using the arms and ammunition with which members defect.

A significant propaganda campaign is part of the FSA’s efforts to seek assistance, but the group is still operating under the weight of Syria’s pervasive security and intelligence presence. In reaching out to countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia that may want al Assad to fall, the FSA has stressed the need for military cover — much like that provided by NATO in Libya, which allowed rebels time and space to develop their resistance in the eastern stronghold of Benghazi. This is why FSA leadership has emphasized the Syrian regime’s allegedly heavy use of the air force to bombard civilians — the FSA hopes to create a justification for humanitarian intervention. (STRATFOR has not seen any indication that the regime has chosen to use its air force against demonstrators, likely out of fear of Sunni air force pilot defections.)

The exact nature of this proposed military intervention is deliberately ambiguous, varying from the implementation of buffer zones extending into Syrian territory to air cover provided by no-fly zones. Though the FSA has sought to avoid creating the perception it is inviting foreign “occupiers” into Syria, the group undoubtedly hopes to bring about a replication of the Libya model of intervention. In the FSA’s view, if the opposition can draw external forces into forming buffer zones in Syrian territory, it will bring them one step closer to receiving the more significant tactical support they are seeking, such as the insertion of foreign special operations forces, to help split the army and topple the regime.

Turkey’s Reluctance

The FSA is having trouble finding military powers willing to intervene. Turkey has been the most vocal in pressuring al Assad, with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Nov. 22 calling for al Assad’s resignation and on numerous occasions threatening to implement a buffer zone extending into Syrian territory. Turkey also openly hosts FSA leadership, along with other defectors who have fled into Turkey. However, while Ankara has a broad spectrum of options for supporting the opposition from its own side of the border, Turkey has not indicated it will follow through on its threat of military intervention.

Rather than deal with the near-term security implications of hastening al Assad’s fall, Turkey prefers to gamble on the regime’s inability to crush the resistance. Turkey could use a protracted political crisis in Syria to cultivate an opposition to Ankara’s liking, while avoiding direct involvement. The risk for Turkey is that al Assad will survive the crisis with Iranian aid. But Turkey also wants to avoid the near-term threat of becoming vulnerable to Syrian and Iranian militant proxy attacks, especially as the country has recently seen a significant rise in Kurdish militant activity.

Turkey’s primary interest in Syria is to ensure that instability there does not cause a refugee crisis or encourage Kurdish separatist activity within Turkey’s borders. Any eventual military intervention by Ankara — and its absorption of the associated risks — would be driven mainly by these concerns and not by the welfare of Syrian citizens. The United Nations estimates that roughly 7,600 Syrians currently live in Turkish refugee camps, but Turkey does not face an imminent crisis from thousands more refugees flooding across the border. This is largely because Syria has concentrated military crackdowns in opposition strongholds further south in the cities of Homs, Hama and Daraa.

(click here to enlarge image)

Constraints in Creating a Refugee Crisis

The FSA could try to spur Turkey to militarily intervene by creating just such a refugee crisis. By focusing activity in and around the northern strategic cities of Aleppo (an opposition stronghold) and Idlib, the FSA could draw harsher crackdowns by the Syrian army that would send civilians fleeing toward the Turkish border. This would also fixate Syrian forces on one location while thinning out the concentration of forces in other areas where the FSA may be trying to operate.

Similarly, the FSA could attempt to draw Jordan into the Syrian conflict by provoking stronger crackdowns in the southwest, where Syrian forces have concentrated much of their strength since the beginning of the uprising. Rumors circulated in the past week that the Jordanian government was also contemplating a “safe zone” on the Syria-Jordan border in the event of a refugee crisis, but a STRATFOR source in the Jordanian government strongly denied this. At the same time, the source said Jordan might have to contemplate such a measure if tens of thousands of refugees came across the border and if Jordan’s forces were augmented by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) troops.

This is unlikely in the near term. An estimated 3,000 Syrians have fled to Jordan, and the Jordanian government is just now starting to set up refugee camps. Jordan does, however, share an interest in weakening the al Assad regime. STRATFOR has received indications from Syrian sources that GCC money and supplies have moved through Jordan to opposition forces in Daraa and the Damascus suburbs. But despite significant opposition activity near the Jordanian border, the refugee flow in the south has not reached the level that would warrant a Jordanian intervention, and Amman likely will continue to exercise caution when it comes to escalating its limited involvement in Syria.

While the FSA needs to accelerate a crisis to compel outside intervention, potential interventionists have a strategic interest in staving off such a crisis. Though Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United States all share an interest in supporting the Syrian opposition and sowing rifts within the regime, none appear ready to step up their involvement. Should a neighboring country like Turkey (or possibly Jordan) detect that the FSA is trying to create a refugee crisis on its border, that government could take measures to restrict FSA activity on its territory to avoid being led toward military confrontation with Syria. In the meantime, it remains unclear whether the FSA can survive without a refuge near the main areas of resistance and solely with the weapons taken when they defected, while at the same time trying to lure the Syrian army into intensifying its crackdowns.

Al Assad’s Dilemma

Syria and Iran want to prevent further support from reaching Syrian dissidents by making clear to Turkey that there are repercussions for trying to split the Syrian regime. The most direct way to capture Turkey’s attention is through Kurdish militancy. Syria and Iran may not have the ability to directly orchestrate attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party core based out of the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, but they can potentially exploit splinter factions. The Turkish government takes this threat seriously and it is likely a major factor in Turkey’s reluctance to escalate its confrontation with Syria. But Syria and Iran would also need to exercise a great deal of caution — using Kurdish militant proxies could inadvertently give Turkey a compelling reason to intervene in Syria.

Al Assad’s strategic interest is simple: to ensure the survival of the regime. This is an interest shared by Iran, which needs Syria to complete an arc of influence running from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. Though the Alawite-dominated forces are so far holding together, they are being stretched thin trying to maintain intensive security operations across the country. This strain does not bode well for the regime’s ability to bring an end to the crisis soon. At the same time, the amorphous FSA does not appear able to threaten the Syrian regime without significant outside help. This dynamic gives Turkey and others time to develop a more coherent strategy on Syria, but it will leave the FSA in a tenuous position as it attempts to get its insurgency off the ground with limited foreign backing.

Copyright 2011 STRATFOR.

November 26, 2011
Turkey Seeks to Monopolize Investments In American Indian Tribal Lands

Publisher, The California Courier

In a few weeks, when high-priced Turkish lobbying firms file their mandatory reports with the Justice Department, important revelations will emerge about their behind the scenes role in pushing through Congress a bill which would give Turkish companies a monopoly for investments in American Indian tribal lands.

These reports would disclose the chain of contacts leading to the approval of Resolution 2362, the “Indian Tribal Trade and Investment Demonstration Project Act of 2011,” by the House of Representatives’ Committee on Natural Resources by a vote of 27 to 15, on November 17.

One should not be surprised to learn that this innocent sounding resolution, meant to “facilitate economic development by Indian tribes and encourage investment by Turkish enterprises,” was gliding through Congress helped by the lavish flow of funds — the mother’s milk of politics — to some House members.

Of course, there is nothing wrong in helping Native Americans to attract foreign investments, except that Congress was being asked to give preferential treatment to a single country — Turkey! Strangely, majority of the Committee members were willing to go along with this unusual and illegal request, ignoring strong warnings from the Congressional Research Service that extending special privileges to only one country would violate provisions of major U.S. trade agreements — Most Favored Nation (MFN), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and World Trade Organization (WTO).

Moreover, there was no need whatsoever for Congress to approve a pilot program for any one country, when the same Committee was simultaneously considering a more inclusive bill — House Resolution 205 — which would provide to all countries an equal opportunity to trade with and invest in Indian tribal lands. In fact, the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs testified that he had serious reservations about Resolution 2362. That is why he preferred to support Resolution 205 which would “foster the same goals…on a broader scale.” When Cong. John Sarbanes (Dem.-Maryland) tried to introduce an amendment to expand the scope of Resolution 2362 beyond Turkey, it was ruled out of order due to a technicality.

Before the vote, several Armenian-American and Greek-American organizations submitted to the House Committee letters in opposition to Resolution 2362, pointing out the impropriety and illegality of giving Turkey a monopolistic access to Indian tribal lands. These organizations raised five key objections to Congress extending special privileges to Turkey because that country:

1) Remains an unrepentant perpetrator of genocide against millions of Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians.

2) Continues to blockade Armenia, occupy Cyprus, confront Israel, attack Kurds, and undermine U.S. regional interests.

3) Threatens U.S. commercial interests in the Mediterranean region.

4) Is linked to American Turkish entities suspected of involvement in illegal activities.

5) Supports Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions.

The possible aim of the proponents of Resolution 2362 is to pass this particular bill before the more inclusive Resolution 205 is approved, in order to give Turkey a head start and undeserved advantage over all other nations. Turkey could then strike exclusive trade deals with Indian tribes for up to 25 years, renewable for two additional terms of 25 years each, for a total of 75 years. This means that by the time companies from other countries have a chance to sign contracts with Indian tribes, Turkish firms would have snatched up the most lucrative deals, leaving the others empty-handed.

Immediately after the Committee’s adoption of Resolution 2362, Turkish Americans and the Turkish Embassy in Washington rushed to celebrate a premature victory. The Turkish Coalition of America issued a press releaseon November 17, expressing its joy that the Resolution was approved by the Committee, and would soon be adopted by the full House. That same night, the Turkish Embassy hosted a reception in Washington “to mark American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month and celebrate the successful passage of H.R. 2362 out of the House Natural Resources Committee.” Turkey’s illustrious Ambassador Namik Tan was personally tweeting pictures of American Indians in their native costumes as the festivities were taking place at the Embassy.

The Ambassador should be reminded that a victory celebration is premature because there are no guarantees that this defective bill would ever reach the House floor, let alone the Senate, since it grossly violates a number of U.S. trade agreements. Even if the bill receives Congressional approval, American civic organizations and many countries would file lawsuits to block this discriminatory piece of legislation.

November 22, 2011
Discussions on Achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDG) at Global-Local Approach Level and “Uzbek Model”: “Historical Experience, Contemporary Implementations and the Common Future”

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin EROL, Gazi University, Deputy Head of International Relations Department

The “Millennium Development Goals” (MDG) project which is being implemented under the leadership of the United Nations (UN) focusing
to solve the eight fundamental issues facing the human beings at the global level, regarded as a courageous step for the future. The realization of the goals
will be a historical turning point in terms of the great philosopher Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” which is still regarded to be a utopia today without any
doubt. In other words, the UN has undertaken a mission issued by the leaders in the Millennium Summit 11 years ago and targeting a more prosperous, just and
peaceful world.

Well, how much is it possible to implement this project which is almost challenging the next millennium in the name of improving the welfare and quality of life of
the humanity? Especially, how will this issue be solved when materialistic perception of globalism that is being made dominate the world and subsequent
problem of evaluating moral-subjective values are considered? Will the UN be able to get over this paradox in an atmosphere in which quantity forestalls
quality and, with regard to this, “imposing” proposed solutions are put on the market as “standard” packages under
different names and an atmosphere in which all these “standard” packages cause more problems?

No doubt neither at present nor in the medium-term it is easy to answer these questions. Especially approaching to the issue in this way and seeking for
“yes-no” answers to the said questions will mean dynamiting the way to the solution. Anyhow, such an approach will go against both the spirit of social
sciences and the methodological understanding. Our goal here is, through this kind of questions, to bring up the matters that should have been asked and
raised in the first place and to ensure the development of possible solutions, may be by saying “the Emperor is bare.” For this reason, there is no need to
enter into philosophical discussions and very complex methods. Even putting the reality of the world and the statements in the published declaration will be enough
to depict a certain number of challenges in front of the process. Accordingly, although the MDG are launched as a project to find a common solution to the
problems of the humanity at the global level, in practice they are open to be attributed different meanings as long as a common road map cannot be introduced.

Especially after the post-Cold War era within a context where some local issues which could be solved locally are globalized over the concepts are brought into intervention tools,                                                                                                                     so it is inevitable for some nation-states to consider this type of UN based projects cautiously. Therefore, it seems that it wouldn’t be so easy for our world experiencing ebbs and                                                                                                                 flows between the globalization and nation-state process to realize the targets set in the MDG in terms of the implementing developments and practices
about “human rights-democracy- governance” understandings on national, regional and global basis. In other words, this cautious approach will endure unless the
mentality does not change and an objective viewpoint considering the local in many respects and in this context balancing the local-global with collaboration
is not put forth instead of top-down approaches and interventions. On the other hand, as it is partially mentioned above, this is not a problem that
cannot be overcome. The key to overcome it lies in listening the local, trying to grasp its realities, and taking its journey, experience, values and
sensibility into consideration. Hence, it is time to recognize the local as a solution partner rather than taking it only as the source and field of
problems. After all, the locals are global in total and today goals stated with regard to the MDG are predicated on the solution of the problem that grows out
of the locals within the pioneering powers of the globalization. Additionally, it should be accepted that the problems formed with regard to the MDG are not
belong just to the century or millennium we live and that their roots originates in centuries before.

As of today, it cannot be a coincidence that almost the whole of the problems which are on the spotlight of the world agenda and tried to be solved in the
context of the MDG are seen in the former colonial countries, too. As a matter of fact, the said problems’ moving away from their limited and local image,
spreading, deepening, gaining a global character and, at the end, turning into threats to and elements of instability for the future of the whole humanity
have their roots in the centuries before.

In such an environment how can geographical discoveries, colonialism and, as an inevitable outcome of these, imperialism together with the globalization be
kept out of all these? What can be said for materialism that tramples all moral values-beliefs by making material forestall meaning and what can be said for
distorted understanding of modernization that turns people into consumption slaves? Today how many of the problems emerging in the context of the MDG                                                                                                                                                        has followed a development process independent from these mentioned points?

We know that projects are represented as they are very much humanistic in the global manner. However, since they are kept limited to certain regions for
certain reasons and are launched as peculiar to these regions, they can face some challenges in practice. As a result, in resolution of such kind of
problems it is necessary first to have a clear and well-intentioned position and second to take steps accordingly. Then, what can be done at this point?

There is no need to go so far to find an answer to this question. To find an answer, it will be enough to look at successful approaches and practices that this
region contains within and implements in line with its realities and values, that have their roots in centuries before, that maintain their existence today,
and that take human as its base. In this context, two leading practices of civil society perception and solidarity in Uzbekistan are noteworthy. Focusing
on these practices shows that indeed they are successful models for a significant part of the problems drawn out of the MDG.

As a result of the historical practices and experiments, the civil approach understanding in Uzbekistan is based on the protecting the people from many
difficulties and threats and aiming social justice, equality and healthy social structure in such an unstable region like Central Asia. It is known that these
human based practices have the capacity to solve many interdependent social-individual problems with on time interventions. This nongovernmental
approach which is taking the family as the base and the woman and the children in the family as the focus and   imposing the necessity of all types of good education                                                                                                                                             is a successful practice within the power of the local completely. These practices are called “Makhalla System” and “Kamalat Youth Movement” and as mentioned above briefly                                                                                                                     they have got human based nongovernmental understanding, a deep history and tradition in the country.

The governing idea of the “Makhalla System” that has been implemented after the independence of Uzbekistan as one of the most concrete examples of participationary and direct
democracy is making the system, in which the basis of social structure is formed, the ground which prepares the youth for the future. With another words, “Makhalla is a big family”,                                                                                                        “Makhalla is the cradle of education” idea and together with “Economic development starts from the Makhalla” understanding constitutes the core of this model.

Constituting the first stage of the participatory administration, “Makhalla Foundations” started their activities in small Makhalla with 5000-7000 residents in which everyone knows each other.                                                                                         They have a spiritual, educational, informative and ability improving attitude. In this context, education, social assistance, environmental health and development; solution to social problems of                                                                                      the residents; help for the ill, aged and needy; employment and construction of social facilities for the youth; attachment of importance to women and their problems; and                                                                                                                             “Women Affairs Commission” working on a voluntary basis are outcomes of the “on-site and on time solution” perception of this model.

Moreower, “Kamalat Youth Movement”, formed in 2001, accepts young people aged between 14 and 28 as members and prepares them for the future with the necessary facilities.                                                                                                                     It is a civil society movement working actively on the issues such as unity of the youth, protection of their interests, improvement of their abilities, solutions to their problems, teaching them                                                                                                their social rights and guiding them in the way of entrepreneurship, and sport.

Therefore, as it is seen in this study primarily some problems emerged at the local-global basis from the aims put forth in the MDG and some concerns carried
by the local and ignored realities will be considered, firstly. Then, the importance and role of Uzbekistan will try to be emphasized in order to understand the
local very well and adaptation of successful practices of it into the global process. At this point, the contributions of “Uzbek Model” and its NGO understanding with “Mahalla System”                                                                                                        and “Kamalat Youth Movement” which are based on their historical depths, strong tradition, experience and human based dimensions can be considered as a
successful example and experience in terms of challenging with the fundamental issues facing the human beings at the global level.

November 22, 2011
Turkey’s Involvement In Syria Raises the Stakes For Its Government

Turkey’s Involvement In Syria Raises the Stakes For Its Government

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 211

November 15, 2011

By: Saban Kardas

Turkey has accelerated its contact with the Syrian opposition, while maintaining its criticism of the regime’s ongoing violent crackdown on the uprising. This development is in parallel to the growing involvement of the Arab League in the Syrian uprising. A recent deal agreed between the Arab League and Damascus heightened expectations for ending the months-long bloodshed. However, in a move reminiscent of the Baath regime’s delaying tactics while Turkey was seeking to convince President Bashar al-Assad to heed protesters’ calls earlier this year, the Syrian security forces continued their violent campaign even after the deal was announced. This reckless behavior prompted the Arab League to suspend Syria from membership. Rather than backing down in the face of growing regional isolation, the Baath regime preferred to launch a verbal assault on fellow Arab nations, accusing them of pursuing a very dangerous course of action (www.aljazeera.com, November 14).

Pro-regime protestors have attacked several diplomatic representations, which included attacks on the Turkish embassy in Damascus by a crowd of 1,000, and on consulates in Aleppo and Latkia. In response, the Turkish government issued an official protest, evacuated the families of diplomats, asked its citizens not to travel to Syria, and summoned the Syrian charge d’affaires in Ankara (www.mfa.gov.tr, November 13). While the Syrian Foreign Minister, Waled al-Moallem, issued an apology for the attacks, this did not prevent his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu from arguing that Turkey would adopt a “decisive attitude” against these attacks and continue to support “the Syrian people’s rightful struggle” (Today’s Zaman, November 14).

These developments lend support to the arguments of the Syrian opposition. The opposition for a long time broke ranks with the Damascus regime, making clear that they would not settle for political reforms alone and their struggle would continue until Assad relinquishes power (EDM, June 7). In the intervening period, the opposition has been working hard to gain international recognition, and generate larger international momentum behind the military option – similar to the Libyan case.

In the aftermath of these recent events, Davutoglu met with the Syrian National Council, a group seeking to form a united front against the Syrian regime, which reportedly asked for permission to open an office in Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, November 13). Previously, Turkey had hosted several meetings of the opposition groups, and Davutoglu had also received representatives from the Syrian opposition (Sabah, October 18). Moreover, Turkey has provided shelter to refugees fleeing the crackdown in tents inside Turkish border. At the same time, Ankara has imposed an arms embargo on Damascus and expressed its readiness to impose further sanctions.

With these courageous steps and Turkish leaders’ constant calls on the Syrian regime to listen to the people’s voice, Turkey has emerged at the forefront of international efforts for pro-democratic regime change in the country. Normally, Turkey’s pursuit of such a policy might have jeopardized its ties to other authoritarian Arab nations in the region, but given the increasing number of deaths in Syria, even monarchies in the region have asked Assad to leave power. Thus, the recent toughening of the Arab League’s position eases Turkey’s restraint in this unfolding crisis, as it provides a regional endorsement for its actions. Turkey is also acting in close coordination with the Arab League.

However, there is a strong body of opinion in Turkey critical of the government’s increasingly vocal confrontation with Syria. For many analysts, this new state of affairs in relations with Syria marks an obvious weakness in the government’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy, under which Turkey had sought to forge closer relations with Damascus and other capitals in surrounding regions. The fact that Turkey is on the brink of going to war against a leader with whom Turkish leaders had established a close friendship is seen as an indication of the failure of Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy.

Another line of criticism argues that the government is going too far in its stance on the Syrian regime and its decision to support the opposition. They question the prudence of extending shelter to the opposition groups of a neighboring country, which contradicts Turkey’s established state traditions, and argue that if Assad succeeds in surviving this challenge, Ankara will be left with no options to maintain normal relations with Damascus. Yet another criticism presents the Syrian uprising as being orchestrated by Western powers to change the political map of the region. In that view, Turkey’s assertive policy is also part of the same plan and is imposed upon it by Western powers. This somewhat conspiratorial thinking is at times raised even by members of the main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (Cihan, November 10).

While defending the government’s policy during a parliamentary hearing on his ministry’s budget, Davutoglu rebuked such allegations of “subcontracting.” Davutoglu defended Turkey’s position by saying that “in foreign policy, we make the plans, set the principles and develop the discourse. Sometimes when this is just and right, it might be in harmony with the United States. Sometimes with Iran … sometimes with Russia … sometimes with the EU. Thus, just because the United Sates is also taking a stance, shall we turn a blind eye to Syria?” Davutoglu justifies Turkey’s policy on humanitarian grounds and rejects any suggestion that Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy has failed. In this view, Turkey’s solidarity essentially lies with the Syrian people, and in an environment where the regime oppresses unarmed civilians Turkey cannot remain impassive (www.haberturk.com, November 14).

Granted, this new policy raises several security challenges. Since Iran, Russia and China still support Damascus, Turkey risks severing its ties with Iran over this issue (EDM, October 11). Moreover, Assad signaled several times that if Damascus is cornered, there will be extreme repercussions in the region, creating security challenges for all the regional actors. For Turkey, such threats usually bring to mind the issue of Damascus resorting to the “PKK card,” meaning it could use its leverage over some groups within the PKK to accelerate attacks on Turkish civilian and military targets. While President Abdullah Gul and other Turkish officials have warned Syria not to inflame the PKK (Star, November 9), there is no guarantee that Damascus will not choose this option when needed, nor is it clear what instruments Turkey will use to deter Damascus from following that path.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkeys-involvement-in-syria-raises-the-stakes-for-its-government/

November 17, 2011