Category: Authors

Azerbaijan and Obama Suffer Setbacks As Amb. Bryza’s Service is Cut Short

As a result of successive political blunders by the Obama administration, Matthew Bryza was forced to abandon his ambassadorial post in Azerbaijan last week.

Pres. Obama ignored repeated warnings that the candidate he was nominating as Ambassador to Azerbaijan in May 2010 had serious flaws. Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accused Bryza of having a pro-Azerbaijani bias and questionable ties to Azeri officials. The Senators were troubled by reports that foreign officials had given Bryza lavish gifts at his Istanbul wedding, during which the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan had served as a groomsman. In addition, the nominee’s Turkish-born wife Zeyno Baran was accused of conflicts of interest while working on Caspian energy issues at a Washington think tank. She had also antagonized the Armenian-American community by testifying against recognition of the Armenian Genocide at a Senate Subcommittee hearing.

When Pres. Obama failed to take these concerns seriously, Senators Barbara Boxer (Dem.-CA) and Robert Menendez (Dem.-New Jersey) had no choice but to place a hold on Bryza’s nomination, effectively blocking his confirmation. Obama then compounded his error by appointing Bryza as Ambassador to Azerbaijan in late 2010 without Senate approval. The President seemed oblivious to the potential damage to his own reputation, the prestige of the United States, and U.S.-Azeri relations, should the Senate not confirm Bryza’s nomination, forcing him to leave his post and return to Washington upon expiration of his 12-month appointment.

As Amb. Bryza’s temporary assignment was ending in December 2011, Obama administration officials pressured Senators Boxer and Menendez to allow him to continue serving in Azerbaijan by confirming his nomination. The two Senators remained steadfast in opposing Bryza, even though it is not easy for these Democratic politicians to turn down a request from the President of the United States, who also happens to be the nominal leader of their own party.

The Senators were also pressured by the government of Azerbaijan and its powerful lobbying firms which went into overdrive to justify their exorbitant fees. Through their special connections they were able to get the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post to publish editorials attacking the Senators and the Armenian National Committee of America which had spearheaded a public campaign against this unqualified Ambassadorial nominee.

Not surprisingly, the Wall Street Journal heaped lavish praise on Bryza, calling him a “respected career foreign service officer,” and accused the two Senators of “kissing up to the Armenian-American lobby.”

The Washington Post was even nastier. Its editorial could be described as outright racist and anti-Armenian. Contrary to its claim of defending “the larger U.S. national interest,” the newspaper was actually advocating the confirmation of an Ambassador with questionable credentials who would weaken, rather than strengthen America’s interests.

The Washington Post concluded its shameful editorial by accusing “oil-poor” and “isolated” Armenia as being the biggest loser in the Bryza controversy. We beg to disagree. This is an American issue and Armenia had no role in it. In fact, the biggest losers are those who lobbied long and hard for the confirmation of an ill-qualified Ambassador who was more intent on serving the interests of Baku in Washington than those of America in Azerbaijan.

In my opinion, the real losers are:

1) Pres. Obama who picked a poorly qualified nominee and stubbornly pushed for his confirmation when it was crystal clear from day one that Bryza did not have the chance of a snowball in hell to get confirmed.

2) The government of Azerbaijan which spent a fortune on lobbyists who miserably failed to get the job done.

3) Azeri and Turkish organizations, such as the Azerbaijani-American Council, Azerbaijan Society of America, Pax Turcica Institute, US Azeris Network, and Assembly of Turkish-American Associations, which issued countless press releases and sent thousands of e-mails to the Senate — to no avail. By supporting Bryza, they confirmed that in fact he was “their man,” and not an unbiased diplomat.

4) The Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post which compromised their journalistic integrity to please their “petro-friends.”

5) The 36 former U.S. officials who signed a joint letter urging the Senate to confirm Bryza. It is no mere coincidence that most of these signatories are currently associated with think tanks and lobbying firms that are funded by Azerbaijan or expect such funding in the future.

There are, however, two clear winners:

1) The Armenian-American community which has sent a loud and clear message to Baku, Ankara, and Washington that it represents a powerful political force to be reckoned with.

2) Matthew Bryza and his wife, who as lobbyists for Azerbaijan and Turkey, can be expected to make millions by cashing in on their high-level connections in Baku and Ankara.

January 10, 2012
Story Behind the Turkish Idiom “Pabucu Dama Atılmak”

Pabucu Dama Atılmak – Shoe to be thrown to the roof ” to lose favor; to fall from popular esteem; to seem less appealing; to look pale by comparison”…..

The story behind the idiom “Pabucu Dama Atilmak” – to throw someones shoe on the roof is…

At the time of the Ottoman, the organisation the artisans and craftsmen belonged to would regulate trade along with social life. They had come up with an interesting method to try to prevent defective goods, cheap production (with intention of less material, more profit), and bad quality work.

Let’s say you bought a shoe and had it fixed, but it was flawed. The committee would listen to both sides of the story- the plaintiff (customer) and the craftsman. If the plaintiff’s complaint was found to be legitimate, the cost of the shoe would be paid back to him and the shoe itself would be thrown on the roof of the shoemaker as a warning or deterrent to others.

This way, passer-by’s and future customers would know who is a good shoemaker and who isn’t just by looking at their rooftops. The shoemakers whose shoes are thrown to the roof would thereby lose out on financial earnings, and lose potential customers thus it would be as if HIS “shoe was thrown on the roof”.

January 5, 2012
Turkey Besieged by Armenian Successes Long Before the Genocide Centennial

Turkish leaders made a serious tactical error in 2011. They were so preoccupied with countering the upcoming tsunami of the centennial of the Armenian Genocide in 2015, that they lost sight of the more immediate political storms facing them.

Armenians quickly capitalized on the Turkish blunder, managing to score a series of early successes: 1) the French Parliament adopted a bill banning denial of the Armenian Genocide, 2) the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on Turkey to return Armenian churches and other properties to their rightful owners, 3) an Israeli parliamentary committee held a public hearing on the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and 4) a U.S. Federal Court may shortly issue a default judgment against the Republic of Turkey.

Facing a tenacious French President who refused to be intimidated by insults and threats, Turkey reacted with slash and burn tactics that aggravated its problems and undermined its bid for European Union membership. By withdrawing its ambassador from Paris, the Turkish government deprived itself of the services of a capable diplomat at a crucial time when the French Senate is about to take up the bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. Judging from past experience, the Turkish Ambassador will be sent back to Paris soon, making his dramatic recall an exercise in futility and attracting the ridicule of the diplomatic community. If Turkey withdraws its ambassador every time a country recognizes the Armenian Genocide or adopts a decision contrary to Ankara’s wishes, it will isolate itself from the rest of the world.

Even more damaging to Turkey’s interests is the threat to boycott goods imported from countries that are deemed to be “unfriendly.” Turkey would simply damage its own economy by purchasing inferior products at higher prices from alternative sources. Moreover, should Turkey stop buying highly technical items such as passenger planes and advanced missiles from the few countries that make them, it will end up with an antiquated air transport system and a weakened military. In recent days, however, Turkish leaders have sheepishly withdrawn their bombastic boycott threats, after realizing that the World Trade Organization would impose severe penalties on Turkey for violating its membership obligations.

Turning to the House resolution on return of church properties, the Turkish government and its high-priced lobbying firms were caught flat-footed on how to counter such a delicate matter. After years of success in derailing Armenian Genocide resolutions, the Turkish side was clueless about fighting a motion that called for the return of church buildings and other properties to their respective Christian communities. Consequently, the resolution was approved by a vote of 43-1 in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and by more than two-thirds of the full House. This is the first time that the U.S. Congress has gone on record demanding that Turkey restore the rights of genocide victims beyond the mere acknowledgment of the Genocide. In the coming months and years, Armenians will be presenting an ever growing list of demands to international organizations, parliaments around the world, and the Turkish government itself.

The third positive development took place in Israel, when the Knesset’s Education Committee held an unprecedented three-hour public hearing on the Armenian Genocide, despite pressure from Turkey, its lackey Azerbaijan, and the Netanyahu government. This discussion, held in front of TV cameras, and not behind closed doors, is expected to continue at a later date. It is shameful that the Israeli government continues to obstruct recognition of the Armenian Genocide, perhaps hoping to regain Turkey’s trust and friendship. Rather than playing political games with mass murder, the Netanyahu government should acknowledge the truth of the Armenian Genocide for the sake of its own reputation.

The final salutary development is an expected default judgment to be issued by a U.S. Federal Court against the Republic of Turkey on two lawsuits demanding payment for Armenian properties confiscated during the Genocide. Such a judgment would be a stern warning to the Turkish authorities that they cannot continue to enjoy the ill-gotten gains from the blood money of genocide victims.

Long before the arrival of the Armenian tsunami in 2015, Turkey is increasingly confronted by pressures for greater human rights and Kurdish autonomy, and far-reaching Armenian demands, while experiencing acute problems with virtually all of its neighbors. A Turkish regime besieged with serious internal and external challenges is less of a threat to its own population and its neighborhood, and more likely to settle past injustices and present conflicts.

January 4, 2012
Turkey Reiterates Commitment to Southern Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline

Turkey Reiterates Commitment to Southern Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 1

January 3, 2012

By: Saban Kardas

Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding that will facilitate the transit of Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe, changing the calculations over the EU-backed Southern Corridor concept. In October 2011, the two countries signed numerous agreements regulating the volume and price for Turkey’s gas imports from Azerbaijan as well as the transit terms for Azerbaijani gas exports to Europe through Turkish territory (EDM, November 1, 2011). Among these documents they agreed to work on a dedicated pipeline that will transport gas from the second phase of the Shah Deniz gas field through a pipeline from Turkey’s eastern frontier to its western border, in addition to using the existing Turkish grid for transiting Azerbaijani gas.

On December 26, 2011, Turkey’s Energy Minister Taner Yildiz and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Natig Aliyev, signed a memorandum of understanding on the construction of the Trans-Anadolu natural gas pipeline. The Trans-Anadolu consortium will be formed by the State Oil and Gas Company (SOCAR) and Turkey’s BOTAS and TPAO. While the Azerbaijani side will hold 80 percent of the shares, the Turkish participants will control the remaining 20 percent, but the stakes might change over time, as the consortium will be open to participation by other international energy companies. The construction work is scheduled to start in 2012 and be completed in 2017, when the Shah Deniz-II is also expected to become operational. The pipeline will have an initial annual capacity of 16 billion cubic meters (bcm), which could be increased to 24 bcm. The 6 bcm capacity will be used for consumption in Turkey’s western regions, while the rest of the throughput will constitute Azerbaijan’s exports to Europe. Since Turkey will retain the re-export rights for its imports from Azerbaijan, the total volume of gas available for European markets could increase depending on the market conditions. Though the construction costs will be determined after feasibility studies, Yildiz estimated these costs at around $5 billion (Anadolu Ajansi, December 26, 2011).

This development raises many interrelated issues about the future of bilateral relations, as well as the EU’s Southern Corridor project seeking to diversify European natural gas supplies tapping into Caspian basin reserves.

With this decision, Turkey and Azerbaijan took another step to cement their evolving strategic partnership, while Ankara also reconfirmed its Baku-centered South Caucasus policy. Energy occupies a major place in both countries’ ambitious foreign policy agendas. While Azerbaijan is eager to capitalize on its developing hydrocarbon reserves to emerge as a major regional actor in the South Caucasus, Turkey has sought to use its geographic location as an asset to establish itself as a major transportation corridor for oil and gas from the Caspian basin and Central Asia as well as the Middle East.

Given Azerbaijan’s need for a reliable export route and Turkey’s interest in sustainable throughput to feed its ambitions to become an energy hub, there are economic and strategic imperatives forcing the two countries to forge a closer partnership in the energy sector, which is further strengthened by overlapping perspectives on regional issues. Such a shared vision led to the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline marketing Azerbaijani oil globally and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline exporting Azerbaijani gas to Turkey, part of which is re-exported to Greece by using the Turkish grid. With the successive energy deals signed in recent years, including a rising volume of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey’s energy sector, and deepening political dialogue such as the establishment of a high level strategic cooperation council, the two countries are healing the frictions caused by Turkey’s thwarted normalization efforts with Armenia.

Currently, there seems to be a strong determination to develop joint energy projects and turn this partnership into a solid axis in the South Caucasus and beyond. Natig Aliyev’s remarks that with the trans-Anatolia project the two countries will work in European energy markets together reflected this shared vision (www.ntvmsnbc.com, December 26, 2011).

Moreover, the implications of this development for the EU-backed Southern corridor remain a matter of controversy. The competing projects including Nabucco, Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) submitted their bids to the BP-led consortium operating the Shah Deniz field in October 2011. While Azerbaijan and the consortium were expected to make their decision, the trans-Anatolian project has altered the equation in the ongoing competition to secure access to Azerbaijan’s export volumes.

To complicate these calculations even further, Turkey also moved to sign an accord with Russia by the end of 2011. An agreement finalizing Turkey’s approval for the construction of South Stream in its territorial waters in the Black Sea was signed in Moscow by the heads of BOTAS and Gazprom, overseen by Yildiz and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. With this decision, which Russia had been expecting for over one year, Turkey removed its objections to the South Stream project, which Russian sources expect to be completed by 2015. In return, Yildiz claimed that he secured guarantees from the Russian side to resolve the dispute over the western pipeline in terms favorable to Turkey, especially including a reduction in the price for gas imports from Russia (Anadolu Ajansi, December 29, 2011).

The Turkish government has faced the criticism that by taking these controversial steps it is effectively killing the Nabucco project, which it claimed to have deemed as a strategic priority (Hurriyet, December 31, 2011). For its part, the Turkish government has been arguing that the trans-Anatolian project was in fact complementary to Nabucco and Southern corridor projects, as it will reduce the costs of the other projects (Anadolu Ajansi, December 26, 2011; Yeni Safak, November 19, 2011).

Ankara considers that it has fulfilled its responsibilities towards the Nabucco project by granting the necessary permissions earlier for its construction on its territory. The recent deal on the trans-Anatolian project in that context reiterates that Turkey would not be the deal-breaker in Southern corridor projects, as it effectively resolves issues pertaining to the transit of Azerbaijani gas. More importantly, the willingness of the BP-led Shah Deniz consortium, for Azerbaijan and Turkey to undertake a major portion of the transportation corridor might allow Nabucco and other projects to redesign themselves on scalable terms. Now it will be up to other Nabucco partners to do their part, readjust to the new conditions, and find a supply source, which remains the main obstacle before the project.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-reiterates-commitment-to-southern-corridor-with-trans-anatolia-pipeline/

January 4, 2012
Decorating Pine Tree was a Turkish Ritual

Famous all around world Sumerian specialist Dr. Muazzez İlmiye Çığ said pine tree which used Christmas tree was a Turkish ritual. Pine tree which used Christmas tree spreads to Christian world at century 16. And Turks had been celebrated new year at 22 December when the longest night of year. They had been celebrated new year while decorate pine tree.

Sumerian specialist Dr. Muazzez İlmiye Çığ talk about a tree which named “Akçam’. It is a kind of pine tree. Akçam just used to grew at Turkistan. Turks used to bring Akçam to homes and they used to put some gifts for God under that tree. They used to bind some doeks to boughs. They used to give thanks to God because of God had been given them a good life at pass year. Families used to wear good clothes and visit each one of them and elders. “This ritual reached to Europe. Pine tree isn’t about Noel. Christians accepted as Jesus birth the pine tree at İznik Concile. But Christians didn’t decorate pine tree. This ritual has begun in Germany century 16. It reached to France and spread all around world” said Dr. Çığ.

Turks still have been featured to tree. They decorate with some doeks not only pine but some others trees too. They make some vows. Some Turks perceives the making vow means paganism. This tradition attends with local people. More High-educated, high-income and city people see this tradition at some movies, stories or ads. Some of city people buy noel tree and decorate them at Turkey. All these appear that Dr. Çığ’s claims may be right. Turks left all Shamanist totems after adopt Islam. I think decorating pine tree and putting some gift under that were perceived against Islam. And they began to celebrating the New Year according to Islam. They left celebrating December 22. And noel tree turned back Turkish high-level people as Europe and American ritual after centuries.

December 29, 2011
Analysis: Turkey helps pull the rug from under Nabucco

By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.
Houston, Texas

Judging from the press reports, one would not know it, but Turkey, the presumed supporter of the Nabucco gas project, recently helped kill the project.

It was not to be so. After all, the Nabucco project was designed not only to supply natural gas to the EU from the Caspian region and the Middle East, but also help Turkey meet its domestic needs. The intergovernmental agreement signed in Ankara amid media publicity in July 2009, followed by parliamentary seal of approval in March 2010, gave all the indications that Turkey would stand by the project.

Turkey’s BOTAS was one of the 6 partners that developed the project. The Vienna-based NIC (Nabucco International Company) represented the consortium formed by the partners. The 3,900 km-long pipeline’s planned destination was Baumgarten in Austria.

Not that the project was ideal for Turkey (). But compared to its rivals ITGI (Italy-Greece Interconnector) and TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), not to mention a host of “exotic” Black Sea options flagged by Azerbaijan, it was the most mature and most comprehensive gas pipeline project to connect Turkey and the EU to the supply sources to the east. Strategically it deserved Turkey’s support. It was the only project among its rivals that aimed to transport Azeri as well as non-Azeri gas. Turkmen gas was a high-priority objective.

Surely, with its ambitious design capacity of 31 billion m3 (bcm)/year, Nabucco was under stress. What was holding the project from implementation was the lack of feed (throughput) gas. The feed gas problem caused delays in the project, and the capital costs soared (up to EUR 14-15 billion by most recent estimates). The Azeri Shah Deniz-II gas was identified as the initial start-up gas as from 2017-2018.

But Azerbaijan, that owned the gas, and the Shah Deniz consortium that would share and produce it, were non-committal about supplying gas. That meant major headache for Nabucco. Turkmen gas input required the cooperation of Azerbaijan, and would be added to the gas stream at a later date.

In the meantime, the rival projects ITGI and TAP emerged. Like Nabucco, these also counted on Shah Deniz-II gas for throughput. A winner-take-all pipeline contest was in the works.

Still, Nabucco had a good fighting chance. On October 1, 2011, NIC submitted its proposal to the Shah Deniz consortium tabling transport terms. The rival projects ITGI and TAP did the same. A high-stakes waiting game would then start, during which the Shah Deniz consortium would pick the winner.

The spoiler project

All that changed when BP (British Petroleum), at the last minute before the October 1 deadline, came up with a new, “in-house” project: SEEP (South-East Europe Pipeline). It was a shrewd move, and immediately caught the attention of the Shah Deniz consortium – where BP is the operator and a major (25.5%) stake holder. The Azeri partner SOCAR, in particular, quickly warmed up to BP’s proposal.

Instead of building a new pipeline across the Turkish territory, SEEP envisioned the use of BOTAS’ existing network (with upgrades) in Turkey and construction of new pipelines and their integration with existing interconnectors past Turkey. Azeri gas would be the feed gas. The destination would still be Austria, but the cost would be much less than that of Nabucco.

Nabucco had come under threat.

Behind the scenes

Events behind the scenes further undermined Nabucco. On October 25 Ankara and Baku signed an intergovernmental agreement in Izmir in western Turkey. Details released to the press were sketchy, but one of the accords reached was to use initially BOTAS’ existing network in Turkey, and later build a new pipeline when needed, to ship Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey and the EU. Starting in 2017 or 2018, of the total 16 bcm gas to be produced annually from the Shah Deniz-II phase, Turkey would receive 6 bcm, and the rest 10 bcm would be shipped to the EU.

Azerbaijan would be the direct seller of gas to the EU, with Turkey being a mere bridge or transit route.

No mention was made of Nabucco, ITGI, TAP, or SEEP in the press release, but the footprints of SEEP were unmistakable.

Demise of Nabucco

Still worse news followed. On November 17, during the Third Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum held in Istanbul, SOCAR chief Rovnag Abdullayev announced that a new gas pipeline, which he named “Trans-Anatolia,” would be built in Turkey from east to west under the leadership of SOCAR. The new pipeline would deliver Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey and Europe.

Azerbaijan and Turkey had already started working on the pipeline project, he said, and others could possibly join later. The planned capacity was at least 16 bcm/year –large enough to absorb all future Azeri exports after depletion of Shah Deniz II.

While not stated so, the announcement made Nabucco effectively redundant. The announcement was an offtake from the Izmir agreement, and signaled a surprising, 180-degree turn on the part of Turkey on Nabucco.

Turkey’s energy minister Yildiz Taner tried to put the best face in the press by claiming that Trans-Anatolian would “supplement” Nabucco, while the NIC chief Reinhard Mitschek expressed his “confidence” in Nabucco.

More recently SOCAR’s Abdullayev maintained that Nabucco was still “in the race,” and NIC started the pre-qualification process for procurement contractors.

For all these business-as-usual pronouncements, however, there was little doubt that Nabucco had received a fatal blow. If Trans-Anatolia, dedicated to Shah Deniz II gas, is built, Nabucco will lose its start-up gas, and with it the justification for a new infrastructure across Turkey.

Without synergy from the Azeri gas, a full-fledged Nabucco project dedicated solely to Turkmen gas will also have a virtually zero chance of implementation.

Nabucco, in its present form, was dead. (See also . A much-modified, “truncated” version of Nabucco, starting at the Turkey-Bulgaria border, may well emerge, however.

Conclusion

With Nabucco frozen in its tracks, the geopolitics of energy in Turkey and its neighborhood has changed dramatically ). What is surprising is that Turkey assisted in undermining a project that it had long supported. It was a project that encompassed both Azeri and Turkmen gas. To reduce its dependence on Russia for its gas exports, Turkmenistan has been eager to ship its gas to the West.

Azerbaijan, apparently viewing Turkmen gas exports to the West a threat to its own gas exports, has been reluctant to cooperate with Ashgabat on this issue.

Turkey acceded to the aspirations of the Azeri brethren, while ignoring those of the Turkmen brethren. Over the past year, as the EU delegates approached repeatedly Ashgabat for Turkmen gas (vis-à-vis a TCGP or Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline), Turkey chose to stay on the sidelines. This was a strategic mistake.

Both Baku and Ashgabat could benefit from a synergy between the Azeri and Turkmen gaz exports, and Turkey could use gas from both sources to enhance its energy security. Being pro-active on TGCP and nudging Azerbaijan in that direction would have been a wise move for Turkey. On balance, there is little doubt that on the gas issue Azerbaijan has played its cards well – perhaps too well!

ferruh@demirmen.com

December 24, 2011