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Category: Nihat Ali Ozcan

  • PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 7 March 26, 2009

    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Turkey, Iran, Terrorism, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas, Nihat Ali Özcan
    The United States Treasury Department added the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Parti bo Jiyani Azadi la Kurdistan – PJAK) to its list of designated terrorist groups on February 4. [1] Operating on the Iranian-Iraqi border under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), PJAK has sought to create an autonomous Kurdish region within Iran since its formation in 2004, though the relationship between Iran and the PKK dates back to the creation of the Islamic State of Iran in 1979. This development also highlights unique dynamics of the relationship between a terrorist organization (the PKK) and a state sponsor (Iran).  

    The decision to designate PJAK as a terrorist group brought to the forefront the trajectory of Iran-PKK ties, which traditionally have oscillated between sponsorship and enmity. In this article, we will look at the ebb and flow of sponsorship-enmity dynamics between Iran and the PKK, and put this relationship into the context of regional developments.

    The PKK established contacts with Iranian Kurds who rebelled against Tehran following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Since then, the PKK’s relationship with the Islamic Republic has gone through several phases that can be analytically divided into five distinct periods. The first period (1980-1982) covers the immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution. The establishment of the Iran-Syria alliance and Iran’s war with Iraq marked the second era (1982-1988), during which a sponsorship relationship gradually took root. During the third period (1988-1997), Iran and the PKK redefined the sponsorship relationship to adjust it to the new geopolitics brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fourth period (1997-2003) can best be described as controlled cooperation, during which the parties struggled to maintain a fragile partnership under the pressure of the rapidly shifting regional balances of power. During the fifth era (2003-2009), starting with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a rather adversarial relationship emerged between the parties, which occasionally turned into open confrontation.

    First period

    Initial encounters between the PKK and the Islamic Republic date back to the first years of the revolution. The Iranian Kurds, seeking to take advantage of the post-revolutionary turmoil and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, initiated a rebellion against Tehran. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, tasked some of his militants with establishing contacts with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, which was leading the rebellion against Tehran at the time. Ocalan was reportedly urged by Jalal al-Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to engage Iranian Kurds. [2]

    The initial years of the PKK-Iran relationship were characterized by enmity, developing as they did under the shadow of the new Iranian regime’s Islamic credentials and the PKK’s Marxist agenda. Moreover, the possibility that the PKK might ignite a desire for independence among Iranian Kurds further exacerbated Iran’s suspicions of the PKK. However, subsequent developments replaced this short-lived period of ideological antagonism with a spirit of pragmatism dictated by changes in regional diplomacy that provided a fertile ground for the emergence of a sponsorship-alliance relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Marxist PKK.  

    Second period

    The emergence of the Iran-Syria strategic alliance in 1982 had direct repercussions for Iranian-PKK ties as well. In response to the geopolitical shifts brought about by the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, including the deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations, Tehran and Damascus were increasingly drawn towards each other. A shared interest of this new alliance was the undermining of two pro-Western countries in the region through subversive activities, namely Turkey and Israel. To do this, the Tehran-Damascus axis decided to support the PKK and Hezbollah. [3] Following this agreement, Iran dispatched its Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon through Syria to train Hezbollah fighters. The PKK froze its ties to al-Talabani and signed a partnership agreement with Barzani. [4] This agreement allowed the PKK to relocate its militants in Syria to northern Iraq through Iranian facilitation.

    From Iran’s perspective, it had many incentives to engage in such a relationship:

    • Tehran and Ankara were involved in an enduring rivalry.

    • The Islamic revolution increasingly pitted Tehran against the secular regime in Ankara, adding an ideological fervor to the competition.

    • The close ties between Ankara and Washington exacerbated Tehran’s fears of Ankara. As part of American plans to contain the Islamic regime, some airfields in Turkish territory close to the Iranian border were expanded (Cumhuriyet, November 16, 1982). Moreover, the United States relocated some of the listening stations it had to withdraw from Iran to eastern Turkey, raising Iranian concerns about Turkey.

    • Following the revolution, many supporters of the Shah’s regime, seeking to reach Western countries, first flew to Turkey. Revolutionary leaders were worried that these refugees, whose numbers were in the millions, could organize themselves in Turkey to undermine the new regime.

    • The Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to world markets through Turkish territory brought extra revenue to Baghdad, helping it to finance its war against Iran.
     
    These pragmatic reasons led Iran to support the Marxist PKK in its efforts to undermine Turkey. Nonetheless, Iran always denied its support for the PKK, which was partly a reflection of the fact that Iran needed to maintain relations with Turkey (Cumhuriyet, May 3, 1987). For instance, it had to use Turkish territory to ensure a flow of logistical supplies to maintain its war against Iraq.
    Despite Tehran’s official denial of any support to the PKK, its sponsorship gradually increased towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war. As the senior partner, Iran exerted some limitations on the PKK. [5] The PKK could not attack Turkish targets within fifty kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border and would refrain from operating among Iranian Kurds. It also agreed to share the intelligence it gathered about Turkey and American bases there with Tehran. In return, Iran provided the PKK with weapons, medical assistance and logistical facilities. Through entering this relationship, the PKK gained access to a wider area of operability and eventually expanded its influence into the Turkish interior.
     
    Third period

    Concerned about the growing influence of the PKK among Iranian Kurds after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran changed its attitude towards the PKK and arrested some of its militants. [6] Nonetheless, this situation soon changed. Although Iran’s Kurdish population posed a challenge, it was not a vital threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. Since the Sunni Kurds were a numerically small minority dwelling in the periphery of the Iranian political system, Iran regarded the problem as manageable. A more serious threat was presented by Azeri nationalism, especially after Azerbaijan emerged as an independent country. Turkey’s increasing profile in the Caucasus and Central Asia (backed by the United States) and the growth of Azeri nationalism within Iran became major issues of concern for Tehran, which found itself forced to restore its ties with the PKK. Indeed, a growing number of PKK activities during the 1990s took place mostly around Turkey’s northeastern and Caucasus borders. [7] In this way, Iran sought to hinder Turkey’s ties to the Caucasus and Central Asia and limit its influence in the region. One direct effect of this policy was that the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline had to be postponed for another nine to ten years. The intensification of PKK terrorist activities consumed much of Turkey’s energy, turning its attention inward.

    Fourth period

    In this stage, Iran gradually reduced its support to the PKK parallel to a declining threat perception. The Turkish-Iranian competition lost its intensity as Azerbaijan and Azeri nationalism were no longer perceived as major challenges. Similarly, Syria’s diminishing support of the PKK following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan resulted in Tehran reconsidering its ties to the PKK. Iran adopted a wait-and-see approach given that the regional balance of power was full of uncertainties. Last but not least, the 9/11 terror attacks and the Global War on Terrorism made Tehran more cautious as it sought to avoid being labeled as a sponsor of terrorism.

    Fifth period

    The Iran-PKK relationship, which started to deteriorate following the capture of Ocalan, turned into one of open confrontation in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The extensions of the PKK operating among the Iranian Kurds declared the founding of PJAK in 2004 (see Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006).  Drawing on its past networks, the PKK consolidated its power among Iranian Kurds within a short period. It capitalized on the legacy of Kurdish nationalism and resistance to Tehran introduced to the region before the local Kurdish movement was crushed by Iran, while building its own economic and political networks. To give PJAK a local character, some Iranian Kurds were recruited to its leadership cadres. Despite PJAK’s claim to the contrary, it operated under the PKK umbrella and sought refuge in the Kandil Mountain region. As an indication of these organic ties, militants recruited from Turkey were sometimes deployed in Iran, while militants of Iranian origin sometimes took part in PKK operations inside Turkey. [8]  

    The PKK’s growing visibility in Iran and an acquiescent American attitude towards the PKK presence in northern Iraq (which came to be perceived as a de facto rapprochement between Washington and the PKK) pitted Iran and the PKK against each other. PJAK has increasingly engaged Iranian military personnel since 2003 in a bid to gain media attention. In response, Iran has occasionally shelled PJAK positions in the Kandil Mountain region. There were also unconfirmed reports from Kurdish sources of cross-border operations by Iranian security forces in September, 2007 (Today’s Zaman, August 24, 2007; McClatchy, August 23, 2007). Like Turkey, Iran preferred to present PJAK as an extension of the PKK and lent support to Turkey’s fight against the PKK. In this way it sought to boost its own popularity among the Turkish public and to undercut Turkish-American ties.  

    Although the Bush administration added the PKK to the list of designated terrorist organizations, it was more tolerant toward PJAK, which led to allegations that America and Israel supported PJAK as a way to destabilize Iran. [9] Shortly after coming to power, the Obama administration designated PJAK as a terrorist organization controlled by the PKK. By this decision, Washington signaled that it would adopt a more principled approach in the fight against terrorism. This development also signifies a change in the American attitude towards the intricate relationships between Turkey, Iran and the PKK. Turkey welcomed the decision and saw it as the fruit of its new policy of building international coalitions to eradicate PKK terror, particularly through closer collaboration with the United States and northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities. A statement from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined Ankara’s satisfaction with the U.S. acknowledgment of PKK-PJAK ties (Anadolu Ajansi, February 6).

    The PKK, in contrast, increasingly feels that it is being encircled as a result of recent developments. PJAK officials condemned the U.S. designation and claimed that for over a year the United States already had a de facto policy of pleasing Turkey and Iran by intensifying pressure on PKK and PJAK. The organization noted that northern Iraqi authorities were also supportive of this new policy (Gundem Online, February 12; February 17). PJAK challenged the Obama administration, arguing that the terrorist designation would not deter their struggle.

    Conclusion

    Iran is carefully observing developments in Iraq and the evolution of Turkish-American relations. The next stage in the sponsorship-enmity cycle between Iran and the PKK will depend on Iran’s assessment of the changes in the regional balance of power and threats to its national security. To escape the pressures exerted by close coordination between Turkey, the United States and the Kurdistan Regional Government of northern Iraq, the PKK will have an incentive to redefine its relationship with Iran. Despite Iranian-PJAK border clashes, PKK leaders are already sending warm messages to Tehran (Gundem Online, February 24). Whereas playing the “Iran card” might increase the PKK’s bargaining power, Iran also has reasons to maintain the continued availability of the “PKK card.” Considering the ongoing uncertainty over the future of the region (especially northern Iraq) in the wake of a partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and discussions over the Iranian nuclear program, Iran might not want to see the PKK disappear from the game completely.

    Notes:

    1. www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg14.htm.
    2. Cemil Bayik, Parti Tarihi, Damascus, 1996, p.58.
    3. For the background of this relationship, see: Huccetulislam Hasimi Muhtesemi’s (former Iranian ambassador to Damascus) memoirs. Turkish translation: Dunya ve Islam, 1990, pp.53-64.
    4. Bayik, op.cit. pp.75,77.
    5. Abdullah Ocalan, Parti Tarihimiz Boyunca Disaridan Dayatilan Tasfiyecilik Uzerine (Damascus, 1991), p.17
    6. Bayik, op.cit. p.92.
    7. Reports submitted to PKK’s Fifth Congress, Damascus, 1995, p.283.
    8. For the personal records of PKK militants killed see: www.hpg-online.com/sehit/sehit_kunyeleri/2008_a.html .
    9. Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act,” The New Yorker, November 27, 2006. The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, denied those allegations; See www.cnnturk.com, June 30, 2008.  www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/12/AR2007091201133.html

     
    https://jamestown.org/program/pjak-iran-and-the-united-states-kurdish-militants-designated-terrorists-by-the-united-states/
  • Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Turkey’s PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government

    Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 23
    December 8, 2008 03:25 PM Age: 44 min
    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Terrorism, Turkey
    By: NIhat Ali Ozcan and Saban Kardas
    Turkey had high hopes its cross-border operations in the winter of 2007-8 would eliminate the threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – PKK). The ability of the PKK to strike back in the spring and summer of 2008 through staggering attacks raised questions about the effectiveness of Turkey’s strategy. The PKK survived the Turkish winter offensive and endured heavy weather conditions without losing its operational capability, thanks to its safe havens in northern Iraq. This situation led to a reevaluation of Turkey’s policies. Boosting the dialogue between Turkey and northern Iraqi authorities has emerged as the new approach to the solution of the PKK problem.

    The center of gravity for the PKK problem has shifted to the political and diplomatic realm, and will remain so in the coming months. Unlike the relative calm in the area of military operations in rural southeastern Turkey, the political debates continue unabated and will intensify further as municipal elections approach. The PKK also has been a subject of Turkey’s international and regional diplomatic initiatives (see Terrorism Focus, November 19). We will analyze the AKP government’s new openings in domestic and foreign policy and the PKK’s response to the new political setting.

    Preparing for the Winter

    PKK activity in Southeastern Turkey has declined considerably with the approach of winter. Most PKK militants are getting prepared to cope with the harsh winter conditions; some have withdrawn to their safe havens in northern Iraq, while others are moving to higher elevations where they have traditionally sought shelter in hidden caves. The PKK militants will need to survive through the winter with minimum mobility, living on the limited amount of food they were able to store during the summer. The Turkish Armed Forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri – TSK) has also called back most of the commando units from the region; most will be stationed in their barracks, preparing for new offensives in the spring. The TSK will most probably continue to use high-tech winter equipment to carry out its special operations. The level of armed activity in the region may remain low over the next few months as the PKK shifts to attacks in urban areas, like its December 1 attack on the Istanbul offices of the  Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) (Milliyet, December 3). The key question is whether Turkey will be able to quell the PKK threat through political openings and prevent new attacks next spring and summer.

    Turkey’s Dialogue with the Northern Iraqi Regional Administration

    The PKK has taken advantage of the mountainous terrain of northern Iraq and used the region as one of its encampment areas since 1983. This situation has had direct implications for Turkey’s relations with northern Iraq’s majority Kurdish population. The main determinant of the nature of this relationship has been the changing balance of power in the region. Despite the historic importance attached to Turkey’s recent dialogue with the Kurdish authorities in Iraq, such cooperation is not a political taboo. Turkey worked closely with Kurdish peshmerga forces and conducted joint operations against the PKK throughout the 1990s. However, the dynamics of regional politics over the last couple of years changed this picture drastically. Growing American influence in the region following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 resulted in the severance of ties between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds’ newfound partnership with the United States heightened the Kurds’ perception of their relative power in the region, resulting in a rather daring and at times confrontational attitude toward Turkey. Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq did not refrain from increasing tensions with Turkey when Turkey protested the Iraqi Kurds’ lenient attitude toward the activities of PKK guerillas in northern Iraq (Radikal, October 22, 2007).

    Within Turkey, the image of northern Iraq’s Kurds as the sponsor of the PKK has created a domestic constituency against any sort of dialogue with the Kurdish authorities, thus contributing to the hostile environment. Relations between Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds are nevertheless going through a new period of optimism lately, after hitting several low points over the last year. The Turkish media abandoned its policy of bashing Jalal Talabani (President of Iraq and leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – PUK) and Massoud Barzani (President of the Kurdistan Regional Government – KRG – and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party – KDP). Barzani has since adopted a softer language toward Turkey. There are signs the pragmatism of the 1990s might be returning.

    Developments on both sides of the Turkish-Iraqi border lay behind these changes. On the one hand, the anticipated changes in America’s Iraq policies in the wake of the U.S. presidential elections and new developments in Iraqi domestic politics have forced the Kurdish groups to re-evaluate their uncooperative attitude vis-à-vis Turkey’s demands. On the other hand, the growing consensus within the Turkish security establishment on the need to cooperate with the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq has facilitated changes in Turkey’s policies.

    The Impact of the US-Iraqi Security Accord

    The U.S.-Iraqi security accord requiring the United States to pull out from Iraq by 2011 has important implications for the PKK and the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The KRG is uneasy about the growing power of Shiite and Sunni Arabs in Iraq. In a post-American Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership will not only lose the political leverage they obtained through alliance with the United States, but will also have to calculate the possible risks of a civil war scenario. To hedge their bets against these future uncertainties, Iraqi Kurds have reasons to be on good terms with Turkey. [1] The Kurdish leadership has come to realize that the key to normalization with Turkey is abandoning their tolerance of the PKK by limiting the group’s freedom of movement in areas controlled by the KRG. Recent developments indicate a consensus between the Turkish government and the Barzani administration to increase their grip on the PKK. The question may no longer be whether to fight the PKK together, but how.

    The Trilateral Permanent Security Commission

    Although the first signs of a possible Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish rapprochement emerged during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Washington in October 2007, the AKP government took concrete steps toward normalization only recently. Here one has to note the crucial role played by the TSK’s decision to support establishing relations with the Kurdish administration.

    The AKP government made its initial overtures last spring. Most significantly, following the decision of the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu – MGK) to enhance relations with “all Iraqi groups” in its meeting on April 24, a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor, met a team of Iraqi officials, including Nechirvan Barzani, the KRG Prime Minister and nephew of Masoud Barzani (Zaman, May 2). [2] The real impetus came with the second phase in early October. An official Turkish delegation composed of high-level representatives including Davutoglu and Murat Ozcelik (Turkey’s Special Envoy to Iraq), met Masoud Barzani in Baghdad (NTV, October 15). In the ensuing days, diplomatic relations improved significantly and areas of cooperation diversified. Turkish Interior Minister Besir Atalay visited Baghdad and held a tripartite meeting with representatives of the Iraqi central government and the United States on November 19, only a few days after the Iraqi-American security accord was agreed upon. The parties decided to establish a permanent commission to streamline Turkish, American and Iraqi efforts in fighting the PKK and to regulate Turkey’s access to Iraqi airspace and territory to carry out cross-border operations in northern Iraq (NTV, November 20). KRG representatives were included as part of the Iraqi delegation. By sending the interior minister, the Turkish government signaled its determination to recognize the Kurdish administration, but only as part of the central government (Radikal, November 23).

    PKK to Kurdistan Regional Government: Don’t spoil Kurdish gains

    PKK sources have been observing the KRG’s attempts to reorient its policies closely and with growing anxiety. They view this development as the main threat to the gains of the Kurdish nationalist movement. The collaboration of the Kurdish administration with the trilateral permanent commission is seen as a shortsighted move that is extremely damaging to the national cause. For the PKK, the only novelty of this new arrangement is its pitting the southern Kurds against the PKK, for the United States and Baghdad government have already worked with Turkey to eliminate the PKK (see Terrorism Focus, November 26). Therefore, the PKK criticizes the shift in Barzani and Talabani’s positions, as this will inevitably undermine the Kurds’ position in the region and in Iraq. From the PKK’s perspective, Turkey’s decision to initiate dialogue with the Barzani administration marks Turkey’s return to its old strategy of the 1990s, which in the PKK’s opinion is bound to fail (Gundem Online, November 30).

    More specifically, PKK sources are critical of the operations carried out by Barzani’s peshmerga militias. The PKK accuses Barzani’s peshmerga of limiting civilian movement in PKK-controlled areas and confiscating villagers’ excess food. The PKK militants depend on local food and the continuation of their freedom of movement in northern Iraq to maintain their logistical infrastructure. Tactically, the PKK seeks to settle civilians in proximity to its camping grounds in order to blend into the local population. Moreover, in case of Turkish airstrikes against these camps, the PKK might use civilian casualties to mobilize international public opinion against Turkey. Another PKK criticism takes aim at the KRG’s failure to protest TSK airstrikes against PKK positions (Gundem Online, November 30).

    PKK to Turkey: Put Your Own House in Order

    The representatives of Turkey’s Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – DTP) have started to criticize Turkey’s rapprochement with Barzani. For instance, Selahattin Demirtas, deputy chairman of the DTP, criticized the AKP government’s willingness to speak with Barzani while at the same time refusing to talk to the DTP. For Demirtas, Barzani “is a party to the problem. He is an outside power,” whereas the DTP is a native force represented in Turkey’s Parliament. Demirtas also distanced the DTP ideologically from the KRG by labeling it a “feudal, conservative, rightist movement,” while the DTP represents a “democratic, pro-human rights and leftist movement” (Zaman, November 30-December 1).

    As the municipal elections approach, the competition between the governing AKP and DTP over winning Kurdish votes has heightened. In the midst of growing tensions caused by the exchange of fighting words between the representatives of the two parties, as well as violent demonstrations in streets, Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin suggested that if imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called on the PKK militants to lay down their arms, the government might consider easing his conditions in the prison.

    For Ocalan, the real solution is contingent on dialogue. Domestically, he called for the establishment of a “truth and reconciliation commission,’” similar to those established in other post-civil war societies. Only a democratic project at home could save the state and solve the Kurdish question and make Turkey a true regional power. Ocalan seeks to reach out to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani by asking him to get involved by using his status in the Socialist International to promote a democratic solution by mobilizing international actors. Ocalan, however, did not give up covert threats to Turkey; “Right now there is a condition of uprising. It might turn into a hurricane in spring” (Gundem Online, November 28).

    PKK commander Murat Karayilan noted the movement is in favor of a peaceful solution through dialogue but ruled out a unilateral ceasefire; “If the Turkish state comes out and says that it seeks dialogue, and ceases its operations, no bullet will be fired. We are not the attacking side, we are in defense … How can we lay down our arms? We survive thanks to our arms” (Gunderm Online, December 2). Karayilan criticized Erdogan for failing to live up to his promise to find a democratic solution to Kurdish problem by reverting back to the military option. Karayilan underlined that the PKK is prepared for a political solution but also remains vigilant to meet military challenges. He also paralleled Ocalan’s’ threats, by maintaining that if Turkey continues its military operations and fails to develop a settlement that recognized the role of the PKK, the group would abandon its defensive strategy of “low-intensity warfare” and elevate its armed campaign to offensive “medium-intensity warfare.”

    Karayilan, however, recognizes that the PKK is being pressed hard militarily. The mounting Iranian offensive on Kurdish positions along the Iranian-Iraqi border, conducted in coordination with Turkey’s airstrikes, has caused worries for the PKK. Karayilan has criticized Iran for supporting Turkey, citing the economic and energy cooperation between the two countries. He called on Iran to give up futile military measures, and embrace the Kurdish people’s demands for peace and dialogue (Gundem Online, December 2).

    Conclusion

    Through its diplomatic initiatives, the Turkish government may be hoping to worsen the conditions for the PKK during the winter, curbing its operational ability in the spring. In their rapprochement with Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds are driven by a concern to readjust to the new strategic reality of Iraq after an American withdrawal and the development of Iraqi domestic politics.

    The PKK leadership and the DTP are worried about the implications of Turkey’s diplomatic opening to Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. On the military front, the PKK claims to possess the military capability needed to resume its armed activities in Turkey. Through its sabotage attack against the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline on November 22, the PKK might have been sending a warning to both the Iraqi central government and the KRG about their decision to support Turkey.

    The PKK has sought to bring to the fore the argument that a real solution to the Kurdish problem requires the Turkish government to deliver political reforms, meaning it should recognize the PKK as a legitimate actor. In regards to electoral competition, the DTP and the PKK have started to invoke speculation that the Turkish government could use fraudulent techniques to manipulate the local elections. DTP deputies have emphasized this point as part of their election campaign.

    The AKP government came under criticism from pro-reform forces and international observers for abandoning domestic reforms and prioritizing a military solution to the Kurdish issue. It has sought since to use diplomacy and limited political openings to further curb the PKK’s military strength. The DTP, however, consistently calls for “true democratic openings” at home, without relinquishing PKK violence. The AKP is forced to engage in a delicate balancing act—on the one hand, it has to assume political responsibility for the armed struggle against the PKK’s terror campaign; on the other hand, it has to compete with the DTP in the democratic field. While the AKP realizes that tightening the military grip on the PKK may harm its electoral chances in southeastern Turkey, letting up on the PKK now risks more attacks in the spring and may harm the party’s prestige in the West.

    Notes

    1. Turkish analysts believe that a common understanding between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds about the future of Iraq is emerging. Some claim that in case of a civil war, Turkey might throw its support behind the Kurds. See Mete Cubukcu, “Turkiye’nin Irak’taki B Planinda Kurtler Var,” Referans, November 27.
    2. National Security Council Press Briefing, April 24, 2008. www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2008/24nisan2008.htm.

  • PKK Party Congress Sets Long-Term Strategy Based on Threat Perceptions

    PKK Party Congress Sets Long-Term Strategy Based on Threat Perceptions

    Terrorosm Monitor
    Volume 6, Issue 20 (October 24, 2008)

    PKK Party Congress Sets Long-Term Strategy Based on Threat Perceptions

    By Nihat Ali Özcan, Saban Kardas

    The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – PKK) was established in 1973 against the background of Cold War politics. In the formation of the PKK’s institutional culture and practices, the prevailing Marxist ideas and strategies adopted by other leftist movements of the time played a major role in their ideology. Influenced by the experiences of various Marxist organizations around the world, the PKK’s organizational structure was based on three pillars: a party organization acting as the ideological center and running the movement according to strict hierarchical rules, a military wing to carry out subversive military activities, and a “front” organization to oversee the activities of all PKK supporters in both legal and extralegal domains. Even after the Cold War came to an end, the PKK maintained its adherence to these institutional practices and behavioral habits. In this essay, we will evaluate one of the deep-seated practices of the PKK, party congresses. In particular, we will examine the PKK’s threat perceptions as reflected in the conclusions of the tenth party congress, held on August 21-30 in shelters in the mountainous terrain of northern Iraq. We will also discuss the PKK’s response to these challenges in the context of recent developments.

    The Role of Congresses in the PKK’s history

    The PKK has sought to project itself as more than a mere armed organization terrorizing a local population to reach some short-term goals. On the contrary, it defines itself as a party advocating a well-established political program through the application of a long-term strategy. To preserve this image, the PKK went to great lengths to hold party congresses even under dire circumstances. PKK congresses have served as a platform for evaluating the organization’s performance during previous years, assessing the existing situation and setting the agenda of the organization for subsequent years. So far, the PKK has held ten congresses. Although the organization has sought to hold its congresses approximately every five years, in some cases it convened extraordinary meetings. Since it had its first congress in Turkey in 1978, the PKK has convened two congresses in Lebanon, four in Syria and the latest three in northern Iraq.

    Prior to the actual PKK congresses, militants conduct preliminary meetings in their respective regions to determine the agenda of the convention, as well as select the delegates who will attend. The ceremonial value attached to them aside, the congresses perform three main functions. First, in addition to reaffirming the loyalty of the delegates to the imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, they help incoming members of the organization’s leadership cadres solidify their legitimacy. Second, members of the PKK assess the organization’s past activities, as well as the state of political and military conditions prevailing in the region and discuss new strategic goals and alternative instruments for future activities. These deliberations are conducted under the influence of a dogmatic attachment to Marxist principles. Third, by utilizing the milieu of the conferences, the PKK seeks to foster a sense of motivation among the members while boosting their morale.

    The conduct of delegates at congresses helps sustain the internal legitimacy of leadership cadres in several ways. Abdullah Ocalan has been the unchallenged and unquestioned leader of the PKK in all these gatherings. Over time, he has come to assume a symbolic role as the unifying element of the entire movement, and as such a “personality cult” was created around his name. According to the established practice in congresses, the members of the organization, except for Ocalan, engage in self-criticism before their comrades; they reflect on their past mistakes and acknowledge their weaknesses in fulfilling their duties. In essence, these almost ritualistic acts serve to shake the reliability of the leading figures of the PKK other than Ocalan before other delegates. As a result, through the discussions as well as ceremonies during the sessions, the congresses not only legitimize the leadership cadres but also ensure the continuation of the organization’s loyalty to the leader.

    Another function of the congresses is their role in providing a platform for analyzing the past, present and future conditions of the organization in line with its ideological disposition. In general, despite the drastic changes in world politics, the PKK’s discourse is still heavily influenced by Marxist thinking. For instance, it is commonplace to hear criticisms of capitalism in congresses. Similarly, the members of the organization seek to demonstrate their comprehension of Ocalan’s teachings through bombastic flattery of their leader. The rulings concerning the future direction of the organization are also framed in line with its ideological discourse. Therefore, decisions taken at congresses have strategic value for the evolution of the organization. The PKK publishes the conclusions of congresses in print or on the internet to communicate its goals to the public. [1]

    Lastly, congresses help motivate members of the organization. The proceedings of congresses contain short, clear and effective slogans to mobilize members. Following congresses, militants accelerate their attacks to demonstrate their loyalty to the organization and their determination to carry out the conclusions.

    Of the ten congresses the PKK has held so far, the following stand out in particular: The third congress held in 1982 called for the return of the PKK militants from Lebanon to Turkey to initiate an armed struggle against the state. The fifth congress in 1995 prioritized the political struggle over the armed struggle. The eighth congress of 1999 decided to cease terror attacks following Ocalan’s capture and the ninth congress of 2005 agreed to halt attacks against Turkish security forces. Such decisions have marked important turning points in the PKK’s overall strategy.

    Decisions of the Tenth Congress, August 2008

    The PKK convened its latest congress in northern Iraq on August 21-30. Delegates met in mountain shelters under the threat of airstrikes from Turkish jetfighters. In the traditional spirit of the congresses, the latest gathering declared the forthcoming period as “Freedom to Ocalan.” The tenth congress also maintained the tradition of assessing the past, present and future of the organization. The statements following the congress indicate one of the biggest current sources of concern is the new situation created by the meeting between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and U.S. President George Bush in November 2007. [2] After this meeting, the United States started to share actionable intelligence with Turkey, with alarming results for the PKK. The closing statement of the congress maintains that the United States, along with Turkey and Iran, is determined to eliminate the PKK.

    The PKK’s major concern appears to be the decision of the Barzani-led Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to reconsider its relations with the PKK, which may result in it abandoning the PKK (Firat Haber Ajansi, September 8). If the KRG indeed withdraws its support from the PKK, this development will likely have a grave impact on the organization’s use of the terrain of northern Iraq as a safe haven. So far the PKK’s activities in this region have been largely unhindered, which at times has led the Turkish government to accuse the KRG of actively supporting the PKK. Nonetheless, the PKK is uneasy about prospects for U.S. pressure on Barzani as well as a possible rapprochement between Turkey and Barzani (Referans, October 14). To forestall such scenarios, the PKK congress expresses its support for Barzani on the Kirkuk question (Firat News Agency, September 8).

    The conclusions of the congress also indicate that the PKK is concerned about the fate of its “front” organization (Firat News Agency, September 8). PKK supporters established various associations and political parties in the legal domain to advocate for Kurdish nationalism and compete in Turkish electoral politics. Since entering the legal political sphere in the 1980s, Kurdish nationalists have operated a series of political parties such as the Democratic Party (DEP) and the Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), a new entity arising each time the last manifestation was shut down by the state. The most recent of these is the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – DTP), founded in 2005. These groups nonetheless maintained organic ties with the PKK, steadfastly refusing to condemn PKK violence. The legal advocates of ethnic nationalism benefited from the violence as fear became an important factor in mobilizing people around their agenda. Continued connections or support for the PKK eventually led the Turkish state to close down many of these organizations. Despite continued protestations from DTP leaders that they do not act as a front for the PKK, the party has recently faced court proceedings designed to shut it down. At a recent meeting with three leading DTP MP’s, Deputy Prime Minister Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat (himself of Kurdish origin) told the MP’s, “We know your reality. The type of relations you have with the PKK are an obstacle for the prime minister’s efforts to implement solutions to the problem. We want you to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization” (Hurriyet, October 19).

    As a matter of fact, the threat to the PKK’s front organizations was unwittingly aggravated by its decision to refrain from attacking civilians following the 9/11 terror attacks in order to cultivate a more sympathetic image (Ozgur Politika, March 14, 2002). Having lost the leverage of being able to “penalize” civilians, the PKK encountered serious problems in disciplining its front organizations. The most common problems were encountered in mobilizing people for street demonstrations or providing logistical support for armed militants (Firat News Agency, September 18). Having been freed from fear of punishment, the priorities of sympathizers changed during the calm years between 2001 and 2005. They started to ignore the demands of the organization. To avoid this handicap, the PKK set up more militant shadow organizations (such as the Freedom Hawks of Kurdistan) and sought to motivate its supporters and terrorize its opponents. In some cases, the PKK executed civilians on charges of being government agents (hezaciwanan.com, August 11, 2004). The conclusions of the tenth congress show that the PKK is eager to regain the leverage of punishment, threatening cadres that have failed to conform to the organization’s ideology (Firat News Agency, September 18).

    The final statement of the congress, as well as ensuing developments, show that the PKK perceives another serious threat to its front organization: the growing power of the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi -AKP) in the region as the March 2009 municipal elections approach (Milliyet, October 21). Current predictions indicate that the DTP, which currently controls municipalities in several cities such as Diyarbakir, will face a serious challenge from the AKP. Losing municipalities may cost the PKK dearly; even if its front organization avoids a total collapse, it will still face a severe crisis. Maintaining control over local municipalities is crucial, not only because they provide material resources to the organization and boost its supporters’ morale, but also because a political presence helps build the legitimacy of the movement domestically and internationally.

    A parallel development further disturbed the PKK. The new Turkish Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug, unlike his predecessors, has sought to establish channels of communication with local people in southeastern Turkey. Moreover, Basbug has drawn attention to the economic and social problems in the region. Perceiving this outreach as a threat to its interests, the PKK threatened those people who attended a meeting Basbug held with the representatives of various NGOs in Diyarbakir. [3]

    Threats to Survival

    In short, the PKK seems to perceive threats to its survival both inside Turkey and in northern Iraq. Its assessment of current threats – namely, the prospect that the PKK may lose its safe havens in northern Iraq and the challenges posed by upcoming municipal elections and other local developments to its front organization – led the delegates attending the tenth congress to focus on two alternatives: first, increasing the medium-intensity armed attacks; second, revitalizing mass public demonstrations in urban areas, marked by the visible attendance of women and children (Firat News Agency, September 18 ). Through these moves, the PKK plans to raise the tension in the run-up to the municipal elections and mobilize people along ethnic lines. It expects that if the people are confronted with the brutal face of the state, they will cast their votes based on ethnic identity. This mode of thinking largely explains the aggressive attitude the PKK has adopted lately, through intensifying its attacks on Turkish security forces and agitating Kurdish people in southeastern Turkey and the major cities in western Turkey.

    This new strategy was put into effect shortly after the congress. The number of terror incidents increased dramatically; between August 30 and October 20, around 180 attacks were reported, the most notorious being the one against the Aktutun border station on October 3, which took the lives of 17 Turkish soldiers (www.tsk.mil.tr; see also Terrorism Focus, October 21). At the same time, the PKK was successful in mobilizing civilians. To protest Prime Minister Erdogan’s trip to Diyarbakir, PKK sympathizers organized illegal demonstrations in various cities on the grounds that Ocalan was mistreated in prison, which disrupted provision of basic services in many places. DTP deputy Emine Ayna stated, “Ocalan is seen as a leader by many Kurds. If there is any physical violence toward him, this violence is directed at Kurds” (Turkish Daily News, October 23). With demonstrators threatening local businesses into shutting down their shops, the municipalities controlled by the DTP did not collect garbage and halted public transportation as part of the PKK’s protest of the AKP (kanaldhaber.com, October 20).

    Conclusion

    To counter the political and military threats from inside and outside Turkey, the PKK has initiated proactive policies in line with the conclusions of the tenth congress. If it fails to mobilize ethnic sentiments among Kurdish speaking constituents, the DTP might have to concede electoral success in the 2009 municipal elections to the AKP, which has been making political inroads in southeast Turkey. Recent developments highlight the PKK’s determination to raise tensions in Turkey to reverse this process.

    Notes:

    1. For instance, see: Abdullah Ocalan, PKK 4. Kongresine Sunulan Politik Rapor (Istanbul: Zagros Yayinlari, 1993); Abdullah Öcalan, PKK 5. Kongresine Sunulan Politik Rapor (Istanbul: Gunes Ulkesi Yayinlari, 1995); Abdullah Öcalan, PKK Olaganustu 7. Kongresine Sunulan Politik Rapor (Istanbul: Mem Yayinlari, 2000).
    2. For Murat Karayilan’s statements, see Firat News Agency, September 18.
    3. For Basbug’s meetings, see Radikal, September 5 and Terrorism Focus, September 24; for the PKK threat, see Firat Agency, September 18.

  • Energy Security and the PKK Threat to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

    Energy Security and the PKK Threat to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

    By Nihat Ali Özcan, Saban Kardas

    In the wake of the conflict in Georgia, the future of energy transportation from the Caspian basin and Central Asia to world markets is once again on the agenda. By looking at the attack by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in August, we will discuss how growing instability in the region highlights the interconnectedness for Turkey of security of energy pipelines, terrorism and regional stability.

    Given the political, military and economic implications of oil and natural gas production and transportation, one can better appreciate the search, on the part of producers, investors and consumers, for cheaper and more secure energy transportation routes. Even a seemingly technical decision over the optimal transportation lines is shaped by political competition. The rivalry is present at all stages of energy transportation including project, construction and management. Such struggles range from securing investment capital to sharing profits, providing physical security, and ensuring political stability in the countries involved.

    Today, in addition to their high economic value, energy pipelines play important roles in diplomatic, economic, military and ecological terms. In addition to offering immediate economic benefits to transit and terminal countries, pipelines may act as the building blocks of alliances and boost cooperation among states. Likewise, pipelines may shape domestic politics in countries that are increasingly dependent on imported energy for heating or power.

    One strategy that appeals to countries situated astride alternative pipeline routes is to engage in activities designed to undermine the profitability of rival existing routes and render them risky for investors. Since investors will be discouraged from financing projects in volatile and insecure regions, destabilizing rival routes by sponsoring terrorist or insurgent organizations that operate in the transit corridors is a common strategy.

    It is widely documented that terrorist groups around the world often attack energy pipelines and the personnel working there. Through acts of sabotage, bombing and kidnapping, terrorist or insurgent groups may seek to derail the construction of pipelines or the flow of oil or gas. Such attacks have occurred in many countries, including Colombia, Nigeria, Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Likewise, during the last 25 years, the PKK has threatened the security of pipelines running through Turkish territory and from time to time has mounted actual attacks on them.

    Various reasons explain why pipelines are targeted by terror organizations and their sponsors. First, the direct and indirect impact of pipelines on society makes them highly valuable targets. The effects of attacks range from the interruption of heating in winter conditions to environmental disasters, fluctuations in world energy markets, and diplomatic and legal disputes over compensation. These repercussions empower terrorist organizations in terms of bargaining power and propaganda purposes. Second, because securing infrastructure is extremely difficult, the physical vulnerability of pipelines and related facilities make them easy targets. Given the availability of explosives, blowing up pipelines can be accomplished by terrorists easily, further complicating security. Third, since petroleum and natural gas can easily ignite, terrorists prefer to attack them with explosives. Despite many safeguards developed to reduce the impact of sabotage acts and resume the operation of pipelines through quick repairs, overall pipelines are still considered vulnerable targets.[1]
    The PKK and Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Pipeline.

    Turkey has two strategically important trans-border pipelines, aside from the ones serving domestic needs: Kirkuk-Yumurtalik and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. When the Nabucco pipeline project is finalized it will connect the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Turkey) and the Tabriz (Iran)-Erzurum gas pipelines to Austria, feeding extensive European gas networks (see nabucco-pipeline.com). During the deliberations over the selection of these projects, their implementation, and the administration of pipelines, multinational companies had to factor the instability caused by the PKK’s terror campaign into their calculations, making the PKK an indirect player in the game.

    Turkey completed the construction of the first strategic oil pipeline, Kirkuk-Yumurtalik, between 1978 and 1984. It was completed in 1984, the year when the center of gravity of the Iran-Iraq war shifted from the Persian Gulf to northern Iraq. Having benefited enormously from oil revenues in financing the war, Iraq negotiated with Turkey to build a parallel line. To undermine the feasibility of Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, Iran supported the Kurdish peshmerga forces in Northern Iraq and the PKK in Turkey. [2] Coincidentally, the PKK initiated its terror campaign around the same time (Hurriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, August 18, 1984).

    The PKK and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

    The new political geography of the Caucasus and Central Asia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a power struggle between Russia, Iran and Turkey. More importantly, the growing demand for energy worldwide directed the attention of the developed countries seeking to diversify their suppliers to the vast energy resources in these regions. [3] The discussions concerning the transportation of Azerbaijan’s energy resources to the world markets brought Turkey to the forefront, agitating Iran and Russia.

    The BTC route emerged as the most efficient option for the transportation of Azeri gas and oil to the West. It was eventually expected to be expanded to carry the rest of the Caspian basin resources. Since the lynchpin of these developments was the transportation of Azeri and Caspian resources to the West in circumvention of Russian-controlled lines, preventing or delaying the BTC project was in the interests of Russia, Iran and Armenia. Russia was concerned about losing its influence in the region and being left outside the calculations concerning the Caspian region. Iran was worried that oil revenues might boost Azerbaijan’s power and increase separatist sentiments among Azeris in Iran. Armenia was naturally irked by the close relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey and by the likely increase in Azerbaijan’s power.

    The strategy of Russia, Iran and Armenia was based on portraying the BTC corridor as risky and unstable. Through acts of omission and commission they contributed to this perception in the 1990s. Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan in 1993 and its invasion and ongoing occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh played a role in perpetuating instability in the Caucasus. Russia’s support for Armenia and meddling in the domestic affairs of Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1992-1993 prompted instability in these countries. The escalating PKK violence inside Turkey raised questions about the safety of the transportation corridor, further delaying the project.

    During the debates on the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK – Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri) came close to eliminating the PKK through a cross-border operation in northern Iraq in September 1992. The PKK had to relocate to camps in Zeli in northern Iraq, far from the Turkish border. The deteriorating conditions forced PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to declare a unilateral ceasefire in March 1993 (Hurriyet, March 15, 1993). In May 1993, during his visit to Turkey, the Azerbaijani prime minister signed the contract for the construction of the pipeline. In the intervening period, the PKK maintained close ties with Iran and Russia. [4] On May 24, 1993, the PKK resumed violence, ambushing a military convoy on the Elazig-Bingol highway, killing 33 recruits discharged from their duties (Hurriyet, May 25, 1993). As the TSK intensified its counter-terrorism operations, the conflict escalated. Consequently, growing instability in the energy corridor forced investors to suspend the project.

    Around the same time, Russia and Iran stepped up their efforts to sell Turkey their natural gas. The Blue Stream pipeline (a trans-Black Sea natural gas pipeline supplying Russian gas to Turkey) that increasingly rendered Turkey dependent on Russian gas was initiated under these conditions.[5] Similarly, Turkey signed a contract with Iran for the construction of a pipeline to carry Iranian gas to Turkey. The resumption of the BTC project came only in the early 2000s, after Turkey expended enormous resources to capture Ocalan and bring the PKK violence under control.

    New Russian Security and Foreign Policy Doctrine

    Russian foreign and security policies in the Putin era were centered on a new doctrine that sought to channel energy revenues to the realization of Russia’s strategic priorities (Eurasianet.org, February 1, 2006). Rising energy prices after the Iraq war and the increasing demand for oil worldwide provided perfect conditions for implementing this project. The sustainability of this approach depends on the maintenance of Russia’s influence over ex-Soviet countries, and the continuation of the West’s dependence on hydrocarbons and continuing high energy prices.

    Russia’s interest in the production, marketing and transportation of oil and natural gas is particularly visible in the case of the BTC, hence in its policies as well toward Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Anxious to diversify energy supply routes and break down Russia’s dominance, the United States and the European countries have grown increasingly interested in the BTC as well as other routes through Turkey. Although, the BTC and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are buried underground, concerns over their security never fully disappeared. [6]

    In this context, the recent conflict in Georgia has refocused the attention to energy security in the Caucasus. Coincidentally, prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Georgia, the BTC came under attack on August 5, 2008, disrupting the oil transportation for 14 days (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 8). The pipeline had been pumping 850,000 to 900,000 barrels per day before the explosion. Although some 200,000 barrels per day were diverted to underused pipelines running through Russia and Georgia, the financial loss over 14 days still came to over 1 billion dollars (see U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Assurance Daily, August 8). The oil that burned, expenses for putting off the fire, personnel and repairs cost another 20 million dollars.

    These economic losses aside, the security of the BTC corridor and reliability of Turkey as an alternative supply route again came into question, as in the 1990s. During the invasion of Georgia, the Russian army did not destroy the BTC pipeline but some railways and trains used for oil transportation were destroyed. The interruption of the railways and the sabotage of the pipeline temporarily forced Azerbaijan to divert some of its crude oil through routes controlled by Russia (RFE/RL, September 2). In the wake of the Georgian crisis, Azerbaijan is wary of the idea of bypassing Russia entirely in energy transportation, as reflected by the cool reception U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney received during his September 3 visit to urge Baku to commit to pipeline routes that would avoid Russian territory. [7]

    In the coming days, the debate on energy security and alternative energy corridors is likely to intensify. If Turkey cannot counter economically and politically costly attacks on pipelines in its territory and prevent instability in the surrounding regions, it will face enormous consequences. Not willing to incur billion dollar losses in every attack, multilateral corporations might explore alternative routes, and seek compromise with the PKK to cease its attacks on the pipelines. As a country aspiring to become a major transportation hub connecting Middle Eastern and Caspian hydrocarbon reserves to Europe, Turkey will come under pressure to ensure security at home and in its neighborhood. Through its diplomatic initiatives, such as the proposal for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, it has sought to stabilize relations in the Caucasus region (Today’s Zaman, August 19). Likewise, it has to restore the credibility of its territory as a secure route, especially given its plans to push for the Nabucco pipeline and discussions on the integration of trans-Caspian pipelines into the BTC.

    Turkey’s ambitions will paradoxically make it a target of the actors seeking to discredit the routes stretching through Turkey. As long as Turkish territory remains one of the main theaters of battle over energy transportation, the interest in the PKK either from Turkey’s regional competitors or from the West will not cease. The motivations that led the PKK to sabotage the BTC in August are unclear. In any case, this move shows that the PKK closely follows regional developments and is in search of new roles and potential supporters. By targeting the BTC pipeline, the PKK might have been attempting to find new strategic partners. There are grounds to be concerned that the PKK may be receiving limited international support, though as of yet no definitive evidence is available. This sabotage was the PKK’s first attack on the BTC; interestingly, it came on the eve of the crisis in the Caucasus. As the attack broke with the movement’s long-standing caution in avoiding alienating Europe and the United States, it is possible the PKK may have received guarantees from other potential sponsors. Given Russia’s record of limited support for the PKK in the past (such as harboring PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan), the August 5 PKK attack on the BTC pipeline may have to be analyzed within the context of broader debates on the future of energy transportation in the region and Russia’s attempts to solidify its dominant position as the major supplier of Caspian and Central Asian energy reserves.

    Notes:

    1. See “Threats to Oil Transport,” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, n.d., ; “Terrorism and Oil Make Volatile Mix,” Pipeline & Gas Journal, May 2006, pp.32-33. .

    2. Nihat Ali Ozcan, PKK (Kurdistan Isci Partisi) Tarihi, Ideolojisi ve Yontemi, Ankar, ASAM Yayinlari, 1999, pp.222-237.

    3. A. Necdet Pamir, Baku-Ceyhan Boru Hatti, Ankara: ASAM Yayinlari, 1999.

    4. For PKK-CIS relations, see reports submitted to the 5th Congress of the PKK, Vol. 2, Damascus, 1995, pp.569-586; on PKK-Iran relations, see pp.553-567.

    5. Firat Gazel, Mavi Akim, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 2003).

    6. For an account of the motivations of regional actors to destabilize the BTC, see: Gal Luft, “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Not Yet Finished and already Threatened,” Energy Security, November 4, 2004 .

    7. Mete Goknel, “Kafkas Krizinin Ardindan Enerji Kaynaklari Konusundaki Gelismeler,” September 11, 2008, .