The most important thing that French President Nicolas Sarkozy emphasized during a visit to Yerevan in October 2011 was that France will introduce sanctions against Turkey if it fails to recognize the Armenian genocide by the end of the year. (more…)
Category: Authors
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The French impasse in Turkish-Armenian relations
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Congress Urges Turkey to Return Churches:
First Successful Attempt at Restitution
Turkey suffered a major setback last week when the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved a landmark resolution calling on the Turkish government to return over 2,000 confiscated Christian churches and other properties “to their rightful owners.”This victory is particularly significant as it comes at a time when Turkey is said to be at the apex of its power both regionally and internationally. Yet, despite its considerable political and economic clout, neither the Turkish regime nor its high-powered lobbyists could openly oppose a congressional resolution intended to protect the religious rights of Christian minorities in Turkey. This is the reason why, when the resolution was first submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 20, as an amendment to the State Department’s Foreign Relations Authorization Act, it was easily adopted by a vote of 43-1.Just before the resolution came up for a vote on the House floor on December 13, the State Department, at Turkey’s request, made discreet but ultimately futile efforts to derail it. Turkish-American groups also unsuccessfully lobbied against the resolution. Neither the House Republican majority nor the Democratic minority heeded their denialist demands. The strong bipartisan consensus paved the way for the resolution to overcome the hurdle of needing over two-thirds of the House votes for passage, since the motion was presented under a special parliamentary procedure known as the Suspension Calendar.The Turkish government and its high-priced lobbying firms were greatly embarrassed when only one member of Congress rose on the House floor to speak and vote against the resolution. Even then, Cong. Ed Whitfield (R-KY), a co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Turkey, readily acknowledged that not “very many people would oppose” this bill! He then added: “The mere fact that the resolution is being introduced would leave an objective observer with the intent (sic) opinion that religious freedom is being systematically denied in Turkey!” After rambling on for a few more minutes and running out of things to say, Cong. Whitfield yielded the balance of his time to his opponents — the supporters of the resolution!After such a devastating defeat, the Turkish Foreign Ministry did not have much to say, except to express its disappointment. This is standard Turkish practice — initiallyapplying heavy pressure and making threats to prevent an unfavorable decision, and after losing the vote, dismissing the bill as being unimportant, in order to hide their embarrassing failure. If the Turkish government did not think the bill was important, why did it turn the world upside down in trying to defeat it?In attempting to fool the unsuspecting public, Turkish officials claimed that the resolution was merely adopted by two to one vote, without explaining that during voice votes, most House members are not usually in the Chamber. Once the leadership of the two parties comes to an agreement on an issue, only a handful of members are then required to adopt the bill. The real question that Turkish authorities must answer is why only one Congressman out of 435 voted against the resolution? This episode demonstrates that the new Ottoman emperor has no clothes!Even though this resolution is not binding, unless the Senate also adopts it and the President signs it into law, it is still a significant breakthrough for all Christian minorities in Turkey whose properties have been confiscated for decades. Encouraged by this positive development, the Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek communities will continue their active collaboration to pressure Turkey to restore their historic rights.For Armenians worldwide, this is the first time that the U.S. Congress has demanded restitution from Turkey, rather than mere recognition of the Genocide. This resolution could serve as an impetus for other countries and international organizations to follow suit, demanding the restoration of property rights in Turkey. Henceforth, the Turkish government has to be much more cautious when trampling on these rights, knowing full well that the international community is keeping a watchful eye on its recurring violations.The successful passage of this bill will energize Armenians around the world to continue the struggle for restitution of their losses during the Genocide. Regrettably, no clergyman or official in Armenia has said a single word on this important issue, as if the fate of Armenian churches in Turkey is of no interest to them! Wouldn’t it be in Armenians’ best interest if Armenia joined with the Diaspora to seek restitution, particularly in view of Pres. Sargsyan’s recent declaration in Marseille, France, demanding “justice” from Turkey? -
Pres. Sargsyan Makes Major Strategic Shift in Armenia’s Demands from Turkey
Pres. Serzh Sargsyan delivered a major speech in Marseille, France, last week, during which he introduced a new strategy for the resolution of Armenia’s demands from Turkey. Until now, the Armenian government had merely pursued the recognition of the Armenian Genocide.For the first time, the President spoke about Armenia’s demand for “justice.” To ensure that his message was received loud and clear, he repeated the word “justice” three times in three separate sentences:— “Every Armenian demands justice, whether he or she lives in Armenia, Artsakh or the Diaspora.”— “We were strong enough to survive the Meds Yeghern [Great Calamity], and we are just as strong now to demand justice.” The President used the term “Armenian Genocide” six times in other parts of his speech.— “That was the joyful news for justice, not revenge,” Pres. Sargsyan stated, describing the joy of Marseille Armenians in 1921, when they heard the acquittal of Soghomon Tehlirian, Talat’s assassin, by a German court.Surprisingly, not a single political commentator in Armenia, Turkey or elsewhere took note of the significant shift in the approach articulated by Pres. Sargsyan. Seeking “justice” for the victims of genocide is a completely different objective than simply attaining recognition. In this context, the word “justice” encompasses the undoing of as much of the damage as possible, by demanding the restitution and return of all looted assets, confiscated properties, and occupied territories.While advancing a more comprehensive set of demands from Turkey, Pres. Sargsyan expressed his conviction that the day would come when Turkey’s leaders would acknowledge the mass crimes committed by their predecessors: “We are confident that Turkey will repent. That is neither a precondition nor a desire to exact revenge. Turkey must face its own history. Someday, Turkey’s leadership would find the strength to reassess its approach to the Armenian Genocide. Our position has not changed — it is clear cut. We are prepared to establish normal relations with Turkey, befitting neighboring countries. For example, neighboring countries Poland and Germany led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, acknowledging his country’s terrible crimes, dropped to his knees at the Warsaw Ghetto. Sooner or later, Turkey, a self-described European country, will have a leadership worthy of being called European, which will bow its head at the Tsitsernagapert [Genocide] Memorial. The sooner the better, but, that’s the prerogative of the Turkish people. We cannot impose anything on them. They should do that for the sake of the Turkish people, just as Willy Brandt did for the sake of the German people.”Egemen Bagis, Turkey’s Minister for European Union Affairs, perhaps not comprehending the far reaching consequences of Pres. Sargsyan’s demand for “justice,” reacted angrily to other parts of the Armenian President’s remarks. Bagis arrogantly stated: “There is no power in the world that could bring the Turkish people to its knees. On the contrary, the Turkish people know full well how to bring to their knees those who make such ill-informed statements.”I fully endorse Pres. Sargsyan’s new approach to the pursuit of Armenian demands from Turkey. Through my columns, speeches, interviews, and private meetings, I have repeatedly urged Armenia’s leaders to demand “justice” from Turkey, rather than simply seeking genocide recognition. One of my articles on this topic, “Genocide Recognition and Quest for Justice,” was published last year in The International & Comparative Law Review of the Loyola Law School of Los Angeles.Armenia is better off presenting its claims from Turkey in terms of seeking “justice,” to avoid the danger of making official territorial demands from a powerful and menacing neighbor. Nevertheless, the demand for “justice” is a code word or shorthand for a comprehensive set of claims from Turkey. Not even Turkey’s denialist leaders would dare challenge the universally-accepted notion of “justice” based on the rule of law, specifically, international law.While Pres. Sargsyan’s remarks in Marseille are highly commendable, it remains to be seen how this newly articulated concept of seeking justice for the Armenian Genocide will be translated into action. What practical steps will the Armenian government, particularly the Foreign Ministry, take to demand justice from Turkey? Will Armenia back the lawsuits filed by Diaspora Armenian communities in American and European courts against Turkey, demanding restitution for Armenian losses during the Genocide or will Armenia bring its own lawsuit against the Republic of Turkey in the World Court? -
A Reality Check On US-Turkish Relations
A Reality Check On US-Turkish Relations
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 223December 8, 2011By: Saban KardasUS Vice President, Joe Biden, paid a working visit to Turkey, which provided an opportunity for a reality check of the current condition of US-Turkish bilateral relations. In addition to meeting with Turkish leaders, Biden attended the Global Entrepreneurship summit, which was developed as a new platform by the Obama administration to foster dialogue and cooperation with the Muslim world. Throughout his public appearances, Biden praised Turkey’s economic and political achievements, highlighting its potential to serve as a model for other nations.Beyond these words of praise, his contacts largely served to reiterate the growing consensus between the two countries, rather than breaking new ground on any major issue. While seeking to mobilize Ankara’s support for key US strategic interests in the Middle East, Biden at the same time worked to assure his Turkish counterparts about the continuation of US strategic involvement in ensuring regional stability. In charge of the Obama administration’s Iraq portfolio, Biden’s visit to Ankara was preceded by his earlier stopover in Iraq. In many ways, the US experience in Iraq was also a major turning point for Turkish-American relations. Following the disagreements caused by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, bilateral relations cooled, resulting in serious questioning on both sides concerning the future of the alliance that tied both nations together. Over time, the two countries adjusted their policies in Iraq, as they soon realized that they have major stakes in the stabilization of this country. Their coordinated action in Iraq has been an important development that helped maintain strategic cooperation in recent years. In an environment where the region is in flux in the wake of the Arab Spring and the US military withdrawal is imminent, however, Turkish concerns over the future of Iraq have become even more worrisome. In that regard, Biden largely worked to convey the message to Turkish leaders that the United States will remain committed to that country after the military withdrawal.
Obviously, another issue of shared concern is the evolving situation in Syria, which runs the risk of destabilizing the region. Despite its initial argument for a controlled transition under Assad’s watch, Turkey has increasingly criticized the Syrian government forces’ brutal crackdown against the opposition and emerged on the frontline of the international efforts to prevent further killing of civilians. As Turkey recently announced a new round of sanctions against the Assad regime in similar fashion with Western powers, the visit provided an opportunity for exchanging information and discussing ways to further coordinate policy on Syria. However, this convergence is putting the Turkish government in a risky situation as Turkey moves to initiate economic sanctions, which might hurt certain constituents and especially local economy. Therefore, although Turkey has followed a policy in tune with the Western and US position, it has to tread a fine line to avoid being seen as too closely aligned with the United States. Most opposition parties and nationalist circles in Turkey view the government as implementing a program in Syria imposed upon it by the United States and interpret Biden’s visit as Ankara’s submission to Washington in its regional policies (Yenicag, December 4).
Iran was another major item on Biden’s agenda. Biden reportedly sought to convey the message that the US policy of isolating Tehran through coercive measures was effective and they needed to be pursued vigilantly (Hurriyet, December 3). Yet another source of friction in the bilateral relationship once, the recent change in Turkey’s policy on Iran has pulled Ankara and Washington together, also leading to a series of threatening statements coming from Tehran. Granted, Turkey remains reluctant to impose new sanctions against Iran, in an effort to avoid putting further strain on its relations with Iran.
In return for Ankara’s more cooperative position on issues of interest to the United States, Washington has been more forthcoming in its support for Turkey’s fight against the terrorist campaign by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has seen escalation in recent years. Biden reiterated recent steps undertaken by the United States, including the stationing of Predator drones in Incirlik to increase Turkey’s information gathering capacity, and selling three Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey. Moreover, Turkish President Abdullah Gul seemed content with Biden’s statements that even after the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, Turkey would continue to receive support from not only the United States, but also Iraqi groups in its fight against the PKK , December 2). Though such statements obviously are important signs of commitment from a symbolic and political point of view, the level of military contribution is unlikely to bolster Turkey’s operational ability against the PKK and change the situation on the ground decisively in favor of the Turkish army.
Granted, the accelerating pace of the US-Turkey security partnership has been an issue of concern in terms of the ongoing process of domestic transformation inside Turkey. Some commentators who have grown critical of the AK Party government’s democratic credentials and its commitment to fundamental rights have been expecting the West and the United States to act as a restraint against the “authoritarian tendencies” of the government. Troubled by the new realignment between Ankara and Washington, they have expressed concern that the US might turn a blind eye to the government’s conduct in domestic politics. One commentator argues that “the Turkish government takes it as carte blanche to be careless about political freedoms, to limit free speech and to crush the Kurdish opposition in return of its ‘great’ role in regional politics” (Hurriyet Daily News, November 15).
Partly in an effort to allay such concerns, US delegations visiting Turkey and US diplomats based in Ankara often emphasize the importance of respecting basic rights. Maintaining the same tradition, Biden highlighted the need for a free political climate, and urged Turkey to maintain the momentum for rewriting a more civilian and democratic constitution (Anadolu Ajansi, December 4). It remains to be seen if such statements will be followed by deeds in the coming months and whether the US will observe the AK Party’s domestic conduct in a manner to satisfy its critics.
https://jamestown.org/program/a-reality-check-on-us-turkish-relations/ -
US Court to Rule on Turkish Banks’ Motion to Dismiss Armenian Lawsuits
Two separate lawsuits were filed last year in US Federal Court in Los Angeles against the Republic of Turkey and two of its major banks demanding compensation for properties confiscated from Armenians after the 1915 Genocide.The first is a class action lawsuit seeking what could amount to billions of dollars from the Turkish Republic, T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, and the Central Bank of Turkey for unjust enrichment from liquidation of properties belonging to Armenians deported and exterminated during the Genocide.The second lawsuit, filed by three Armenian-Americans, seeks $64 million for their confiscated properties in Adana, Turkey, and millions more for accrued rent and interest paid by the U.S. government in the past 60 years for use of the strategic Incirlik Air Base, built on land taken from families of the Armenian plaintiffs.When these lawsuits were initiated, the Turkish government and its two banks ridiculed the charges, claiming that US courts have no authority to judge the actions of other governments. In order to block the lawsuits, the Turkish entities refused to be served with the legal documents, which is the first step in filing a lawsuit. After lengthy cat and mouse games, Turkish officials finally received the court documents transmitted to them by the US Embassy in Ankara at the request of the State Department.After grudgingly accepting the court papers, the Republic of Turkey refused to appear in US Federal Court, despite warnings from the State Department that it risked a default judgment. The Turkish banks, however, fearing a similar fate, rushed to the court and filed a motion to dismiss the pending lawsuits.In their filings, the banks objected to the lawsuits, claiming that American courts lacked jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. They argued that the lawsuits should not go forward because of the Ankara Agreement of 1934, the “political question doctrine,” potential harm to U.S.-Turkish relations, lack of evidence that the plaintiffs are heirs of the owners of the confiscated properties, and the expiry of the statute of limitations.Surprisingly, the Turkish banks conceded that even if the Republic of Turkey did confiscate Armenian properties, international law precluded the filing of such lawsuits, since Turkey had taken “the property of its own nationals.”The banks’ lawyers made the outrageous suggestion that the wills of Armenian Genocide victims be reviewed to determine the legal heirs of the confiscated properties. In case these victims did not have a will, the lawyers proposed that the relevant laws be examined to see who was really entitled to their properties!The attorneys for the Armenian plaintiffs countered the Turkish objections and asked the court to deny the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs asserted that the Ziraat bank branch in the United States is a private commercial bank and has no reason to enjoy sovereign immunity. Moreover, “genocide and the associated plunder of property is never deemed a legitimate act of the state. There is no application of a political question, as this case focuses on the return of unjust gains from the sale and/or rental of property held in trust. Finally, the statute of limitations does not apply because the properties were held in trust, and the failure to return them is a continuing injury.” The attorneys further asserted that there are no statutes of limitations for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.Contradicting the Banks’ claims, the lawyers for the class action lawsuit maintained that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act does not preclude the prosecution of foreign entities engaged in commercial activity in the United States which both the Republic of Turkey and the two banks have done for many years. The lawyers also asserted that the defendants falsely claimed that international law does not apply to foreign countries “for wrongs perpetrated against their own nationals.” On the contrary, “international law prohibits states from expropriating property of nationals conducted during genocide and human rights abuses.”A hearing is scheduled in Federal Court on December 19 to determine the validity of the Turkish banks’ motion to dismiss the two lawsuits. Should the court reject the Turkish motion, and the Armenian plaintiffs end up winning their lawsuits during a subsequent trial, the court may order that the US assets of both Turkish banks be seized, up to the value of the claims, and turned over to the heirs of dispossessed Armenian victims as fair compensation. -
The secret flotilla negotiations between Turkey and Israel
Claire Berlinski, one of the best observers and reporters out of Turkey, has a must-read article on what happened during the negotiations between Israel and Turkey over the Palmer report on the flotilla:
The Turkish journalist Kadri Gürsel published an interesting piece the other day inMillyet about the failure of the negotiations between Turkey and Israel to normalize relations in the wake of the Mavi Marmara fiasco. Kadri Gürsel is a journalist whose work and opinions I take seriously; here, for example, he’s written a thoughtful piece in Turkish Policy Quarterly that will help you locate him in the spectrum of Turkish political opinion.
Gürsel first places the blame for the failure of the negotiations on the Turkish foreign ministry’s incompetence (he uses the more tactful phrase “lack of experience,” but the Turkish foreign ministry is hardly inexperienced, so I assume we’re to read between the lines). He then moves to what has become something of a standard narrative in Turkey and elsewhere: that the deal was “95 percent completed,” but fell through only because of Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman’s intransigence:
But the deal was never “100 percent complete” because in Israel, the obstacle, the extreme of the extreme Lieberman was not overcome. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not persuade Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman for an apology and compensation. And the Turkey-Israel secret negotiations that started after the U.N. Investigation Panel was formed in August 2010, collapsed in June following the days when the draft agreement was prepared.
Matters in this “duplex channel” were held tight. The Israeli member of the U.N. Investigation Committee, Joseph Ciechanover and Ambassador Özdem Sanberk, who represented Turkey on the panel, were also negotiating through the duplex channel. The head of the panel Geoffrey Palmer and his deputy Alvaro Uribe, even if they were aware of that secret negotiations were conducted between the two countries, they did not know that Ciechanover and Sanberk were the participants. The “duplex channel” held meetings in Geneva, Bucharest and Rome.
Despite all, this draft agreement could be the operational basis for a new normalization process between Turkey and Israel. Of course, if it is possible to persuade Lieberman in the light of new situations in the Middle East.
I asked an Israeli official who was close to these negotiations–and who has thus far never provided me with information that has proved unreliable–for comment. This is what he said:
I’ve seen the “draft deal” and the formula for apology includes indeed the English word “apologize”, though the phrase “operational mistakes that caused life losses and injuries to Turkish people” was preceded by an “if.” (I can’t remember the exact wording, but it went something like: Israel apologizes if there were any operational mistakes etc … ) This was the mutually agreed formula, and by using the conditional mode, it was possible for us to apologize without admitting that we actually did something wrong, which of course we believe we didn’t.
It is also correct that we agreed to pay compensations (through a bi-national fund, not directly), though the Turks did not specify at that point how much they thought would be reasonable. We thought the details and the sum could be worked out later on, based on mutual trust that would arise from the approval of the package deal.
Turkey, however, did not guarantee that “Turkish citizens and their legal representatives would not take legal action against Israel.” It agreed to promise not to prosecute Israelis, but explained it could commit itself on behalf of private citizens in Turkey or abroad. This made some Israelis suspicious: what would happen if we endorsed the deal, and then had to face suits by members of the Turkish public, maybe even with covert assistance by the government? What guarantee did we have that the “deal” would actually end all claims and enable Israel and Turkey to reconcile and restart their relationship? This suspicion grew stronger in light of Turkey’s insistence that the text should state that Israeli soldiers killed activists “intentionally.” Why insist on this admission of guilt if not to enable legal action? As Gürsel himself says, this text which the Israeli government was supposed to approve was not completely agreed upon by Turkey, because they still wanted to include the intentionality wording. Even if the Israeli government had approved the draft, it would have left us with Turkish disavowal and discontent.
Another condition set forth by the Turks, and agreed to by Israel, was shelving the Palmer Report. Strange that Gürsel should say nothing of this, since he starts his discussion with the meaning of the Report to Turkey. The Turks were very keen on making the report disappear …
Finally, when it all came down to a discussion in the Israeli Cabinet, it wasn’t just Lieberman who was reluctant to approve the whole package deal. Others, too, did not exactly trust Erdoğan, and raised doubts as to his real intentions: what would we get in return for the (indirect) apology, the compensations and the shelving of the report? Restoring ties with Ankara and an “end of conflict.” But what if, after all was said and done, Erdoğan would claim that not all of his conditions were met? That Israel did not fulfill the requirements? All of a sudden, he speaks about lifting the siege on Gaza as a condition – but it was never mentioned in the negotiations nor in the draft! How easily it could have served as a pretext not to restore ties. And as for taking legal action against Israelis, well … With the intentionality clause still open, and with Turkey’s non-commitment to stop private suits, and with the Palmer Report scrapped, where would it all lead us? Certainly not to an end of conflict, but rather to a further deterioration, with us in an inferior position.
This is the reason why quite a few ministers refused to endorse the draft. The Turkish anger at the leak of the Palmer Report, and Davutoğlu’s hot-headed reaction and statements, only seemed to confirm our worst doubts: they were never in earnest to begin with.