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Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 12

January 18, 2012

By: Saban Kardas

As Turkey struggles to avert crises involving its neighbors Syria and Iran, Iraq has emerged as yet another issue that needs immediate attention from Turkish diplomacy. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent remarks critical of what he considered to be Ankara’s “interference” in Iraqi internal affairs threatens to worsen the already tense situation in the Middle East.

In an interview broadcast by state television, Maliki sent a stern warning to Ankara asking it to stop its interventions in Iraqi domestic affairs. Maliki maintained that Turkey had acted as though it ruled Iraq, and went on to claim that the current path taken by Ankara might invite disaster and civil war in the region. He warned that if Turkey continued the same rhetoric, it might suffer repercussions from its actions, because it also has different sects and ethnic groups (Anadolu Ajansi, January 13).

Maliki’s inflammatory rhetoric was triggered by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s remarks in the previous week. Both in his conversation with Maliki and in his public addresses, Erdogan urged the Iraqi leadership to take swift measures to reduce tensions in Iraq, which were caused by an arrest warrant being issued for the Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi (Anadolu Ajansi, January 10). Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Hashemi, a leading Sunni politician, shortly before the withdrawal of US forces on the grounds that he was leading a death squad targeting Iraqi politicians. Fearing for his safety, Hashemi escaped to northern Iraq controlled by the Kurdistan regional government. The clampdown on Hashemi and other Sunni ministers triggered a new wave of attacks against the Shiites, raising questions about the sustainability of the fragile coalition government, as well as the future of the country as a unified entity.

Turkey initially refrained from direct involvement in the unfolding crisis over the arrest warrant against Hashemi and exclusion of Sunnis from key government positions. It drew attention to the risks that the recent rift could escalate into sectarian conflict, with destabilizing effects for the entire region. It also maintained communication with the Kurdistan regional government to forge national consensus. Regionally, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also sought to mobilize a joint Turkish-Iranian response to address the Shiite-Sunni disagreements, which lie at the core of the ongoing crises in Syria, Bahrain and Iraq (EDM, January 10).

However, the recent spree of bombings in Baghdad prompted Erdogan to raise this issue publicly. Raising concerns about the inability of Iraqi political authorities to prevent bloodshed, Erdogan maintained that he has lost his optimism for the future of democracy in this country, as the government laid siege to the houses of coalition partners. Erdogan challenged Maliki to assume his historical responsibility and work to maintain the unity of Iraq, adding that those who instigate chaos with sectarian instincts would go down in history as devils. Echoing speculation that Iran might be behind the recent political crisis in Iraq, Erdogan also warned other countries endeavoring to exert influence in Iraq to act in a prudent and responsible manner (Anadolu Ajansi, January 10).

While Erdogan was trying to promote common sense on the part of his Iraqi counterparts, he also provided further ammunition to Maliki and his Shiite block that seem determined to take a stand against Turkey to bolster their position in Iraqi domestic politics. Following Maliki’s televised criticism of Ankara, the Turkish envoy in Baghdad was summoned by the Iraqi deputy foreign minister to be reminded of Iraq’s expectation that Turkey must avoid actions which could disturb good neighborly relations (Anadolu Ajansi January 16). In response, the Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara, who was told that Turkey found unacceptable the allegation that it is interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs. It was only natural for Turkey to pursue the stability of its neighbors, according to Turkish foreign ministry officials (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 16).

This development is likely to invite a harsh response from the Turkish side in the days ahead, but it has already pleased Hashemi and his supporters. Reportedly Sunni politicians, who feel threatened by the government crackdown, were approaching Turkish officials to take a more effective role in order to thwart a sectarian conflict. Hashemi also expressed his debt to Turkey, adding that Erdogan had personally worked to support his cause in recent months. Reiterating his concerns about receiving a fair trial in Baghdad, he vowed not to return to the capital before his safety is ensured (www.ntvmnsbc.com, Today’s Zaman, January 16).

Clearly, this dispute raises many questions about Turkey’s Middle East policy. At one level it reignites the possibility of sectarian conflict in the region. Turkey has purposefully refrained from sectarian considerations in its foreign policy, and has sought to embrace all major groups, a policy which was most clearly observed in Iraq. When a violent civil war destabilized Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003, Ankara played a major role in convincing the Sunni groups to withdraw their support from the insurgency and join the political processes in Baghdad. During the government vacuum that ensued after the Iraqi elections of 2010, Turkey again prioritized Iraqi unity and urged the al Iraqiyye list representing Sunni groups to work with the Maliki-led coalition.

As the risk of sectarian conflict may have increased in the wake of the Arab Spring, Turkey once again wants to spearhead preventive measures to avert such a scenario. In Iraq, while seeking to play a similar role and prevent further polarization and eventual partition of the country along sectarian lines, Turkey arguably runs the risk of being drawn into sectarian divisions, as the Sunni groups are obviously in search of an ally to balance Maliki’s bloc that interestingly is supported by not only Iran, but also the United States.

Also, this might have repercussions for the Turkish-US relationship. Despite its objections against the invasion of Iraq, Turkey worked closely with the United States, hoping that this would be the best way to prevent the country’s descent into chaos and total breakdown. In the process leading to the withdrawal of US forces, Ankara again coordinated its policy with Washington. However Washington’s support for Maliki, whose reckless show of force and exclusion of Sunni groups from government positions, might also expose new divisions between Ankara and Washington.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-works-to-prevent-sectarian-rift-in-iraq/

January 19, 2012
As France Tightens the Noose, Turkey Reacts with Outrageous Words and Deeds

Turkish leaders routinely proclaim that they are not afraid of facing their country’s past. Yet, the minute someone reminds them of the darkest chapters of their history, they panic and overreact.

The most recent example of Turkish officials’ irrational behavior is their reaction to French initiatives to adopt a law criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. Despite Turkish threats and retaliatory measures, the bill was adopted by the French Parliament on December 22, 2011 and the Senate is expected to approve it on January 23, 2012.

Here are a few examples of outrageous Turkish overreaction to France and all things French:

— Prime Minister Erdogan accused French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s father of participating in the Algerian atrocities, while serving in the French Army. Sarkozy’s father shot back by admonishing Erdogan to read his biography, telling him that he had never set foot in Algeria.

— To justify his own country’s genocide of Armenians, Erdogan accused France of committing “genocide” in Algeria. Yet, Erdogan was shocked when Algeria’s Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia rebuked him for playing politics with Algerians’ blood. Ouyahia also blamed Turkey for the deaths of countless Algerians by providing ammunition to France during the colonial period for which former Turkish Pres. Ozal apologized to Algeria.

— The Mayor of Ankara announced last week that the City Council had decided to change the name of “Paris Street” to “Algeria Street,” rename “Charles De Gaulle Street” in honor of a yet to be named Algerian hero, and erect a monument dedicated to the Algerian “massacres” in front of the French Embassy in the Turkish capital.

— Turkish factories have been busily manufacturing toilet paper, trash bags, and baby diapers carrying Sarkozy’s name, and condoms with the picture of French Deputy Valerie Boyer. Meanwhile, a gang of Turkish hackers attacked the websites of French lawmakers and threatened to rape Mrs. Boyer and murder her children.

— Prof. Oya Akgonenc wrote a hilarious article titled, “Armenian Events in the Triangle of Armenia, France and America.” She identified three “dangerous attackers” of Turkey whose last names start with S: “Sarkozy of France, Sargsyan of Armenia, and Sassounian, head of the Armenian lobby in the United States!”

— Although Turkey called for a boycott of French products and services, Turkish flights to Paris were fully booked, as the number of Turks visiting France during the holidays increased by 10% compared to last year. Similarly, trade between the two countries increased by 30% after the 2001 French recognition of the Armenian Genocide, despite the Turkish boycott of France.

— French-Algerian businessman Rachid Nekkaz, who proudly declared during a recent visit to Turkey, “I feel like I am a Turk,” announced setting up a million euro ($1.3 million) fund to pay the fine for any Turk arrested in France for denying the Armenian Genocide. Mr. Nekkaz failed to inform potential Turkish denialists that the pending French law also carries a sentence of one year in jail which his fund would be unable to prevent.

— The head of a Turkish news agency called for the closing down of French schools in Turkey and banning the teaching of French in Turkish schools.

Such nutty statements are likely to multiply after the French Senate approves the bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide and Pres. Sarkozy signs it into law, in view of the fact that the two largest French parties have expressed their support for the Armenian bill. Imagine the whining of Turkish leaders, when Turks are arrested in France for breaking the upcoming law on genocide denial.

Turkish protests will reach a crescendo when the French government proposes to the 25 other states of the European Union a similar anti-denial law which would lead to the arrest and punishment of Turkish denialists throughout Europe.

Turkish leaders have no one else to blame but themselves for their embarrassing and demeaning predicament. Yet, Turkey is in no position to give lectures about freedom of expression to anyone, given its draconian laws that violate the basic human rights of its own citizens. In France, it is illegal to lie about genocide, while in Turkey, it is illegal to tell the truth!

Instead of blaming the French Senate or the three men “whose last names start with S,” Turkish leaders could get out of their century long quagmire by acknowledging the Armenian Genocide and making amends to the descendants of dispossessed victims.

January 17, 2012
Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 6

January 10, 2012

By: Saban Kardas

Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, paid a crucial visit to Tehran on January 6, amidst the increasing confrontation between Iran and the West. The visit mainly provided an opportunity to address bilateral issues, as it followed a heated debate in recent months which questions whether Turkey and Iran were involved in an undeclared rivalry in the Arab Spring. The two countries’ diverging positions on Syria, Turkey’s decision to host NATO’s early warning radar, as well as differences on the Palestinians’ quest for recognition, arguably pitted the two against each other. The confrontational mood was further worsened by harsh statements against Turkey by Iranian politicians and high-ranking officials (EDM, October 11, 2011).

As such statements even led to direct threats voiced by some Iranian lawmakers and military officers, indicating that Iran might take military action against NATO facilities in Turkey, Davutoglu was prompted to convey his uneasiness and demand an explanation. Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, visited Ankara in an effort to allay Ankara’s growing concerns. Reiterating the two countries’ friendship, Salehi sought to assure his Turkish counterpart that such remarks reflected personal opinions and did not represent official Iranian policy on Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, December 14, 2011).

Ankara also downplayed such threatening remarks as personal opinions, in an effort to maintain channels for dialogue with Tehran. Though not hiding the differences of opinion on regional issues, Davutoglu and other Turkish officials prefer to focus on issues of converging views and continue to view Tehran as a major stakeholder in the region whose cooperation is essential. More importantly, Davutoglu is keen to reassure his Iranian counterparts that Turkey will not take part in any direct military action against Iran, which seems as a calculated move to comfort Tehran and convince it to steer away from the path of escalation.

With such considerations in mind, Davutoglu paid a working visit to Iran on January 6, to meet Salehi and other Iranian officials. Davutoglu worked hard to stress the defensive nature of the ballistic missile shield and reiterated that Turkey would not let its territory be used in any attack against Iran. The two ministers also agreed to continue to discuss regional issues, and meet at least twice each year (Anadolu Ajansi, January 5).

Beyond the immediate Turkish-Iranian frictions, Davutoglu addressed a number of regional issues with Iran. Foregoing the speculations of rivalry, Davutoglu invited his Iranian counterparts to work together in order to address the escalating tensions in the region, which some claim could lead to Sunni-Shiite sectarian divisions. In the last two days, because the uprising in Syria, the ongoing political crisis in Iraq, and the situation in Bahrain involve some sectarian elements, Davutoglu increasingly refers to an imminent danger of sectarian conflict and warns against a new Cold War in the Middle East (Dogan, January 8).

Moreover, the uncertain future of the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program, especially in view of US sanctions policy and the Iranian brinkmanship in the Strait of Hormuz is a growing concern for Turkey. Ankara recognizes Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology, but also invites the country to be more transparent about its ongoing program and allay concerns on the part of Western powers.

Since the talks held between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul one year ago, diplomatic channels were largely closed. In order to push things forward on that front, Davutoglu seems to have attempted shuttle diplomacy. In the wake of his Tehran trip, he announced that he was in touch with Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief, on this issue. Davutoglu raised expectations by maintaining that both parties were ready to resume nuclear talks in Turkey. Earlier, Salehi also expressed his readiness to return to nuclear talks in a suitable time and venue agreed upon by the parties, adding that Turkey would be the best option (Anadolu Ajansi, January 8). Commenting on this development, US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, said that the US remained in consultation with Turkey over Davutoglu’s trip and agrees with Turkey’s goal of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and complying with its international obligations, though they might differ on tactics. She also emphasized Washington’s readiness to resume discussions, though adding that Iran has yet to formally convey its decision to start the talks (Today’s Zaman, January 7).

Adding urgency to the matter, the United States and its European allies are initiating a new wave of sanctions to pressure Iran on the economic front. The sanctions recently approved by President Barack Obama involve penalizing the financial institutions doing business with Iran as well as halting oil imports from Iran, by targeting its Central Bank. Turkey abides by the sanctions regime introduced by the UN Security Council in the summer of 2010, but refuses to implement the unilateral Western sanctions on the grounds that they are non-binding. However, there has been growing US expectation for Turkey to join the new sanctions, while Ankara seeks an exemption, given its oil and gas imports from Iran, requiring it to work with Iranian financial institutions.

A visit by a US delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State, William Burns, to Ankara on January 9, offered an opportunity to discuss these issues. During his talks with Turkish officials, the US delegation, among others, solicited Turkey’s support for unilateral sanctions. Prior to the meeting, some senior US Congressmen and diplomats visited Turkish government officials and bureaucrats, underscoring the importance attached to this issue (Haberturk, January 9).

Commenting on the visit, Nuland dismissed the argument that Turkey opposes US policy on Iran. She emphasized that the US acknowledges Turkey’s sensitivities given Ankara’s trade ties, but the two sides will continue their dialogue on how to maximize the pressures on Iran to force it to comply with its international obligations (Haberturk, January 10). Turkish sources also reported that Ankara does not want to see a further escalation of the already heightened tensions in the region (Sabah, January 10).

Uneasy at the growing escalation, Ankara seeks to dampen tensions through a reassertion of its facilitator role and engaging the parties, without taking any side. Once again, Turkey is walking a diplomatic tightrope due to its difficult neighbor’s relations with the West.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-wants-to-resume-talks-on-iranian-nuclear-program/

January 11, 2012
Azerbaijan and Obama Suffer Setbacks As Amb. Bryza’s Service is Cut Short

As a result of successive political blunders by the Obama administration, Matthew Bryza was forced to abandon his ambassadorial post in Azerbaijan last week.

Pres. Obama ignored repeated warnings that the candidate he was nominating as Ambassador to Azerbaijan in May 2010 had serious flaws. Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accused Bryza of having a pro-Azerbaijani bias and questionable ties to Azeri officials. The Senators were troubled by reports that foreign officials had given Bryza lavish gifts at his Istanbul wedding, during which the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan had served as a groomsman. In addition, the nominee’s Turkish-born wife Zeyno Baran was accused of conflicts of interest while working on Caspian energy issues at a Washington think tank. She had also antagonized the Armenian-American community by testifying against recognition of the Armenian Genocide at a Senate Subcommittee hearing.

When Pres. Obama failed to take these concerns seriously, Senators Barbara Boxer (Dem.-CA) and Robert Menendez (Dem.-New Jersey) had no choice but to place a hold on Bryza’s nomination, effectively blocking his confirmation. Obama then compounded his error by appointing Bryza as Ambassador to Azerbaijan in late 2010 without Senate approval. The President seemed oblivious to the potential damage to his own reputation, the prestige of the United States, and U.S.-Azeri relations, should the Senate not confirm Bryza’s nomination, forcing him to leave his post and return to Washington upon expiration of his 12-month appointment.

As Amb. Bryza’s temporary assignment was ending in December 2011, Obama administration officials pressured Senators Boxer and Menendez to allow him to continue serving in Azerbaijan by confirming his nomination. The two Senators remained steadfast in opposing Bryza, even though it is not easy for these Democratic politicians to turn down a request from the President of the United States, who also happens to be the nominal leader of their own party.

The Senators were also pressured by the government of Azerbaijan and its powerful lobbying firms which went into overdrive to justify their exorbitant fees. Through their special connections they were able to get the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post to publish editorials attacking the Senators and the Armenian National Committee of America which had spearheaded a public campaign against this unqualified Ambassadorial nominee.

Not surprisingly, the Wall Street Journal heaped lavish praise on Bryza, calling him a “respected career foreign service officer,” and accused the two Senators of “kissing up to the Armenian-American lobby.”

The Washington Post was even nastier. Its editorial could be described as outright racist and anti-Armenian. Contrary to its claim of defending “the larger U.S. national interest,” the newspaper was actually advocating the confirmation of an Ambassador with questionable credentials who would weaken, rather than strengthen America’s interests.

The Washington Post concluded its shameful editorial by accusing “oil-poor” and “isolated” Armenia as being the biggest loser in the Bryza controversy. We beg to disagree. This is an American issue and Armenia had no role in it. In fact, the biggest losers are those who lobbied long and hard for the confirmation of an ill-qualified Ambassador who was more intent on serving the interests of Baku in Washington than those of America in Azerbaijan.

In my opinion, the real losers are:

1) Pres. Obama who picked a poorly qualified nominee and stubbornly pushed for his confirmation when it was crystal clear from day one that Bryza did not have the chance of a snowball in hell to get confirmed.

2) The government of Azerbaijan which spent a fortune on lobbyists who miserably failed to get the job done.

3) Azeri and Turkish organizations, such as the Azerbaijani-American Council, Azerbaijan Society of America, Pax Turcica Institute, US Azeris Network, and Assembly of Turkish-American Associations, which issued countless press releases and sent thousands of e-mails to the Senate — to no avail. By supporting Bryza, they confirmed that in fact he was “their man,” and not an unbiased diplomat.

4) The Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post which compromised their journalistic integrity to please their “petro-friends.”

5) The 36 former U.S. officials who signed a joint letter urging the Senate to confirm Bryza. It is no mere coincidence that most of these signatories are currently associated with think tanks and lobbying firms that are funded by Azerbaijan or expect such funding in the future.

There are, however, two clear winners:

1) The Armenian-American community which has sent a loud and clear message to Baku, Ankara, and Washington that it represents a powerful political force to be reckoned with.

2) Matthew Bryza and his wife, who as lobbyists for Azerbaijan and Turkey, can be expected to make millions by cashing in on their high-level connections in Baku and Ankara.

January 10, 2012
Story Behind the Turkish Idiom “Pabucu Dama Atılmak”

Pabucu Dama Atılmak – Shoe to be thrown to the roof ” to lose favor; to fall from popular esteem; to seem less appealing; to look pale by comparison”…..

The story behind the idiom “Pabucu Dama Atilmak” – to throw someones shoe on the roof is…

At the time of the Ottoman, the organisation the artisans and craftsmen belonged to would regulate trade along with social life. They had come up with an interesting method to try to prevent defective goods, cheap production (with intention of less material, more profit), and bad quality work.

Let’s say you bought a shoe and had it fixed, but it was flawed. The committee would listen to both sides of the story- the plaintiff (customer) and the craftsman. If the plaintiff’s complaint was found to be legitimate, the cost of the shoe would be paid back to him and the shoe itself would be thrown on the roof of the shoemaker as a warning or deterrent to others.

This way, passer-by’s and future customers would know who is a good shoemaker and who isn’t just by looking at their rooftops. The shoemakers whose shoes are thrown to the roof would thereby lose out on financial earnings, and lose potential customers thus it would be as if HIS “shoe was thrown on the roof”.

January 5, 2012
Turkey Besieged by Armenian Successes Long Before the Genocide Centennial

Turkish leaders made a serious tactical error in 2011. They were so preoccupied with countering the upcoming tsunami of the centennial of the Armenian Genocide in 2015, that they lost sight of the more immediate political storms facing them.

Armenians quickly capitalized on the Turkish blunder, managing to score a series of early successes: 1) the French Parliament adopted a bill banning denial of the Armenian Genocide, 2) the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on Turkey to return Armenian churches and other properties to their rightful owners, 3) an Israeli parliamentary committee held a public hearing on the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and 4) a U.S. Federal Court may shortly issue a default judgment against the Republic of Turkey.

Facing a tenacious French President who refused to be intimidated by insults and threats, Turkey reacted with slash and burn tactics that aggravated its problems and undermined its bid for European Union membership. By withdrawing its ambassador from Paris, the Turkish government deprived itself of the services of a capable diplomat at a crucial time when the French Senate is about to take up the bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. Judging from past experience, the Turkish Ambassador will be sent back to Paris soon, making his dramatic recall an exercise in futility and attracting the ridicule of the diplomatic community. If Turkey withdraws its ambassador every time a country recognizes the Armenian Genocide or adopts a decision contrary to Ankara’s wishes, it will isolate itself from the rest of the world.

Even more damaging to Turkey’s interests is the threat to boycott goods imported from countries that are deemed to be “unfriendly.” Turkey would simply damage its own economy by purchasing inferior products at higher prices from alternative sources. Moreover, should Turkey stop buying highly technical items such as passenger planes and advanced missiles from the few countries that make them, it will end up with an antiquated air transport system and a weakened military. In recent days, however, Turkish leaders have sheepishly withdrawn their bombastic boycott threats, after realizing that the World Trade Organization would impose severe penalties on Turkey for violating its membership obligations.

Turning to the House resolution on return of church properties, the Turkish government and its high-priced lobbying firms were caught flat-footed on how to counter such a delicate matter. After years of success in derailing Armenian Genocide resolutions, the Turkish side was clueless about fighting a motion that called for the return of church buildings and other properties to their respective Christian communities. Consequently, the resolution was approved by a vote of 43-1 in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and by more than two-thirds of the full House. This is the first time that the U.S. Congress has gone on record demanding that Turkey restore the rights of genocide victims beyond the mere acknowledgment of the Genocide. In the coming months and years, Armenians will be presenting an ever growing list of demands to international organizations, parliaments around the world, and the Turkish government itself.

The third positive development took place in Israel, when the Knesset’s Education Committee held an unprecedented three-hour public hearing on the Armenian Genocide, despite pressure from Turkey, its lackey Azerbaijan, and the Netanyahu government. This discussion, held in front of TV cameras, and not behind closed doors, is expected to continue at a later date. It is shameful that the Israeli government continues to obstruct recognition of the Armenian Genocide, perhaps hoping to regain Turkey’s trust and friendship. Rather than playing political games with mass murder, the Netanyahu government should acknowledge the truth of the Armenian Genocide for the sake of its own reputation.

The final salutary development is an expected default judgment to be issued by a U.S. Federal Court against the Republic of Turkey on two lawsuits demanding payment for Armenian properties confiscated during the Genocide. Such a judgment would be a stern warning to the Turkish authorities that they cannot continue to enjoy the ill-gotten gains from the blood money of genocide victims.

Long before the arrival of the Armenian tsunami in 2015, Turkey is increasingly confronted by pressures for greater human rights and Kurdish autonomy, and far-reaching Armenian demands, while experiencing acute problems with virtually all of its neighbors. A Turkish regime besieged with serious internal and external challenges is less of a threat to its own population and its neighborhood, and more likely to settle past injustices and present conflicts.

January 4, 2012