The recent step by France with respect to the 1915 incidents represents a great victory for the Armenians before 2015, the 100th anniversary of the incidents. (more…)
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Turkey needs to devise a 2015 strategy
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20 Steps Turkey Could Take to Worsen Relations with France After Genocide Vote
Turkey’s leaders have been threatening France for months with various reprisals should the French government pass a law making it illegal to deny the Armenian Genocide.Ignoring Turkish threats and blackmail, the French Parliament adopted a bill on December 22, 2011, criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. The Senate followed suit on January 23, 2012, with a vote of 127-86, after a 7-hour debate. The new law, to be signed soon by Pres. Sarkozy, carries a one year jail term and a fine of $60,000 for anyone denying the Armenian Genocide. Every single member of the French legislature, even those voting against the bill, stated that they had no doubt whatsoever about the facts of the Armenian Genocide.The hour of truth has now arrived. One wonders if Turkey’s leaders have the courage to carry out their bombastic declarations. We would like to ask them two questions: 1) Are you all talk and no action or, as the saying goes, is your bark worse than your bite? 2) Will you be taking short-term face-saving measures or more serious and permanent steps?Unlike a month ago, the Turkish public will not be satisfied if the Ambassador is withdrawn, only to be sent back in two weeks. Also, Turks may not be too impressed by Prime Minister Erdogan’s announcement that he would no longer visit Paris.While Turkish officials are recovering from the shock of the French vote, we wish to offer some tips on how Turks can make a bad situation even worse. In its fury, the Turkish government may take retaliatory measures not only against France, but also all countries that have recognized the Armenian Genocide. Such extreme, irrational, and self-defeating actions would contribute to Turkey’s isolation and hurt its own interests. Below are suggested ideas on how Turkey could settle scores with France and other perceived adversaries:1) Withdraw the Turkish Ambassador from France and do not send him back until the French government renounces its acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide and the newly adopted French bill.2) Expel the French Ambassador from Turkey and shut down the French Embassy.3) Break all economic, military, cultural, and political ties with France.4) Collect all French products such as chocolates and wines from store shelves throughout Turkey and dump them in the sewer; and ban French fries and French kissing!5) Cancel all Turkish Airlines flights to French cities and do not allow Air France flights to Turkey. Place similar restrictions on French ships.6) Prohibit teaching of French in Turkish schools and shut down private French schools in Turkey.7) Forbid access to all French websites.8) Discontinue Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union, in view of the expected submission of similar measures on genocide denial to all 26 EU member countries.9) Cancel Turkey’s membership in the Council of Europe because in 1987 the European Parliament recognized the Armenian Genocide.10) Withdraw from the United Nations because in 1985 the UN Human Rights Commission adopted a report recognizing the Armenian Genocide.11) Ban all Turkish official visits to France.12) Expel all French citizens from Turkey and demand that all Turkish citizens immediately leave the territory of France.13) Do not allow French tourists and businessmen to enter Turkey.14) Shut down French automobile factories in Turkey, causing the unemployment of thousands of Turkish workers.15) Rename all French streets in Turkey to Algerian and North Korean names.16) Adopt a resolution by the Turkish Parliament accusing France for the so-called Algerian “genocide.”17) Deport all citizens of Armenia working illegally in Turkey. Deprive them of all food and water during their long march from Istanbul to Armenia or, even worse, to the Syrian desert!18) Withdraw all private and public Turkish funds from French banks.19) Blacklist all French books, movies, newspapers and TV programs in Turkey.20) Arrest French citizens in Turkey in retaliation for Turks imprisoned in France for denying the Armenian Genocide.The French Senate’s decision is part of the high price the Turkish government has been paying for the past 100 years for its persistent denial of the Armenian Genocide and the heinous crimes committed by its Ottoman predecessors. Until Turkey acknowledges its guilt and restores the Armenian lands and properties to the descendants of Genocide victims, it will continue to face serious challenges from other countries and will be denied a place in the family of civilized nations. -
Turkey Plans Serial Production In National Weapons Programs
Turkey Plans Serial Production In National Weapons Programs
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 16January 24, 2012By: Saban KardasThe head of the under-secretariat for the defense industry, Murad Bayar, has outlined Turkey’s armaments objectives in coming years. This year, Turkey plans to finish tests on several national weapons systems that have been developed and move to the serial production phase. In the next stage, building on that momentum, Turkey plans to increase its arms exports as well as reduce its reliance on imports (Anadolu Ajansi, January 23).During the past decade, Turkey has embarked on ambitious programs to reduce its dependence on external sources for the procurement needs of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the second largest army in NATO. On the one hand, through stringent rules on procurement tenders, Ankara wanted to ensure that domestic firms will take part in the production of imported weapons systems, as well as enabling technology transfers. On the other hand, building on the accumulation of knowledge gained from these joint projects and the assistance and subsidies provided to the domestic arms industry and R&D activities, Turkey has been working to develop several “national” weapons systems. So far, Ankara’s ambitious national arms projects included the development of a national warship, main battle tank, attack helicopter, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and an infantry rifle.
Turkey has been cooperating with Italy’s Augusta-Westland on an attack helicopter project, which is aimed at resolving the Turkish army’s deficiencies in its fight against the PKK. Earlier, a prototype of this helicopter was developed, which is going through flight and weapons systems tests (EDM, September 29, 2009). Turkey is proud of the attack helicopter deal and sees it almost as an advertisement for its recent national projects. Turkey obtained the sole production license from Italy and introduced the necessary modifications, in order that it meets the specific operational needs of its army in mountainous terrain. Moreover, reflecting its self-confidence in indigenous technological abilities, the electronic systems and the software of the helicopter will be developed in Turkey, meaning it will have full control over the platform’s operation. The weapons installed on the helicopter will also come from national weapons developed domestically in recent years, including Cirit laser-guided rocket systems.
Bayar announced that they are planning to finish firing tests and start the first deliveries to the TAF this year, and complete the delivery of 51 helicopters in the coming years. Bayar also noted that once this platform is added to TAF’s inventory, it will have good marketing prospects. This system will be in demand, Bayar believes, especially in countries that are currently fighting terrorism, given that Turkey developed it with such considerations in mind. Several Middle Eastern countries are believed to be considering ATAK. After successfully passing the flight tests in summer 2011, ATAK has also been invited to submit its bid to a procurement tender in South Korea (Sabah, September 25, 2011).
Another major project is the main battle tank ALTAY, developed in partnership with South Korea’s Rotem (EDM, August 7, 2008). This project seeks to increase the TAF’s firepower in conventional warfare through the procurement of 250 third generation main battle tanks. Currently, ALTAY is in its design phase and the initial deliveries are expected to start from 2013. Bayar noted that this year they plan to develop the first prototype and start the necessary tests.
Turkey also has been working on another ambitious project to bolster its surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities. In need of actionable intelligence in its fight against the PKK, Turkey has relied on the United States and Israel to either lease or buy UAVs. This cooperation, however, proved difficult to sustain given the tensions encountered in its bilateral relations with Israel and occasionally the US. Turkey has launched an indigenous medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAV system program that will initially meet the TAF’s reconnaissance requirements, and later a modified version with combat capability will be developed. The prototypes are going through several tests. Following the maturity tests, Bayar expect the five prototypes to be put into operation and their serial production will start. Ankara sees this project also as a sign of prestige, as it will join the few nations with this technology and eventually develop the potential to export it. Similarly, Bayar expects that the first indigenous satellite developed by Turkey, the Gokturk-2, will be launched into space this year.
Another project has been the development of a national infantry rifle. Turkey is currently conducting tests on a rifle designed and developed domestically, and anticipates moving to the mass production stage this year. The country has also been running a national warship program, MILGEM, to develop a littoral combat capacity. Under the project, the Turkish Navy will be supplied with eight corvettes and four frigates, as well as exploring possibilities for exports. The first corvette has already been delivered, while the second is undergoing tests.
Recently, Ankara announced plans to develop a national fighter jet. Bayar described it as a long term objective, which would mark Turkey’s elevation to a higher class in arms producing countries. Turkey is currently considering this option and will soon initiate two-year long feasibility studies. If the project is deemed feasible, further work will be authorized to develop the first prototype in ten years’ time and serial production in the following decade. Turkey has also announced another ambitious program to develop long-range missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km (www.trt.net.tr, January 13).
Although Turkey remains a major arms importer, through these programs it is now able to procure slightly more than half of its needs from domestic sources. Currently, Turkey is producing short range missiles, armored vehicles and personnel carriers, training aircraft, small UAVs, etc. Especially in advanced weapons systems, Turkey remains dependent on imports, and addressing that deficiency is one of the objectives of the procurement programs. In the future, while seeking to increase the share of domestic contributions, Turkey will also work to bolster its export figures to $1 billion, from last year’s $800 million. Overall, two principles will underpin Turkey’s defense industry policies, as underlined by Bayar: depth, i.e., increasing the national contributions in the new platforms through the development of sub-systems; and sustainability, or, building a viable arms industry that can sustain mass production at competitive prices.
https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-plans-serial-production-in-national-weapons-programs/ -
Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq
Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq
Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 12
January 18, 2012
By: Saban Kardas
As Turkey struggles to avert crises involving its neighbors Syria and Iran, Iraq has emerged as yet another issue that needs immediate attention from Turkish diplomacy. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent remarks critical of what he considered to be Ankara’s “interference” in Iraqi internal affairs threatens to worsen the already tense situation in the Middle East.
In an interview broadcast by state television, Maliki sent a stern warning to Ankara asking it to stop its interventions in Iraqi domestic affairs. Maliki maintained that Turkey had acted as though it ruled Iraq, and went on to claim that the current path taken by Ankara might invite disaster and civil war in the region. He warned that if Turkey continued the same rhetoric, it might suffer repercussions from its actions, because it also has different sects and ethnic groups (Anadolu Ajansi, January 13).
Maliki’s inflammatory rhetoric was triggered by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s remarks in the previous week. Both in his conversation with Maliki and in his public addresses, Erdogan urged the Iraqi leadership to take swift measures to reduce tensions in Iraq, which were caused by an arrest warrant being issued for the Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi (Anadolu Ajansi, January 10). Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Hashemi, a leading Sunni politician, shortly before the withdrawal of US forces on the grounds that he was leading a death squad targeting Iraqi politicians. Fearing for his safety, Hashemi escaped to northern Iraq controlled by the Kurdistan regional government. The clampdown on Hashemi and other Sunni ministers triggered a new wave of attacks against the Shiites, raising questions about the sustainability of the fragile coalition government, as well as the future of the country as a unified entity.
Turkey initially refrained from direct involvement in the unfolding crisis over the arrest warrant against Hashemi and exclusion of Sunnis from key government positions. It drew attention to the risks that the recent rift could escalate into sectarian conflict, with destabilizing effects for the entire region. It also maintained communication with the Kurdistan regional government to forge national consensus. Regionally, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also sought to mobilize a joint Turkish-Iranian response to address the Shiite-Sunni disagreements, which lie at the core of the ongoing crises in Syria, Bahrain and Iraq (EDM, January 10).
However, the recent spree of bombings in Baghdad prompted Erdogan to raise this issue publicly. Raising concerns about the inability of Iraqi political authorities to prevent bloodshed, Erdogan maintained that he has lost his optimism for the future of democracy in this country, as the government laid siege to the houses of coalition partners. Erdogan challenged Maliki to assume his historical responsibility and work to maintain the unity of Iraq, adding that those who instigate chaos with sectarian instincts would go down in history as devils. Echoing speculation that Iran might be behind the recent political crisis in Iraq, Erdogan also warned other countries endeavoring to exert influence in Iraq to act in a prudent and responsible manner (Anadolu Ajansi, January 10).
While Erdogan was trying to promote common sense on the part of his Iraqi counterparts, he also provided further ammunition to Maliki and his Shiite block that seem determined to take a stand against Turkey to bolster their position in Iraqi domestic politics. Following Maliki’s televised criticism of Ankara, the Turkish envoy in Baghdad was summoned by the Iraqi deputy foreign minister to be reminded of Iraq’s expectation that Turkey must avoid actions which could disturb good neighborly relations (Anadolu Ajansi January 16). In response, the Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara, who was told that Turkey found unacceptable the allegation that it is interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs. It was only natural for Turkey to pursue the stability of its neighbors, according to Turkish foreign ministry officials (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 16).
This development is likely to invite a harsh response from the Turkish side in the days ahead, but it has already pleased Hashemi and his supporters. Reportedly Sunni politicians, who feel threatened by the government crackdown, were approaching Turkish officials to take a more effective role in order to thwart a sectarian conflict. Hashemi also expressed his debt to Turkey, adding that Erdogan had personally worked to support his cause in recent months. Reiterating his concerns about receiving a fair trial in Baghdad, he vowed not to return to the capital before his safety is ensured (www.ntvmnsbc.com, Today’s Zaman, January 16).
Clearly, this dispute raises many questions about Turkey’s Middle East policy. At one level it reignites the possibility of sectarian conflict in the region. Turkey has purposefully refrained from sectarian considerations in its foreign policy, and has sought to embrace all major groups, a policy which was most clearly observed in Iraq. When a violent civil war destabilized Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003, Ankara played a major role in convincing the Sunni groups to withdraw their support from the insurgency and join the political processes in Baghdad. During the government vacuum that ensued after the Iraqi elections of 2010, Turkey again prioritized Iraqi unity and urged the al Iraqiyye list representing Sunni groups to work with the Maliki-led coalition.
As the risk of sectarian conflict may have increased in the wake of the Arab Spring, Turkey once again wants to spearhead preventive measures to avert such a scenario. In Iraq, while seeking to play a similar role and prevent further polarization and eventual partition of the country along sectarian lines, Turkey arguably runs the risk of being drawn into sectarian divisions, as the Sunni groups are obviously in search of an ally to balance Maliki’s bloc that interestingly is supported by not only Iran, but also the United States.
Also, this might have repercussions for the Turkish-US relationship. Despite its objections against the invasion of Iraq, Turkey worked closely with the United States, hoping that this would be the best way to prevent the country’s descent into chaos and total breakdown. In the process leading to the withdrawal of US forces, Ankara again coordinated its policy with Washington. However Washington’s support for Maliki, whose reckless show of force and exclusion of Sunni groups from government positions, might also expose new divisions between Ankara and Washington.
https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-works-to-prevent-sectarian-rift-in-iraq/
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As France Tightens the Noose, Turkey Reacts with Outrageous Words and Deeds
Turkish leaders routinely proclaim that they are not afraid of facing their country’s past. Yet, the minute someone reminds them of the darkest chapters of their history, they panic and overreact.The most recent example of Turkish officials’ irrational behavior is their reaction to French initiatives to adopt a law criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. Despite Turkish threats and retaliatory measures, the bill was adopted by the French Parliament on December 22, 2011 and the Senate is expected to approve it on January 23, 2012.Here are a few examples of outrageous Turkish overreaction to France and all things French:— Prime Minister Erdogan accused French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s father of participating in the Algerian atrocities, while serving in the French Army. Sarkozy’s father shot back by admonishing Erdogan to read his biography, telling him that he had never set foot in Algeria.— To justify his own country’s genocide of Armenians, Erdogan accused France of committing “genocide” in Algeria. Yet, Erdogan was shocked when Algeria’s Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia rebuked him for playing politics with Algerians’ blood. Ouyahia also blamed Turkey for the deaths of countless Algerians by providing ammunition to France during the colonial period for which former Turkish Pres. Ozal apologized to Algeria.— The Mayor of Ankara announced last week that the City Council had decided to change the name of “Paris Street” to “Algeria Street,” rename “Charles De Gaulle Street” in honor of a yet to be named Algerian hero, and erect a monument dedicated to the Algerian “massacres” in front of the French Embassy in the Turkish capital.— Turkish factories have been busily manufacturing toilet paper, trash bags, and baby diapers carrying Sarkozy’s name, and condoms with the picture of French Deputy Valerie Boyer. Meanwhile, a gang of Turkish hackers attacked the websites of French lawmakers and threatened to rape Mrs. Boyer and murder her children.— Prof. Oya Akgonenc wrote a hilarious article titled, “Armenian Events in the Triangle of Armenia, France and America.” She identified three “dangerous attackers” of Turkey whose last names start with S: “Sarkozy of France, Sargsyan of Armenia, and Sassounian, head of the Armenian lobby in the United States!”— Although Turkey called for a boycott of French products and services, Turkish flights to Paris were fully booked, as the number of Turks visiting France during the holidays increased by 10% compared to last year. Similarly, trade between the two countries increased by 30% after the 2001 French recognition of the Armenian Genocide, despite the Turkish boycott of France.— French-Algerian businessman Rachid Nekkaz, who proudly declared during a recent visit to Turkey, “I feel like I am a Turk,” announced setting up a million euro ($1.3 million) fund to pay the fine for any Turk arrested in France for denying the Armenian Genocide. Mr. Nekkaz failed to inform potential Turkish denialists that the pending French law also carries a sentence of one year in jail which his fund would be unable to prevent.— The head of a Turkish news agency called for the closing down of French schools in Turkey and banning the teaching of French in Turkish schools.Such nutty statements are likely to multiply after the French Senate approves the bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide and Pres. Sarkozy signs it into law, in view of the fact that the two largest French parties have expressed their support for the Armenian bill. Imagine the whining of Turkish leaders, when Turks are arrested in France for breaking the upcoming law on genocide denial.Turkish protests will reach a crescendo when the French government proposes to the 25 other states of the European Union a similar anti-denial law which would lead to the arrest and punishment of Turkish denialists throughout Europe.Turkish leaders have no one else to blame but themselves for their embarrassing and demeaning predicament. Yet, Turkey is in no position to give lectures about freedom of expression to anyone, given its draconian laws that violate the basic human rights of its own citizens. In France, it is illegal to lie about genocide, while in Turkey, it is illegal to tell the truth!Instead of blaming the French Senate or the three men “whose last names start with S,” Turkish leaders could get out of their century long quagmire by acknowledging the Armenian Genocide and making amends to the descendants of dispossessed victims. -
Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program
Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 6January 10, 2012By: Saban KardasTurkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, paid a crucial visit to Tehran on January 6, amidst the increasing confrontation between Iran and the West. The visit mainly provided an opportunity to address bilateral issues, as it followed a heated debate in recent months which questions whether Turkey and Iran were involved in an undeclared rivalry in the Arab Spring. The two countries’ diverging positions on Syria, Turkey’s decision to host NATO’s early warning radar, as well as differences on the Palestinians’ quest for recognition, arguably pitted the two against each other. The confrontational mood was further worsened by harsh statements against Turkey by Iranian politicians and high-ranking officials (EDM, October 11, 2011).As such statements even led to direct threats voiced by some Iranian lawmakers and military officers, indicating that Iran might take military action against NATO facilities in Turkey, Davutoglu was prompted to convey his uneasiness and demand an explanation. Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, visited Ankara in an effort to allay Ankara’s growing concerns. Reiterating the two countries’ friendship, Salehi sought to assure his Turkish counterpart that such remarks reflected personal opinions and did not represent official Iranian policy on Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, December 14, 2011).
Ankara also downplayed such threatening remarks as personal opinions, in an effort to maintain channels for dialogue with Tehran. Though not hiding the differences of opinion on regional issues, Davutoglu and other Turkish officials prefer to focus on issues of converging views and continue to view Tehran as a major stakeholder in the region whose cooperation is essential. More importantly, Davutoglu is keen to reassure his Iranian counterparts that Turkey will not take part in any direct military action against Iran, which seems as a calculated move to comfort Tehran and convince it to steer away from the path of escalation.
With such considerations in mind, Davutoglu paid a working visit to Iran on January 6, to meet Salehi and other Iranian officials. Davutoglu worked hard to stress the defensive nature of the ballistic missile shield and reiterated that Turkey would not let its territory be used in any attack against Iran. The two ministers also agreed to continue to discuss regional issues, and meet at least twice each year (Anadolu Ajansi, January 5).
Beyond the immediate Turkish-Iranian frictions, Davutoglu addressed a number of regional issues with Iran. Foregoing the speculations of rivalry, Davutoglu invited his Iranian counterparts to work together in order to address the escalating tensions in the region, which some claim could lead to Sunni-Shiite sectarian divisions. In the last two days, because the uprising in Syria, the ongoing political crisis in Iraq, and the situation in Bahrain involve some sectarian elements, Davutoglu increasingly refers to an imminent danger of sectarian conflict and warns against a new Cold War in the Middle East (Dogan, January 8).
Moreover, the uncertain future of the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program, especially in view of US sanctions policy and the Iranian brinkmanship in the Strait of Hormuz is a growing concern for Turkey. Ankara recognizes Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology, but also invites the country to be more transparent about its ongoing program and allay concerns on the part of Western powers.
Since the talks held between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul one year ago, diplomatic channels were largely closed. In order to push things forward on that front, Davutoglu seems to have attempted shuttle diplomacy. In the wake of his Tehran trip, he announced that he was in touch with Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief, on this issue. Davutoglu raised expectations by maintaining that both parties were ready to resume nuclear talks in Turkey. Earlier, Salehi also expressed his readiness to return to nuclear talks in a suitable time and venue agreed upon by the parties, adding that Turkey would be the best option (Anadolu Ajansi, January 8). Commenting on this development, US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, said that the US remained in consultation with Turkey over Davutoglu’s trip and agrees with Turkey’s goal of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and complying with its international obligations, though they might differ on tactics. She also emphasized Washington’s readiness to resume discussions, though adding that Iran has yet to formally convey its decision to start the talks (Today’s Zaman, January 7).
Adding urgency to the matter, the United States and its European allies are initiating a new wave of sanctions to pressure Iran on the economic front. The sanctions recently approved by President Barack Obama involve penalizing the financial institutions doing business with Iran as well as halting oil imports from Iran, by targeting its Central Bank. Turkey abides by the sanctions regime introduced by the UN Security Council in the summer of 2010, but refuses to implement the unilateral Western sanctions on the grounds that they are non-binding. However, there has been growing US expectation for Turkey to join the new sanctions, while Ankara seeks an exemption, given its oil and gas imports from Iran, requiring it to work with Iranian financial institutions.
A visit by a US delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State, William Burns, to Ankara on January 9, offered an opportunity to discuss these issues. During his talks with Turkish officials, the US delegation, among others, solicited Turkey’s support for unilateral sanctions. Prior to the meeting, some senior US Congressmen and diplomats visited Turkish government officials and bureaucrats, underscoring the importance attached to this issue (Haberturk, January 9).
Commenting on the visit, Nuland dismissed the argument that Turkey opposes US policy on Iran. She emphasized that the US acknowledges Turkey’s sensitivities given Ankara’s trade ties, but the two sides will continue their dialogue on how to maximize the pressures on Iran to force it to comply with its international obligations (Haberturk, January 10). Turkish sources also reported that Ankara does not want to see a further escalation of the already heightened tensions in the region (Sabah, January 10).
Uneasy at the growing escalation, Ankara seeks to dampen tensions through a reassertion of its facilitator role and engaging the parties, without taking any side. Once again, Turkey is walking a diplomatic tightrope due to its difficult neighbor’s relations with the West.
https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-wants-to-resume-talks-on-iranian-nuclear-program/