Category: Authors

  • Turkish Kilim Symbols

    Turkish Kilim Symbols

    Most Turkish kilim designs have their roots in the conservative, indigenous, pre-Christian and pre-Islamic backgrounds of the rural population and are related to the basic themes of life: birth, marriage, fertility; spiritual life and happiness; love and unison; and death. They reflect the ancient cults and practices of their ancestors around these events. There are many symbols in the vocabulary of the weaver and many stylizations of each symbol. Unlocking the keys to these symbols reveals a deeper insight into the values, dreams and culture of the Anatolian people and expresses layer upon layer of history and influence in the region.
    Nazarlik: an amulet to protect against the evil eye, cause of harm, injury and misfortune.
    Elebelinde: symbol of motherhood and fertility, originating in the Neolithic cult of the Mother Goddess.
    Ram’s Horn: male fertility, heroism, power and masculinity.
    Hands, Fingers and Combs: the hand motif protects against spells and the evil eye while the comb protects birth and marriage.
    Tree of Life: symbol of life and paradise; represents man’s yearning for immortality and life after death.
    Niche: place of honor, or a doorkilim 1way into paradise.
  • Armenians Need to Pursue Their Cause  With More Confidence and Commitment

    Armenians Need to Pursue Their Cause With More Confidence and Commitment

     

    sassounian31
     
     

    This week’s column deals with the self-defeating attitude of some Armenians whose negative outlook manifested itself once again with the latest news about the French bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide. 

    Some people hold the skeptical view that any project undertaken by Armenians is doomed to failure. A few years ago, I was advised by several readers not to call for dismissal of the Los Angeles Times Managing Editor for censoring an article by Mark Arax on the Armenian Genocide. On another occasion, I was advised not to ask Time magazine to apologize and make amends for disseminating a Turkish denialist DVD. I ignored the defeatist suggestions that countering such powerful publications would be futile and even counter-productive. It was not an easy struggle, but I am happy to report that Armenian activists prevailed in both campaigns. 

    It is noteworthy that such apathetic individuals not only fail to offer any assistance or encouragement, but go to great lengths to discourage those who are furthering the interests of the community. Interestingly, those who sit on their hands are usually the ones who complain the most about others who are serving the common cause. 

    Imagine if twenty years ago the small band of Armenian freedom fighters had listened to such naysayers and decided that it was not possible to liberate Artaskh (Karabagh) from Azeri and Soviet occupation forces! Would I be here today if my ancestors, the brave people of Zeitoun, located in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire, had not fought against powerful Turkish armies and won more than forty battles and hundreds of skirmishes to preserve their safety and autonomy? 

    Returning to our own times, how often are we told by misinformed Armenians with an “all-knowing” attitude that the U.S. Congress will never recognize the Armenian Genocide, when in fact it was recognized in 1975 and 1984! Or how many times these misguided fortune-tellers have prophesized that no U.S. President will ever recognize the Armenian Genocide because Turkey is too important, unaware that Pres. Ronald Reagan recognized it in a Presidential Proclamation on April 22, 1981! 

    These same Armenians were confident that the French Parliament would not adopt a bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian Genocide last December, either because there would be a last minute snag or that Pres. Sarkozy was tricking Armenians to get their votes in the forthcoming Presidential elections. Yet the Parliament approved the legislation by a wide margin. When the bill made its way to the Senate on January 23, 2012, once again the skeptics confidently predicted that an unexpected development would block its passage. The bill was adopted by a vote of 127-86. 

    Last week, when some French legislators, aided and abetted by the Turkish Ambassador, appealed the bill to the Constitutional Council, some Armenians fell into deep depression. They insisted that there was an anti-Armenian conspiracy, claiming to have known all along that the initiative would end up in failure. These people do not seem to realize that the appeal does not necessarily mean defeat of the bill. In fact, should the Council determine that the bill is constitutional, those who would be arrested for denying the Armenian Genocide could no longer challenge the new law. 

    However, should the Constitutional Council reject the bill, it would not be the end of the world, as Pres. Sarkozy has pledged to amend it and resubmit it to both legislative houses. Nevertheless, the pursuit of the Armenian Cause does not depend on any particular bill. Armenians have many other major demands from Turkey under international law. 

    Rather than simply deploring that the bill has ended in the Constitutional Council, Armenians should demand that certain members of the court disqualify themselves from this case due their impermissible affiliation with Turkish Think Tanks or for having made prejudicial statements on this issue. It is noteworthy that six of the French Senators who filed for the appeal are currently enjoying themselves in Azerbaijan as guests of the state, tasting Caspian caviar and indulging in other Azeri “delicacies.” 

    Far more important than any bill is Armenians’ solemn determination to continue the struggle for their rightful cause, undeterred by setbacks or obstacles. Having survived several millennia of occupation, pillage, massacres, and genocide, Armenians cannot succumb or surrender at the first sign of adversity! 

    Armenians can go forward only when they purge themselves of their self-defeating attitude and subservient mentality, left over from centuries of Ottoman Turkish subjugation and servitude.
  • Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 26
    February 7, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    The failure of a recent UN Security Council resolution that sought to calm Syria has once again highlighted the dilemmas Turkey has faced in its efforts to end the humanitarian catastrophe in this neighboring state. Ankara joined international outrage, condemning the Syrian regime on the one hand, and expressing concern over China and Russia using their UN veto, on the other. While calling for urgent action and exploration of fresh options to stop the bloodshed, Ankara, nonetheless, reiterated its reservations about international intervention.

    The proposed UN Resolution would have supported the Arab League’s peace plan. In the negotiations preceding the vote, Moscow’s objections prompted Western powers to soften the resolution’s tone. The failure to satisfy Russia’s expectations that the Syrian opposition is also given sufficient warning and Assad is not forced to leave power created a delicate situation. The lack of a breakthrough on a compromise draft prompted the backers of the resolution to put it to the UN Security Council for a vote. Hours before Russia and China vetoed the draft resolution, Assad forces continued their violent campaign, shelling Syria’s third largest city Homs, which, according to many reports, killed hundreds of people.

    While video footage showing Syrian forces’ alleged atrocities and the conflicting accounts of the death toll could not be independently verified and the Assad regime denied such reports, this development triggered an acute reaction in Turkey both at the governmental and popular levels (Anadolu Ajansi, February 4). Turkish anger was further fueled by the fact that the attack on Homs was executed on the anniversary of the infamous Hama massacre of 1982, when Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had tens of thousands of people killed. Moreover, reportedly, during the bombardment of Homs some mosques were targeted, while Muslims were celebrating a sacred night marking the birth of the Prophet Mohammed.

    More remarkably, the clashes between the Syrian army and the forces of the Free Syrian Army spread to the Turkish border, and gunfire was heard in the border villages in the Turkish province of Hatay throughout the night. While some Syrian villagers fled to refugee camps in Turkey, where thousands of people including the leaders of the Free Syrian Army were already taking shelter, bullets from the clashes hit the homes in Turkish villages, which were televised live, raising public interest in these developments (Sabah, February 5).

    Like in other nations, Turkish people also organized demonstrations outside Syrian diplomatic representations in protest against these developments (www.turkiyegazetesi.com, February 5). Though the demonstrations were not large-scale, they have nonetheless attracted a significant number of people since the beginning of the uprisings. This development was also important because it signified a gradual transformation in Turkish people’s perception of the situation in Syria. Previously, Turks focused more on the geopolitical aspects of the Syrian uprising than the humanitarian tragedy caused by the regime’s brutal crackdown, believing that there was Western manipulation to change the regional balance of power. Many Turks, including conservative segments of society, harbored suspicions about the root causes of the uprisings and were critical of the Turkish government’s outward opposition against the Damascus regime, believing that it was acting as a subcontractor of the West (EDM, November 15, 2011). The recent demonstrations indicate that the Turkish public might become more supportive of their government’s policy on Syria and focus on the humanitarian aspects of the crisis.

    The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, attending the Munich Security Conference together with other world leaders, criticized Moscow and Beijing. Questioning the morality of their behavior, Davutoglu maintained that they acted with a Cold War mentality and the price for the vote would be paid by the Arabs and Turks in the region. Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey would continue to support the Syrian people’s struggle. Expressing solidarity with Syrians, Davutoglu added that Turkey would embrace the entire population of this country if they needed Turkey’s help (www.ntvmsnbc.com, February 4).

    Ankara’s ties with Damascus became contentious at the outset of the Syrian uprising and, over time, Turkish leaders broke with their former ally Assad and asked him to step down. Meanwhile, Ankara supported the umbrella organization, the Syrian National Council in bringing together opposition groups, as well as hosting thousands of refugees (EDM, August 10, 2011). The presence of members of the Free Syrian Army in refugee camps has led to speculation that Turkey was arming the rebels against Damascus. When an earlier attempt at imposing sanctions on Syria failed in October 2011, due to Russian and Chinese objections, Ankara went ahead and adopted sanctions in coordination with Western powers. Turkey also coordinated its diplomatic initiatives with regional countries and worked hard to ensure the peace plan by the Arab League would succeed. Davutoglu undertook enormous diplomatic efforts to convince Tehran, the chief regional ally of Damascus, to work together toward a solution of the crisis and the prevention of sectarian tensions in the region (EDM, January 10). In a subsequent effort, he traveled to Moscow to exert pressure on Damascus (Anadolu Ajansi, January 25).

    As his reaction to the recent failed resolution at the UN demonstrates, Davutoglu has been frustrated over the lack of progress on the diplomatic front. Two statements released by the foreign ministry regarding the ongoing atrocities by Damascus and the UN Security Council vote reflect similar thinking (www.mfa.gov.tr, February 4). While the first statement maintained that “The shelling by a country’s official security forces of its own cities constitutes the most concrete indication that the government of that country has totally lost its legitimacy to rule,” the second statement argued that “The stage that has been reached by the regime’s suppressing the desire of the Syrian people for universal values […] with the use of guns, violence and mass executions has acquired a threatening nature in which international peace and security is at risk.”

    This sort of language is one that values human rights over the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and Ankara has so far underlined clearly that the Syrian regime has lost its right to legitimately rule the country. Turkey, however, has not gone as far as advocating international intervention, and believes that any solution has to come through international legitimacy. Short of international consensus on a UN-orchestrated solution, Ankara is left with little options for changing the situation on the ground.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-confronts-syria-imbroglio/
  • Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Tuesday, 24 January 2012

    Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW) conducted an exclusive interview with Saban Kardas. Saban Kardas is assistant professor at TOBB University of Economics and Tecnology in Ankara. He is also assistant editor of Insight Turkey, a quarterly journal in circulation since 1999, which is published by SETA Foundation. 

    Q: Would Turkey not be successful if it pursued its energy policy through TPAO, equipped with specific power and well-designed by the state, rather than extending state aid? In this context, is the Azerbaijan SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) a successful model? Is it possible for Turkey’s energy policy to be changed substantially?

    A: To start with, Turkey and Azerbaijan’s energy policies are different, and will be misleading to start analysis of Turkey’s energy policies with a comparison between them. While as an energy rich producing country Azerbaijan envisions a different set of priorities in its energy policies, Turkey’s energy policy is driven by first and foremost a concern to meet its own needs. Beyond that, Turkey works to assume a role in energy policies as a transit country. The shaping of energy policies in the countries of origin on the one hand and transit countries, i.e., countries that host the transportation routes, on the other, as well as specific institutional structures they devise take place in different settings.

    Going back to the core issue raised in your question: whether Turkey should develop its energy policies by moving to a private-sector driven model or a model based on some form of state control or intervention in the market. Alongside TPAO, BOTAS needs to be mentioned in the context of transit projects. There are market pressures on BOTAS to reduce its market share. There is also a similar expectation from external players, especially the EU. Turkey is responding to these expectations and reducing state involvement but it is difficult to say that it has progressed to an extent that it can satisfy the demands coming from outside. There are different arguments made in support of the opposing models, referring back to your question. As it is sometimes underlined in the ongoing discussions in Turkey, it makes sense to reduce the element of state intervention to the extent possible. From a liberal logic, one can make the argument that a more effective and efficient system can be developed by this approach.

    However, as a counter line of thought argues, in markets regulating strategic commodities, energy being one of them, there are some reasons to adopt some degree of state-control. The key concern in Turkey is that if such a strategic commodity is left to market forces alone, it is hard to develop competitive national players. Such concerns on Turkey’s part have been underlined in the debate taking place in the energy markets. It is widely believed that as it seeks to assert its importance in energy geopolitics, Turkey has to develop large firms in order to become an active player in this field. Firms with big capital need to emerge for global competition. It is not unlikely to occur in free market conditions, but it will be difficult. The best way to do so would be to develop an energy giant with state support. For this reason, Turkey, as in the case of BOTAS, was for some time resisting the pressures to move to a free market-oriented model and retain it as a major player, despite the pressures coming from outside. Recently, as it has been brought to the public’s attention in the context of gas purchase contracts from Russia, Turkey in fact has started to reduce the monopoly over natural gas imports. Similarly, the domestic distribution grid has been privatized to a large extent. Granted, overall, Turkey is heading to a more market-oriented model. Yet, as stated by Energy Minister Taner Yıldız on several occasions, despite a market-oriented model, Turkey wants to retain a decisive capacity for the state to make critical interventions in the operation of market. This appears to be the official prognosis for the future of the state in energy market.

    Going back to the question on the SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) model, it is early to answer this question, in the sense that the process of SOCAR’s consolidation in the market has yet to be finalized. In this context, what SOCAR is trying to do is in essence to replicate GAZPROM model of Russia, i.e., using its position as a major producer to develop projects aiming to penetrate into downstream markets and gain control over transportation and distribution networks, so that it can maximize profits. The Trans-Anatolia agreement is the most obvious example for SOCAR’s quest to play such a prominent role. Seen from that perspective, this model is not applicable to Turkey, given that Turkey does not stand a chance to become a player in the chain running from the source or producing nations to the distribution networks. So, it is hard to compare Turkey’s energy sector to SOCAR model, given the structural differences.

    Since the SOCAR model is still in the making, one has to wait and see how it will come into full fruition and whether it will accomplish its objectives. It is early to make a realistic assessment. But so far, Azerbaijan is exporting oil and gas and in addition to that it has undertaken major investments in Turkey’s energy sector. So, one can safely say that it has accomplished some progress in downstream markets as well. To sum up, in Azerbaijan, one might expect the emergence of a structure similar to the one in Russia and it has recorded some progress in that regards.

    At this point, one has to note some problems with the GAZPROM model, assuming that SOCAR also pursues a similar approach. In this model, there are debates as to the fusion of the state and business interests; i.e., political authorities shaping the economic decisions or economics dominating political decisions, all the while GAZPROM and other energy giants being at the center of these intermingling relations. If SOCAR follows a similar route to the Russian model, in the mid- to long-term, how the relationship between politics and economics will be forged and whether interest groups formed around energy industry may eventually hinder democratization and good governance are issues that beg closer inspection. If Azerbaijan might be opting for this model, such questions also need to be discussed more candidly.

    Finally, Turkey will unlikely to follow these models. As underlined, while moving toward a market-oriented model, Turkey will develop a structure that enables effective state interventions into the market, through the control of a critical share by the state.

    Q: The signing of the agreement regarding the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, which included Azerbaijan and Turkey, can be considered a blow to Nabucco on the one hand, and giving permission to South Stream might make Europe more dependent on Russia on the other. Was it a reaction against France because of the political air in recent months?

    A: Personally, I do not think the recent developments regarding pipeline projects are directly related to the Armenian allegations. For instance, France has not been particularly supportive of Nabucco. On the contrary, the French are somehow involved in South Stream, having overtaken some of the shares in the project. So, it is difficult to argue that Turkey wanted to hurt France by thwarting Nabucco. There is no such direct connection, and Turkey’s decision(s) are not intended to convey a message to Europe. Both the Trans-Anatolian and the South Stream pipelines should be assessed based on their particular conditions, as well as from Turkey’s own perspective, and how Turkey sees them in line with its priorities in energy policies.

    I don’t think Trans-Anatolia is a blow to Nabucco. Turkey is a country that has always supported the Nabucco as a strategic project and clearly has expressed its commitment. Nabucco continues to play a key role in Turkey’s objectives to become an energy hub. But there are certain structural problems in the Nabucco project itself, and unfortunately, they have not been clearly resolved so far. As is well known, uncertainty over dedicated supplies, lack of financing and lack of unequivocal purchase commitments are other major hurdles. Previously, there used to be uncertainty over the transit regime which occasionally led to crises between Turkey and the EU. Through an understanding Turkey reached with the Europeans earlier, it eliminated those problems.

    One of the drivers of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline is Azerbaijan’s quest for an independent role in energy markets, which I underlined earlier. Turkey has taken a step in support of Azerbaijan’s role. But while providing this support, Turkey also reiterated the fundamental rationale of the Nabucco, i.e., giving approval to a direct corridor from the Caspian basin to European markets traversing Turkey. Turkey hereby sent a signal and reiterated its earlier position that it will not be an obstacle to the so-called Southern corridor. There were some uncertainties regarding the future of the Nabucco project as originally envisaged, which obviously delayed its realization. There had been concerns that the original design might be overambitious and aim at unrealistically high capacity. The joint Azerbaijani-Turkish initiative now enables a reconfiguration of Nabucco in more manageable scales. It is difficult to say that this route is altogether dead, as the rationale underpinning it also is at the core of the Trans-Anatolia.

    Turkey’s support for South Stream is a separate debate, because there is a direct competition with Nabucco there. Turkey has taken similar complementary steps in the past as well. After supporting Nabucco, Turkey demonstrated that it would not be the country that prevents South Stream. In that regards, we can say Turkey has not adopted a new position. The recent moves towards Trans-Anatolia and South Stream is a continuation of the previous position in the recent context.

    Q: The energy agreement signed by Turkey in recent weeks further brought Azerbaijan and Turkey together. In the coming years, will Ankara develop an Azerbaijan-oriented policy despite Yerevan, or create its own policy regarding energy?

    A: Based on the previous discussions, it is worth emphasizing a few points. Firstly, it is difficult for Turkey to develop independent energy policies under the current conditions. If we are talking about supply security in this context, it has different implications. If we are discussing this question in the context of Turkey’s goal of becoming an energy transit corridor, it needs to be handled differently.

    If we try to answer your question in this second dimension, i.e., energy transportation, it is difficult for Turkey to develop energy policies independent of Azerbaijan in the short to medium term. For Turkey to emerge a transit corridor and develop major transit routes, the producers of oil and gas have to give their approval. Azerbaijan is the first and only viable option at this point. In this sense, the Trans-Anatolian agreement signed with Azerbaijan, and the earlier agreements signed at the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council summit between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Ilham Aliyev, finalized Turkey’s first real transit agreement in natural gas markets. Although we have been proud of becoming a hub country, so far it remained at the rhetorical level and has yet to be realized. The compromise reached subsequent to the treaty signed with Azerbaijan allows Turkey to become a natural gas transit route for the first time. In this context, it is difficult for Turkey to develop a policy completely independent of Azerbaijan.

    Apart from this, which alternative players are there? Exporting natural gas reserves in northern Iraq through Turkey has been on the agenda of the northern Iraqi leaders. However, there are problems between Baghdad and provinces as to how to use the natural resources of Iraq. The other option is obviously Iran. Tehran’s strained relations with America, among other factors, limit the ability of Iran to emerge as a major alternative for Turkey’s ambitious to become a transit hub. On the other hand, Russia does not want to market its natural gas through Turkey.

    However, it can be said that Turkey has a growing role at present regarding the oil transportation. The Yumurtalik–Kirkuk pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipelines or tankers through the sea lanes play an important role in the transportation corridors controlled by Turkey. Beyond these developments, Turkey also has achieved limited progress in terms of reaching its ambitions. Especially, concerning the transport of Kazakh and Russian oil through Turkey, major issues remain. In short, as of now, talking about a role independent of Azerbaijan is difficult.

    Going back to the other issues raised in the question, yes, there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Particularly, the current government’s policy is in favor of close relations with Azerbaijan and we might expect the continuation of this policy. There is no reason for Turkey to give up its Azerbaijan-oriented policy in the upcoming years, especially if the economic partnership continues to deepen between them, as is the case currently. These ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, in a sense, create disincentives for a possible rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. For Turkey to be drawn into normalization process, the Armenian side, in its approach towards Turkey, has to understand that there is not only an emotional dimension in the Turkish-Azerbaijani relationship, or a strategic dimension, but there is also a very strong economic dimension. It would be advisable for Armenia to consider its position on Turkey by taking into account these various angles.

    Tuesday, 24 January 2012

    Journal of Turkish Weekly

  • France Shouldn’t Allow Turkey To Meddle in its Domestic Affairs

    France Shouldn’t Allow Turkey To Meddle in its Domestic Affairs

     sassounian3
     
    For nearly a century, Turkey’s leaders have tried to hide the monstrous crime of the Armenian Genocide by covering up what really took place in the killing fields of the Syrian desert, then part of the Ottoman Empire. The powerful Turkish state has committed its considerable financial and diplomatic resources to the nefarious cause of genocide denial.
     
    Turkish leaders do not seem to realize that as they deny and lie, and vainly proclaim their innocence, they actually help publicize their dastardly act to an incredulous worldwide audience.
     
    Furthermore, even though today’s Turkish officials were not the ones who committed the genocide of 1915, they foolishly associate themselves with their criminal predecessors, thus making themselves accessories after the fact by lying about it and concealing the evidence.
     
    With each passing day, the Turkish leadership is further submerging itself in a mire of its own making. Let’s take a closer look at its sordid behavior in the French government’s decision-making process.
     
    Over ten years ago, when the French legislature was adopting a law recognizing the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish government used its usual bag of tricks in a failed attempt to undermine that effort. After the Parliament and Senate recognized the Genocide, Pres. Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin on January 29, 2001, signed the following law: “France publicly recognizes the Armenian Genocide of 1915.”
     
    Even though the French law had made no mention of Turkey or the Ottoman Empire as perpetrator of the Genocide, Turkish officials exhibited a guilty conscience by their exaggerated claims of innocence; hence identifying themselves as the culprits in this heinous crime, while no one was pointing a finger at them.
     
    The long arm of the Turkish state interfered in French domestic affairs once again in 2006, when lawmakers in Paris attempted to establish a penalty for those violating the law passed in 2001, applying the same sanctions to those denying the Holocaust. Regrettably, the French government succumbed to Turkish threats and hysterics and blocked the measure, until the Senate finally approved it on January 23, 2012.
     
    The French public is now facing yet another egregious attempt of foreign interference in their domestic issues. The Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges hired a French lobbying firm last week to pressure legislators into filing a legal challenge to the law banning denial of genocides recognized by French law — the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide. So much for Turkish threats to boycott French companies!
     
    Pres. Sarkozy has 15 days from January 23 to sign the new law, unless 60 members of the French Parliament and Senate act first by petitioning the Constitutional Court to rule on its legality. The Turkish Ambassador, contravening a foreign diplomat’s mandate not to meddle in French domestic matters, has used all possible means of pressure and “inducement” in a desperate attempt to secure the necessary 60 signatures.
     
    The Turkish government may be making a serious mistake by assuming that the court will necessarily find the new law to be unconstitutional. Turkish officials could be undermining their own interests should the court decide that the law is constitutional, thereby precluding any future legal challenges from Turkish denialists who would be arrested for denying the Armenian Genocide, once the law goes into effect.
     
    In recent days, Turkey’s leaders have made utterly ridiculous statements about the new law. Prime Minister Erdogan accused France of following “the footsteps of fascism.” How can the leader of a country that is one of the biggest violators of human rights dare to blame France for fascism? Pres. Gul jumped into the fray by accusing France of “limiting freedom of expression.” Has the Turkish President checked his own country’s jails where dozens of journalists are languishing for months without trial for simply writing articles critical of the government? Has he read Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code — “insulting Turkishness” — which bans all public references to the Armenian Genocide? Foreign Minister Davutoglu may have gotten it right when he complained that the French law is an attempt to “Nazify Turkey,” except that this is being done not by France but by his own government which continues to associate itself with the crimes of a now defunct Ottoman Empire.
     
    The most laughable statement, however, was made by Turkey’s brash Minister of European Affairs Egemen Bagis during his recent visit to Switzerland. He dared Swiss authorities to arrest him for denying the Armenian Genocide, since Switzerland, similar to France, has a law banning genocide denial. Minister Bagis is fortunate that he cannot be arrested or prosecuted because of his diplomatic immunity. Nevertheless, he could and should be expelled from Switzerland as persona non grata!
  • Message from Ergun Kirlikovali , President ATAA

    Message from Ergun Kirlikovali , President ATAA

    Ergun Kirlikovali is one of the founders and long standing member of Turkish Forum – Dunya Turkleri Birligi Advisory Board.

    We wish him Good-luck, and we will support his actions  in the coming years and with all membership and with all available means of Turkish Forum.

    We also wish good-luck to ATAA’s sister organization FTAA . FTAA is now led by President Ali Cinar who is supported by wast majority of membership during the last months election. we  recognize the wast amount work with Mr. Ali Cinar has to face. Similarly, Our support will also be with FTAA  if he so desires.

    Dr. Kayaalp Buyukataman, President

    Turkish Forum -Dunya Turkleri Birligi

    ==============================================

    President Message By Ergün Kırlıkovalı

    ergun sDear Members of the Turkish American Community coast-to-coast:

    I hope you and your family have adjusted to the hustle and bustle of the New Year after having a wonderful holiday season.

    The month of January has passed with fury and left me wondering where the whole month went.  When you take a look at what was achieved, you will see why.

    What a start to the New Year!

    ATAA component associations were busy arranging local events and our TABAN and Student Outreach programs were on the road, visiting Colorado, Nevada and Canada. Membership drive and fundraising were in full swing.  ATAA Türk Evi hosted the visiting graduate students from Bahcesehir University (İstanbul, Türkiye),  where distinguished lecturers like Mark Meirowitz, David Saltzman, and Gunay Evinch, have addressed the students, explaining to them how the U.S. Government operates and the U.S. legal system works.

    ATAA leadership paid an official visit to the brand new headquarters of the Turkish Coalition of America only steps from the White House.  Joint programs were discussed.

    ATAA leadership visited the offices of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to sign the book of condolences for the legendary Turkish Cypriot leader and the founder of TRNC, Rauf Denktash, who passed away on January 13, 2012.

    ATAA leadership also paid a courtesy visit to the Turkish Embassy to show our community’s deep respect and love for our motherland, Türkiye.

    ATAA leadership met with Dr. Elizabeth W. Shelton, executive director of American Friends of Turkey, to coordinate the upcoming events.  AFOT will be bringing to the U.S. Dr. Ufuk Kocabas, the Project Director of the Yenikapi, Istanbul Project (the Byzantine Port of Constantinople). As you know, the Istanbul University group undertaking the excavations has unearthed 36 vessels and cargoes, going back to the Fifth Century. It has been an amazing find. As you may well know, his trip will be the first time any information about this project will be presented to American audiences, and by all indications, the audiences will be packed to see his presentation and hear him lecture.

    Congratulations FTAA President Ali Çınar!

    On behalf of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), I congratulate Mr. Ali Çınar for his election to the presidency of the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA). Established in 1956, FTAA is one of America’s leading national Turkish American organizations in a critical part of the country, New York and New Jersey. Ali Çınar comes to the FTAA Presidency with vast knowledge and experience in public advocacy and community empowerment. A former Vice President of ATAA (2009-11) and as Chief Advisor to the ATAA President since June 2011, Mr. Çınar a much loved, hard-working, creative, and energetic community leader. Mr. Cinar was also the founder of the Istanbul University Mezunlari US (IUMEZUS) and its first president.

    ATAA looks forward to continued excellence in solidarity and cooperation with FTAA. I wish President Ali Çınar and the FTAA Team all the success.

    Elections at ATAA

    The ATAA Board of Directors resolved on January 18, 2012 to start a Nominating Committee to oversee the upcoming elections where one third of the Board will be up for election.

    I am grateful to Lale Iskarpatyoti for accepting to chair the Nominating Committee and members Gunay Evinch (Past President, ATAA), Tunca Iskir (Past President, ATAA), Nurten Ural (Past President, ATAA) and Mehmet Celebi (President Elect, ATAA) for accepting to serve on this very important committee.

    The positions up for election are the following: Treasurer (Esra Ugurlu), Vice President Midcentral (Feridun Bek), Vice President Southwest (Sibel Pakdemirli), Vice President Northwest (Sevgi Baran), West (Maria Cakiraga). Please note that all incumbents can run again for their seats as this is their first term in office and that the race is wide open to all other qualified candidates. I would be delighted, therefore, if you kindly participate in this democratic process by nominating candidates and/or voting.

    We will issue a CIS on this immediately with more election information and specifics. Due to time limitations and in the interest saving paper and labor, a separate paper mass-mailing via USPS will not be done. We will try to reach every member via this monthly e-Newsletter and a separate CIS, as well as press releases, media coverage, and www.ataa.org site. We hope, with your support, to complete the nominating process by February 15, 2012, so that the elections may be completed by March 15, and the approved by the AOD on April 15, 2012. Your cooperation and participation is, again, greatly appreciated.

    Damnation Without Representation:  French Memory Law

    We all know what “taxation without representation” led to in 1776: Expulsion of the British from colonial America.

    And now we will see what “damnation without representation” will lead to in 2012: expulsion of the French culture from the Turkish/Turkic world.

    I am, of course, referring to the draconian French memory law that cleared the French Senate on January 23, 2012, which criminalizes the denial of the so-called “Armenian genocide”, allegedly carried out in Ottoman Empire during World War I.  The passage of the measure, adopted a month earlier by a mere 50 out 577 deputies in the lower chamber of the French Parliament, makes a mockery of the notion of “participatory democracy”, not to mention the freedom of speech.

    The WW I era atrocities in Eastern Anatolia were never tried by a “competent tribunal” as the 1948 United Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of genocide stipulates. “Intent” to exterminate was never proven, leaving the discredited political claim as just that.  “No court verdict” was issued characterizing these events a genocide. This historical controversy has become fodder to election year politics in France, destroying the freedom of expression along with it.  No law can be used retroactively, 1948 UN convention on genocide included. And yet, these rock solid facts, values, and concepts,  which are foundations of modern life cherished by humanity were respected by only 86 courageous French Senators who tried to stop that shameful memory law with their “No” votes.  The law passed by the “Yes” votes of 127 Senators, despite the rejection of the same law by the Constitution Sub-Committee a few days earlier.  Now it looks like it is heading for the Constitution Committee for a final verdict on whether it is constitutional to criminalize thought.

    Some French parliamentarians, it seems, felt compelled by ethnocentric political agenda in an election year, to play the judge, the jury, the executioner, and while at it, the expert historian. We all know they are none of these.  The harsh memory law, reminiscent of those in the defunct Soviet Empire, places a severe limitation on the French democracy, curbs free speech, undermines dialogue, destroys scholarly research, and discourages scholarly dissent.

    France currently serves as a co-chair country of the OSCE Minsk Group on the resolution of Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Adoption of a law upholding the victims of one ethnicity over another on a historically controversial issue would question the practicality of French role as a mediator on an issue, which both Azerbaijan and Turkey view as directly linked to Turkish-Armenian reconciliation.

    This law might also be considered the epitaph of the Nabucco pipeline and the European energy security, if not also anything French in the culture of the people of the vast geography that stretches from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from the Middle East to North Africa, and from Anatolia to Central Asia.

    Armenians have a cause, not a case

    Armenians took up arms against their own government. They joined the invading enemy armies. They wreaked havoc among the unprotected Muslim villages of Anatolia with their Huncak, Dashnak, Ramgavar, and other bands and thugs. They demanded territory for what can only be described as the first apartheid  of the 20th Century (i.e. the Greater Armenia.)  These and other such aspects are grouped under the “NINE T’s OF THE TURKISH ARMENIAN CONFLICT”.   If one ignores these, one ignores half the story gets no closure.

    The assertion of Armenian genocide is based on a racist and dishonest version of history. Racist because Turkish suffering is deliberately ignored; and dishonest because the 9 T’s are ignored.

    Just look at this 1906 photo of Cadets at an Armenian Military Academy, established in Bulgaria, with all in uniforms and their Russian “Mosin” weapons brandished. This single frame of an old photo destroys the entire Armenian narrative: that Armenians were peaceful; that they were poor, starving, and helpless; that all happened one day in 1915 without provocation; and that Armenians never killed any Turks.  How much evidence does one need to wake up and smell the Armenian deception? Didn’t Armenians die?  Didn’t they suffer?  Yes, of course, but along with many more Muslims, mostly Turks.  Wartime suffering? Yes.  Genocide? No, not by even a long shot.

    Social construction of Memory

    This is a term used by sociologists to describe the process of rebuilding a group memory by social acts, not history’s facts. In order to make the long discredited political claims of Armenian genocide stick, Armenian propaganda, agitation, terror, raids, revolts, treason, territorial conflicts and the Turkish victims resulting from them, are all swept under the rug. Novels, letters, exhibits, parliamentary resolutions, films, rallies, political pressure, in short, anything but facts are employed in “social reconstruction” process. Such dramaturgical approaches and ethno-methodology, unfortunately shape most perceptions, feelings and behaviors. People soon start thinking “All this hype cannot be without justification.” French politicians or American columnists or others are not immune to such symbolic and seemingly humane interactions. Before long, one is consumed by “social construction of reality”, i.e. defining reality through social interactions, not objective realities, just like in the case of the alleged Armenian genocide today. Consider this: until 1990s, most media reports used the qualifier “alleged” before genocide, but now they dropped it. Why? Did new research unearth heretofore unknown information? Did a “competent court” determine Ottoman “intent” to exterminate? No and no. What happend is, the Armenians have since increased the dose of pressure to intimidation and harassment levels. That’s social construction at its worst !

    May love and peace win over hate, bigotry and discrimination one day . . .

    Ergün Kırlıkovalı
    President
    Assembly of Turkish American Associations