Category: Ferruh Demirmen

Top European court’s decision should make Pope Francis blush

By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.

AVİM, Center for Eurasian Studies

October 26, 2015

When Pope Francis, during a Mass in St. Peter’s Basilica on April 12, 2015, pronounced the word “genocide” in reference to the 1915 events in Ottoman Anatolia a century ago, it was patently clear that he was delving into territory he should not have. It was a meeting where the pontiff and top Armenian clerics and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan had gathered in what was apparently a show of Christian solidarity.

By recognizing “Armenian genocide,” and calling the Armenian victims “confessors and martyrs for the name of Christ,” the Pope was asserting an unproven event, revealing his prejudice, or at the vey best, his misjudgment. The recent decision from the Grand Chamber of the prestigious European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is a testimony to the Pope’s wrongful and deplorable stance on Armenian allegations.

In its milestone decision announced on October 15, 2015, the Grand Chamber, by a majority vote, agreed with the Second (lower) Chamber’s 17 December 2013 decision that Switzerland had violated Turkish politician Doğu Perinçek’s right to freedom of expression when it imposed penalty on Perinçek in connection with his “denial of Armenian genocide.” Hoping to have the lower chamber’s decision reversed, Switzerland, under intense Armenian lobbying, had appealed that decision to Grand Chamber – obviously to no avail.

The Grand Chamber’s decision had two equally important ramifications. By letting stand the lower chamber’s decision, the Grand Chamber in effect affirmed that: (a) “Armenian genocide” is controversial and unproven, (b) there can be no comparison between the 1915 events and Holocaust.

The court’s position is consistent with the provisions of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide (ratified in 1951), which first codified this term. According to this Convention, genocide is a legally construed special crime, and it can only be established through a judicial process in a duly authorized court – an international court or a court where the alleged crime was committed. Without a verdict from such a court, labeling an event as genocide lacks legal validity. In other words, it is merely an opinion.

To date there exists not a single court verdict characterizing the 1915 events as genocide. The UN has also refused to call the 1915 events genocide. When he decided to recognize “Armenian genocide,” the Pope should have been aware of these legal boundaries. ECHR is an organ of the 47-member Council of Europe.

So, one must ask, absent a judicial verdict, what gave the Pope the authority to call the 1915 events “genocide”?

In its February 3, 2015 ruling (Croatia v. Serbia), the International Court of Justice in The Hague also concluded that forced relocation, which is what happened in Anatolia in 1915, even if it results in killings, cannot be called genocide unless specific intent (dolus specialis) to harm or kill is proven. The court also held that the provisions of the 1948 Convention cannot be applied retroactively, i.e., judgments as to past events not permissible.

In the U.S. the Bill of Rights protects a party from being labeled guilty of a crime without due process; i.e., the alleged crime must be adjudicated in a court of law. The old, venerable adage, “Innocent until proven guilty,” must be respected.

It is obvious that by labelling the 1915 events as genocide the Pope exceeded his authority and violated both the European and American due-process standards. The same standards, in fact, also bind parliaments that have so far recognized “Armenian genocide.”

To date, the Armenian side, out of fear it would lose, has refrained from litigating its case in a court of law, preferring to influence the public opinion through propaganda instead.

A case in point is the 17 December 2003 order of the European Court of First Instance on a lawsuit lodged by a group of Armenian-French citizens against three European institutions including the Council of the European Union. The applicants had sought compensation for non-material damage suffered on account of, inter alia, recognition of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the EU without Turkey’s prior acknowledgment of Armenian genocide. The court found that the applicants’ action was without legal merit and dismissed the claim, adding that the European Parliament’s 1987 resolution calling on Turkey to recognize “Armenian genocide” was purely political, without any binding consequences. Appeal of the ruling to the higher court was dismissed.

The case was a legal defeat for the Armenian side, also reaffirming the fact that Armenian “g” resolutions passed by parliaments are no more than political opinions.

Such realization should prompt parliaments that have recognized Armenian “g” to date to re-think their stance and rescind their decisions. The 1948 Convention does not make a distinction between “political” and “legal” recognition of genocide.

The Pope, of course, has the right to express his opinion on the 1915 events; but this is not the same thing as denouncing these events as proven genocide.

Speaking of opinion, in 1985 69 U.S. historians and researches signed a declaration, published in New York Times and Washington Post, stating that in their opinion the 1915 events do not constitute genocide. Among the signatories were eminent scholars such as Bernard Lewis. Surely, the Pope should have been aware of this declaration. Hence, even as regards opinion, there is no consensus among the scholars on “Armenian genocide.”

The Pope apparently is also not aware that in 1920 his predecessor Pope Benedict XV had pleaded with the British to release some of the high-ranking Ottoman officials who were being held on the Island of Malta on suspicion of complicity in massacring Armenians. Benedict XV, who had direct contact with the Ottoman authorities, obviously did not think the Ottoman government had murderous or genocidal intentions toward the Armenians. All 244 Malta detainees, in fact, were released by the British for lack of evidence and returned to Turkish soil.

So, one must ask the Pope: What did he know about the 1915 events in 2015 that his predecessor Benedict XV did not know almost a century earlier?

Human rights issue

The Pope, while recognizing “Armenian genocide,” astonishingly did not express any compassion for more than half a million civilian Muslims that lost their lives at the hands of renegade Armenian bands during the 1915 Armenian revolt.

In a gesture of humanity, the Pope could have also offered condolences to the relatives of 42 Turkish diplomats and 4 foreign diplomats that were assassinated by Armenian terrorists in the 1970s through 1990s – including Turkish ambassador to Vatican Taha Carım in 1977. Three years later, in 1980, Carım’s successor Vecdi Türel and his driver were wounded by the terrorists.

Likewise, the Pope could have expressed his compassion for the memory of the more than 600 Azeri civilians massacred by Armenian forces in the town of Khojaly in 1992.

The Pope’s “humanity” should not be limited by race, religion or ethnicity.

The 1.5 million Armenian victims alluded to by the Pope is also a grotesque exaggeration. The Armenian losses in Anatolia during World War I from all causes including fighting on the sides of the Allies were roughly 300,000, some 57,000 of which were during the relocation itself, most of them due to disease, famine and chaos.

Double standard

When he visited Sarajevo in June 2015, His Holiness, while denouncing the massacres inflicted upon the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, refused to use the term “genocide.” This, despite the fact that two UN courts have unequivocally called the Srebrenica massacres genocide. The Pope ignored the appeals of Bosnian academics and representatives of war victims to recognize the massacres as genocide. Srebrenica in a sense is a stone-throwing distance from the Holy See.

Reflecting a shameful double standard, the Pope could not bring himself to use the word “genocide” when the perpetrators are Christian and the victims Muslim.

In conclusion, His Holiness should deal with matters of faith and stay away from highly-charged historical issues that sow discord and hatred in society. He should not readily accept Armenian “g” allegations presented to him on a gold platter by the Armenian side. Otherwise, his call for inter-faith and inter-communal dialog becomes shamefully hollow.

November 2, 2015
Holocaust Museum Championing Armenian Cause

By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.

Make no mistake about it: The U.S. Holocaust Museum is now unabashedly championing the Armenian cause and the Armenian lobby’s efforts to slander Turkey. This became evident when the Houston branch (Holocaust Museum Houston, HMH) announced earlier this year that it would feature Taner Akçam as a speaker on May 4 (2015). The announcement was accompanied by a short paragraph containing the usual genocide accusations. From April 1 to August 7 the Museum is displaying the controversial, prejudice-laden Armin Wegner exhibit. In cooperation with the local Armenian community, in March the Museum hosted a lecture by Peter Balakian.

The Dallas branch also screened on April 30 the hatred-filled “The Armenian Genocide” pseudo-documentary by Andrew Goldberg.

Although the Akçam talk at HMH was cancelled (due to “sickness”) at the last minute, the Museum didn’t waste time scheduling a talk by UCLA professor-emeritus Richard Hovannisian, on May 27 (2015). It is the same Hovannisian who, having invited Akçam and two other “genocide” proponents (F.M. Göçek and E. Shafak) to a special “forum” at UCLA in 2005, declared at the conclusion of the meeting that, “a future conference would deal with the issues of reparations and territorial demands from Turkey.”

The Turkish-American community in Houston, and Texas in general, is not amused by such naked advocacy of the Holocaust Museum.

The HMH website used to contain a short article entitled “Genocide in Armenia (1915-1923).” The article, in its reference to 1923, and connoting that “genocide” took place in the Armenian territory, is brazenly misleading just by its title alone. That article is now replaced by a longer one, the title of which still carries the 1923 nonsense. The body of the article contains the usual allegations taken from an Armenian script. Ingeniously, the article mentions the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide, but without discussing its substance and caveats.

The intensity of anti-Turkish events by the Museum is unparalleled. Where is the gratitude for the friendship Turks, from the Spanish inquisition in 15^th century to World War II, extended to Jews, one wonders. Thanks to Turkish help, thousands of Jews from Vichy France found their way by train to Istanbul during the war. That memory is still fresh, as there are Turkish Jews settled in Turkey that benefitted from that humanitarian effort.

And could it be that the Museum is not aware of the Dashnak-Nazi collaboration in World War II, including the Armenian 812th Battalion created by the Wehrmacht in 1941, as revealed by the Nazi-era German magazine Deutsch-Armenischen Gesselschaft? The 20,000-men-strong battalion was commanded by General Dro Drastamat Kanayan, a war criminal on his own from the time he was a guerilla leader in eastern Anatolia and later the army chief in the short-lived First Republic of Armenia in 1919-1920. The whole idea of the Dashnak-Nazi cooperation was to prove that the Armenians were “Aryans.” Armenian recruits also joined the Panzer Corps and Gestapo in France and Germany.

Interestingly, General “Dro” is one of those “titans” Prof. Hovannisian remarked recently that he had met in his “younger days.”

After the war “Dro” was arrested by American forces, and soon released. He died in Boston in 1956. Years later his remains were taken to Armenia where he was given a hero’s ceremony. Of Dro’s past deeds in the First Republic of Armenia, “The Jewish Times” wrote (June 21, 1990): “An appropriate analogy with the Jewish Holocaust might be the systematic extermination of the entire Muslim population of the independent Republic of Armenia which consisted of at least 30-40 percent of the population of that republic.” Indeed, according to Russian historian A.A. Lalaian, 225,000 Muslims, or nearly 80% of the resident Muslim population, perished in the First Republic of Armenia over a period of two and half years.

One wonders whether the professor will reminisce during his talk his younger days when he met his hero “Dro.” Regardless, it will be a deep irony that a Holocaust institution will be featuring someone for whom a prominent Nazi collaborator was a “titan.”

There is little doubt that the actions of the Houston (as well, Dallas) branches of the Holocaust Museum are reflective of the Jewish lobby’s position in general. The Museum’s stance cannot be divorced from the current realpolitik between Turkey and Israel. But just as in the case of the hideous “Hitler Quote” (a deception!) displayed in the U.S. Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., one cannot withhold the strong suspicion that generous donations from the Armenian lobby played a major role in shaping the Museum’s attitude toward the Armenian assertions.

One should never underestimate what such donations can deliver!

Back in March (2015), I wrote a 5-page long letter to the Managing Director of HMH protesting the Akçam event and suggested that the Museum give “equal time” to a scholar from the Turkish side. The director stonewalled my suggestion and replied with a cliché-type letter. Her reply, and my further comments in bold italics, are reproduced below.

“Dear Mr. Demirmen,

Thank you for your e-mail of March 2 regarding our upcoming program with Dr. Taner Akçam.

As you know, the mission of Holocaust Museum Houston is to educate the public about the dangers of hatred, prejudice and apathy using the lessons of the Holocaust and other genocides. Thus, we feel it is important that we take the 100th anniversary of atrocities during World War I as a time to examine that history and what can be learned from it.”

The Holocaust Museum’s mission is commendable. But shouldn’t the atrocities inflicted by the armed Armenian bands on the Muslim population likewise be remembered and the lessons there from learned? As I noted in my detailed letter, more than half a million Muslim civilians lost their lives to Armenian terror.

“We understand that Turkey disputes the use of the word “genocide.” Whatever term is used, it is historically clear that more than 1 million Armenians perished as a result of execution, starvation, disease, the harsh environment and physical abuse.”

It is not just that Turkey disputes the word “genocide.” In fact, there was no genocide. In the context of 1915 events, the genocidal intent (dolus specialis), as required in accordance with the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide (Article 2), is missing. We must respect the law. In its February 3, 2015 decision (Croatia vs. Serbia), the International Court of Justice underlined the vital importance of dolus specialis for genocide determination. Other points the court made also support the Turkish position.

“As of 2014, more than 22 countries and 42 of the 50 states in the U.S., have declared those acts “genocide,” according to the International Association of Genocide Scholars. At least 126 leading scholars of the Holocaust have urged western democracies to acknowledge it as well.”

Political entities and scholars are not authorized to establish the crime of genocide. Only a duly authorized court can. This is what the Convention on Genocide (Article 6) says. For the alleged Armenian genocide, there is no such court verdict. Further, if we take note of the opinion of “126 genocide scholars,” how can we ignore the opinion more than 100 other scholars who disagree? Separate from Holocaust, the two events accepted as genocide under international law are the Rwanda and Srebrenica atrocities.

“For all these reasons, we will not change our messaging regarding this talk.”

It is deeply ironic that HMH is sponsoring a program that is distinctly anti-Turkish but supportive of the Armenian position. As noted in my detailed letter, while Turks have extended their warm welcome to Jewish people in their history, Armenians collaborated with the Nazi Germany.

For your information, I am also attaching a sworn testimony by rabbi Albert J. Amateau, now deceased, who lived the tumultuous days of the Ottoman period just before the 1915 events and observed what the Armenian gangs were doing to local population including Jews.

“Sincerely, Kelly J. Zuniga, Ed.D., CFRE

Executive Director, Holocaust Museum Houston”

May 18, 2015
Armenian “Settled History Syndrome”: An affliction that runs deep in the media

By Ferruh Demirmen

Anyone who tries to see or instill a measure of balance or open mindedness in the Western media on the question of Armenian “genocide” will soon discover he/she is out of luck. For the phenomenon, which I call the “Settled History Syndrome,” is not only palpable, but also widespread. It runs deep in the media across Europe and America. It is not new, but deserves special recognition under a name of its own – hence the term coined here. It is the product of year-in, year-out incessant propaganda perpetrated by the Armenian lobby on the so-called “Armenian genocide.”

The syndrome explains how a group of certain historians or scholars, supposedly open minded, gather to discuss Armenian “genocide,” but colleagues who disagree are kept away as misguided renegades.

It explains why anyone who challenges the Armenian version of history is labeled “Genocide denier,” often citing a self-appointed group called ”The International Association of Genocide Scholars“ as the infallible arbiter.

It explains how minds are frozen, debate is stifled, and freedom of opinion is trampled upon – truth being the ultimate casualty.

It explains how money and influence, fed by prejudice, create a cadre of ill-informed politicians and general public. The media, itself thrown into deep freeze, commonly plays the role of the facilitator.

Turks who want to fight unfounded accusations from the Armenian side must first deal with this mindset affecting the media.

Examples are myriad. I will first relay an anecdote, then continue with a recent example, both from America. No doubt, what goes on in America also goes on in Europe, with some mutations.

The PBS Episode

Time is early 2006. PBS, the national Public Broadcasting Service in America, is planning to air on April 17 a supposed TV documentary called “Armenian Genocide.” The film, directed by Andrew Goldberg and bankrolled by more than 30 largely Armenian foundations in America, will surely be an anti-Turkish diatribe based on distorted history. I and a small group of Turks and Turkish Americans contact the PBS headquarters in Alexandria , Virginia, to protest the screening of a one-sided story. (As it turned out, the film shamelessly started with a macabre scene of human skulls taken from a 1871 painting by a Russian artist. For a fuller account, see F. Demirmen, Turkish Daily News, April 24, 2006). We argued that, if PBS decides to go ahead with the screening, it should also show, as a balancing act, “The Armenian Revolt,” a newly released documentary directed by Marty Callaghan.

The PBS headquarters did not change its mind. And the screening of “The Armenian Revolt” was out of consideration.

I then took my case to the affiliate of PBS in Houston Texas, which was also planning to air “Armenian genocide.” Commenting on the film, the channel’s website carried the statement: “The International Association of Genocide Scholars affirms that the number of Armenian deaths at the hands of Ottoman Turks …” It was a reminder to the viewers that the “genocide” was a shut case.

Nonetheless, I thought I should still try to educate the Houston channel, that what they would be airing was a prejudiced and distorted story. To that end, I contacted the programming director and sent him some archival material. After back-and-forth correspondence, I had my fingers crossed. At the end, the channel didn’t change its plans, but the programming director made an admission, which was revealing. He remarked that until I contacted him, they had assumed that “genocide” was a “settled history.”

It was a Lilliputian victory. But it showed what the Turkish side is against: a mindset more or less frozen on its track.

Pasadena Star Episode

Fast forward 9 years. On January 15, 2015, the Pasadena Star in California published a news article titled: “Ground broken on Pasadena Armenian Genocide Memorial.” It was an announcement that the monument would be completed on April 18, ahead of the “100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide on April 24.” Pasadena happens to be next door to Los Angeles, a hotbed of Diaspora activism.

As the Star put it, the monument would take “the form of a 16-foot-tall tripod … with water drops dripping … to represent each of the 1.5 million lives cut short by the Ottoman Turks in the Armenian Genocide of 1915 to 1923.” The droplets would “fall every 21 seconds, so that 1.5 million drops will fall annually.” The tripod would represent “similarly shaped structures which Armenian leaders were hanged from during the Armenian Genocide.” Surrounding the tripod and stonework would be “12 pomegranate trees, representing each of the 12 lost provinces of Armenia.”

Pictures of Armenian clerics solemnly praying at the ground breaking ceremony and an artist’s rendition of the tripod-shaped monument were included in the news.

The description and symbolism were chilling; but infused in all was a prejudiced and distorted history. Particularly notable in the article was the absolutist tone in the language. “Genocide” was treated as a fact, with no hint as to its disputable character.

Considering their mindset, I hesitated contacting the Star to express my disagreement that Armenian “genocide” is a fact. But the invitation at the end of the article, for readers to engage in “insightful conversations,“ was too good to resist. I also thought that, instead of sending a short blog, I should lay out my arguments in a full article so as to enlighten them. I informed the Star of my intention to submit a dissenting view, and proposed that they publish it as a stand-alone contribution by a guest writer. Their initial reaction was encouraging. They asked me to send in my article.

In the article I took special care to acknowledge Armenian sufferings and losses, but also mentioned sufferings and losses on the Muslim side. I pointed to certain facts, and made corrections to some of the allegations in the article. I also tried to strike a conciliatory note, referring to the calls of Armenian religious leaders in Turkey, and pointed to the poisoning effect such a monument would have on the Armenian-Turkish relations in America. It was an appeal for “peace.” While I did not expect they would agree with my views, my expectations were high that the Star would publish my article – if for no reason than journalistic curiosity and respect for dissenting views.

The response from the Star was an eye opener:

“Yes. We don’t print op-eds by Holocaust deniers, nor articles denying the settled history of the Armenian genocide, recognized now by 23 countries and by the vast majority of scholars and historians not in the pay of the Turkish government.”

So, I was a “Genocide denier,” and Armenian “genocide” was a settled history, the arbiter presumably being the all-knowing International Association of Genocide Scholars. Case shut. Opinions and facts brought forward by others will not change anything.

The response was the embodiment of a frozen mind. Frozen in time, frozen in space. Here was another example of the “Settled History Syndrome.”

February 10, 2015
Open letter on Perinçek v. Switzerland case

Open letter (slightly revised) rebutting Armenian claims submitted by Ferruh Demirmen to Swiss Interior Department on ECHR’s decision on Perinçek v. Switzerland.

February 24, 2014

An Open Letter to:
Madame la Conseillère fédérale
Simonetta Sommaruga
Cheffe du Département fédéral de justice et police (DFJP)
Palais fédéral ouest
CH-3003 Berne, SWITZERLAND

Dear Madame Sommaruga,

This open letter is being submitted by a concerned citizen as a rebuttal of an open letter sent to you by a group called “concerned genocide scholars” regarding the December 17, 2013 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on Perinçek v. Switzerland.

In their February 16, 2014 letter, the “scholars” take issue with ECHR’s position that genocide is a precisely defined legal concept that is not easy to prove, and that the historical record on the 1915 events is a matter of debate. The “scholars” argue that the 1915 events constitute “genocide,” and request that you re-examine the Court’s judgment. This letter will endeavor to establish that the arguments advanced by the “scholars” are incomplete and specious.

The “scholars” assert that Ottoman “mass killings” of Armenians conform to the definition of Article 2 of the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). But such assertion is based only on a partial reading of the Convention. That Convention, in fact, is the Achilles’ heel of the “Armenian genocide” thesis. For Article 2, while describing genocide as, in part, killing or causing serious harm to the members of a group, makes two additional provisos: (1) there must be intent, (2) the targeted victims should belong to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The “scholars” conveniently ignore these two provisos.

Ottoman government archives contain incontestable evidence that the relocation of Armenians in 1915 was not related in any way to nationality, religion, etc., but to military exigency in time of war, which was being fought on multiple fronts. Rebellious armed Armenian groups were aiding and abetting the enemy and sabotaging the Ottoman army from behind, and the government had to intervene. In other words, Armenians were subjected to relocation not because of their religion or ethnicity, but because they posed grave security threat in time of war. Armenians in the western part of Anatolia were spared from relocation orders because they did not pose a security threat. The central government orders to local authorities made it clear that the security of Armenian convoys during relocation should be ensured, and that all necessary precautions should be taken to meet their needs during and after relocation.

There was no intent to harm the Armenians; but war conditions including lawlessness, chaos, disease, and famine, gave rise to tragic events on both sides.

The fact that Armenians in the western part of Anatolia were spared from relocation orders belies accusations that the 1915 events were religion or ethnicity-related.

Russian archives also reveal that religion and ethnicity were not causal factors behind the relocation orders, that relocation was conceived as a measure of self-defense by the Ottoman government, and that the tragic events were inter-communal in nature.

Considering the above facts, and viewed in its fuller context, Article 2 of the 1948 Convention negates the genocide argument advanced by the “scholars.” The “scholars” cannot pick and choose a portion of Article 2 and ignore the rest.

Equally important, the 1948 Convention contains a stipulation, in Article 6, that those charged with the crime of genocide should be tried by a competent tribunal in the state where the act was committed, or by an international penal tribunal whose jurisdiction is recognized by the contracting parties. In other words, to establish the crime of genocide, a court verdict is a sine qua non. The judgments by the Nuremberg Tribunal post-World War II, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) more recently on the Rwanda and Srebrenica events are examples to such verdicts.

There exists no court verdict, however, on alleged “Armenian genocide.” The Malta Tribunal, convened by the victorious British after World War I to prosecute 144 high-ranking Ottoman officials on charges of killing Armenians, yielded not a single conviction. Among those detained for trial were cabinet ministers, the Grand Vizier and Army Commanders. The Armenian Patriarchate at Istanbul was the principal source of information against the accused, but the evidence was too flimsy for formal prosecution. Even the search of the U.S. State Department files in Washington failed to produce incriminating evidence. After two years of investigation, all Malta detainees were released and returned to Turkish soil.

It is interesting that in referring to the opinions of France, the United Kingdom and Russia in their 1915 joint declaration, the “scholars” do not mention the Malta Tribunal. The Malta Tribunal drew its jurisdictional authority from these three powers, and its findings were binding on the three powers.

So, Article 6 of the 1948 Convention also negates the genocide assertions of the “scholars.” What Article 6 establishes, in principle, is that neither parliaments nor a group of academics can pass judgment on an alleged genocide crime. A verdict by a duly authorized court of law is a must. The “scholars” ignore this very fundamental precept contained in the 1948 Convention.

In conclusion, the 1948 Convention, which is the fundamental international covenant bearing on genocide determination, completely vitiates the genocide thesis when viewed in its entirety. The “scholars do not have the luxury to use only a portion of the covenant to establish their case.

The “scholars” note that in 1997 the “International Association of Genocide Scholars” passed a resolution recognizing the Ottoman massacres of Armenians as genocide. That may be so, but a large number of scholars hold the opposite view. In 1985, for example, 69 U.S. historians and researchers passed a unanimous resolution, addressed to members of the U.S. House of Representatives and published in New York Times and The Washington Post, refuting Armenian allegations. These were academicians specializing in Turkish, Ottoman and Middle Eastern studies. Many of these academicians were subsequently harassed or intimidated by the pro-genocide camp.

The conclusion is inescapable, as ECHR observed, that there is no consensus among historians and scholars on the 1915 events. And that is not taking into account the views of Turkish researchers and historians.

In their letter the “scholars” indirectly draw an analogy between Holocaust and the 1915 events. Such analogy is not only grotesque, but more bluntly, obscene. Jews of Nazi Germany did not rise in armed rebellion against the state, did not embark on a rampage of violence against the local population, did not join the ranks of an invading army, did not sabotage the German army behind the front lines, and in general did not engage in perfidious acts. Their only “crime” was not being of the “Aryan race.” Race was the motive behind the killings.

The Nazis did not court-martial those implicated with wrongdoing against the Jews, as did the Ottomans prosecute those accused of mistreating Armenians during relocation. Nor did the Nazis deliberately spare Jews as “good citizens” in some parts of the Reich, or award meritorious awards to Jews, as did the Ottomans to Armenians. The Ottomans, having long embraced Armenians in high-ranking positions in the government, including generals and cabinet ministers, did not spread racist, scurrilous lies about the Armenian minority. And the Armenians certainly did not perish in gas chambers.

To broaden their horizon on the 1915 events, the “scholars” should perhaps read, if they have not already, the admissions of Boghos Nubar Pasha at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, and the manifesto issued by Johannes Kachaznuni at the Dashnak convention in Bucharest in March 1923. It would be like hearing the truth from the horse’s mouth. More than half of a million Muslims lost their lives at the hands of Armenian guerillas who fought a losing battle relying on false promises of imperial Western powers and the Tsarist Russia. Even the Russian officers on the scene were troubled by the severity of violence inflicted by the Armenian guerillas on Muslims.

And the terror inflicted was not confined to Muslims. As stated by Albert J. Amateau, a rabbi born in Turkey and later emigrated to America, in a testimony sworn before a notary public in California in 1989, Armenian atrocities also extended to Jews, and even to Armenian families who refused to cooperate with the armed guerillas.

In their letter the “scholars” attempt to link the tragic murder of Hrant Dink to genocide controversy, and claim that Turkey has “one of the worst” records on human rights “over the past decades.” This is a slanderous attack aimed at Turkey, and it is deplorable. Dink was murdered by a deranged fanatic, and the facts behind the assassination are still unknown. More than 100,000 Turkish people took to the streets in Istanbul to protest Dink’s murder. Mention of human rights by the “scholars” is particularly ironic, considering that their list of signatories is headed by none other than Taner Akçam, an ex-convict and a prison escapee who advocated violence and was imprisoned for terrorist activities in Turkey. Akçam is now a protégée and beneficiary of the Armenian lobby.

And speaking of human rights, it is curious that the “scholars” failed to mention the ASALA/JCAG terror that took more than 40 innocent lives, most of them Turkish diplomats, during 1973-1991. Not only did the committees funded by Armenian organizations pay for the legal defense of the majority of terrorists, but several prominent Armenians and pro-Armenian “scholars” testified in the trials of the terrorists. One terrorist, after his release from the French prison, was welcome as a hero in Armenia. So much about concern for “human rights”!

Incidentally, how many Armenians took to the streets to protest the killing of Turkish diplomats and their families by the ASALA/JCAG terror?

It is a known fact that Turkey and Armenia cannot agree on legal characterization of the 1915 events. That being the case, one wonders why the “scholars” have not urged Armenia to file a complaint with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Established in 1945, ICJ is the primary judicial arm of the U.N. to settle legal disputes submitted by states. A court case undertaken by ICJ would require all historical archives to be open, due process to apply, and the evidentiary material scrutinized for probity. The only reasonable explanation for the stance of the Armenian side is that it finds a judicial process too risky for its taste.

The Armenian side, instead, has over the years relied on propaganda in public arena, where bias and prejudice play a large role, and financial resources can be deployed aplenty.

It is refreshing that the “scholars” make a concession in their letter: They agree with the notion of freedom of expression articulated by ECHR. It is impossible not to be sarcastic about their newly-found concern for this basic human right. Over the years these “scholars” attended conferences where presence of academics opposing their genocide thesis was not welcome. Did the “scholars” express any freedom of expression concern when, in 1995, a French court fined historian Prof. Bernard Lewis because he did not subscribe to the genocide thesis, or when, in 2007, Dr. Doğu Perinçek was convicted by a Swiss court for the same reason? And what was the reaction of the “scholars” when the French Senate passed a bill in 2011 (later overturned) that criminalizes denial of “Armenian genocide”?

One additional comment in this context is noteworthy. The “scholars” use the word “denialist” to refer to those who reject their genocide assertions. “Denialist” is a pejorative term, and its use is a breach of academic decorum. It is also a sign of arrogance. How would the “scholars” like if their colleagues in the opposing camp call them “distortionists” or “fabricators”?

To wrap up, characterization of the 1915 events as “genocide” is incompatible with the definition of this term as prescribed in the 1948 U.N. Convention. “Genocide” is a legal construct, and should not be used to further political aims. The suffering on the Armenian side in the 1915 events cannot be denied; but the suffering on the Turkish side also deserves recognition. After a century, it is time for the two sides to reconcile their differences without further recrimination, and move on. We don’t need new generations poisoned with “genocide” controversy.

It is hoped that the Swiss government will accept the judgment of ECHR as final.

Respectfully yours,

(hard copy signed)

Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.
(address)

Appendix
SIGNATORIES TO MAY 19, 1985 STATEMENT ADDRESSED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS PUBLISHED IN NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST:

RIFAAT ABOU-EL-HAJ
Professor of History, California State University at Long Beach
SARAH MOMENT ATIS
Professor of Turkish Language & Literature, University of Wisconsin at Madison
KARL BARBIR
Associate Professor of History, Siena College, New York
ILHAN BASGOZ
Director of the Turkish Studies, Department of Uralic & Altaic Studies, Indiana University
DANIEL G. BATES
Professor of Anthropology, Hunter College, City University of New York
ULKU BATES
Professor of Art History, Hunter College, City University of New York
GUSTAV BAYERLE
Professor of Uralic & Altaic Studies, Indiana University
ANDREAS G. E. BODROGLIGETTI
Professor of Turkic & Iranian languages, University of California at Los Angeles
KATHLEEN BURRILL
Associate Professor of Turkish Studies, Columbia University
RODERIC DAVISON
Professor of History, George Washington University
WALTER DENNY
Associate Professor of Art History & Near Eastern Studies, University of Massachusetts
DR. ALAN DUBEN
Anthropologist & Researcher, New York City
ELLEN ERVIN
Assistant Professor of Turkish Researches, New York University
CAESAR FARAH
Professor of Islamic & Middle Eastern History, University of Minnesota
CARTER FINDLEY
Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University
MICHAEL FINEFROCK
Professor of History, College of Charleston, South Carolina
ALAN FISHER
Professor of History, Michigan State University
CORNELL FLEISCHER
Assistant Professor of History, Washington University (Missouri)
TIMOTHY CHILDS
Professorial Lecturer at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
SHAFIGA DAULET
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut
JUSTIN MCCARTHY
Associate Professor of History, University of Louisville, Kentucky
JON MANDAVILLE
Professor of the History of the Middle East, Portland State University, Oregon
RHOADS MURPHEY
Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern Languages & Cultures & History, Columbia University
PIERRE OBERLING
Professor of History, Hunter College, City University of New York
ROBERT OLSON
Associate Professor of History, University of Kentucky
DONALD QUATAERT
Associate Professor of History, University of Houston
WILLIAM GRISWOLD
Professor of History, Colorado State University
WILLIAM HICKMAN
Associate Professor of Turkish, University of California at Berkeley
JOHN HYMES
Professor of History, Glenville State College, West Virginia
RALPH JAECKEL
Visiting Assistant Professor of Turkish, University of California at Los Angeles
JAMES KELLY
Associate Professor of Turkish, University of Utah
PETER GOLDEN
Professor of History, Rutgers University, New Jersey
TOM GOODRICH
Professor of History, Indiana University of Pennsylvania
ANDREW COULD
Ph.D. in Ottoman History, Flagstaff, Arizona
MICHAEL MEEKER
Professor of Anthropology, University of California at San Diego
THOMAS NAFF
Professor of History & Director, Middle East Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
WILLIAM OCHSENWALD
Associate Professor of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
WILLIAM PEACHY
Assistant Professor of the Judaic & Near Eastern Languages & Literatures, Ohio State University
HOWARD REED
Professor of History, University of Connecticut
TIBOR HALASI-KUN
Professor Emeritus of Turkish Studies, Columbia University
J. C. HUREWITZ
Professor of Government, Emeritus, Former Director, Middle East Institute (1971-1984) , Columbia University
HALIL INALCIK
Member of the of Arts & Sciences, Professor of Ottoman History, University of Chicago
RONALD JENNINGS
Associate Professor of History & Asian Studies, University of Illinois
KERIM KEY
Adjunct Professor, Southeastern University, Washington, D.C.
DANKWART RUSTOW
Distinguished University Professor of Political Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York
STANFORD SHAW
Professor of History, University of California at Los Angeles
METIN KUNT
Professor of Ottoman History, New York University
AVIGDOR LEVY
Professor of History, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts
DR. HEATH W. LOWRY
Institute of Turkish Studies Inc. Washington, D.C.
JOHN MASSON SMITH, JR.
Professor of History, University of California at Berkeley
ROBERT STAAB
Assistant Director of the Middle East Center, University of Utah
JAMES STEWART-ROBINSON
Professor of Turkish Studies, University of Michigan
FRANK TACHAU
Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago
DAVID THOMAS
Associate Professor of History, Rhode Island College
WARREN S. WALKER
Home Professor of English & Director of the Archive of Turkish Oral Narrative, Texas Tech University
WALTER WEIKER
Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Jersey
MADELINE ZILFI
Associate Professor of History, University of Maryland
ELAINE SMITH
Ph.D. in Turkish History, Retired Foreign Service Officer, Washington, DC
EZEL KURAL SHAW
Associate Professor of History, California State University, Northridge
FREDERICK LATIMER
Associate Professor of History (Retired), University of Utah
BERNARD LEWIS
Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern History, Princeton University
GRACE M. SMITH
Visiting Lecturer in Turkish, University of California at Berkeley
DR. SVAT SOUCEK
Turcologist, Oriental Division, New York Public Library
JUNE STARR
Associate Professor of Anthropology, SUNY Stony Brook
DR. PHILIP STODDARD
Executive Director, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.
METIN TAMKOC
Professor of International Law and Regulations, Texas Tech University
MARGARET L. VENZKE
Assistant Professor of History, Dickinson College, Pennsylvania
DONALD WEBSTER
Professor of Turkish History, Retired, Beloit College, Wisconsin
JOHN WOODS
Associate Professor of Middle Eastern History, University of Chicago

March 8, 2014
Turkey’s PM Erdoğan Uses Unique, Unorthodox Way to Address Corruption Allegations

By Ferruh Demirmen

As the adage, “There’s more than one way to skin a cat” goes, Turkish PM Tayyip Erdoğan recently found a remarkable way to respond to corruption allegations surrounding his administration. His reaction to the allegations was far from building public confidence.

When the corruption news implicating those close to Mr. Erdoğan broke out in the Turkish media on December 17, the number one question in Turkey was how the PM would react. After all, the sons of three cabinet ministers, a local mayor from his AK Party, the head of the state-owned Halkbank, a construction mogul close to the PM, and a businessman doing a clandestine gold-for-gas trade with Iran, were snatched from their homes in the early hours of the morning on charges of bribery and money laundering. All together 52 suspects were rounded up for questioning.

Images in the press of piles of dollar bills stuffed in shoe boxes and money-counting machines found in the homes of some of the accused were both riveting and nauseating.

All the indications were that Mr. Erdoğan had not been informed of the arrests in advance, and was caught by surprise.

Press news were raging with speculations that more arrests, involving others close to Erdoğan including his sons, were in the offing.

Accusing a “Criminal Gang”

The first reaction coming from an angry Erdoğan was to point to a ‘criminal gang.”

But not a criminal gang involved in bribe and thievery, as one might have expected. It was a “gang” with foreign connections, out to topple his government, he said.

Although Erdoğan did not name the illicit organization, it was widely known that the “gang” he alluded to was “Cemaat,” the organization of the reclusive Turkish Islamic clergyman Fethullah Gülen living in Pennsylvania.

Cynics observed that Erdoğan’s government had cooperated remarkably well with the Cemaat over the past 11 years in prosecuting, muzzling and imprisoning hundreds of military officers, writers, and academicians on trumped up charges of plotting to overthrow the government. It was like an alliance made in heaven. Now the Cemaat was an enemy.

Mr. Erdoğan’s charges of a criminal gang was reminiscent of an “interest lobby” that he claimed was responsible for the “Gezi Park” protests that erupted across Turkey, especially Istanbul, in May and June. A conspiracy orchestrated by the “interest lobby” was out to topple his government, he said at that time.

“He does no wrong, commits no ill, means no harm; but it is always someone else – a foreign hand, in fact – that is the problem,” mused observers, cynically.

“Clean-up” in the Police Establishment

Mr. Erdoğan knew that throwing salvos at others alone was not going to defuse the situation. His next move, surprisingly, was to fire the police bureau chiefs in Istanbul that were behind the arrests. Five police bureau chiefs were sacked on the spot and replaced by new appointees. The head of the Istanbul Police Department also lost his job. To expedite the replacement of the top policeman, Erdoğan had his new hand-picked new appointee flown from to Ankara to Istanbul in his private jet.

One of the first acts by the new appointee was to establish an army of inspectors to look into the police operations in Istanbul and bring charges, if deemed necessary.

The reaction of the PM to the police arrests was in sharp contrast to his reaction during the Gezi Park protests when the police acted with brutal force against the protestors. Six people lost their lives due to excessive force by the police. At that time the PM applauded the police, and even rewarded them for “job well done.”

That was the police charged with quelling street protests. The police that was the target of Erdoğan’s fury last week was law enforcement officers working with prosecutors on criminal investigations behind closed doors.

Interestingly, the PM did not ask the resignation of the cabinet ministers whose sons were implicated, or of the minister in charge of EU affairs Egemen Bağış, reportedly also embroiled in bribery.

With press reports that arrests may be made outside Istanbul as well, Erdoğan expanded the reshuffling of the police organization. Thirty more police chiefs, mainly in Istanbul and Ankara, were replaced. The government wanted to make sure there would be no further “surprise arrests.”

An angry Erdoğan also threatened to expel foreign envoys in Turkey for plotting against his government. “We don’t have to host you in this country,” fumed an animated PM. While not naming names, the barb was aimed at US ambassador Francis Ricciardone, who said that the US had warned Halkbank in the past about its connection to Iran.

It must have slipped the PM’s mind that his AK Party ascended to power in November 2002 with the full support and blessing of the US – a support that has remained virtually unabated till this day.

A Déjà Vu

A further development was the addition of two new prosecutors to the ongoing graft investigation in Istanbul. It was explained that the move was prompted by the “heavy load” in the investigation – notwithstanding that no such concern had been raised by the sitting prosecutor. The real purpose behind the move, however, observers noted, was to dilute the authority of the sitting prosecutor and derail the ongoing investigation.

This was a déjà vu. The move was reminiscent of the way the prosecutorial authority in the famous “lighthouse scandal,” also known as the “corruption of the century,” was seized by the appointment of two new prosecutors. The three sitting prosecutors handling that investigation were dismissed, and the indictment against the suspects (closely linked to the AK Party) was dropped by the new prosecutors for lack of evidence. The original prosecutors were then charged with “misconduct.” (All 3 were exonerated). That was in 2011.

The lighthouse case involved donations to an Islamic charity, had its roots in Germany, and ended with convictions in Germany. According to German authorities, the main culprits were in Turkey.

Extreme Measure

As the crisis deepened, the next act by the PM and the government was even more extraordinary. In a midnight move, a law enforcement by-law was amended to require the police and the gendarmerie to inform their administrative superiors and chief prosecutor’s office before conducting investigative operations. Prosecutors conducting a probe were also required to receive consent from the chief prosecutor.

The new by-law violated the secrecy of law enforcement operations, effectively eroding the separation of judicial and executive powers.

Cynics tweeted – and cartoons in the press humored likewise – that the new curbs imposed on law enforcement was like warning the thieves before arresting them.

In the meantime, the press was barred from entering the Istanbul Police Department, and the PM instructed the provincial mayors to keep a tab on the local police.

Repercussions

The repercussions to the new by-law were swift. A number of legal entities including Turkey’s Union of Bar Associations and the Turkish Syndicate of Prosecutors lodged lawsuits with the Council of State for the annulment of the new by-law on Constitutional grounds, underscoring that such provisions can only be implemented in totalitarian regimes.

No sooner had the new by-law been put in effect, than the Istanbul prosecutor Muammer Akkaş released a bomb-shell written statement. Akkaş had prepared a summons/arrest list that he had given to the police on December 25 for instructions for a second wave of operation scheduled to take place after the New Year’s eve. But the police was not following his instructions, he said.

He had noticed leaks to the press, and was concerned that the evidentiary material in the probe would be tampered with.

The scale of financial irregularities involved in the second operation was reportedly massive, circa $100 billion, implicating 42 persons. Among the suspects was the PM’s son Bilal Erdoğan.

Akkaş said his probe was blocked, and he had been removed from the case. The copy of the summons/arrest warrant for Bilal Erdoğan, with the enforcement date marked as January 2, 2014, appeared in the press.

The PM was quick to denounce Akkaş, calling him a disgrace for the judiciary.

Soon after, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) released a majority opinion backing Akkaş’ concerns, stating that the new by-law violated the Constitutional edict of the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers.

What Now?

The high-stakes corruption allegations have rocked Turkey, with ramifications extending from politics to economics to public trust. It is a rapidly shifting ground. At the writing of this article, barely 10 days after the scandal broke out, the PM is in his seat, three ministers from the cabinet have resigned, and 10 new cabinet ministers have been replaced.

One of the resigned ministers, Erdoğan Bayraktar, in charge of environment and urban works and a long-time associate of the PM, said the PM had approved the construction projects that are under investigation, and should also resign. It was a serious charge from an ex-confidant.

All the while people have taken to the streets calling for the resignation of the government, the Council of State has issued an injunction to halt the implementation of the new by-law, and President Abdullah Gül bafflingly maintaining his silence. A sense of disbelief and political malaise has permeated the air.

Gül’s silence can perhaps be explained by the fact he himself was embroiled in corruption (“lost trillions”) allegations years ago. The case was not adjudicated in a court because of Gül’s parliamentary immunity.

At this point it is anybody’s guess whether the government will weather the scandal without further fallout. If it does, however, there is no doubt a thick cloud of suspicion and distrust will hang over the PM and his government.

Out of this sordid affair, one thing that stands out, inarguably, is the way that the PM Erdoğan has handled the situation. In a democracy where the rule of law prevails, and public trust counts, the scandalous details that surfaced, while not yet proven in a court of law, would have been more than sufficient for a PM and the government to resign. This is what credibility and accountability is about.

Instead, the PM has resorted to unusual and extraordinary measures to hold on to power that failed to build public confidence. Cursing others and blaming conspiracies and foreign elements for imaginary coup attempts makes no sense. None of this augurs well for Turkish democracy.

December 29, 2013
Ergenekon: A dark chapter in Turkish history

Ferruh Demirmen

The Ergenekon verdicts in Turkey announced on August 5 shook the Turkish judicial system and left an indelible mark on the conscience of Turkish people. The confidence that most Turks had in their judicial system received a major blow. Jail sentences were showered on all but 21 of the 275 defendants, including nearly two dozen journalists.

The case started 5 years ago, but arrests and detentions started 6 years ago.

The hearing was held in prison compound in Silivri, 70 km from Istanbul, in an atmosphere of martial law, at arms distance from police barriers, water cannons and gas bombs, and within an earshot of rubber bullets, with chanting, flag-waiving protestors taking shelter in scorched, burning fields, while countless busses trying to bring plain folk to the compound from across the country were stopped on track by government order. It was not a pretty picture. Not for a government that preaches democracy.

Due process, including the right to speak before sentencing, and the right to have next-of-kin present at the trial, was denied to the defendants. Holding hearings in a prison compound also drew criticism.

ALLEGED PLOT

Officially, “Ergenekon” was the name of a clandestine terrorist organization that tried to overthrow the Turkish government. Politicians (three of them parliamentary deputies), journalists, academics, university presidents and retired and active-duty military officers, including 4-star generals, were members of an alleged terrorist organization.

A terrorist establishment, as it turned out, that lacked a leader, an organizational chart, and a manifesto. A group, most members of which had not even known each other. No document bearing the name “Ergenekon” existed in the state archives, and no weapons had been found in possession of any of the terrorists. To implement their nefarious plans, we are led to believe, the terrorists relied on a cache of hand grenades found in a shanty house in 2007, and later in the garden (buried) of a deserted house in 2009. The hand grandees were destroyed soon after “discovery.”

There were indications that the ammunition “discovered” had been planted, and doubts lingered in the press as to whether the ammunition found was live. Defendants denied the validity of incriminating evidence introduced during the trial, and in one case, the prosecution admitted that the incriminating message found in the mobile phone of a defendant had been “mistakenly recorded” by police. Many defendants, including the world-renown transplant surgeon Prof. Dr. Mehmet Haberal, said they did not know what they had done wrong.

But these concerns did not stop the prosecution from filing a series of indictments running thousands of pages.

It was extraordinary that a pro-Sharia convict, found guilty in a prior murder case (assassination of Council of State judge), and implicated in the bombing of the secular-oriented daily “Cumhuriyet,” was brought into the Ergenekon case as a suspect and tried together with defendants that were starkly opposite in ideology. The convict, whom the prosecutors affectionately called “Osmanım” (“My Osman’), turned a secret prosecution witness and was set free at the end of the trial. “It was a payoff,” observed the opponents.

It was ironic that journalists İlhan Selçuk (now deceased) and Mustafa Balbay, columnists at “Cumhuriyet,” became co-defendants with criminals that had bombed their daily.

Among the secret witnesses was Şemdin Sakık, at one time a high-ranking leader of the terrorist organization PKK.

THE REALITY

But in reality, the Ergenekon was a plot orchestrated to undermine the very foundation of a democratic, secular state by silencing the opponents of the current Islamic government. A desire to “settle the score” in connection with the 1997 “soft coup” against the Islamist Farewell Party – an event that forced Fethullah Gülen to flee to the U.S. – no doubt also played a role.

One attribute that united the Ergenekon defendants was their conviction in a secular, democratic state driven by Kemalist reforms.

It was very unusual that a sitting Prime Minister, ignoring the separation of the executive and judiciary powers, declared himself early in the trial to be the prosecutor of the case.

A court case that attracted wide criticism in its breach of judiciary standards. Although the court has not yet issued the basis for its conclusions, legal experts familiar with the case have characterized the verdicts as absurd, arbitrary, inconsistent, and disproportionate.

One journalist, Tuncay Özkan, receiving an aggravated life sentence, said after the verdicts that, although he was exonerated of charges of keeping weapons and ammunition in his house, was penalized because he – much to the dislike of the government – had organized the “Cumhuriyet meetings.”

Balbay, receiving a 34-year and 8 months jail sentence, maintained all along that he was penalized for doing his job as a journalist. He denounced the treatment the defendants received on the day of sentencing, adding that even an occupying force would have acted in a more respectful manner. He was particularly resentful that “Osmanım” had been released.

Another journalist/author, Ergün Poyraz, who has written books critical of the PM Erdoğan and Fethullah Gülen (e.g., Children of Moses, The Imam in America), and under detention since 2007, was sentenced to 29 years 6 months of aggravated jail sentence.

Doğu Perinçek, the leader of the Workers’ Party (İP), receiving aggravated life term, said he does not recognize the verdict.

Perhaps the defendant that attracted most attention was İlker Başbuğ, the former Chief of Staff of the military, who received life sentence. General Başbuğ was appointed to the top military post by the Prime Minister, and for two years served directly under the PM.

As someone who commanded the second largest NATO army, the verdict against Başbuğ rattled the political establishment, and no doubt also the military. How to explain a terrorist commanding a 700,000 strong army, how his terrorist activities had gone unnoticed, and what all this means for NATO, were questions that naturally came to mind.

Main opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu said the verdicts were illegitimate, adding that those who had appointed Başbuğ to the top post should be tried on charges of supporting terrorism. The government spokesman Bülent Arınç, deputy PM, issued a warning to Kılıçdaroğlu.

Başbuğ himself said the target in the Ergenekon case was the Turkish army. He was pointedly indignant that he was denied a right that was granted to Saddam Hussein: the right to speak before his sentence was announced. Four other retired 4-star generals received life term.

As for the academics, Peter Diamond, a professor of economics at M.I.T. and a Nobel laureate, after having looked into the cases of eight academics, concluded that there appeared to be no credible evidence to convict his colleagues.

Judge Köksal Şengün, who, for three years, presided over the 3-man panel of judges in “Ergenekon,” but later removed from the case, commented that he could not support the verdicts. With 187 hearings behind him, Şengün was well familiar with the evidence. Upon his removal from the case in 2011, Şengün disclosed that he was in favor of dismissing many charges, but was opposed by the two other judges.

PUTTING IT IN CONTEXT

With all of its implications, “Ergenekon” marks a dark chapter in Turkey’s history.

Alluding to the draconian sentences handed out by the court, some observes drew analogy to the death sentence announced by the Istanbul government against Mustafa Kemal in May 1920.

Turkey’s Syndicate of Judges, an independent organization, declared the Ergenekon convictions null and void because two reserve judges, with no voting rights, participated in the final deliberations preceding sentencing. Such participation violated the law, it was noted.

There is a general feeling that the government intends to declare a general amnesty encompassing the Ergenekon victims and the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. That would open the door for the terrorist leader – now serving life term – to be released from prison.

A scenario that, if materializes, would surely create a firestorm in Turkey.
In the background to the Ergenekon imbroglio lies the near-unanimous 2008 decision of the Constitutional Court that found that the ruling party had become the focal point for anti-secularist movements. The ruling party at that time barely escaped closure. The make-up of the Constitutional Court has since changed.
All this happening in a country where the government boasts of the freedom expression while children 16 years of age are dragged to court on charges of insulting the Prime Minister because they tore down a poster bearing the PM’s Bayram message.

Istanbul-based British analyst Gareth Jenkins, who has reviewed the voluminous documents in the Ergenekon case, has concluded that there is no such organization as Ergenekon, and that the investigation bearing this name was carried out as a collaborative effort between RTE and Fethullah Gülen. He has stressed the role of the Gülen movement. Jenkins appears correct in his conclusions.

But the story Jenkins tells is incomplete. To ascribe the “success” of the Ergenekon plot solely to RTE-Gülen cooperation is to overlook the limitations of such alliance. A meticulously planned plot, “Ergenekon” could not have been executed without outside help. The story of a third, “dark force,” that provided clandestine help in “Ergenekon,” also needs to be told.

August 18, 2013