Author: Media Watch

  • Poland’s Misunderstood Holocaust Law

    Poland’s Misunderstood Holocaust Law

    My government wants to ban accusations of Polish wartime complicity for the sake of honoring history.

    Mateusz Morawiecki

    Nazi'lerin toplama kampı, Auschwitz, Birkenau, Polonya
    A visitor is seen behind the lettering “Arbeit macht frei” (work makes you free) at the entrance of the memorial site of the former Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau in Oswiecim, Poland, on January 25, 2015. Seventy years after it was liberated, 300 Auschwitz survivors — most now in their nineties — will on January 27, 2015 return to the former Nazi death camp, the site of the largest single number of murders committed during World War II. AFP PHOTO / JOEL SAGET (Photo credit should read JOEL SAGET/AFP/Getty Images)

    World War II altered not only the fate of nations but also that of millions of families in Europe. From the viewpoint of Poland, it was the end of a multicultural, multiethnic world that had flourished for more than seven centuries. The borders of prewar Poland in the east included cities such as Nowogrodek, Rowne, and Stanislawow.

    Nowogrodek was the birthplace of Adam Mickiewicz, one of the greatest ever Polish poets, who was personally involved in the process of creating a Jewish legion as part of his efforts to fight for Polish independence in the 19th century. Rowne was the birthplace of the mother of Israeli author Amos Oz, whose novel A Tale of Love and Darkness inspired actress Natalie Portman to make a brilliant movie about Israel’s difficult beginnings seen through the lens of a family of Polish Jews. As for Stanislawow, it is a place close to my heart. My mother’s family comes from this city, which is now called Ivano-Frankivsk and lies within Ukrainian borders.

    continious foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/19/polands-misunderstood-holocaust-law

  • Germany’s Post-Merkel Power Fraus

    Germany’s Post-Merkel Power Fraus

    The German chancellor’s most likely successors are both women — but the similarities end there.

    It shouldn’t surprise that Angela Merkel, as the leader of Germany’s biggest conservative party, has shied away from being called a “feminist.” But it’s indisputable that her three terms as chancellor (the fourth term began last week) have changed the lives of German women for good. Doors previously shut to them have been opened — nowhere more pronouncedly than in German politics itself.

    Even as a new four-year term gets underway, the outlines of the post-Merkel era have already come into view. Germany’s cabinet has been stocked with new female faces, including atop both Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), which means women are likely to lead the country for years to come. And nobody is better situated to compete to replace Merkel as chancellor four years from now than the SPD’s freshly installed leader, Andrea Nahles, and the CDU’s new general secretary, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer.

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    The two politicians — Nahles, 47, and Kramp-Karrenbauer, 55 — have been tasked by their respective parties to do what their male predecessors couldn’t: namely, stop the disintegration of Germany’s big-tent postwar establishment. In the September 2017 election, both parties chalked up record losses — the CDU with 33 percent of the vote (which includes its partner the Christian Social Union), the SPD with a lowly 21 percent — leaving them with few alternatives but to reluctantly join forces again in a “grand coalition,” for the third time since 2005. But this latest halfhearted, cobbled-together partnership will likely accelerate the trend. The SPD now stands at 19 percent in polls, just five points ahead of the far-right Alternative for Germany. Two weeks ago, they were even at 15 percent a piece.

    Both Nahles and Kramp-Karrenbauer clearly believe that they are equal to the generational task of pulling their parties out of their death spirals. Both are career politicos, practicing Catholics, and hail from small German towns along France’s borderlands just over a hundred miles from each other. Unlike Merkel, both are mothers: Kramp-Karrenbauer of three, Nahles of one. Like the present chancellor, both project an air of serious professionalism while also steering clear of the arrogant style common among the alpha males who still populate much of their respective parties’ ranks.

    But that’s where their similarities stop.

    Nahles is a known commodity on the German national stage, having nimbly climbed the party’s hierarchy since her entry into the SPD as an 18-year-old. Initially on the party’s anti-capitalist left, she has since mellowed without relinquishing her Attac membership. In the party’s executive since 1997, she has held half a dozen posts, though not one of them determined by popular vote. Most recently, from 2013 to 2017, she served as the federal minister for labor and social issues, where she muscled through the term’s most impressive socially minded legislation: a national minimum wage, pension reform, and safeguards for the temporarily employed. Today, her expertise and pragmatism are appreciated even in the CDU, which originally doubted that it could work with such a wild-haired rebel on anything.

    The German media have dubbed Nahles “the boxer” — and not only because of her tenacity, toughness, and broad shoulders. In the thunderous speeches that have become her trademark — whether at union halls or at the SPD’s headquarters in Berlin — Nahles can look like a prize fighter in the ring, stabbing the air with clenched fists, her face grimaced and scarlet, eyes blazing.

    Yet she also has a reputation for sometimes hitting too hard. Her diction can occasionally be churlish, almost adolescent. A few days after last year’s national vote, pledging vigorous opposition to a CDU-led government without the SPD, she said her party would deliver the CDU a “good smack in the kisser.” She had to apologize for that — and eat humble pie, too, when it became clear that another grand coalition was in the offing.

    But Nahles has come as far as she has because Germans have largely been willing to chalk up her excesses to her working-class authenticity. Indeed, her father was a master mason, her mother a financial clerk. Nahles is a social democrat through and through, a true believer in social justice and respect for the working classes. Nahles was largely responsible for shoring up SDP support for the new coalition government, which many in the party, especially on the left, resisted. They argued that after hemorrhaging so much support the party needed a term in opposition, outside of Merkel’s long shadow, to renew itself. On a whirlwind journey across the country, Nahles won over reluctant comrades one local branch at a time.

    In return, the SPD elected Nahles to the highest post in the historic party of August Bebel and Willy Brandt: the first chairwoman ever in the party’s 154-year history. “This is really something extraordinary,” explains Tina Hildebrandt, an editor at the weekly Die Zeit. “The SPD sees itself as the party of women’s rights, which historically it has been, but it’s always been a real men’s club. Men have always had the say. Nahles’s tenure is a kind of reality test for the SPD.”

  • The U.S. Alliance With Turkey Is Worth Preserving

    The U.S. Alliance With Turkey Is Worth Preserving

    Ankara is a difficult friend. That doesn’t mean the United States should cut it loose.

    If the United States didn’t already face enough troubles in Syria, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently threatened American troops with an “Ottoman slap” if they interfered with Turkey’s military incursion into northwestern Syria. The threat, coming two days before a visit to Turkey by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, underscored just how contentious relations between Ankara and Washington have become, and how close this historic alliance is to crumbling altogether — to the detriment of both states.

    The list of issues dividing the United States and Turkey is a long one. U.S. and other Western officials look with alarm on Erdogan’s Putinesque consolidation of power and disregard for human rights, and have protested the arrest of U.S. citizens and Turks employed by American diplomatic missions. Turkish officials, for their part, accuse the United States of instigating a July 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan and harboring the man most Turks believe was its mastermind: the spiritual leader, erstwhile Erdogan ally, and Pennsylvania resident Fethullah Gulen.

    Even more sharply dividing Washington and Ankara are the divergent paths they have tread in Syria for the better part of a decade. Erdogan was furious at the Obama administration for what Turks perceived as U.S. indifference to the threat the Syrian conflict posed to their country. When the United States finally did intercede, only to make allies of the Turks’ mortal enemies — the People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia, a Syrian offshoot of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — Ankara’s anger mounted. For their part, U.S. officials were troubled by Ankara co-opting jihadis as allies in the Syrian fight, and more recently with its cooperation with Russia, which has extended to the purchase of a Russian air defense system that complicates Turkey’s NATO commitments.

    The temptation is strong in Washington to simply jettison the foundering alliance with Turkey

    The temptation is strong in Washington to simply jettison the foundering alliance with Turkey

    — as was recently done with Pakistan — and even to impose sanctions on Ankara for its actions. And the feeling in Turkey, where 67 percent of the population harbors an unfavorable view of Americans, is surely mutual.

    Yet cutting Turkey loose would constitute a self-inflicted wound. Turkey is not just President Erdogan but a regional geographic and economic giant that stands as a buffer between Europe and the Middle East, and between the Middle East and Russia. Losing Turkey as a Western ally would mean bringing the Mideast to Europe’s threshold, and the potential frontier of Russian influence into the heart of the Middle East. Turkey is also the state best positioned to balance against Iran, whose ambitions and influence are growing along with its partnership with Russia. The dependency is mutual; without the United States, Turkey would be left to Tehran and Moscow’s tender mercies.

    Preserving the Turkish-American alliance and the strategic value both sides derive from it will require refocusing on shared strategic threats, such as the growing Russia-Iran alliance, while compromising on the disagreements distracting from that focus. While there is little the United States can do to assuage Erdogan’s more paranoid concerns, greater flexibility is possible when it comes to the Syrian Kurds.

    Vital to reaching a compromise are commitments made during Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s recent visit to Ankara. According to Turkish officials, the United States has reportedly agreed to decrease the Kurdish militia presence west of the Euphrates River around the strategic town of Manbij, which Turks fear is aimed at creating a contiguous zone of Kurdish control along Turkey’s southern border with Syria. Turkey, in turn, could tolerate a continued American and YPG presence in the Kurdish areas of northern Syria east of the Euphrates as the only way to keep the U.S. in Syria.

    Some in the United States see any accommodation of Turkish concerns regarding the Syrian Kurds as a betrayal of a partner that proved doughty in the fight against the Islamic State. Yet the proposed arrangement holds advantages for all parties involved. For all its bluster, Turkey would be far worse off without the United States as an ally; what’s more, U.S. influence is the best chance of convincing Syrian Kurds to break with the PKK and forge their own path, as Iraqi Kurds did.

    As for the Kurds, the United States would not abandon them in their homeland east of the Euphrates, but simply turn Manbij over to local officials under U.S. and Turkish security guarantees. Kurdish aspirations may be grander, but the United States is not obligated to entertain its allies’ every ambition here or elsewhere, especially when those aims threaten another ally or the stability of the region.

    For the United States, it would make little strategic sense to alienate Turkey over the Kurdish issue. Turkey, the world’s 17th largest economy and one of the Middle East’s primary military powers. In Syria itself, the approximately 2,000 U.S. troops now in the country’s northeast cannot be reliably supplied without air and land access through Turkey, given Iraq’s susceptibility to Iranian influence. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the United States accomplishing much of anything in Syria militarily or diplomatically in the face of determined Iranian and Russian resistance if we cannot even manage to find common ground there with our putative ally.

  • TAGS (Trump Armenian Genocide Statement). By Garen Yegparian

    TAGS (Trump Armenian Genocide Statement). By Garen Yegparian

    TAGS (Trump Armenian Genocide Statement)

    Trump Armenian Genocide Statement—that’s what TAGS stands for. Last year, when he had his first chance to do right on the matter of the Armenian Genocide, U.S. President Donald Trump gave us the same mealy-mouthed meaninglessness we had gotten accustomed to from his immediate predecessors in that office.

    Donald Trump (Photo: Gage Skidmore)

    We are about six weeks out from proclamation/resolution/statement (PRS) season when it comes to the annual spike in intensity of genocide recognition efforts, so it is very timely to discuss what our expectations of Trump are or should be. It seems to me there are two aspects to consider.

    First, let’s address how we should approach heads of state and governments when it comes to Armenian Genocide recognition. It strikes me that should adopt a “one chance” policy. The first April that person is in office, s/he should be expected to make an appropriate statement, including the word “genocide” coupled with relevant, implementable, policy that will guide the course of that country. Anything less, even if it includes the word “genocide” is far too little, too late. The time for such platitudes is past. Armenians’ expectations are far more hard-nosed now. We want something that will produce real results, not just good feelings. It should be permanent in its effect, that is, it should not require annual renewal. Otherwise, we will forever be in the position of the proverbial dog chasing its tail. This does not mean we should sever relations with an executive-office-holder who fails to deliver on our expectations. Rather, we should appropriately criticize her/him and simply focus on other issues of Armenian concern where cooperation is possible. Repeatedly groveling for a “handout” when one can reasonably expect no benefit is simply humiliating.

    In Trump’s case, since this “one chance” rule was not in place last year, we should make every effort to elicit an appropriate utterance from him in 2018. Turkey’s crescendoing arrogance and troublemaking might provide sufficient impetus to move the White House’s various entrenched bureaucracies to reduce or eliminate their opposition to a proper Genocide PRS, as described in the previous paragraph. Congressmember Adam Schiff makes this argument in his piece Turkey’s Descent into Authoritarianism published a little over two weeks ago.

    Another interesting argument is made by Robert M. Morgenthau, the famous Ambassador Morgenthau’s grandson, in a Wall Street Journal piece from late January titled Will Trump Tell the Truth About the Armenian Genocide? He thinks that because Trump is so unconventional, he just might be willing to rock the boat enough to give proper recognition to the Genocide. Of course this would still be insufficient based on my requirements for something results, rather than feelings, oriented. It is something worth thinking about.

    But, let’s say that Trump is willing to go all the way, recognize and change policy, give appropriate marching orders to the Departments of Defense and State. The question becomes, do we, Armenians, want that action to come from someone like Trump?

    Why would this question even arise? Trump’s inconsistency, erraticness, thoughtlessness, impulsiveness, intellectual-rigorlessness, vacuousness, and just plain inappropriate-for-the-presidency personality could easily devalue, render meaningless, any Genocide related action or position he may take. He is not even like Reagan, who at least had some political experience and a tolerable presidential bearing and mien. That’s why Reagan’s 1981 statement (inserted by his speechwriter, Ken Khachigian, after getting appropriate clearances, as recently documented by Peter Musurlian in an interview with him) carried weight then and still does now.

    Nevertheless, I think it would be a good thing if he were to take action, but especially because of who he is, it becomes doubly important that what he does meets the “practicality” requirements I set forth above.

    All the Armenians who voted for him (and heck, everyone else, too) should engage in a massive letter writing/e-mailing/tweeting campaign urging Donald Trump to properly characterize the Genocide and direct that U.S. policy reflect it.

  • Turkish-Iranian trade revived amid growing cooperation in Syria

    Turkish-Iranian trade revived amid growing cooperation in Syria

    Mehmet Cetingulec

    Article Summary
    Turkey and Iran have reversed a four-year downturn in bilateral trade as collaboration in Syria increases, but the possibility of a setback remains real.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (R) meets with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani during an extraordinary meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul, Dec. 13, 2017.

    After a four-year downturn, trade between Turkey and Iran rose in 2017, as the two neighbors began collaborating in Syria. Judging by figures from the past five years, the political climate between Ankara and Tehran seems to directly affect commercial ties. Their bilateral trade volume contracted during periods when Turkey’s Middle East policies led to closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia and deeper differences with Iran, but perked up in 2017, when the two countries engaged in joint efforts in Syria.

    Trade volume between Turkey and Iran reached an all-time high in 2012, totaling $21.9 billion. In 2013, it fell sharply, to $14.5 billion, under the impact of US sanctions on Iran. The decline continued in 2014, down to $13.7 billion. In a bid to prop up commercial ties, the two countries enacted a preferential trade agreement at the start of 2015, cutting tariffs on hundreds of products. A target was set of $35 billion in annual bilateral trade.

    The nuclear agreement Iran signed with the world powers soon led to the lifting of sanctions, fueling hope that no major obstacles remained to the desired boom in bilateral trade. Yet despite positive developments, trade volume slumped to $9.7 billion in 2015 and then to $9.6 billion in 2016. The worsening figures were a clear sign that commercial ties would fail to take off unless the two countries resolved areas of conflict in their regional policies, chief among them the crisis in Syria.

    Things began to change in 2017, as Turkey came to loggerheads with the United States in Syria and engaged in efforts with Russia and Iran toward a resolution to the conflict. A significant factor bringing Ankara and Tehran closer has been a shared concern that their countries could be next in line for trouble stemming from the regional upheaval, with the Kurdish problem growing more complicated for both of them.

    Turks have long been concerned that Western powers want to “divide” their country, and this has been a major factor shaping domestic and foreign policies alike. In this vein, one major motivation behind Turkey’s new alliances is to move to neutralize any risks that might lead to partition. For a great deal of ordinary Turks and even state officials, many NATO countries are not really allies, but Western powers plotting to carve up Turkey to create a proxy Kurdish state adjacent to Iran and diminish Turkey’s position as a regional power. Hence, the idea of bolstering regional alliances enjoys solid public support. Political, military and economic rapprochement with Iran, Russia and Iraq and the narrative of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity rest on the notion of standing together with allies to stave off threats to the integrity of Turkey’s border and avoid partition.

    Amid the drive to strengthen regional alliances, high-level visits between Turkey and Iran intensified last year. The two sides agreed to use their national currencies, instead of the US dollar, in bilateral trade. A deal to that effect was signed by the Turkish and Iranian central banks in October.

    Parallel to the political rapprochement, the trade volume rose for the first time since 2012, standing at $10.7 billion at the end of 2017, representing a $1.1 billion increase from 2016. Iran benefited more from the revival than Turkey did. Its imports from Turkey amounted to about $3.2 billion, down from nearly $5 billion in 2016, while its exports to Turkey increased to more than $7.5 billion, up from about $4.7 billion the previous year. In other words, Iran reversed the trade balance in its favor, from a $266 million deficit in 2016 to a surplus of nearly $4.3 billion in 2017.

    In fact, however, the figures show that bilateral trade is only returning to normal. In the past 17 years, 2016 was the only year in which Iran ran a trade deficit in regard to Turkey, with surpluses ranging between $579 million and $8.8 billion in other years.

    How did the balance shift in Iran’s favor? Increased oil supplies to Turkey were the main factor. Official data is not yet available, but according to figures compiled by Turkey’s state-run Anatolia Agency, oil imports from Iran reached 7.4 million tons in the first seven months of 2017, a 142% increase compared to the same period the previous year. Increases of more than 100% were also seen in Turkish imports of untreated zinc, nitrogenous minerals and chemical fertilizers, untreated aluminum, and fresh and dried fruits.

    Why then did Turkish exports decrease? The decline stems primarily from a dramatic slump in Turkey’s once-booming gold exports to Iran, which trickled to $111 million last year, from $1.3 billion in 2016.

    Iran’s vast energy reserves — 150 billion barrels of crude oil and 33.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas — make it one of the world’s leading energy producers, while neighboring Turkey remains a major oil and gas importer amid efforts to become a key energy route between the Middle East and Europe.

    Bolstering economic ties with Iran may be beneficial to Turkey, but the possibility of a setback cannot be ignored given recent fence-mending moves between Ankara and Washington. The Donald Trump administration clearly has Iran in its crosshairs. Meanwhile, Turkey has become a potential target of US sanctions over its plan to purchase advanced Russian missiles, atop the lingering spat in Syria.

    If Ankara is committed to mending fences with Washington, doing so while maintaining cooperation with Iran will require masterful balancing acts.

    Found in: Economy and trade, Syria war spillover

    Mehmet Cetingulec is a Turkish journalist with 34 years professional experience, including 23 years with the Sabah media group during which he held posts as a correspondent covering the prime minister’s and presidential offices, economy news chief and parliamentary bureau chief. For nine years, he headed the Ankara bureau of the daily Takvim, where he also wrote a regular column. He has published two books.

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  • Lies, Damn Lies, and Armenian Deaths

    Lies, Damn Lies, and Armenian Deaths

    On April 24, 2009—Armenian Remembrance Day— President Barack Obama issued a statement “remember[ing] the 1.5 million Armenian [deaths] in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.” The President stumbled.

    To paraphrase Mark Twain, there are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and the number of Armenians who are claimed by Armenians and their echo chambers to have died in an alleged World War I genocide. Almost a century later, the number of deaths they assert oscillates between 1.5-2 million. But the best contemporary estimates by Armenians or their sympathizers were 300,000-750,000 (compared with 2.4 million Ottoman Muslim deaths in Anatolia). Further, not a single one of those deaths necessarily falls within the definition of genocide in the authoritative Genocide Convention of 1948. It requires proof that the accused was responsible for the physical destruction of a group in whole or in substantial part specifically because of their race, nationality, religion, or ethnicity. A political or military motivation for a death falls outside the definition.

    Immediately after the war, when events and memories were fresh, Armenians had no incentive to concoct high casualty figures or genocidal motivations for their deaths. Their objective was statehood. Armenians were encouraged by the self-determination concept in President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, (while conveniently forgetting that they were a minority in Eastern Anatolia where they hoped to found a new nation). Armenian leaders pointed to their military contribution to defeating the Ottomans and population figures that would sustain an Armenian nation.

    Boghus Nubar, then Head of the Armenian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919), wrote to the French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon: “The Armenians have been, since the beginning of the war, de facto belligerents, as you yourself have acknowledged, since they have fought alongside the Allies on all fronts, enduring heavy sacrifices and great suffering for the sake of their unshakable attachment to the cause of the Entente….” Nubar had earlier written to the Foreign Minister on October 29, 1918, that Armenians had earned their independence: “We have fought for it. We have poured out our blood for it without stint. Our people played a gallant part in the armies that won the victory.”

    When their quest for statehood shipwrecked on the Treaty of Lausanne and annexation by the Soviet Union in 1921, Armenians revised their soundtrack to endorse a contrived genocide thesis. It seeks a “pound of flesh” from the Republic of Turkey in the form of recognition, reparations, and boundary changes. To make their case more convincing, Armenians hiked the number of deaths. They also altered their story line from having died as belligerents against the Turks to having perished like unarmed helpless lambs.

    Vahan Vardapet, an Armenian cleric, estimated a prewar Ottoman Armenian population of 1.26 million. At the Peace Conference, Armenian leader Nubar stated that 280,000 remained in the Empire and 700,000 had emigrated elsewhere. Accepting those Armenian figures, the number of dead would be 280,000. George Montgomery of the Armenia-American Society estimated a prewar Armenian population of 1.4-1.6 million, and a casualty figure of 500,000 or less. Armenian Van Cardashian, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1919, placed the number of Armenian dead at 750,000, i.e., a prewar population of 1.5 million and a post-war figure of 750,000.

    After statehood was lost, Armenians turned to their genocide playbook which exploited Christian bigotries and contempt for Ottoman Muslims. They remembered earlier successful anti-Ottoman propaganda. United States Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the war, Henry Morganthau, was openly racist and devoted to propaganda. On November 26, 1917, Morgenthau confessed in a letter to President Wilson that he intended to write a book vilifying Turks and Germans to, “win a victory for the war policy of the government.” In his biography, “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story,” Morgenthau betrays his racist hatred toward Turks (“humanity and civilization never for a moment enters their mind”) and unconditional admiration for Armenians (“They are so superior to the Turks intellectually and morally.”).

    British Prime Minister Gladstone’s histrionic figure of 60,000 Bulgarian Christians slaughtered in 1876 captured the imagination of the west. The true figure later provided by a British Ambassador was 3,500—including Turks who were first slain by the Christians.

    From 280,000-750,000, Armenians initially raised their death count to 800,000 to test the credibility waters. It passed muster with uninformed politicians easily influenced by campaign contributions and voting clout. Armenians then jumped the number to 1.5 million, and then 1.8 million by Armenian historian Kevork Aslan. For the last decades, an Armenian majority seems to have settled on the 1.5 million death plateau—which still exceeds their contemporary estimates by 200 to 500 percent. They are now testing the waters at 2.5-3 million killed as their chances for a congressional genocide resolution recede. It speaks volumes that champions of the inflated death figures have no explanation for why Armenians on the scene would have erred. Think of the absurdity of discarding the current death count of Afghan civilians in the United States-Afghan war in favor of a number deduced in the year 2109!

    Armenians have a genuine tale of woe. It largely overlaps with the tale of tragedy and suffering that can be told by Ottoman Muslims during the war years: 2.4 million deaths in Anatolia, ethnic cleansing, starvation, malnutrition, untreated epidemics, and traumatic privations of war under a decrepit and collapsing Empire.

    Unskewed historical truth is the antechamber of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. That is why the Government of Turkey has proposed an international commission of impartial and independent experts with access to all relevant archives to determine the number and characterization of World War I deaths. Armenians are balking because they are skeptical of their own figures and accusations.

    *Bruce Fein is a resident scholar at the Turkish Coalition of America.