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Turkey Inches Closer to Nuclear Cooperation with China

Turkey Inches Closer to Nuclear Cooperation with China

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 77

April 18, 2012

By: Saban Kardas

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accompanied by members of his cabinet, paid an official visit to China on April 8-11. The first by a Turkish PM in 27 years, the trip was remarkable in many ways and underlined the parties’ continued determination to deepen their cooperation, despite political differences on some regional issues.

The most spectacular part of the trip was Erdogan’s stopover in Urumchi, the capital of China’s Xinjiang autonomous region (Anadolu Ajansi, April 9). Since Erdogan’s vocal criticism of China over its brutal crackdown of the Uyghur demonstrations in the summer of 2009, Sino-Turkish relations have been transformed significantly. Turkey ceased to advocate the Uyghur issue in public forums, while the Chinese officials also allowed increasing interactions between Xinjiang and Turkey. In particular, China enables such interactions in order to give the message to Turkish public opinion that it respects the rights of the Uyghur people. Overall, the parties are careful to turn the Uyghur factor into an element of cooperation rather than a factor of tension in the bilateral relationship.

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to Turkey earlier this year underscored this mutual understanding to focus on areas of common interest (EDM, March 1). During his trip to Beijing and Shanghai, Erdogan held fruitful discussions with Chinese leaders to further cooperation in the economic and political realm, while also signing several agreements to enhance cultural exchanges. Granted, the relationship remains driven by economic interests.

In previous conversations, the parties indicated their determination to improve economic ties. Especially the Turkish side is keen to have a serious discussion on this issue, as Ankara currently incurs a major foreign trade deficit to Beijing. As the parties aim to increase the current bilateral trade volume from $25 billion to $100 billion by 2020, it will be important for Turkey to manage this process in a healthy manner so that its domestic market is not flooded with Chinese consumer goods (haberturk.com, April 10).

The two countries rank as the fastest growing economies in the world, further raising expectations that the parties should cooperate in the economic realm. In order to compensate for the liability caused by the trade imbalance, Turkey hopes to see a greater volume of Chinese investments flowing into its economy. During its trip to Shanghai, the Turkish delegation met with executives of Chinese investment companies to discuss the details of furthering economic cooperation (Anadolu Ajansi, April 11).

Erdogan went to great lengths to explain the “success” of the Turkish economy in the midst of the global financial crisis and how Ankara introduced structural reforms to turn the country into a safe destination for investments. He also underlined Turkey’s proximity and access to the European markets as an additional incentive to lure Chinese investments. Reportedly, the cabinet ministers and businessmen accompanying Erdogan signed several agreements with their Chinese counterparts, especially investments in Turkey’s energy sector and infrastructure projects. The government has reportedly received positive news about Chinese interest in its major infrastructure projects. Especially, Turkey wants to see greater Chinese investment – both in terms of financing and undertaking construction work – as it seeks to construct a high-speed train railway throughout the country (Aksam, April 13).

Indeed, the two countries also have been recognized as leading players in the worldwide construction sector. While China owns the largest number of international contracting firms, Turkey comes in second on the same list (Sabah, April 6). With the growing visibility of China in this field, concerns have been raised about competition between the two countries. Given China’s advantages, especially in terms of credit opportunities, Turkey is careful to avoid competition and instead works to woo China into cooperation.

A tangible outcome of the trip was the signing of a declaration on cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology (Anadolu Ajansi, April 9). This agreement follows Turkey’s earlier cooperation efforts with Russia, Japan and South Korea in this field. Such an agreement usually is a segue into negotiations on the construction of a nuclear power plant. So far, Turkey granted a tender for its first-ever nuclear power plant to be built in the Mediterranean coastal town of Mersin-Akkuyu to Russia. The second plant is planned to be constructed in the Black Sea province of Sinop. Earlier, the talks Turkey launched with South Korea pertaining to the second plant failed, partly because Seoul was reluctant to give the state guarantees for the investments. As Turkey initiated negotiations with Japan on the same project, the Fukushima disaster again led to the interruption, with the Japanese side giving unclear signals as to their willingness to resume the talks.

Following Erdogan’s trip, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced that Turkey would soon hold talks with Japan, South Korea and China on the construction of the country’s second nuclear power plant (Anadolu Ajansi, April 13). Ankara’s approach in nuclear talks is significant in many ways. On the one hand, it seems that Turkey might be hoping to benefit from competition between the three Asian powers and receive a better deal for the second plant. In his remarks, Yildiz clearly underlined that Ankara would pick up the best offer between the three countries. On the other hand, this development also indicates Turkey’s anxiousness to conclude a deal, after having invested political capital in the idea of constructing a second plant. Given its soaring energy needs in recent years, which are met largely by imported hydrocarbons, Turkey has attached a major value to nuclear power plants in its energy strategy.

However, this rather hasty and pragmatic approach also raises questions. The first plant was contracted to Russia, although Moscow has a mixed international reputation. Now, the pursuit of an agreement with China, which has not established itself as a major international player in this field, makes one wonder about the coherence, sustainability and reliability of Turkey’s nuclear energy plans. Occasionally, the government comes under criticism over the safety of the plants to be constructed with this strategy (www.turkey.setimes.com, November 11, 2011). In an obvious attempt to allay such questions, Yildiz also maintained that the plants will be built in line with robust standards, set by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the EU. Even if this will be the case, it remains to be seen if Turkey can genuinely develop peaceful nuclear technology by building partnerships with different players.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-inches-closer-to-nuclear-cooperation-with-china/

April 18, 2012
Two Faces of Turkey: Veneer of Gentility Masking Ruthlessness

When Turkey’s Foreign Minister met secretly with a group of Armenians in Washington last month, he wooed them with his sly smile and sugar-coated words. This was the fake facade of traditional Turkish diplomacy.

Last week, Turkey’s UN Ambassador in New York revealed the nasty and aggressive face of his government. Upon learning that a symposium on the Armenian Genocide was going to be held at the UN on April 12, Turkey’s Permanent Representative filed a protest with the Secretary General’s office, trying to disrupt the event.

Organized by the Association for Trauma Outreach & Prevention (ATOP), the event was titled: “Toward Preventing Genocide, Nations Acknowledging their Dark History: Psychosocial, Economic and Cultural Perspectives.” Following screening of Dr. J. Michael Hagopian’s documentary, “The River Ran Red,” the attendees heard addresses from filmmaker Carla Garapedian, Dr. Dennis Papazian, Prof. Ervin Staub, and Garen Nazarian, Armenia’s UN Ambassador.

Encouraged by Turkey’s 2007 success in obstructing a reference to the Armenian Genocide in a UN exhibit on Rwanda, the Turkish Ambassador tried to force the UN to cancel last week’s Armenian Genocide symposium. Fortunately, Armenia’s UN Mission, official sponsor of the event, stood its ground and the symposium took place as planned, albeit with some minor disturbances.

At the start of the event, two Turkish diplomats entered the meeting room without an invitation, and repeatedly attempted to disrupt the proceedings. They kept on shouting, accusing the speakers of defaming Turkey, and refused to comply with the organizer’s request to submit all comments and questions in writing. As the commotion continued, UN security officers were called in, and the two undiplomatic Turkish diplomats left the hall, inanely shouting: “we are the security, we own the security, and we pay for the security!”

In his introductory remarks, Amb. Nazarian observed that “97 years ago, a state-devised plan unleashed a crime whose magnitude and consequences were unparalleled not only in the history of the Armenian nation but also in the history of the world. The plan of extermination of the Armenians was implemented by the Ottoman Empire’s state machine through all its structures and carried out with exact instructions.”

Prof. Papazian’s remarks were titled: “Sovereignty, Nationalism, Racism vs. Humanism and Intellectual Freedom: The Causes and Cures of Genocide.” He expressed his discontent “that the Armenian Genocide is not recognized by the present day Turkish government as a crime committed by its predecessor government under the dictatorship of the Committee for Union and Progress”; “that the people of Turkey are denied free access to accurate sources because of Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code which makes it a crime to insult Turkishness”; and “that such [Ottoman] collections as the confiscated properties archives and the military archives are not open to inspection by objective scholars.”

Prof. Staub spoke about “Overcoming Evil: Preventing Genocide and Creating Peaceful Societies.” He stated that “acknowledgement by perpetrators, bystanders, and the world in general of a group’s suffering has great value for both healing and reconciliation.” However, “perpetrators rarely, and only with great difficulty, acknowledge their acts and show regret,” because of “their profound devaluation of the victims, their ideology, and their unacknowledged shame.”

Carla Garapedian explored the “Economic Consequences of Acknowledging the Genocide.” She related that J. Michael Hagopian had recorded the testimonies of genocide survivors so that their voices would be heard someday at an international tribunal deciding what restitution Turkey would have to pay to heirs of the victims.

Not counting the value of the properties, lands and other assets confiscated from Armenian victims of the genocide perpetrated by the Turkish government, Garapedian assessed as $15 billion the restitution value of the 1.5 million Armenians who had perished. Her estimate is based on Germany’s $60 billion restitution payment for the six million Jewish victims of the Holocaust since 1952. Garapedian concluded by suggesting that no state should profit from violating the law and unjustly enrich itself, asserting that a criminal state should not be allowed to keep the fruits of its crime.

This week, Dr. Ani Kalayjian, President of ATOP, sent a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon complaining about the “disruptive, unprofessional, and arrogant behavior” of the two Turkish diplomats. She wondered how the UN could bring peace to the world, when it cannot establish order at an event held at its own headquarters!

April 18, 2012
Cyprus – a litmus test for Turkey

Famagusta Gazette 9 April 2012

By Robert Ellis

Sweden’s Minister for International Cooperation Development, Gunilla Carlsson, has confirmed in a joint article together with Turkey’s Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bagis, Sweden’s full support for Turkey’s bid for EU membership.

This comes as no surprise, as four years ago Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, declared that “the AKP government is made up of profound European reformers”.

What was also predictable was Ms. Carlsson’s statement at the round table meeting with Mr. Bagis that it was unacceptable to stall Turkey’s accession negotiations because of bilateral issues that had nothing to do with the EU itself. This was evidently a reference to the unresolved Cyprus dispute.

When Sweden was term president of the EU in the second half of 2009, the draft of the General Affairs Council conclusions in November noted that “bilateral issues” should not hold up the accession process but needed to be resolved by the parties concerned “bearing in mind the overall EU interests”.

In effect, this relegated the Cyprus issue to the level of the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, but because of opposition from other EU member states the paragraph was dropped from the Council’s conclusions.

This attempt to sweep the issue under the carpet is reminiscent of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s reference to the Sudetenland conflict in 1938 as “a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing”.

What is notable is that Ms. Carlsson spoke of a struggle to embrace deeply owned common values, as this is precisely the issue that is at stake in Cyprus. In effect, Cyprus can be considered a litmus test as to whether it is possible for two ethnic communities to coexist inside the same national framework, and, on a larger scale, whether Turkey can fit into the European Union.

Prime Minister Erdogan has accused the European Union of being “a Christian club” but President Gül on his first official visit to Cyprus in September 2007 stated “There are two realities on Cyprus, two democracies, two states, two languages, two religions”, which are the same arguments advanced by opponents of Turkey’s EU membership.

Turkey’s invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974 cemented the division of the two communities but also opened a shameful chapter of Turkish history.

The European Commission of Human Rights in its 1976 report documented the conduct of the invasion forces and the Committee on Missing Persons is working to establish the fate of 502 Turkish Cypriots and 1,493 Greek Cypriots missing after the intercommunal fighting in 1963-4 and the Turkish invasion.

The US Helsinki Commission in its 2009 report on the destruction of cultural property in northern Cyprus documented that 500 Orthodox churches or chapels have been pillaged, demolished or vandalized and 15,000 paintings have disappeared.

Furthermore, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has in its 2012 report recommended that Turkey be designated a “country of particular concern” notwithstanding its importance as a strategic partner.

The USCIRF delegation found three main issues in northern Cyprus, including the inability of Orthodox Christians to hold services at their places of worship and the disrepair of churches and cemeteries as well as the preservation of religious heritage.

Egemen Bagis is surely disingenuous when he at the meeting with the Swedish minister criticized the EU for blocking most of Turkey’s accession talks. As he remarked, “They want us to do our homework without actually telling us what our homework is.”

Even to Mr Bagis, the solution must be apparent. In 2006 the EU Council froze negotiations on eight chapters because Turkey refused to honour its commitment according to the Additional Protocol and extend the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus. Consequently, a solution to the conflict would remove the main stumbling block to Turkey’s accession process and serve to heal the wounds of the past.

By virtue of its strategic position, and now because of the gas deposits in its Exclusive Economic Zone, Cyprus is a key player in the eastern Mediterranean, and therefore it was short-sighted of Turkey not to invite Cyprus to the Syria meeting in Istanbul on 1 April.

Once again, the European Parliament has called on Turkey to begin withdrawing its forces from Cyprus, to transfer Famagusta to the UN and for the port of Famagusta to be opened under EU supervision, but this call will no doubt fall on deaf ears. Turkey’s threat to boycott Cyprus’ EU Presidency is also counter-productive.

As the European Parliament concluded in its resolution on Turkey’s 2011 Progress Report, the interdependence between the European Union and Turkey can only produce positive results if it is framed in a context of mutual commitment.

(Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.)

via Cyprus – a litmus test for Turkey | EuropeNews.

April 14, 2012
Turkey Facilitates Talks with Iran, Following Bickering over Venues

Turkey Facilitates Talks with Iran, Following Bickering over Venues

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 74

April 13, 2012

By: Saban Kardas

A new round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries (United States, France, United Kingdom, Russia, China and Germany) engaged in diplomatic efforts with the Islamic Republic is scheduled to be held in Istanbul this weekend. As the meeting comes against the background of other disputes involving the parties, the diplomacy surrounding it has been and remains extremely delicate, also putting the host, Turkey, in a difficult position.

Ankara’s involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue has been one of the most troublesome items in its foreign policy agenda complicating not only its relations with Tehran but also the West. As the US sought to mobilize a broad-based coalition to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities, on the grounds that it might have military objectives, Turkey stood against coercive approaches and argued for the utilization of diplomatic channels to address this issue. When the US pushed for a new round of sanctions in 2010, Turkey again raised similar objections and, in a joint initiative with Brazil, brokered a swap deal, resulting in the Tehran Declaration of 2010 (EDM, June 1, 2010).

Though Turkey also vetoed the UN Security Council resolution authorizing sanctions, it eventually agreed to implement them, noting that they reflect the will of the international community. Turkey, however, underlined that it would not abide by the unilateral sanctions introduced by the US and its European allies.

While the United States has continued to implement the sanctions to increase gradually pressure on Tehran, attempts to restart the dialogue between the two sides have been underway. Both parties expressed appreciation for Turkey’s readiness to facilitate this dialogue, which led to the talks held in January 2011 in Istanbul (EDM, January 25, 2011). The talks failed to produce any significant outcome. The efforts to resume the talks have been stalled, with Western powers asking Iran to come to the table with concrete proposals.

Turkey continued to offer its mediation services in the middle of other diplomatic initiatives it has undertaken. These other Turkish initiatives include reaching out to Tehran and the West in regards to the Syrian crisis, and the situation in Iraq. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s meeting with US President Barack Obama in Seoul on the occasion of the nuclear summit and his subsequent visit to Tehran enabled first-hand discussions with both parties. Again, while Ankara strongly reiterated its commitment to Iran’s right to develop and use peaceful nuclear technology, it also underlined that all military activities should be under international inspection (Anadolu Ajansi, April 5).

Expectations were raised that Turkey’s go-between role might be paying off and negotiations could soon be held in Istanbul on April 13-14. However, the controversial statements coming from some high-ranking Iranian officials clouded the air. Despite Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salihi’s depiction of a meeting in Istanbul as the best alternative, other officials called for holding the meeting in “friendly” countries such as Syria, Iraq or Lebanon. They criticized Turkey’s pro-Western policy in Syria and other regional problems, questioning Ankara’s neutrality (www.dunyabulteni.com, April 3).

Having invested diplomatic credibility in this initiative, such statements were shocking for Turkish leaders. Erdogan reacted harshly, calling Iranian officials to act sincerely (Zaman, April 6). The escalating tensions could only be mitigated with direct communication between foreign ministers, and finally the Iranian side confirmed the meeting in Istanbul (www.presstv.ir, April 8).

These verbal exchanges and Erdogan’s questioning of Iranian sincerity underscored the transformation of the bilateral relationship and Turkey’s involvement in the Iranian nuclear dispute since 2010. First, Turkey’s approach to the talks has changed. While in 2010 Turkey was actively mediating on the issue, it has retreated from that position. Already in the January 2011 meeting, Turkey underlined that it seeks to facilitate the talks, by providing a venue. However, at that time, Turkey still believed the Tehran Declaration provided a constructive framework to discuss further diplomatic initiatives, and emphasized readiness to assist the parties if they decided to address the issue along the lines contained in that declaration. Since then, however, Turkey seems to also have backtracked from that position as well, and the content of the talks have yet to be set by the parties.

Moreover, Turkey’s relationship to both sides has been transformed to a great extent. Compared to 2010, while Turkey now enjoys more cooperative relations with the US, Ankara’s ties to Tehran have been severed over other developments in the intervening period. In 2010, Turkey was seen as largely uncritical of Tehran’s position, which even led to charges that it was pro-Iranian or providing shelter for Tehran. By the January 2011 meeting, the change in Ankara’s position was well underway. Turkey increasingly called on Iran to be more transparent and reassure the international community that its nuclear program had peaceful purposes. Turkey also moved in the direction of seeking a greater degree of protection against potential threats that might be posed by the Iranian nuclear program. Especially, Turkey’s decision to support NATO’s missile shield program and its agreement with the US for the installation of early warning radars on its soil in late 2011 were important indicators of this transformation.

The changes in Turkey’s policy seem to have altered Tehran’s perceptions, which no longer views Ankara as a “neutral” actor. This was perhaps partly the reason why Iranian officials raised vocal objections to Istanbul as the venue for the talks. However, Iran is being negatively affected by the sanctions, which must have forced it to adopt a more conciliatory position to avoid completely losing Turkey in this dispute, hence Teheran’s agreement to hold talks in Istanbul.

As the talks are fast approaching, there are conflicting signals about the prospects of achieving some progress. Earlier, Western officials underlined that in the talks they would seek to get Iran to suspend high-level enrichment and close down an underground nuclear facility near Qom. The Iranian officials rebuffed immediately any preconditions (www.presstv.ir, April 9). The head of Iran’s Supreme National Council, Saeed Jalili, stated that they would come to the table with a constructive approach and propose new initiatives (www.presstv.ir, April 11). Given Iran’s earlier track record, it remains to be seen if this is a sincere constructive approach or yet another delaying tactic. But in any case, it will be up to the parties to reach a common ground, not Turkey, whose sole involvement now is to facilitate this dialogue.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-facilitates-talks-with-iran-following-bickering-over-venues/

April 14, 2012
US will not attack Iran

Azerbaijan is not subject to “Arab spring”

Gulnara İnandzh,

Director of Information and Analytical Center Ethnoglobus (ethnoglobus.az), editor of turkishnews.com website. [email protected]

Israel and the US policy’s consequences in the region is mainly danger for the statehood of Azerbaijan. Despite official Baku has repeatedly declared its position towards Iran, interested international powers are still trying to cause tension in the relations between Baku and Tehran. US Jamestown Foundation president Glen Howard comments on the subject in his interview.

– What specific line does the US support in relation to Azerbaijan amid the serious geopolitical processes occurred in the Mideast, I mean “Arab spring”?

– I do not think theUSorAzerbaijanplay any role in “Arab spring”. TheUSdoesn’t support any particular line. We don’t also support what is happening againstSyria. It does not any affect onCaucasus. It more affects onRussia.Russiais subject to Arab spring more rather than theSouthern Caucasus. Because you have theUSAmbassador who is very active in democracy promotion. He has been chased by Russian NTV TV Channel. And this is the sign thatRussiafeels more trouble with regard to Arab spring rather thanSouthern Caucasus.

– What does Washington expects from Azerbaijan in its Iran policy?

– TheUShas already stated that it doesn’t support attack onIran. TheUSeven has warnedIsraelnot to attackIran. I believe thatIsraeldue to good relations with theUSwill follow the advice of President Mr. Barak Obama. I do not thinkIsraelwill attackIran. All these are rumors designed to make people scared and afraid. All these are a part of geopolitical plan by the outside powers intending to destroy stability in theSouthern Caucasus.

– How would you comment on the rumors that Israel will use Azerbaijani lands in order to attack Iran?

– I hope you understand the military importance of it. This is not a military base to attackIran. Contrary, ifIsraelattacksIran, thenIsraelmilitary air forces will usePersian Gulffor it. But if it happens,Israeljets will not have enough fuel to go back and they will be obliged to useAzerbaijanlands only for the purpose of getting fuel. This doesn’t mean attack onIran, this is just air route forIsraeljets to go back.

– As you see there are attempts to confront Iran and Azerbaijan. How do you think, what will be Washington’s answer if Iran acts aggressively against Azerbaijan? For example, overflying a border.

– Aggressive?. I thinkAzerbaijanis also ready for such aggressive reply.Iranwill not use military againstAzerbaijan,Iranwill use other methods. I believe thatIrandoesn’t want to apply military force againstAzerbaijanand even is not ready for it. Why doesIranneed it? Today whenIranhas an attack danger from the Persian gulf,Tehrandoesn’t need another problem in another border.

– In the US today we hear offers about dialogue with Iran more than war. How do you think, why such dialogue offers are not voiced louder?

– Because sometimesIsraelwarns the world thatIran’ nuclear program is dangerous. When official Tel-Aviv openly informs thatIran’s nuclear program is dangerous, we have to be anxious and it causes warlike atmosphere. This is useful for many sides includingIsrael. On the other side, war threats are also for threateningIran.Iranalso uses some words to threatenIsrael. So, sometimesIranmust be reminded thatIsraelhas strategic relations withAzerbaijan. This is natural and understandable.

– Can we say that Israel puts pressure on the situation?

-Israelputs pressure on the situation?Israelis an independent country and may have good relations with any country of the world. Therefore ifIsraelhas military relations withAzerbaijanit is good. Because,Azerbaijanis a good partner in military field.Azerbaijandoesn’t have to get the weapon only fromRussia.Azerbaijanmay buy weapons from any country of the world in order to protect its country.

Nowadays discussions are held between theUSandIraninIstanbul. It doesn’t mean that there will be conflict between theUSandIran. If there are diplomatic relations between theUSandIran, how can we speak of warlike atmosphere? IfIranthinks that it has war danger from theUS, then why do they conduct new talks and dialogue with theUSinIstanbul?

Source – www. newbakupost.az

April 14, 2012
Turkey’s Foreign Minister In Search of ‘Soft’ Armenians
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s ‘man on the run,’ has added to his extremely busy schedule the new task of travelling around the globe trying to recruit ‘sensible’ Armenians.

Davutoglu has embarked on such a desperate initiative after the failure of all Turkish attempts to divide and conquer the Armenians and weaken their resolve to pursue their just cause. The Turkish Foreign Minister openly acknowledged that his urgent efforts are prompted by the looming 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide that hangs like a Damoclean Sword over his country.

After the collapse of the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) and Turkey’s futile attempts to seek ‘friendly’ Armenians around the world, Ankara gave up on the Diaspora altogether and turned its attention to a ‘softer target’ — the Government of Armenia.

Initially, Turkey registered some success when the Armenia-Turkey Protocols were signed by both countries, under the guise of opening their mutual border. However, this latest attempt to drive a wedge between ‘soft’ Armenian officials and ‘hard-line’ Diasporans also failed, when the much-touted Protocols were not ratified.

Realizing that Turkey had to deal with the Diaspora, not just Armenia to resolve genocide related issues, Davutoglu once again turned his attention to Armenian communities worldwide. During a March 24, 2010 CNN-Turk interview, he announced that Turkish authorities would initiate a dialog with ‘sensible’ Diaspora Armenians.

To pursue this stratagem, in April 2010 Davutoglu met in Washington with Turkey’s ambassadors to the United States and Canada, and Consul Generals in Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and Toronto. He instructed them to contact Armenians who are open to dialog, and to avoid ‘hard-line groups,’ according to the Turkish ‘Today’s Zaman’ newspaper.

A few weeks later, ‘Hurriyet’ reported that the Foreign Ministry issued a 10-point action plan, instructing Turkish diplomats worldwide to:
1. Invite and involve local Armenians in Turkish events;
2. Participate in Armenian community activities;
3. Contact Armenians who are materially benefiting from making genocide claims as well as recent immigrants from Turkey; and invite to Turkey those who harbor anti-Turkish sentiments;
4. Establish good relations with Armenian diplomats and attend their official events;
5. Accept speaking opportunities at local community and university events to explain Turkey’s position on Armenian genocide claims;
6. Establish contacts with local academics to explain to them Turkey’s position;
7. Develop contacts with diplomats of countries neighboring Turkey and familiarize them with Turkey’s position on Armenian genocide claims;
8. Advocate the creation of ‘a joint commission of historians’;
9. Promote normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations;
10. Emphasize that the peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict would benefit Armenian-Turkish relations.
In December 2011, Turkey announced a revised concept of ‘Diaspora’ to include all descendants of ‘Anatolia,’ regardless of their religion or sect. Davutoglu instructed all Turkish diplomats to hold ‘face-to-face’ meetings with such individuals in order to discuss their ‘joint history’ and “the suffering of all Ottoman people during the incidents of the World War I era.”

Dissatisfied with the efforts of his diplomats, Davutoglu decided to take matters into his own hands. Last month, he spent several hours in Washington meeting privately with several Armenians and non-Armenians from the Los Angeles area to discuss ‘Armenian-Turkish reconciliation.’ The Turkish Foreign Minister also invited the attendees to come to Ankara and bring along other ‘prominent’ Armenians. Since then, Davutoglu has held similar meetings elsewhere.

Meanwhile, another Turkish-initiated group on ‘Armenian-Turkish reconciliation’ will be launched on April 12 in Washington. The host group ‘HasNa’ is set to meet at the offices of Arnold & Porter, a lobbying firm hired by the Turkish government. The attendees will include some Armenians and Turks, U.S. government officials, members of the media, non-governmental organizations, academics, and others.

Armenians who choose to get involved in Turkish recruitment schemes could well be seeking fame or fortune, or are well-intentioned, but naive do-gooders. However, regardless of the reasons for their involvement in such questionable practices, they should be mindful of the consequences of their actions:
1. Dialog for the sake of dialog could do more damage than good to the Armenian Cause. The Turkish government would exploit such efforts to create the false impression that Armenians and Turks are in the process of reconciling, thereby derailing the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by other countries.
2. Unless a specific positive outcome is agreed upon in advance, there is a good chance that the Armenian participants would end up holding an empty bag.
3. Only Armenian officials and credible leaders with diplomatic expertise should be negotiating with shrewd and skilled Turkish diplomats. Otherwise, Turkish officials will cleverly cut a deal with those who are bound to be less demanding and more accommodating.
April 10, 2012