The Honorable Barack H. Obama President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500
USA
Dear Mr. President:
KILLERS!
You have destroyed the secular republic of Turkey. But it’s not only about you, Mr. President. It’s about Bush and Clinton and the other Bush and Reagan and Carter and Ford and Nixon and all the others like them who have been trying through the years to subvert Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s secular, democratic republic of Turkey. It’s also about your CIA and all its directors and its agents like Abramowitz and Edelman and Fethullah Gülen and Graham Fuller. And it’s about your CIA-inspired collaborating ambassadors to Turkey like Ricciardone and Jeffrey and Wilson and Edelman and Pearson and Parris and Grossman and Barkley and Abramowitz and Strausz-Hupe and Spain and Spiers and Macomber and Handley and Komer and all their double-talking predecessors beginning on 10 November 1938 when Atatürk died. But it’s mostly about your once best friend and key hit-man, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. And, of course, your under-educated, ever-treacherous under-cover CIA agent, religious huckster, and Pennsylvania resident, Fethullah Gülen. How good of you, Mr. President, to use these two religious hypocrites to employ God as a vehicle to divide and destroy a nation like Turkey. You, Mr. President, you and all the above American agent-provocateurs are guilty of subornation of treason. As a lawyer, I am sure you know what this means.
You have aided and abetted these two traitors, Erdoğan and Gülen, to engage in high crimes and misdemeanors in destroying the sovereignty of the Turkish nation. You have allowed your puppets, Erdoğan and Gülen, to kill and maim the citizens of Turkey. You have allowed your Erdoğan and his political thugs to plunder the nation of its natural resources, its wealth, its security and its honor. You have allowed your Gülen and his Gülen-controlled police force to brutally attack the Turkish people. And now, fed up with the treacherous, embarrassing Erdoğan, you are trying to dump him. But he is your “child,” Mr. President, another made-in-America political thug. And now you are using your other “child” (via the CIA) to have Gülen’s police to topple him. How stupidly obvious can you be? Erdogan’s corruption (and his political party’s) has been known for years. As has Gülen’s treachery. Your Erdoğan and Gülen’s police killed, gassed, beat, stabbed and otherwise maimed thousands of “Gezi Park” protestors. You and your reprehensible ambassador sold the Erdoğan government tons of tear gas and tasers and long range acoustic devices to violently suppress a democratic expression of the Turkish people’s disgust with the Erdoğan government. It resulted in six murders by the police. Are you beginning to understand, Mr. President?
How nice that now you too are disgusted with Erdoğan. And how clever of you to turn CIA “asset” Gülen against CIA “asset” Erdoğan. But what now, Mr. President? Do you think the “moderately” Islamic “gülenistas” in the AKP are any better than “moderately” Islamic Erdoğan? Do you think the Abdullah Gül puppet is any better than the Erdoğan model? Do you think the opposition party, now cravenly meeting with your ambassador, Ricciardone, is any better than Erdoğan? None of them are. Why? Because it is All-American garbage, that’s why. And it is because of you and your continuation of the sordid legacy of American gangsterism in the Republic of Turkey. Mr. President, Erdoğan and Gülen and you are enemies of the Turkish state. And the Turkish people know it. But, Mr. President, do you? Do you even care?
A power struggle is brewing in Turkey. It is a contest not among the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and the country’s secularists, but between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the populist religious movement of expatriate cleric Fethullah Gulen. It is not about elections or democracy. Rather, it is a struggle for control of the Turkish state itself.
From his self-imposed exile in the Poconos, where he has lived since 1999, Gulen has explicitly declared that he wishes his followers to control the state to encourage a kind of a cargo-cult Westernization, one that may be described as bringing to Turkey what he views as the good part of the West – technology and global commerce – without the bad: liberal democracy’s inherent resistance to Islamic conservatism. Superficially, there is no huge difference between Gulen’s and Erdogan’s worldviews. Gulen presents himself – nowadays – as more liberal, reasonable and friendlier to the United States. But he has not always done so, and unlike Erdogan he enjoys the luxury of being unaccountable to the electorate.
The Gulen movement has spent the past three decades aggressively expanding its presence in the education sector, both in Turkey and abroad. It is one of the largest players, for example, in the American charter school market. The movement seeks to create a well-educated “Golden generation,” friendly to the movement and possessed of the technical skills to assume high positions in strategic sectors of the economy, government and armed forces.
The contemporary Gulen presents himself as an elderly, humble champion of interfaith dialogue, and perhaps this is now true. Age, after all, mellows many a man. But Gulen has never unequivocally reversed his early teachings, on which his senior cadres have been raised, including his early sermons, which are replete with bracing exhortations to Muslims to “become bombs and explode,” and “tear to pieces the heads of the infidels.”
Initially, the AKP and the Gulen movement formed an alliance of convenience aimed at dislodging the old, “Kemalist” establishment in Turkey. But like any alliance of convenience, it reached a natural conclusion. Today, the old guard is safely in prison or silenced for fear of arrest. As a result, what we are witnessing now is a fight among the new, ostensibly pious ruling elites about how to divide the spoils of power.
Erdogan’s wing of the AKP is mainly in charge of the military, and the Gulenists in control of the police and judiciary. But the state isn’t big enough for them to share. The split had been papered over for years, but broke into the open when Gulenist prosecutors attempted to arrest Hakan Fidan, Erdogan’s intelligence chief. It exploded during the Gezi protests this past summer, when the movement issued an 11-article communiqué to dispute “accusations and charges” that it claimed came from AKP quarters.
The most recent flashpoint was Erdogan’s decision to abolish the dershanes – something like private university crammer schools, and a major source for Gulen’s recruits. The movement correctly perceived this as an attempt altogether to eradicate their influence. While they’re fighting, of course, the actual business of governing has been crowded out.
Erdogan is unlikely to encounter serious obstacles in the three approaching elections: municipal in March 2014, presidential in August 2014, and general in 2015. His support in the polls remains high, and he has no serious challengers. Unable to throw his weight behind a serious political alternative, all Gulen can do is grumble and sabotage. This may make some difference at the margins, but will not result in Erdogan’s removal via democratic means. The crucial question is who will take over the ruling party after Erdogan – and whether the Gulen movement will remain influential.
For those still friendly to the idea of Western-style democracy in Turkey, there are two ways to look at this. In the optimistic view, any counterweight to the growing authoritarianism of Erdogan’s government is a positive development. If the Gulen movement is the last meaningful barrier to one-man rule, at least it’s a barrier. In the alternative view, a balance of power only serves a nation well if it is a legitimate one. No one has elected Gulen, he and his movement did not come to power transparently and there is no mechanism by which they may be peacefully and transparently removed.
The optimist and Turkophile in me focuses on the former. The pessimist and Turkophile in me sees the latter and despairs.
Claire Berlinski is senior fellow for Turkey at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.
via Turkey’s Political Civil War – World Report (usnews.com).
Earlier this year, I wrote a column describing the Turkish government’s bullying tactics to reclaim antique objects from European and American museums. It is ironic that Turkey, one of the greatest looters and pilferers of other nations’ cultural heritage, would so aggressively demand the return of these antiquities.
Just in case its threats fail to work, Turkey embarked on a new course of action last month — bribery! Turkish Education Minister Nabi Avci announced on November 10: “Turkey has doubled its contribution to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) amid the financial crisis it faces with the United States and Israel not paying their membership fees.”
Minister Avci did not even attempt to hide the real reason for Turkey’s generosity. He disclosed that “significant progress has been made in Turkey’s candidacy for the UNESCO World Heritage Committee elections to be held on November 19.” Indeed, the Turkish Minister’s prediction came true when his country was elected to the 21-member World Heritage Committee for the next four years.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry immediately announced that as a member of that Committee, “Turkey intends to share, at the international scale, the experience and knowledge it has accumulated in managing and protecting its own 11 world heritage areas representing different layers of Anatolian civilization, including Neolithic, Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, Seljuk and Ottoman periods.”
Electing Turkey to a body that is supposed to preserve cultural assets is akin to putting a wolf in charge of guarding sheep. Turkey should not be eligible to serve on the UNESCO committee or on any other UN agency because of its long record as a major violator of human rights and the hegemonic threat it presents to the peace and security of neighboring states.
Not surprisingly, the Foreign Ministry’s announcement made no mention of the numerous Armenian religious and cultural monuments in present-day Turkey. Only in recent years, with the intent of easing the way for its European Union candidacy as well as generating income from foreign tourists, the Turkish government has renovated a handful of Armenian and Greek churches, after decades of neglect and systematic desecration and destruction.
Now that Turkey has undeservedly become a member of the World Heritage Committee, Armenia’s UNESCO representative has the opportunity during each meeting for the next four years to point out the irony Turkey faces — tasked with preserving cultural monuments, while remaining one of the biggest confiscators of other nations’ cultural heritage.
Murat Suslu, Turkey’s director-general of cultural heritage and museums, told the New York Times with a straight face: “We only want back what is rightfully ours…. If you come to my house and you steal precious objects from me, do I not have the right to get them back?” Mr. Suslu, who insisted that thievery and looting are wrong no matter when they occurred, must be reminded that Turkey can make such claims only after returning to Alevis, Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Cypriots, Greeks, and Kurds, what is rightfully theirs!
Just as ironic was the statement made by Ertugrul Gunay, Turkey’s Culture Minister, to the Economist magazine: “I wholeheartedly believe that each and every antiquity in any part of the world should eventually go back to its homeland. Even if these objects are made of stone, just as people have souls, so do animals, plants and monuments. Taking a monument away destabilizes the world and is disrespectful to history.”
Instead of falsely presenting their country as a looting victim, Turkish officials should acknowledge that they are in possession of numerous antiquities confiscated by their Ottoman predecessors while occupying over a dozen neighboring countries. For example, the sarcophagus of Alexander the Great, discovered near Sidon, Lebanon in 1887, was shipped to Istanbul’s Archaeology Museum under orders from Sultan Abdul Hamid II, where it is still kept as one of its most prized possessions. It’s now up to Lebanon to demand the return of this precious cultural treasure from Turkey! Also, Saudi Arabia has the right to reclaim a plethora of sacred Islamic relics removed from Mecca by the Ottoman authorities in the 19th century.
Turkey’s membership in UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee provides a unique opportunity for Armenians and other dispossessed nations to draw the world’s attention to the Turkish government’s illegal confiscation of their cultural heritage and demand their immediate return.
Gulnara Inandzh, Director of International online information-analytical center “Etnoglobus”, the editor of the Russian section of the US-Turkish resource tirkishnews.com, representative of “Gumilev” center in Azerbaijan, mete62@inbox.ru
Collapse of the Soviet Union, then start of globalization has created a new environment for the realization Ethnopsychological self-identy.
Soviet policies aimed at developing the conscience of the Soviet man, erasing ethnicity and religion, suddenly painted in bright colors the most radical of these factors of identity.
During first years of the new independent states, in Azerbaijan, political nationalism ran in parallel with ethnic nationalism, including with numerous, mainly Turkic ethnic groups. With the strengthening of state nationalism of Azerbaijani Turks declined in parallel reducing ethnic nationalism which is not the major ethnic groups living in the country.
However, the ethnic self-identity of the Azerbaijani citizens calling themselves as “Azerbaijanis” and citizens calling themselves as “Turks”, ” Lezghian”, “Avars”, “Talish” runs parallel. But in the mass consciousness there is no aggression and absolutism in self-identity. But also an understanding of the definition of “Azeri” as a political nation or state is too weak.
For example, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to explain the Azerbaijani Turks, still retained the format of the Soviet definition of “Azeri” that Lezghians Talish and Jew living in Azerbaijan, are also “Azeri”. Also jealous Lezghians Talish and Avar does not want to plead Azerbaijani as again under Soviet format believes that this is definition element, diverting his identity by the wayside.
Such an approach to the title “Azerbaijani” takes place among ethnic groups that do not have their own state. Deep in the subconscious behind it there is self-preservation instinct on the background of globalization, when the process of integration and merger of cultural values.
The so-called “Arab Spring” again exposed ethnic and religious feelings. Studies, as well as own fieldwork shows that in this international call, in Azerbaijan religious expression and ethnic identity prevails over, sometimes mixing them.
But the rise of ethnic consciousness is based on mythologizing history, historical figures searches among their ethnic group. (1)
Azerbaijan, participating in transnational and regional projects, accelerates the process of engaging in the process of globalization and its reverse side – localization. Localization develops regional and local identity. As a result of globalization, localization also acts as a catalyst of ethnic mobilization. (2)
The above identification format proposes a new way of thinking and identification – Eurasianism. This kind of format is new thinking for the Azerbaijani society. Part of the country is included in the European and Asian geographical space. One of the two villages located nearby according to this section may be both in Europe and Asia. What do they think of it? What continent do the residents of these villages belong to? They are likely to be called the name of his village, then their ethnicity, depending on where it is rural or political nation – Azerbaijani, then religious affiliation – Muslims. But they don’t care whether they are European or Asian.
Outside the country Azerbaijanis are considered as the eastern people, Muslims. And by presenting to our public consciousness a new format of thinking, we need to define and explain what the purpose of it is. If there is still a debate about ethnicity and political nation, those who do not want to consider himself a nation, and remains in its ethnic house, suggest a Eurasian identity.
Gumilev’s Eurasian idea was transferred to the political arena and has become a leading link in Russia’s foreign policy thus becoming virtually a new format for the unification of the Eurasian geography. That is, this is the idea of Eurasian identity manifested itself on the political plane. In such a case Eurasianism will be dictated from above, if the political authorities decide to join it. Dictated from above new factor of integration or association will not be framed as an ideological component, and would mean only to carry political- geographical name. It means that Azeri do not have to adapt to the new identity. In this case, the proposed policy of Eurasian idea does not compete or clash with ethnic and national identity, but it is the basis for cultural and economic integration.
With the growing economic and political status of Azerbaijan, national identity takes a new quality. Today being an Azerbaijani is prestigious, for example, equals with Europeanized Eastern man, a Muslim with a modern way of thinking. Azerbaijanis are now not only migrant workers but also employers. Azerbaijan already began to receive migrants from southern Russia, Asia and Iran. This is due to participation of Azerbaijan and the role of Azerbaijani business as an employer in the south of Russia.
Here it would be appropriate to consider the involvement of Azerbaijan in the economy of the south of Russia, which includes not only economic, but also cultural and social integration.
Economic and political development of Azerbaijan assigns it the role of the employer that changes the attitude towards the state and the people. Russia invited foreign private and public companies, including Azerbaijani investors to participate in the development of economy in southern Russia.
Southern borders of Russia, bordering with two regional states, Azerbaijan and Georgia, is a strategically important reference point of Russia. In order to establish peace in the south of the country, the federal center along with operational activities implement economic reforms, aimed at serving as establishment of new jobs, growth of social conditions of the population and reduction of migration.
But at the same time, given the desire of foreign powers to separate the south of the country, including the North Caucasus from Russia, the Kremlin approaches the foreign investors carefully, without allowing them into the regional economy.
In this case, absence of geopolitical ambitions in the North Caucasus and the reluctance to become an instrument of foreign games in the region, makes Azerbaijan successful and trusted source of investment in the economy of the south of Russia. Many factors contribute to this, including economic potential, similarity of mental traits, natural infrastructure, a large market, etc.
State border treaty, signed in 2010 between Baku and Moscow accompanied the opening of the North Caucasus economic fields for the Azerbaijani business.
In the summer of 2011 Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, the special representative of the President of Russia in the North Caucasus Federal District (North Caucasus Federal District ) Alexander Khloponin, with the delegation of heads of all the North Caucasian Republics came to Baku to discuss the subject. Immediately thereafter, the Minister of Economic Development of Azerbaijan Shahin Mustafayev visited seven republics of the North Caucasus and business forums and business meetings were held. (3)
Paying particular attention to economic cooperation with Azerbaijan, plenipotentiary representation of the Russian President in the North Caucasus Federal District creates a special council to supervise the execution of the decisions relating to the subjects of the federation in the region and also plans to open a representative office of North Caucasus Federal District in Azerbaijan.
According to the deputy envoy to North Caucasus Federal District Sergei Subbotin, “A task was put before North Caucasus Federal District leaders aiming at development of relations with Azerbaijan, and it is high time to control the effectiveness of these tasks. Effective solution of all tasks depends primarily on effective control. ” (4)
Participation of Azerbaijani business is particularly felt in Stavropol and Krasnodar regions of Russia. For example, in 2009, Azerbaijan won the 3rd place in terms of foreign trade with the Stavropol Territory – $ 123.3 million, which is 8.7 % of the total foreign trade turnover of the region, and trade with the Krasnodar Territory – $ 71.4 million.
In 2010 national company “Azersun Holding” put into operation a tea-packing factory in Belorechensk (Krasnodar region) with a total of more than $ 3 million. and started the construction of a cannery in the same amount. Totally the company has invested in the infrastructure of the Krasnodar Territory $ 22 million.
In September 2011 Azerbaijani company “Matanat – A” started construction of Materials Plant in Uspensky district of Krasnodar region ( project worth of 30 million euros).
In early June of this year in Volgograd during the fourth forum “Russia -Azerbaijan: interregional dialogue 2013” business exhibition was organized where the Russian regions and Azerbaijan demonstrated products of industrial and processing enterprises. The exhibition was attended by more than 40 producers in the region , including plants such as “Volgogradneftemash “, ” VZBT “, ” united Tsarician manufactory “, ” Volzhsky Abrasive Plant ,” ” Kamyshinsky textiles “, “Brewers”, “Config”, “Gardens Pridonya” , “King – product” and other productions.
According to the Minister of Economy, Foreign Economic Relations and Investment Elvira Lagutina, Azerbaijan today is one of the largest customers of the Volgograd region. Currently, the region has 10 enterprises with the participation of the Azerbaijani capital, trade is growing with the republic – by the end of 2012 it exceeded $ 140 million.
– Azerbaijan is interested in Volgograd APK, bus manufacturing, chemical products and other enterprises. Besides, there are also prospects in the implementation of joint investment projects, including the construction of hotels and the creation of platforms in the field of agricultural processing. Azerbaijan also purchased Drilling Equipment Plant in Volgograd. (5 )
Federal center is very interested in the development of the region and creates maximum conditions for investment.
“The district used the most advanced tools to stimulate investment and development – government guarantees and investment insurance that does not exist in any other region of Russia. North Caucasus Development Corporation was established” – said Russian presidential representative in the North Caucasus Federal District Alexander Khloponin, inviting Azerbaijani investors to the region. (6 )
We also should note the need to establish a free trade zone in the region, which should abolish movement between Azerbaijan and Russia, to promote mutually beneficial trade and rapprochement and closer ties of the two countries, to attract Azerbaijani investors. This should also be accompanied by the creation of conditions for labor migration between Azerbaijan and in southern regions of Russia.
Russian side is trying to bring economic relations between Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus Federal District from framework of trade relations into the direction of the development of modern industry and technology and innovation. It is noteworthy that as evidenced above examples, the participation of Azerbaijani business in southern Russia is seriously interested in Moscow.
(Speech at the conference titled “Alternatives for regional developmen” The Shabunin readings, 11-12 October 2013, Volgograd)
It is always interesting to see how the Armenian community is viewed by outsiders. That perspective becomes more fascinating when the assessment is made by a U.S. diplomat in an internal report.
The large number of classified U.S. government documents released by WikiLeaks include cables sent by the American Embassy in Armenia to the State Department. One of those dispatches, dated Nov. 17, 2009, is a ‘Confidential’ report by Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch covering her 2009 tour of Los Angeles, Boston, New York City, and Washington, D.C.
Here are highlights of the ambassador’s report, titled: “Experience Engaging Diaspora Communities — Armenia.”
1) The Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church “is under the authority of the Holy See of Etchmiadzin,” while the Prelacy “recognizes the jurisdictional authority of the Armenian Catholicos (head of the Armenian Church) based in Antelias, Lebanon. This is only for administrative purposes though, as, doctrinally, the Prelacy recognizes the theological supremacy of the Catholicos in Etchmiadzin in Armenia. The Prelacy is associated with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)/Dashnaks, founded in 1890, and constitutes one of the three largest sectors of the Armenian-American community and are considered conservative in nature.” The report explains that “the ARF/Dashnaks have two goals: recognition that the massacres of Armenians in Turkey in 1915 constitute genocide, and the recovery of the traditional Armenian lands in eastern Turkey.” In all certainty, the Turkish government would not be pleased that a US diplomat has described parts of Turkey as “traditional Armenian lands.” Furthermore, the report states that the ARF “supports a ladies auxiliary association…known as the Armenian Relief Society (ARS), in addition to youth and cultural associations and a large media operation in the United States including newspapers, radio, and television.”
2) The report describes U.S. Armenian Catholics as “the smallest religious denomination…. The Armenian Catholic Church supports a small number of schools and orphanages but has almost no activities in Armenia.”
3) “The Armenian Protestant community is considered the oldest Armenian community in the United States and is very active through their Armenian Missionary Association of America (AMAA).”
4) “The Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), established in 1906, is the second major sector and is the largest charitable organization in the Armenian community…. They are affiliated with the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADL), also known as Ramkavars, which is active (but marginal) in Armenia, the American Diaspora community, and in the Middle East, such as Lebanon.”
5) “The Hnchag, or Armenian Social Democrat Party, is the third of the politically based Armenian community cluster of organizations and the smallest Armenian-community based political party. It functions as a political club in California and publishes a weekly paper.”
6) The report also lists “independent organizations that are non-partisan in character,” such as the Armenian Assembly of America [AAA], Lincy Foundation, Cafesjian Foundation, and Tufenkian Foundation. Interestingly, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) is placed in this category even though the report acknowledges that ANCA is “generally recognized as the lobbying organization of the Dashnaks.”
7) In the humanitarian group, the report includes the Fund for Armenian Relief, Hayastan All Armenian Fund, Children of Armenia Fund, Jinishian Foundation, Armenian EyeCare Project, and Armenia Tree Project, but fails to mention the United Armenian Fund which has delivered close to $700 million of humanitarian aid to Armenia since the earthquake of 1988.
8) Amb. Yovanovitch describes the Ministry of Diaspora and the National Competitiveness Foundation as examples of the Armenian government’s outreach efforts to the Diaspora.
9) The report criticizes the Armenian Diaspora for not supporting “the promotion of democracy, electoral reform, and civil society development in Armenia.” However, it states that Armenian-Americans provide financial support to two think tanks: the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, and Civilitas Foundation.
The most interesting aspect of Amb. Yovanovitch’s report is the section on the Armenian-Turkish Protocols. She asserts that Armenian-American groups “pay close attention to Armenia’s foreign policy decisions and are quick to mobilize their supporters against the Armenian government if the Diaspora groups believe the government is not acting in Armenia’s best interests. Many groups oppose the government’s regional reconciliation efforts on the grounds that such reconciliation does not include resolution of the simmering conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh or recognition that the Ottoman Empire engaged in genocide in 1915. Other groups though, such as the Armenian Assembly of America and AGBU, have publicly supported the government’s policies of regional cooperation and an end to Armenia’s isolation in the Caucasus. In September [2009], AAA, AGBU, the Eastern and Western Diocese Churches, and the Ramkavars issued a public statement supporting President Sargsyan’s foreign policy to normalize relations with Turkey.”
Although the Ambassador’s report is informative, it does not accurately and comprehensively cover the full spectrum of the Armenian-American community.
On 24th Nov 1950, the U.N. Forces launched their attack north from the line of contact with its center of mass in the 8th Army area with all Army (Ist and IXth U.S.Corps, Ist Turkish and 27th British Brigades),Xth U.S. Corps and Ist South Korean Corps. Since the weak enemy forces on the 8th Army front retreated hastily, the advance elements moved quickly forward 8-10 miles. This easy advance gave misleading impression that “the enemy is withdrawing to Manchuria and that peace was on hand. Only units of IInd South Korean Corps on the Armies right flank held its position. The attack continued on 25th Nov with Ist and IXth U.S. Corps advancing in the 8th Army area and II Korean Corps again remaining in its position. However, on 26th Nov attack initiated by Ist and IXth Corps were met with stiff resistance. While the attack was loosing its intensity, the IInd South Korean Corps on the U.N. Force’s right flank was suddenly struck a massive counter offensive by some 180.000 Chinese Troops in 18 divisions. In consequence, the shattered IInd South Korean Corps had to retreat to the east of Tokchon. The enemy forces continued their attack on the night of the 26th Nov. and forced the IInd South Korean Corps 40 Kilometers South, to the Taedong River. The enemy is believed to have used 8 Communist Chinese divisions to spearhead this attack. A holding attack in this area was launched the same night with about 6 divisions against the IXth Corps units. However, with the withdrawal of the IInd South Korean Corps, the right flanks of two U.S. Corps were exposed, making them highly vulnerable. The enemy, whose center of mass was believed to be here, was capable of enveloping the entire 8th Army. With this sudden change of events, this exposed flank had to be refused in order for the 8th Army to withdraw in an orderly manner. This duty was assigned to the Turkish Brigade, which was in the army reserve.
The Turkish Brigade (Bde), tasked with protection the right flank of the 9th Corps, which was threatened with enemy envelopment, and thus that of the 8th Army, was to advance along the Kunuri-Tokchon road and single handedly counter superior enemy forces which had repulsed the IInd South Korean Corps. On 27th Nov, these Communist Chinese forces had, as expected, initiated a fast encirclement and pursuit operation. And a substantial portion of its forces was directed towards Kunuri. The Turkish Bde had started marching from the opposite direction on the same road from Wawon to Tokchon. However, in the afternoon, it stopped and order from IXth Corps Command and returned to Wawon. The order had unfortunately been transmitted to the Bde Commander about 2 hours late. The main units of the Bde had deployed to Wawon area and started to deploy after necessary security precautions were taken. The Bde Commander was informed at around 0100 hours on the 28th Nov that the reconnaissance detachment who had been on rear guard support duty, was attacked by the enemy and destroyed.
28 NOVEMBER 1950-WAWON BATTLE:
The 10th infantry company commander was tasked with closing off the entrance to Choyangmyon. The company completed its deployment and disposition between 2100 and 2200 hours on 27 Nov. Shots fired by the ambushed Recce Detachment were herd by the company between 2400-0100 hours. The enemy attacked to 10th company at daybreak on 28 Nov by first hitting the security detachment in front of the company and later the company itself along its entire front. The platoons of 10th company completed its preparations while the security detachment of the company was fighting and was ready for combat. This company looked like a ship prepared to counter great waves caused by a hurricane. The enemy attack was initially met with intense fire. The enemy engaged by this heavy firepower, hastily withdrew and positioned itself behind a hill while partially spreading left and right, trying to encircle the company.
As the enemy spread northwest, first the 11th company and then the 9th company were committed. When the enemy seemed to be preparing to envelope this company’s left flank, the entire II nd Battalion was moved to this area and a battle group was formed under the command of Deputy Bde. Commander Col Celal Dora. The battle of Wawon continued until the evening of 28 Nov 1950 with first the II nd battalion’s and later all the Bde units’ commitment, one after the other. This was a battle which was conducted over extremely rugged terrain where friend and foe could not be distinguished easily, under temperatures of -20, -30 degrees C (-4 to 22 F), devoid of support from friendly forces, with communication cut of from higher headquarters, and before it was able to develop its combat power as much as necessary.
28-29NOVEMBER 1950 – SINNIM-NI BATTLE:
On the evening of 28 Nov, Turkish units started to withdraw to the area around Sinnim-ni Village was about 7 Km. to the west. The covering force was made up by the 1st company, which had not been heavily engaged during that day’s operations. The enemy realized that the Turkish units were withdrawing, although it was done under cover of darkness. And it followed the Bde very closely along a wide front with delaying operations conducted by the rear guard. The road was narrow and deployment was slow. Therefore marching column rear guards and the enemy were in close proximity with each other during this withdrawal.
The Ist battalion was tasked with defending the south of Sinnim-ni Village and the IInd battalion was tasked with defending the hills to its north. The other units were spread out all the way to Kaechon, about 3 Km to their rear. At about midnight, on 28/29 Nov, units that were mostly in the west of the Sinnim-ni Village came under sudden and intense machine gun, mortar and rocket fire. This surprised attack caused panic among the majority of the Bde personnel. This units started to retreat along the road in the dark. Meanwhile, the enemy captured some hills to the north of the road and cut off Ist and IInd battalions from each other. The hours following the Sinnim-ni surprise attack were the most critical for the Bde and Bde headquarters when the units were retreating. Bde headquarters, which was in a school building in Kaechon, started to receive the first negative reports.
The cannon and vehicles of the artillery battalion and the battalion train had congested the only road to Kaechon in double, triple and quadruple columns and were entwined with each other. Seeing the situation, the Bde Commander General Yazıcı directed the retreating columns to be halted, brought down from their vehicles and reorganized; and ordered contact be reestablished with Ist and IInd battalions. The situation was grave for the Bde Commander and his headquarters; 1/3 of the Bde infantry elements were dissolved. The artillery could not function. Contact was cut of with Ist and Iind battalions who seemed to have stayed in their positions. There was no contact with the U.S. IX Corps and no immediate help could be expected from it. What is more, conflicting reports kept coming in and the bad news had a demoralizing effect on personnel.
The Commander was face with a situation where he had to make a decision, which would affect both the brigades, U.S. IX Corps and the 8th Army. He could follow one of the following courses of action: he could either leave Ist and IInd battalions, which had been cut off in their rear, by themselves and withdraw further to establish a new defense line with what was left; or he could gather all the elements in Kaechon to save Ist and IInd battalions, by establishing a new defensive line on the hills to the right of the village and using every means available to establish contact with cut of units. At this critical moment, Gen Yazıcı did not lose his composure and decided to contact defensive operations at the location where he was. As a result of this firm decision to resist and continue to defense, the uncontrolled flow of people was slowed down. The disorganized units were partially reorganized and a new defensive line was established.
While the Bde Commander was taking this precautions, IId battalion and 2nd company of Ist battalion were in a very difficult situation and were surrounded by superior forces, conducting breath taking combat all night and until noon the next day. In spite of the attacks launched by the enemy from the front and flanks, these units conducted exemplary, heroic operations, holding their positions. Particularly the 2nd company of the Ist battalion, which was located on hills and the valley immediately to the south of Simnin-ni, by conducting a bayonet assault against the enemy who was trying to encircle its flanks and rear, heroically held its position until noon of 29th November. When 2nd company’s ran out, ammunition captured from the enemy was used meanwhile, the IInd battalion, on hills extending to the Northeast of the village, continued to defend its position against the superior enemy’s continuous attacks.
On 29th Nov 1950, at around 10.00 hours, just before the counter offensive, an U.S. infantry battalion and a tank company tasked to cover the withdrawal of the U.S. 2nd division established contact with the units trying to reorganize and the Turkish Brigade trying to established a defense position around Kaechon. They positioned themselves on the northern hills. Upon arrival of the U.S. regiment, the Bde Commander informed the regiment commander of the situation and proposed that a counter offensive be conducted to save IInd battalion and 2nd company. The regiment commander refused this suggestion saying, “His duty was to cover the right flank of the division.” Then the Bde Commander saw that his northern flank was now secured and decided, “to conduct an attack” with the small amount of existing forces. The determination of the Bde Commander started paying off towards noon. The commander was able to establish contact with the units that were cut of through the counter offensive that was conducted. The enabled the cut of units to withdraw through areas, which were not open to enemy, fire.
The enemy pursuit the withdrawing forces closely and advances north and south of the Kaechon positions. They were met with fire from both Turkish and U.S. battalions in these positions. Meanwhile it was determined that a regimental size force continued its advance from behind the hills in spite of artillery and mortar fire. At around 1700, while the U.S. Ist battalion, which was defending the southern edge of the position, began to withdraw, the enemy started to envelope its northern flank. In this situation, the Bde, whose northern edge was open, decided to withdraw in order not to be encircled from both flanks. Again the withdrawal initiated under the cover of the rear guard.
As you have noticed, Turkish Brigade established contact with U.S. units for the first time since 27th Nov. This indicates that, the 8th Army was able to complete its withdrawal within the time, which had been gained. The Turkish Brigade gained a day in Wavon (27-28 Nov), another day in Sinnim-ni area and showed strong resistance to the superior Chinese 38th Corps at Sinnim-ni and Kaechon on 29 Nov, gaining a whole day in itself, although suffering substantial casualties consequently, it was able to accomplish the task it was given, enabling the 8th Army, main strength of the United Nation Forces, to withdraw and thus escape annihilation.
