Turkish Forum

Category: Dr. Galip Baysan

  • KUNURİ BATTLES (26-29 NOVEMBER 1950) İN KOREAN WAR

    KUNURİ BATTLES (26-29 NOVEMBER 1950) İN KOREAN WAR

    On 24th Nov 1950, the U.N. Forces launched their attack north from the line of contact with its center of mass in the 8th Army area with all Army (Ist and IXth U.S.Corps, Ist Turkish and 27th British Brigades),Xth U.S. Corps and Ist South Korean Corps. Since the weak enemy forces on the 8th Army front retreated hastily, the advance elements moved quickly forward 8-10 miles. This easy advance gave misleading impression that “the enemy is withdrawing to Manchuria and that peace was on hand. Only units of IInd South Korean Corps on the Armies right flank held its position. The attack continued on 25th Nov with Ist and IXth U.S. Corps advancing in the 8th Army area and II Korean Corps again remaining in its position. However, on 26th Nov attack initiated by Ist and IXth Corps were met with stiff resistance. While the attack was loosing its intensity, the IInd South Korean Corps on the U.N. Force’s right flank was suddenly struck a massive counter offensive by some 180.000 Chinese Troops in 18 divisions. In consequence, the shattered IInd South Korean Corps had to retreat to the east of Tokchon. The enemy forces continued their attack on the night of the 26th Nov. and forced the IInd South Korean Corps 40 Kilometers South, to the Taedong River. The enemy is believed to have used 8 Communist Chinese divisions to spearhead this attack. A holding attack in this area was launched the same night with about 6 divisions against the IXth Corps units. However, with the withdrawal of the IInd South Korean Corps, the right flanks of two U.S. Corps were exposed, making them highly vulnerable. The enemy, whose center of mass was believed to be here, was capable of enveloping the entire 8th Army. With this sudden change of events, this exposed flank had to be refused in order for the 8th Army to withdraw in an orderly manner. This duty was assigned to the Turkish Brigade, which was in the army reserve.

    The Turkish Brigade (Bde), tasked with protection the right flank of the 9th Corps, which was threatened with enemy envelopment, and thus that of the 8th Army, was to advance along the Kunuri-Tokchon road and single handedly counter superior enemy forces which had repulsed the IInd South Korean Corps. On 27th Nov, these Communist Chinese forces had, as expected, initiated a fast encirclement and pursuit operation. And a substantial portion of its forces was directed towards Kunuri. The Turkish Bde had started marching from the opposite direction on the same road from Wawon to Tokchon. However, in the afternoon, it stopped and order from IXth Corps Command and returned to Wawon. The order had unfortunately been transmitted to the Bde Commander about 2 hours late. The main units of the Bde had deployed to Wawon area and started to deploy after necessary security precautions were taken. The Bde Commander was informed at around 0100 hours on the 28th Nov that the reconnaissance detachment who had been on rear guard support duty, was attacked by the enemy and destroyed.

    28 NOVEMBER 1950-WAWON BATTLE:

    The 10th infantry company commander was tasked with closing off the entrance to Choyangmyon. The company completed its deployment and disposition between 2100 and 2200 hours on 27 Nov. Shots fired by the ambushed Recce Detachment were herd by the company between 2400-0100 hours. The enemy attacked to 10th company at daybreak on 28 Nov by first hitting the security detachment in front of the company and later the company itself along its entire front. The platoons of 10th company completed its preparations while the security detachment of the company was fighting and was ready for combat. This company looked like a ship prepared to counter great waves caused by a hurricane. The enemy attack was initially met with intense fire. The enemy engaged by this heavy firepower, hastily withdrew and positioned itself behind a hill while partially spreading left and right, trying to encircle the company.
    As the enemy spread northwest, first the 11th company and then the 9th company were committed. When the enemy seemed to be preparing to envelope this company’s left flank, the entire II nd Battalion was moved to this area and a battle group was formed under the command of Deputy Bde. Commander Col Celal Dora. The battle of Wawon continued until the evening of 28 Nov 1950 with first the II nd battalion’s and later all the Bde units’ commitment, one after the other. This was a battle which was conducted over extremely rugged terrain where friend and foe could not be distinguished easily, under temperatures of -20, -30 degrees C (-4 to 22 F), devoid of support from friendly forces, with communication cut of from higher headquarters, and before it was able to develop its combat power as much as necessary.

    28-29NOVEMBER 1950 – SINNIM-NI BATTLE:

    On the evening of 28 Nov, Turkish units started to withdraw to the area around Sinnim-ni Village was about 7 Km. to the west. The covering force was made up by the 1st company, which had not been heavily engaged during that day’s operations. The enemy realized that the Turkish units were withdrawing, although it was done under cover of darkness. And it followed the Bde very closely along a wide front with delaying operations conducted by the rear guard. The road was narrow and deployment was slow. Therefore marching column rear guards and the enemy were in close proximity with each other during this withdrawal.
    The Ist battalion was tasked with defending the south of Sinnim-ni Village and the IInd battalion was tasked with defending the hills to its north. The other units were spread out all the way to Kaechon, about 3 Km to their rear. At about midnight, on 28/29 Nov, units that were mostly in the west of the Sinnim-ni Village came under sudden and intense machine gun, mortar and rocket fire. This surprised attack caused panic among the majority of the Bde personnel. This units started to retreat along the road in the dark. Meanwhile, the enemy captured some hills to the north of the road and cut off Ist and IInd battalions from each other. The hours following the Sinnim-ni surprise attack were the most critical for the Bde and Bde headquarters when the units were retreating. Bde headquarters, which was in a school building in Kaechon, started to receive the first negative reports.
    The cannon and vehicles of the artillery battalion and the battalion train had congested the only road to Kaechon in double, triple and quadruple columns and were entwined with each other. Seeing the situation, the Bde Commander General Yazıcı directed the retreating columns to be halted, brought down from their vehicles and reorganized; and ordered contact be reestablished with Ist and IInd battalions. The situation was grave for the Bde Commander and his headquarters; 1/3 of the Bde infantry elements were dissolved. The artillery could not function. Contact was cut of with Ist and Iind battalions who seemed to have stayed in their positions. There was no contact with the U.S. IX Corps and no immediate help could be expected from it. What is more, conflicting reports kept coming in and the bad news had a demoralizing effect on personnel.
    The Commander was face with a situation where he had to make a decision, which would affect both the brigades, U.S. IX Corps and the 8th Army. He could follow one of the following courses of action: he could either leave Ist and IInd battalions, which had been cut off in their rear, by themselves and withdraw further to establish a new defense line with what was left; or he could gather all the elements in Kaechon to save Ist and IInd battalions, by establishing a new defensive line on the hills to the right of the village and using every means available to establish contact with cut of units. At this critical moment, Gen Yazıcı did not lose his composure and decided to contact defensive operations at the location where he was. As a result of this firm decision to resist and continue to defense, the uncontrolled flow of people was slowed down. The disorganized units were partially reorganized and a new defensive line was established.
    While the Bde Commander was taking this precautions, IId battalion and 2nd company of Ist battalion were in a very difficult situation and were surrounded by superior forces, conducting breath taking combat all night and until noon the next day. In spite of the attacks launched by the enemy from the front and flanks, these units conducted exemplary, heroic operations, holding their positions. Particularly the 2nd company of the Ist battalion, which was located on hills and the valley immediately to the south of Simnin-ni, by conducting a bayonet assault against the enemy who was trying to encircle its flanks and rear, heroically held its position until noon of 29th November. When 2nd company’s ran out, ammunition captured from the enemy was used meanwhile, the IInd battalion, on hills extending to the Northeast of the village, continued to defend its position against the superior enemy’s continuous attacks.

    On 29th Nov 1950, at around 10.00 hours, just before the counter offensive, an U.S. infantry battalion and a tank company tasked to cover the withdrawal of the U.S. 2nd division established contact with the units trying to reorganize and the Turkish Brigade trying to established a defense position around Kaechon. They positioned themselves on the northern hills. Upon arrival of the U.S. regiment, the Bde Commander informed the regiment commander of the situation and proposed that a counter offensive be conducted to save IInd battalion and 2nd company. The regiment commander refused this suggestion saying, “His duty was to cover the right flank of the division.” Then the Bde Commander saw that his northern flank was now secured and decided, “to conduct an attack” with the small amount of existing forces. The determination of the Bde Commander started paying off towards noon. The commander was able to establish contact with the units that were cut of through the counter offensive that was conducted. The enabled the cut of units to withdraw through areas, which were not open to enemy, fire.
    The enemy pursuit the withdrawing forces closely and advances north and south of the Kaechon positions. They were met with fire from both Turkish and U.S. battalions in these positions. Meanwhile it was determined that a regimental size force continued its advance from behind the hills in spite of artillery and mortar fire. At around 1700, while the U.S. Ist battalion, which was defending the southern edge of the position, began to withdraw, the enemy started to envelope its northern flank. In this situation, the Bde, whose northern edge was open, decided to withdraw in order not to be encircled from both flanks. Again the withdrawal initiated under the cover of the rear guard.

    As you have noticed, Turkish Brigade established contact with U.S. units for the first time since 27th Nov. This indicates that, the 8th Army was able to complete its withdrawal within the time, which had been gained. The Turkish Brigade gained a day in Wavon (27-28 Nov), another day in Sinnim-ni area and showed strong resistance to the superior Chinese 38th Corps at Sinnim-ni and Kaechon on 29 Nov, gaining a whole day in itself, although suffering substantial casualties consequently, it was able to accomplish the task it was given, enabling the 8th Army, main strength of the United Nation Forces, to withdraw and thus escape annihilation.

    Dr. M. Galip Baysan

  • TURKEY’S REACTİON TO UN İNVİTATİON FOR KOREAN WAR

    TURKEY’S REACTİON TO UN İNVİTATİON FOR KOREAN WAR

    In order to fully understand Turkey’s position concerning the Korean War,it would be beneficial to take a brief look at the prevailing situations in and around Turkey prior the war. During the course of World War-II, Turkey was faced with the threat of invasion by Germany, her historical ally, whose Armies advanced all the way to the Turkish borders in Thrace and who requested her to change her neutral position. In the later years of the war, she was this time pressured by the Allies to enter the war against Germany. President Ismet Inonu and his colleagues succeeded in maintaining strict neutrality by continued maximum resistance to pressures from both sides. As much as the political situation permitted and thus kept Turkey out of the war.
    The Turkish administration was keeping a close watch on Soviet activities during the war. The Soviet desire to gain territory, their disregard for accepted rules and violations, the fact that they did not move out of any country they occupied before setting up puppet regimes loyal to them, were clearly witnessed and were all being taken into account.
    Soviet Russia’s historical claims over the “Turkish Straits” had not changed. They wanted new and expanded rights over Straits and formally claimed land from Eastern Turkey, confirming Turkey’s concern and without hesitation by the government of Turkey even if this would have meant risking a new war. On the other hand; the victorious western nations wanted to give the whole islands which were granted to Italy at the end of World War-I, were under Italian occupation and most of which were only a few miles from the Turkish coast, totally to Greece and were putting political pressure on Turkey in order to achieve their goal. Thus, Turkey found herself completely isolated politically and militarily against one of the most powerful victors of the war. In order to continue her existence, Turkey had to find new and strong allies in the west. The new World Power, which predominated world politics, was the U.S. This country seemed to believe that the expansionist policy of the Communists had to be stopped and she appeared ready to help Turkey. Friendly relations were initiated with this Super Power.
    In 1949, The North Atlantic Alliance was formed and Turkey had not been included in it. This Alliance was to provide the greatest political, economic and cultural solidarity against the USSR and her expansionist policy. Turkey had to enter this alliance for the benefit of her national interests. She could only then find herself the place she desired and needed to have in the Western World within a new, strong defense chain.
    Turkey had entered into an era of multi party democracy. “Democratic Party” which came into power through elections held on 14th May 1950 was willing to have close cooperation with her Western Allies and to undertake major social, political, cultural, military and economic reforms in the country.
    Turkey was aware that she could be subject to the same treatment the Soviets had given to her satellites. The enemy in Korea was a common enemy and this initial attempt had to be stopped, and the enemy should not be given a chance to initiate a new assault against Turkey or any other country. The most important fact for whole world that, Turkey was just over the expansionist route of Communists toward Middle East and North Africa and domination for these areas Soviets must have control over Turkey.
    For all these reasons we have listed, Turkey replied on 29 June 1950 to the U.N. cable dated 27th June pleading for aid to Korea, following the attack initiated by North Korea on 25th June. The cable stated: “Turkey is ready to meet her responsibilities.” The Government of the Republic of Turkey decided on 25th July 1950, to prepare in Ankara, a brigade of 5000 troops comprising 3 infantry battalions, 1 artillery battalion and auxiliary units, to fight under U.N. Command in Korea against the aggressor. With this decision Turkey wanted to demonstrate that she sincerely believed and had faith in the U.N. convictions concerning the establishment and continuation of peace in the world.

    Dr. M. Galip Baysan

  • SOME VIEWS ABOUT M. KEMAL ATATURK

    SOME VIEWS ABOUT M. KEMAL ATATURK

    It can be said that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s influence in the world was increased since his death. What he did in Turkey provided a guiding beacon for many African and Asian nations which were fighting their wars of independence following 1923.
    A French writer Marcel Savage was writing about him as follows.

    “From Egypt to India, in all parts of Islamic world, he is hailed by peasants as the beloved subject of God, by religious leaders as the sword of fait, by statesmen as the revolutionary of the East.”

    The Egyptian writer Musharrafa said “Ataturk’s value for the east is concrete and constructive, because he was shown us that our fiers that we would be crushed under the western culture are unfounded.”

    We would like to present to you in summary comments made about Mustafa Kemal Ataturk by some of the well known leaders of the world.

    “If Mustafa Kemal and his soldiers, whom you referred to as bandits and highwaymen, were here, we would have a statue made of each and everyone of them.” (French Premier Briand-1921)

    “Think of an instance when the Renaissance, Reforms and scientific and cultural revolution of the West, the French Revolution and the industrial revolution all squeezed into the life span of an individual and imposed by law. Thus Ataturk carried out this revolutionary programme between 1920 and 1930, one which has not been implemented in any country. (British historian Prof. Arnold Toynbee)

    Mustafa Kemal is not socialist, but he is obviously an able organizer, a progressive, well meaning and clever leader. He is fighting an independence war. I believe that he will be able to defeat the imperialists and the Sultan and his followers.” (Soviet Leader Lenin-1921)

    “Gentlemen, it is not frequent that we see a genius coming through the centuries.İt is the misfortune of the Allies that this great genius happens to belong to the Turkish Nation.” (British Prime Minister Lloyd George)
    “Ataturk is a leader who has taught us that a nation can create the means that would lead her to independence even when she is devoid and stripped of her strengths and capabilities. His first pupil is Mussolini and I am the second one. It is the great genius, creature of modern Turkey who presented her former allies, which had fallen down by a stroke of bad luck, the first magnificent example of development.” (Adolf Hitler)

    “I asked the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov, while we were having a conversation, who he thought was the most interesting and the greatest statesmen in Europe? İn his reply, he said the greatest statesman of the Europe did not live in Europe but that he lived beyond the Straits, in Ankara and he was the president of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal.” (USA President, Franklin D. Roosevelt)

    “Kemal Ataturk or Kemal Pasha, as we knew him in the days of my youth was my hero. I was very touched when I read about his great revolution. I appreciated immensely his affords in trying to make Turkey modern state. This dynamism and perseverance affected one beyond description. He is one of the builders of the modern era in the East. I continue to be among his greatest admirers.” (Indian Head of State, Jawaharlal Nehru)

    “Ataturk’s life and achievements will continue to be a source of inspiration not only for the Turkish nation but also for all the free nations of the world.” (Chinese Head of State Chiang-Khai- Shek)
    “At a time when we were a spark without luster, with his glance we became a sun illuminating the whole world.” (Pakistan National Poet- Ikbal)

    “In Pakistan, we regard Kemal Ataturk as not only one of the greatest statesmen of this century, but one of the greatest men of all ages.” Pakistan Head of State Eyup Khan)

    Dr. M. Galip Baysan

  • The İdea of Naval Attack to Dardanelle

    The İdea of Naval Attack to Dardanelle

    WİNSTON CHURCHİLL AND GALLİPOLİ COMPAİN
    ( 18th MARCH 1915)
    ( PART–4 )

    THE İDEA OF THE NAVAL ATTACK TO DARDANELLE:

    It was the common view that, it was Churchill who had brought about the war with Turkey. There for Churchill became angry with the Turks. On 17 August the Prime Minister Asquit noted “Winston, in his most bellicose mood all for sending a torpedo flotilla through the Dardanelle’s to sink the Goeben and her consort. Cabinet opinion, however, was swayed by the views of the Secretary of State of War and the Secretary of State for India, who argued that it would be damaging for Britain to appear to be the aggressor against the Ottoman Empire.” (1) Churchill continued to press for action. On 1 September he initiated staff talks between the Admiralty and the war office to plan an attack on Turkey in the event of war. The fallowing day he received authority from the Cabinet to sink Turkish vessels if they issued from the Dardanelles in company with the Goeben and Breslau. After getting this authorization Dardanelles Squadron Commander stopped a Turkish torpedo boat on 27 September. Upon this hostile demonstration Enver Pasha authorized the German officer commanding the Turkish defences of the Dardanelles to order the Straits to be sealed off and the complete the laying of minefields across them. This action cut of the Allied merchant shipping because the Dardanelle had been Russia’s one ice-free maritime passageway to the west. Through them Russia sent 50% of her export trade, notably her wheat crop which in turn, to buy arms and ammunition for the war. This was also the result of Churchill’s another fault.
    By the end of August Churchill had been violently an anti-Turk. He and Lloyd George were enthusiastic advocates of the Balkan confederation. On 31st August Churchill wrote a private letter to Balkan leaders urging the creation of a confederation of Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania, Montenegro and Greece to join the Allies. On 2 September he initiated private talks with the Greek government to discuss the form that military cooperation between their two countries might take in an offensive operation against Ottoman Empire. He wrote to Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, “ All I am asking is that the interest and integrity of Turkey shall no longer be considered by you in any efforts which are made to secure common action among the Christian Balkan States.” (2) Churchill and some British politicians were point out in August 1914 that, having the Ottoman Empire for an enemy had its advantages. Free at last to cut up the Ottoman Empire and to offer portions of its territory to other countries at the eventual peace settlement. Britain could now hold out the lure of territorial gains in order to bring Italy and the Balkan countries into the war on her side. (3)
    In the Eastern Mediterranean, The British made sure of the two Turkish territories that they held under special arrangements. Cyprus – a leasehold since 1878 and Egypt since 1881- they annexed out of hand on the day that went to war with Turkey. At the Cabinet meeting on November 9 Lloyd George referred to the “ ultimate destiny of Palestine”, and after it Herbert Samuel spoke to Grey about the possible formation of a Jewish state, Mr. Churchill favoured an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula as the best way defending Egypt and Suez Canal, sir John Maxwell, about achieving the same end by an attack on Alexandretta (Iskenderun), where the Baghdad Railway ran near to the cost. And which seemed to Maxwell “The safest and most fruitful” way to embarrass the Turks. In August, when the Greeks offered to place all naval and military resources at the disposal of the Entente Powers was refused because of the Russian objections, and the idea of attacking Alexandretta was more than once discarded because of French susceptibilities about Syria. (4)
    In European theatre of war, vast Russian Armies had suffered defeat at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes; they wanted help in the form of arms and ammunition and they wanted the Turks distracted from their campaign in the Caucasus. If Russia collapsed, Germany’s worst serious worry, that of fighting a war on two fronts was gone. The situation revived an old idea of Winston Churchill, an operation to force Dardanelles and seize Istanbul. (5) At the beginning of 1915 when Lord Kitchener received the requests of Russian High Command for a diversionary attack over Turkish Soils, he changed in mind and very parallel to Churchill’s proposal he accepted a British assault to Dardanelles. Churchill on the morning of 3 January 1915, met his near group at Admiralty to reconsider whether, given the importance of keeping Russia in the war, it really would be out of the question to mount a wholly naval operation. The idea employing only warships that were old and expendable was raised; and the war group decided to ask the commander on the spot for his views. Churchill was interested especially in this concept, despite the difficulties that had been experienced when Admiral Duckwood’s British Fleet had attempted the same manoeuvre, unsuccessfully, in 1807.İn accordance with the concept once the fleet had overcome the decrepit Turkish shore- batteries and entered the Sea of Marmara, it was hoped that Greece, Bulgaria, and perhaps Romania and Italy, would abandon their neutrality and join a Balkan coalition against Turkey; and securing Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara would allow Russian ships again, to pass from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, enabling munitions to be delivered to Russia and Russian grain to the western allies.(6)
    When he received the positive answer from the commander British naval squadron off the Dardanelles Admiral Sackville Carden, Churchill convinced the war council that it was the key to shortening the war, which was then in a static situation in France and going badly for Russia. Further, it would possibly forestall some of the Balkan states. Churchill’s brilliant rhetoric and imaginative presentation may have convinced his fellows in the War Council that heavy navy guns and big shells would pulverise the Turkish forts. London had decided to put Admiral Carden’s plan into operation. The plan, which has been termed the only truly innovative strategic concept of the entire war, met with approval from both politicians and military authorities; Kitchener’s approval was doubtless greatly influenced by the fact that few military resources were envisaged, and thus the afford on the Western Front would not be compromised. It was believed that the appearance of British Fleet off Istanbul might cause the downfall of the Turkish Government and as Turkey’s only two munitions factories were within range of naval gunfire, even a short bombardment could effectively remove Turkey from the war at a stroke. As the plan progressed, an increased number of British ships were allocated for the expedition, even the new HMS Queen Elizabeth, one of the most powerful ships in the British Navy. (7)
    One evening, after dinner Violet Asquit spoke with Lord Kitchener and told him that it was Churchill who would deserve the accolades of triumph. She said, “ If Dardanelles comes off Winston will deserve full and almost sole credit. He has shown such courage and consistency in taking the responsibility throughout all the vacillations of Admiral Fisher and others.” Lord Kitchener replied indignantly “ Not at all. I was always strongly in favour of this operation.” (8)

    REFERENCES:

    (1) David Fromkin: A Peace The End All Peace, p.65-66 (Avan Books, New York-1990)
    (2) D.Fromkin,p.74,75
    (3) D.Fromkin,p.74
    (4) Elizabeth Monroe: Britain Moments in The Middle East 1914-1956,p.27-28(London-1963)
    (5) Joseph Murray: Gallipoli As I Saw It,p.11 ( London-1965)
    (6) Philip J.Haythornthwhite: Gallipoli-1915, Frontal assault on Turkey,p.8-9 ( London-1991)
    (7) P.J.Haythornthwhite,p.9
    (8) David Fromkin,p.135-136

    Dr. M. Galip Baysan

  • Stories of The Two Battleships

    Stories of The Two Battleships

    WİNSTON CHURCHİLL AND GALLİPOLİ COMPAİN
    ( 18th MARCH 1915)
    ( PART–3 )

    At the end of Balkan War, Djemal Pasha Minister of Marine invited a British advisory mission to Turkey. With Churchill’s support, Rear Admiral Sir Arthur H. Limpus was assigned as the head of the British naval mission. The British Advisory Mission to the Ottoman Navy was almost as large as the similar German mission to the Ottoman Army, led by the Prussian General of cavallary, Otto Liman von Sanders. The two missions to some extent counter- balanced each other.
    İn 1913 The Turks were suffering from their defeat in Balkan Wars. The conflict with Greece for Aegean islands was still continuing. Turks were determined to equalise their naval position in the Aegean and bought a battleship from Brazil. Despite the protests of Djemal pasha to the U.S. Ambassador, Henry Morgenthau, a violent Phil Hellene who rejoiced in his discomfiture, U.S.A. immediately sold two modern ships, the Idaho and the Mississippi, to the Greeks. (1) With the advice and assistant of British Naval advisors Turks ordered two modern battle ships to England, Sultan Osman and Reshadieh. Both had been built in British shipyards and were immensely powerful; the Sultan Osman mounted more (including 13.5 inch) guns than any battleship ever built before. The Sultan Osman was completed in May and the Turks had paid half of her purchased price; the Reshadieh was ready in early July.
    Their overall cost was 7.500.000. Pound. The money had been raised from the people voluntarily and every Anatolian peasant felt he had a share in these magnificent new ships, which at one move would wipe out of the Greeks’ sharp deal over the Idaho and Mississippi. It is well known that; women had sold their jewellery and school children had given up their pocket money to contribute to the popular subscription. Istanbul was ready to meet the arrival of the ships. Admiral Limpus had put out to sea from Istanbul on 27 July 1914, with ships of the Turkish Navy, waiting to greet the Sultan Osman I, and escort her back through the Straits of Dardanelle to the Ottoman capital, where a “Navy Week” had been scheduled with lavish ceremonies for the Minister of Marine, Ahmet Djemal, and for the cause of British- Ottoman friendships. In early July Turkish crew (about 500 soldiers under the command of Captain Rauf Bey) were ready to take over the ships.
    Churchill was aware that these ships meant a great deal to the Ottoman Turks. They were intended to be the making of the modern Ottoman Navy and it was assumed that they would enable the empire to face Greece in the Aegean and Russia in the Black Sea. He was against of this view in principle and although there was a strong British Naval Advisory team in Turkey, he received a very hostile decision for these ships. During the development of world crisis, 0n 27 July 1914, Churchill raised the issue of whether the Turkish Battleships could be taken by the Royal Navy. The chain of events which apparently flowed from Churchill’s initiative in this matter eventually led to him being blamed for the tragic outbreak of war in the Middle East. The next day Churchill directed to the First Sea Lord, Sir Archibald Moore. “ In case it may became necessary to acquire the 2 Turkish battleships that are nearing completion in British yards.”(2)
    The Turks suspected what Churchill had in mind, Rauf Bey and his sailors already on board a transport in the Tyne, attempted to hoist the Turkish flag and take his ships away. On 29 July the Foreign Office warned the Admiralty that the Sultan Osman I was taking on fuel and was under orders to depart for Istanbul immediately, even though unfinished. Churchill immediately ordered British security forces to guard the vessels and to prevent the Turkish crews from boarding them or from raising the Ottoman flag over them. (Which would have converted them, under prevailing international law, into Ottoman territory?) There had been a clash around the ships with a few causalities from both Turkish and British sides. On 31 July the cabinet accepted Churchill’s view that he ought to take both Turkish vessels for the Royal navy for possible use against the Germany in the event of war. Sultan Osman I became HMS Agincourt and Reshadieh became HMS Erin after this decision. (3) This events created a very big disappointments and hatred in Turkey and two days later an agreement was signed between Ottoman Empire and Germany.
    In Berlin, the German Government decided to send Mediterranean Fleet, which was composed of Goeben and Breslau under the command of Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon to Istanbul, in the early morning of 4 August. French Navy was occupied in convoying their troops from North Africa to France, so the task of intercepting the Goeben and Breslau fell to the British. No one in the British Fleet ever dreamed that the German ships were heading for Istanbul; presumably Churchill’s fear of the Turks had evaporated once he had carried out his coup on the Tyne. Churchill warned the Admiral in the Mediterranean, Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne for these two ships.
    Goeben, the one German ship at large in the Mediterranean, which outstripped in speed and power every vessel in the French Navy. British battle cruisers the Indomitable and the Indefatigable, which alone could compete with her speed were ordered to shadow and sink her. Prime Minister Asquit noted “Winston’s mouth watered for the Goeben.” Milne’s second-in-command, Rear Admiral Sir Ernest Troubridge was commanding an armoured cruiser squadron of four good ships and eight destroyers. (4) British Fleet couldn’t do anything to Goeben and Breslau and German Admiral Suchon found himself his ships untouched, on august 11th at the entrance to the Dardanelles, under the guns of the fortress of Cahanakkale.
    Enver Pasha, on his own responsibility ordered the commander at Chanakkale to allow the Goeben and Breslau to steam up to Istanbul. It was announced that the Germans sold these two ships instead of the two ships blocked by Winston Churchill two weeks ago. The crews put aside their caps and donned the fez, the Star and Crescent was hoisted, the Goeben became the Yavuz Sultan Selim and the Breslau the Midilli.
    Souchon replaced British Admiral Limpus in command of the Turkish fleet and on the 9th September the British Naval Mission was dismissed. Almost three months later on October 28 these two ships still German crewed, accompanied by some small Turkish vessels, entered the Black Sea and shelled the Russian Ports of Odessa, Sevastopol and Theodosia. Thus Ottoman Empire had been pushed into the war. (5) Winston Churchill remained as First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Milne had retired from the Navy on August 18th, but Rear Admiral Troubridge was court martialled in November and although acquitted, never held a sea command again.

    REFERENCES:

    (1) David Wilder: The Chanak Affair,p.24 ( Hutchinson of London-1969)
    (2) David Fromkin: A Peace The End All Peace, p.56-57 (Avan Books, New York-1990)
    (3)Philip J.Haythornthwhite: Gallipoli-1915, Frontal assault on Turkey,p.6 ( London-1991)
    (4) Violet Benham Carter: Winston Churchill, As I Knew Him,p.320-321 (The Reprint Society, London- 1966)
    (5)David Walder,p.27-28

    Dr. M.Galip Baysan

  • WİNSTON CHURCHİLL AND GALLİPOLİ COMPAİN

    WİNSTON CHURCHİLL AND GALLİPOLİ COMPAİN

    WİNSTON CHURCHİLL AND GALLİPOLİ COMPAİN

    ( 18th MARCH 1915)

    ( PART–2 )

     

    İn the Autumn of 1899 a war broke out in the South African Republic             (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State. There was a new and wonderful opportunity for Churchill to exercise his talents as a war correspondent. The Morning Post quickly took advantage of his availibility. To his amazement he was offered a contract which guaranteed 250 Pound a month, plus expenses, for covering the South African conflict. While he was there and trying to make his job in the best way, his train was attacked by Boers. As a result of fighting The Boers took more than 75 prisoners. One of them was Mr. Churchill.

    He was herded off to an officers’ prisoner of war camp at Pretoria. (1) Churchill with his other two friends agreed upon an escape plan and after many adventures he succeeded. İn June 1900 both Johannesburg and Pretoria were captured by the British Army. Churchill participated in both engagements. And than he returned to England. Almost ten months’ accumulated salary from the Morning Post left him extremely well of financially. He went to Oldham, the scene of his first political defeat and try once again for a seat in Parliament. This time, as being a war hero, he won the elections and in February1901 he made his first appearance as a member of the House of Common.

    İn 1904 Churchill severed his connection with the Conservative Party and dramatically took a seat next to Lloyd George on the Liberal side of the House of Commons. İn the next election which was held on January 1906 Liberals won by a huge majority.The new Prime Minister appointed the 31 years old Churchill Under- Secretary for the Colonies. Despite his intense involvement in politics, Churchill found time during these early days of his political career to write a two volume biography of his father. Some critics consider  this biography, entitled “Lord Randolph Churchill” to be one of his best works. İn the same time he married with Clementine Hazier on September 12, 1908 and in the course of time five children was born to the Churchills.

    In 1910 he was moved to the Home Office. Toward the end of his term as Home Secretary, he was required to put down a series of violent doc and railway strikes that were sweeping the country.To preserve order Churchill called out the troops. As a result, demonstrations occurred and a number of people were killed. For his part in this bloodshed  Churchill was bitterly denounced by the unions.(2)

    İn the summer of 1911 an unexpected opportunity arouse for him to meet some of his ambitious. At that time during the course of a brifing about international crisis , The Asquit Government had been schocked to learn that the Admiralty was not prepared to carry out its wartime missions in support of the Army.To their amazement, Cabinet Ministers at the time were told that the Royal Navy was unable to transport British Expeditionary Force, across the English Channnel. They also learned that the Admiralty was unwilling to creat a Naval War Staff. İt became clear to Prime Minister Asquit and his colleagues that a new First Lord of the Admiralty had to be appointed to institute basic reforms. Churchill, then Home Secretary angled for the job, and his mentor Lloyd George, proposed him for it. Predictably, his candidacy was hampered by his youth.At thirty-six he was already, with a solitary exception, the youngest person ever to serve as Home Secretary; and his many enemies, who claimed that he had pushed himself forward unseemly haste, argued that he had run ahead of himself.

    To them he appeared to posses in excess charasteristic faults of youth: obstinacy, inexperience, poor judgement and impulsiveness.Beside these he often changed his views;and since he always held his views passionately, his change of mind were as violent and extreme as they were fraquent. He had been a Tory and now was a Liberal. He had been the most pro-German of ministers and had became the most anti-German. He had been the leading pro-Turk in the cabinet and was to became the most anti-Turk. The other leading contender for the position of First Lord expressed warm admiration for Churchill’s energy and courage, but echoed the usual accusation that the young Home Secretary was too apt “ to act first and think afterwards.” For whatever reason, the Prime Minister decided to take a chance on Churchill. (3)

        As a First Lord of Admiralty, Winston Churchill surrounded himself with a group of well trained advisers, one of them was a retired Admiral John Fisher. He was almost 74 years old when churchill, against some opposition, called him back to the service. The two, made a wonderful team despite the differences in their ages. İn accordance with the evaluation of his one friend  (doughter of Prime Minister Asquit) “ Winston found in Fisher a veritable volcano of knowledge and of inspiration.” (4) The impact of Churchill’s personality vibrated through the Admiralty. He created an efficient and capable staff, framing a joint strategy for the Navy in close union with Army.

    He and his staff spend every afford to meet the urgent need to increase gun-powder and the speed of the new ships and to prepare against a sudden attack by Germany as though it may come next day. He decreed that Naval officers as well as resident clerks should be on duty night and day on week-days, Sundays and holidays, so that in the event of a surprise attack no moment should be lost in giving the alarm. Naturally there were new appointments to be made- some admirals transferred to other duties and some new comers joint the new headquarters. He also ordered a large chart of the North Sea to be hung up upon the wall behind his chair. On this chart a staff officer marked the position of German Fleet with flags. His first Job was to look at this map every morning. (5) At the result of all of these measures when England entered the First World War on August 4, 1914, the naval superiority of the British navy was undisputed.

     

     

    DİPNOTLAR:

    (1)     Quentin Reynolds: Winston Churchill, p.52-54 (Random House New York-1963)

     

    (2)      Q.Reynolds, p.72-78

    (3)     David Fromkin: A Peace The End All Peace, p.52 (Avan Books, New York-1990)

    (4)     Violet Benham Carter: Winston Churchill, As I Knew Him,p.240 (The Reprint Society,      London- 1966)

    (5)     Q.Reynolds,p.82-83

     

    Dr. M. Galip Baysan