Category: Authors

  • Turkey’s Syria Policy: The Challenge of Coalition Building

    Turkey’s Syria Policy: The Challenge of Coalition Building

    Turkey’s Syria Policy: The Challenge of Coalition Building

    February 17, 2012 / Saban Kardas

    Turkey is in the international spotlight over the Syrian uprising. So far, it has focused largely on the humanitarian situation taking a moral high ground on the civilians trapped by the conflict. Either due to its own ambitious rhetoric or the preferences of other regional and international actors, Turkey is expected in some circles to lead international efforts to end the actions perpetrated by the Baath regime. If necessary, this includes the use of force. Following the failure of the Arab League’s peace plan at the UN Security Council, Turkey has vowed to mobilize a coalition of like-minded states to address the unfolding humanitarian crisis. This effort epitomizes the limited but crucial role Turkey could play here: facilitating a coalition at the regional-global nexus, so that a coercive diplomatic solution short of military intervention is forged.

  • Rising Gas Consumption Reveals Structural Problems in Turkey’s Energy Policies

    Rising Gas Consumption Reveals Structural Problems in Turkey’s Energy Policies

    Rising Gas Consumption Reveals Structural Problems in Turkey’s Energy Policies

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 32
    February 15, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Heavy winter conditions have strained natural gas supplies in Turkey, shedding critical light on the country’s over reliance on hydrocarbons. Due to the record increases in household consumption and electricity demand, which coincided with interruptions in gas imports from Iran and Azerbaijan, concerns were raised as to whether Ankara’s current contracts meet its actual demand, and how this will affect its future energy policies.In early February, some media reports speculated that Russian gas shipments through the Western line declined by 30 percent. However, it was later explained that the declining shipment was due to Ukraine’s tapping the gas from the same route beyond normal levels, and Russia did not officially cut its exports to Turkey (Aksam, February 4). As Turkey’s largest gas supplier, Russia has been reliable so far. In the past, Russia even stepped in to make up for deficient quantities of gas when Turkey encountered shortages with other suppliers, especially Iran. Last December, Turkey agreed to renew a supply contract with Russia, which also foresaw a partial reduction in price in return for Ankara’s support for the South Stream project. In hindsight, it appears that Ankara’s decision to renew that contract, despite its initial objections, was motivated in part by the anticipated increased demand.

    The imports from Iran, the second largest supplier, have been problematic. Upon failure to bridge the differences in negotiations that were in progress, the Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced that Turkey had decided to take Iran to the International Court of Arbitration. The negotiations pertained to two interrelated issues. While Turkey is contracted to import 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually gas from Iran, it maintains that Tehran fell short of meeting that target and it imported around 7 bcm to 8 bcm per annum. Ankara wanted to import the excess amount accumulated in the last two years. Also, Turkey was demanding a discount, as it paid the highest price for Iranian gas. The law suit was lodged on the first issue, and if no agreement is reached in the price discount dispute, Turkey will also take it to arbitration in March (Radikal, February 1).

    A few days later, gas supplies from Iran fell dramatically, due to technical problems. Reportedly, the compressor stations were experiencing technical failures. As a similar problem was also encountered with gas supplies from Azerbaijan, Turkey’s third largest provider, the gas flow from the eastern pipeline declined by around 85 percent. While on average the flow was around 40 million cubic meters (mcm) per day, it fell to 6 mcm per day. Turkey’s average daily consumption also reached as high as 192 mcm per day, while last year it was around 171 mcm per day (Anadolu Ajansi, February 7).

    The technical problems were solved within a few days and the gas flow returned to normal levels, but this development underscored the fragile nature of the country’s gas supplies. To alleviate growing public concerns, Yildiz announced that there was no immediate risk to shipments from Russia, and consumers will not experience any shortages. Turkey undertook several precautions. The power stations that convert natural gas to electricity either stopped production or shifted to secondary fuels. Also, Turkey made greater utilization of LNG conversion stations and tapped the reserves in underground storage facility in Silivri. Periodically, electricity supplies were also interrupted in some areas (Zaman, February 4).

    Despite the minister’s efforts to reassure consumers, experts highlight several problems in Turkey’s natural gas supplies. Electricity producers complained that the secondary fuels are more expensive and increase the price by around 10 percent (Milliyet, February 5). Due to rising demand and declining production at natural gas-based power plants, electricity prices skyrocketed in the free market where producers and distributors meet (Zaman, February 13). Producers and distributors are concerned that electricity generation costs have exceeded the price guarantees in the contracts, forcing them into net losses. Yildiz contradicted those claims, arguing that such seasonal fluctuations need to be seen as normal developments (Anadolu Ajansi, February 14).

    Moreover, shortcomings in reserves were also revealed during this crisis. Turkey’s underground storage facilities in Silivri have a capacity of 2.6 bcm and BOTAS is expected to keep 2.1 bcm in reserves, which will be enough to meet Turkey’s needs for around two weeks. As Turkey tapped these reserves in response to declining deliveries, it has been argued that BOTAS’ failure to fill it to full capacity before the winter was a major mistake. However, BOTAS issued a statement, maintaining that it stored quantities above the minimum levels required by existing legal provisions (Zaman, February 9). Granted, this development underscores Turkey’s poor capacity in managing its strategic reserves. It also demonstrates that despite its claims to be emerging as a major energy hub Turkey’s current capacity to manage that hub still remains unsatisfactory.

    To enhance that capacity Turkey finalized a protracted tender last fall with a Chinese company that will construct storage facilities in Tuz Golu (Salt Lake) near Ankara, which will have a capacity of 1 bcm. More importantly, the electricity producers’ association painted a very grim picture of the balance between demand and contracted gas supplies. While Turkey’s current contracts enable it to import around 170 mcm daily, its average daily consumption is around 180 mcm per day.

    They maintain that the problem is not just conjectural and cannot be explained by seasonal conditions. Rather, Turkey’s excessive reliance on natural gas for electricity generation appears to be a source of the problem (www.haberturk.com, February 13). According to Energy Market Regulatory Agency, Turkey imported 40 bcm gas and consumed 43.5 bcm in 2012, its consumption is expected to reach 48.5 bcm. While around half of Turkey’s electricity is produced from natural gas, slightly over half of its gas imports are used in power plants.

    Electricity producers argue that Turkey urgently needs to reduce the share of gas in electricity generation to around 30 percent through greater use of renewables, domestic resources and nuclear power. This is a problem emphasized a long time ago and energy strategy documents have stated it as their objective to undercut dependence on gas. Yildiz also reiterated it recently. There is a broad consensus inside Turkey on the need to significantly revise its energy policies, but it seems there is less consensus on “how” and “how soon” Turkey should achieve a more balanced energy mix.

    https://jamestown.org/program/rising-gas-consumption-reveals-structural-problems-in-turkeys-energy-policies/
  • Bryza Confesses his Love for Turkey, Confirming his anti-Armenian Bias

    Bryza Confesses his Love for Turkey, Confirming his anti-Armenian Bias

     

     sassounian311
     
    It appears that my prediction about Matt Bryza leaving the State Department and working as a lobbyist is coming true. After his brief stint as Ambassador to Azerbaijan came to a premature end, Bryza disclosed to the Turkish Hurriyet newspaper last week that he will be “advising people, government, and private sector on major investment projects.”
     
    It remains to be seen whether Bryza’s planned activities fall within the legal definition of “lobbying” and “advocacy” on behalf of third parties, such as Turkish and Azeri entities, given the restrictions imposed by U.S. law on former government officials. Depending on the specific type of activity, there is either a one or two-year ban. However, in the case of “very senior officials” such as Bryza, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, there is a lifetime ban. He would certainly be prohibited from having contact with former State Department colleagues on behalf of other parties, regarding official matters with which he was involved as a government employee.
     
    In his interview with Hurriyet, Bryza validates in his own words the accusation that he was biased and unprofessional, while acting as the American Co-Chair of OSCE’s Minsk Group of mediators on the Karabagh (Artsakh) conflict. At the time, he was repeatedly criticized for being anti-Armenian, pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Turkish. Senators Barbara Boxer and Robert Menendez, who placed a hold on his nomination as Ambassador to Azerbaijan, and the Armenian National Committee of America, which objected to Pres. Obama’s ill-advised decision to send Bryza to Baku without Senate confirmation, are now fully vindicated.
     
    In the past, Bryza’s apologists used the convenient excuse that as a government official, he had no choice but to support the President’s position on the Armenian Genocide and related issues. Yet, now that he is a free man, why does he continue to parrot those same Turkish-inspired, anti-Armenian slogans? Could it be that Bryza, in and out of government, has been trying to ingratiate himself to his future paymasters? Otherwise, why would he give Hurriyet the standard Turkish line that politicians and parliaments should not get involved in acknowledging the Armenian Genocide? To score points with Turkish and Azeri officials, Bryza angrily lashes out at the ANCA: “The organization that blocked me will keep bringing up this issue forever. But it’s not up to governments but to people to make their own determination on how to characterize it…. Turkey has the ability to influence that debate in a significant way…. The radicals that blocked me hate that. They don’t want to have an open debate; an open dialogue is their enemy.”
     
    While applauding the more open attitude among some Turks toward a discussion of the Armenian Genocide, Bryza finds as “legitimate” the Turkish official view that “this should not be recognized politically as genocide. It’s not the business of any politician in any country to characterize these events as genocide or not as genocide. It has to be up to societies — not to others — to have a decision taken based on a political calendar. To me, that’s dishonest.”
     
    Bryza then takes his pro-Turkish bias a little too far by revealing his denialist views: “Truth is on everyone’s side, especially on Turkey’s side. The debate about this [Armenian Genocide] issue is really one-sided right now. Anybody who voices a different view is attacked as a genocide-denier, which immediately means you are against human rights. If you believe there was a genocide committed, you can equally argue looking from a narrow definition of the word that genocide was committed to many others, against Turks or Muslims in eastern Anatolia. Let’s have a dialogue of the multiple atrocities [against] many groups. Let’s talk about it all. Let’s be fair and not forget the suffering of others.”
     
    Finally, Bryza seems to have fulfilled his life-long dream of living in Istanbul. During his 2005 visit to Ankara, after a U.S. Embassy official introduced him to local journalists as “an old friend of Turkey,” Bryza unabashedly declared: “I am thrilled to be back in Turkey. Turkey in many ways feels for me like a second home…. I can’t spend enough time in your beautiful country. I hope to be back soon and often.” In a column I wrote at the time, I expressed the hope that “Bryza would soon realize his wish and retire in Turkey permanently.” Now, his wish has come true! Hurriyet reported last week that after leaving Baku last month he had settled in Istanbul. “You can’t imagine how happy I am to be in Istanbul…. Look at me, I am married to a Turkish woman,” Bryza exclaimed!
  • Turkish Kilim Symbols

    Turkish Kilim Symbols

    Most Turkish kilim designs have their roots in the conservative, indigenous, pre-Christian and pre-Islamic backgrounds of the rural population and are related to the basic themes of life: birth, marriage, fertility; spiritual life and happiness; love and unison; and death. They reflect the ancient cults and practices of their ancestors around these events. There are many symbols in the vocabulary of the weaver and many stylizations of each symbol. Unlocking the keys to these symbols reveals a deeper insight into the values, dreams and culture of the Anatolian people and expresses layer upon layer of history and influence in the region.
    Nazarlik: an amulet to protect against the evil eye, cause of harm, injury and misfortune.
    Elebelinde: symbol of motherhood and fertility, originating in the Neolithic cult of the Mother Goddess.
    Ram’s Horn: male fertility, heroism, power and masculinity.
    Hands, Fingers and Combs: the hand motif protects against spells and the evil eye while the comb protects birth and marriage.
    Tree of Life: symbol of life and paradise; represents man’s yearning for immortality and life after death.
    Niche: place of honor, or a doorkilim 1way into paradise.
  • Armenians Need to Pursue Their Cause  With More Confidence and Commitment

    Armenians Need to Pursue Their Cause With More Confidence and Commitment

     

    sassounian31
     
     

    This week’s column deals with the self-defeating attitude of some Armenians whose negative outlook manifested itself once again with the latest news about the French bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. 

    Some people hold the skeptical view that any project undertaken by Armenians is doomed to failure. A few years ago, I was advised by several readers not to call for dismissal of the Los Angeles Times Managing Editor for censoring an article by Mark Arax on the Armenian Genocide. On another occasion, I was advised not to ask Time magazine to apologize and make amends for disseminating a Turkish denialist DVD. I ignored the defeatist suggestions that countering such powerful publications would be futile and even counter-productive. It was not an easy struggle, but I am happy to report that Armenian activists prevailed in both campaigns. 

    It is noteworthy that such apathetic individuals not only fail to offer any assistance or encouragement, but go to great lengths to discourage those who are furthering the interests of the community. Interestingly, those who sit on their hands are usually the ones who complain the most about others who are serving the common cause. 

    Imagine if twenty years ago the small band of Armenian freedom fighters had listened to such naysayers and decided that it was not possible to liberate Artaskh (Karabagh) from Azeri and Soviet occupation forces! Would I be here today if my ancestors, the brave people of Zeitoun, located in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire, had not fought against powerful Turkish armies and won more than forty battles and hundreds of skirmishes to preserve their safety and autonomy? 

    Returning to our own times, how often are we told by misinformed Armenians with an “all-knowing” attitude that the U.S. Congress will never recognize the Armenian Genocide, when in fact it was recognized in 1975 and 1984! Or how many times these misguided fortune-tellers have prophesized that no U.S. President will ever recognize the Armenian Genocide because Turkey is too important, unaware that Pres. Ronald Reagan recognized it in a Presidential Proclamation on April 22, 1981! 

    These same Armenians were confident that the French Parliament would not adopt a bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide last December, either because there would be a last minute snag or that Pres. Sarkozy was tricking Armenians to get their votes in the forthcoming Presidential elections. Yet the Parliament approved the legislation by a wide margin. When the bill made its way to the Senate on January 23, 2012, once again the skeptics confidently predicted that an unexpected development would block its passage. The bill was adopted by a vote of 127-86. 

    Last week, when some French legislators, aided and abetted by the Turkish Ambassador, appealed the bill to the Constitutional Council, some Armenians fell into deep depression. They insisted that there was an anti-Armenian conspiracy, claiming to have known all along that the initiative would end up in failure. These people do not seem to realize that the appeal does not necessarily mean defeat of the bill. In fact, should the Council determine that the bill is constitutional, those who would be arrested for denying the Armenian Genocide could no longer challenge the new law. 

    However, should the Constitutional Council reject the bill, it would not be the end of the world, as Pres. Sarkozy has pledged to amend it and resubmit it to both legislative houses. Nevertheless, the pursuit of the Armenian Cause does not depend on any particular bill. Armenians have many other major demands from Turkey under international law. 

    Rather than simply deploring that the bill has ended in the Constitutional Council, Armenians should demand that certain members of the court disqualify themselves from this case due their impermissible affiliation with Turkish Think Tanks or for having made prejudicial statements on this issue. It is noteworthy that six of the French Senators who filed for the appeal are currently enjoying themselves in Azerbaijan as guests of the state, tasting Caspian caviar and indulging in other Azeri “delicacies.” 

    Far more important than any bill is Armenians’ solemn determination to continue the struggle for their rightful cause, undeterred by setbacks or obstacles. Having survived several millennia of occupation, pillage, massacres, and genocide, Armenians cannot succumb or surrender at the first sign of adversity! 

    Armenians can go forward only when they purge themselves of their self-defeating attitude and subservient mentality, left over from centuries of Ottoman Turkish subjugation and servitude.
  • Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 26
    February 7, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    The failure of a recent UN Security Council resolution that sought to calm Syria has once again highlighted the dilemmas Turkey has faced in its efforts to end the humanitarian catastrophe in this neighboring state. Ankara joined international outrage, condemning the Syrian regime on the one hand, and expressing concern over China and Russia using their UN veto, on the other. While calling for urgent action and exploration of fresh options to stop the bloodshed, Ankara, nonetheless, reiterated its reservations about international intervention.

    The proposed UN Resolution would have supported the Arab League’s peace plan. In the negotiations preceding the vote, Moscow’s objections prompted Western powers to soften the resolution’s tone. The failure to satisfy Russia’s expectations that the Syrian opposition is also given sufficient warning and Assad is not forced to leave power created a delicate situation. The lack of a breakthrough on a compromise draft prompted the backers of the resolution to put it to the UN Security Council for a vote. Hours before Russia and China vetoed the draft resolution, Assad forces continued their violent campaign, shelling Syria’s third largest city Homs, which, according to many reports, killed hundreds of people.

    While video footage showing Syrian forces’ alleged atrocities and the conflicting accounts of the death toll could not be independently verified and the Assad regime denied such reports, this development triggered an acute reaction in Turkey both at the governmental and popular levels (Anadolu Ajansi, February 4). Turkish anger was further fueled by the fact that the attack on Homs was executed on the anniversary of the infamous Hama massacre of 1982, when Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had tens of thousands of people killed. Moreover, reportedly, during the bombardment of Homs some mosques were targeted, while Muslims were celebrating a sacred night marking the birth of the Prophet Mohammed.

    More remarkably, the clashes between the Syrian army and the forces of the Free Syrian Army spread to the Turkish border, and gunfire was heard in the border villages in the Turkish province of Hatay throughout the night. While some Syrian villagers fled to refugee camps in Turkey, where thousands of people including the leaders of the Free Syrian Army were already taking shelter, bullets from the clashes hit the homes in Turkish villages, which were televised live, raising public interest in these developments (Sabah, February 5).

    Like in other nations, Turkish people also organized demonstrations outside Syrian diplomatic representations in protest against these developments (www.turkiyegazetesi.com, February 5). Though the demonstrations were not large-scale, they have nonetheless attracted a significant number of people since the beginning of the uprisings. This development was also important because it signified a gradual transformation in Turkish people’s perception of the situation in Syria. Previously, Turks focused more on the geopolitical aspects of the Syrian uprising than the humanitarian tragedy caused by the regime’s brutal crackdown, believing that there was Western manipulation to change the regional balance of power. Many Turks, including conservative segments of society, harbored suspicions about the root causes of the uprisings and were critical of the Turkish government’s outward opposition against the Damascus regime, believing that it was acting as a subcontractor of the West (EDM, November 15, 2011). The recent demonstrations indicate that the Turkish public might become more supportive of their government’s policy on Syria and focus on the humanitarian aspects of the crisis.

    The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, attending the Munich Security Conference together with other world leaders, criticized Moscow and Beijing. Questioning the morality of their behavior, Davutoglu maintained that they acted with a Cold War mentality and the price for the vote would be paid by the Arabs and Turks in the region. Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey would continue to support the Syrian people’s struggle. Expressing solidarity with Syrians, Davutoglu added that Turkey would embrace the entire population of this country if they needed Turkey’s help (www.ntvmsnbc.com, February 4).

    Ankara’s ties with Damascus became contentious at the outset of the Syrian uprising and, over time, Turkish leaders broke with their former ally Assad and asked him to step down. Meanwhile, Ankara supported the umbrella organization, the Syrian National Council in bringing together opposition groups, as well as hosting thousands of refugees (EDM, August 10, 2011). The presence of members of the Free Syrian Army in refugee camps has led to speculation that Turkey was arming the rebels against Damascus. When an earlier attempt at imposing sanctions on Syria failed in October 2011, due to Russian and Chinese objections, Ankara went ahead and adopted sanctions in coordination with Western powers. Turkey also coordinated its diplomatic initiatives with regional countries and worked hard to ensure the peace plan by the Arab League would succeed. Davutoglu undertook enormous diplomatic efforts to convince Tehran, the chief regional ally of Damascus, to work together toward a solution of the crisis and the prevention of sectarian tensions in the region (EDM, January 10). In a subsequent effort, he traveled to Moscow to exert pressure on Damascus (Anadolu Ajansi, January 25).

    As his reaction to the recent failed resolution at the UN demonstrates, Davutoglu has been frustrated over the lack of progress on the diplomatic front. Two statements released by the foreign ministry regarding the ongoing atrocities by Damascus and the UN Security Council vote reflect similar thinking (www.mfa.gov.tr, February 4). While the first statement maintained that “The shelling by a country’s official security forces of its own cities constitutes the most concrete indication that the government of that country has totally lost its legitimacy to rule,” the second statement argued that “The stage that has been reached by the regime’s suppressing the desire of the Syrian people for universal values […] with the use of guns, violence and mass executions has acquired a threatening nature in which international peace and security is at risk.”

    This sort of language is one that values human rights over the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and Ankara has so far underlined clearly that the Syrian regime has lost its right to legitimately rule the country. Turkey, however, has not gone as far as advocating international intervention, and believes that any solution has to come through international legitimacy. Short of international consensus on a UN-orchestrated solution, Ankara is left with little options for changing the situation on the ground.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-confronts-syria-imbroglio/