In the closing stages of the Syrian civil war, five key powers — Turkey, Russia, Iran, the United States and Israel — are competing for influence and control. Moscow and Tehran firmly back Syrian President Bashar al Assad but differ not only in the levels of support they provide but also in their overall objectives. Russia has used the Syrian conflict to expand its footprint in the Middle East and will be protective of its gains and materiel, though Moscow has little desire for open conflict with Turkey, the United States or Israel. Iran, on the other hand, will be more aggressive in its support for Damascus, especially in opposition to Ankara and Washington. Tehran will also continue to build up its forces inside Syria as a deterrent to Israel and as a means to supply Hezbollah, its powerful ally in nearby Lebanon. Israel will attempt to foil Iran’s plans but is intrinsically wary of sparking an unintended conflict with Russia.
Turkey and the United States remain opposed to Assad’s rule, but despite being NATO allies, they will pursue their own agendas in Syria. The United States is focused on eradicating remnants of the Islamic State in the country, though Washington more broadly seeks to remove Iranian influence from Syria as part of its anti-Iran strategy. Challenging Iran in Syria creates tension between the United States and Russia — Moscow cannot and will not force out Iran. Despite efforts to deconflict, the possibility of a military incident involving U.S. and Russian assets is not beyond the realm of possibility.
The possibility of a breakout conflict involving the major powers overseeing the Syrian conflict is conceivable in 2019.
Turkey, for its part, will maintain its focus on containing Kurdish forces in Syria. This is problematic for the United States, which uses the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group Ankara sees as a terrorist organization, as an ally against the Islamic State and as a proxy against Iran. In Syria’s northwest, Turkey’s pledge to protect Idlib province could stretch Ankara’s credibility as a local partner, especially given Damascus’ stated goal of total reconquest. Idlib could well become a flashpoint among Turkey, Iran, Syrian loyalist forces and, more remotely, Russia. Given the opposing interests in Syria, the potential for accidental escalation or even a state-to-state confrontation in 2019 is higher than ever, though every power will take steps to avoid this. Learn more about the possibilities for state-to-state confrontation and what 2019 will hold for the Syrian conflict.
Handling Turkey’s Fragile Economy
The biggest challenge facing Turkey in 2019 will be its distressed economy. As well as managing record inflation, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have to contend with a privately held corporate debt bill roughly equal to a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product — all while avoiding another lira crisis. Erdogan will be politically compelled to broaden his support base ahead of local elections in the spring, courting financially concerned Turks from across the electoral spectrum, some of whom have been turned off by the president’s nationalist policies. Turkey’s brittle economy also weakens Ankara’s position when it comes to dealing with key partners in the West. The U.S. relationship with Turkey is increasingly fractious thanks in part to Ankara’s growing ties with Russia and Washington’s support for the YPG in Syria.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have his work cut out in 2019 to stabilize the Turkish economy.
Because of its vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure, Turkey will attempt to shore up foreign investment and maintain stable economic relations with Europe. However, Turkey’s historically complex relationship with the European Union will complicate that effort. Beyond stabilizing its economic situation, Ankara will continue to pursue other core imperatives in 2019, including the containment of autonomous Kurdish movements in Turkey’s former Ottoman domains. Ankara will exert whatever influence it can in northern Syria and continue military strikes against Kurdistan Workers’ Party positions in northern Iraq. Learn more about Turkey’s precarious economic position going into 2019.
The Great Power Competition Intensifies. The United States will escalate its strategic offensive against China with tariffs, sanctions, regulatory buffers around emerging technologies, stronger backing for Taiwan and a more assertive posture in the South China Sea. At the same time, failing arms control pacts will accelerate an arms race among the United States, Russia and China. The edgier geopolitical climate will create strategic opportunities for more vulnerable borderland powers, such as Poland and Taiwan, but will also create massive headaches for middle powers trying to find neutral ground, such as Turkey, India and Vietnam.
Increased Geopolitical Risk for Business. Citing national security threats, the United States will lean heavily on Europe, Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea and Taiwan to erect stronger barriers to Chinese investment. This will affect research and trade in strategic areas, from artificial intelligence to 5G network rollouts beginning in 2019. China’s imperative to catch up in critical areas like aerospace and high-end semiconductor development will only increase cyberthreats to corporations and compel an overall more offensive U.S. policy in cyberspace. In addition, corporations will have to contend with supply chain disruptions and heavier fines and lawsuits for data breaches.
Measuring Trade Volatility in the Global Economy. A U.S. showdown with the World Trade Organization could paralyze the body’s dispute settlement process, forcing countries into a less predictable bilateral track to resolve their trade differences. Canada, Mexico, Japan and South Korea have a better chance of negotiating quotas to mitigate the threat of U.S. auto tariffs, but the European Union’s trade talks with the United States are doomed to fail. And while additional U.S. tariffs on China will add to trade uncertainty, the overall effect on the global economy from White House trade policy in 2019 will be relatively muted.
Hair-Raising Scenarios for Italy and Brexit. A defiantly populist Italian government will pose the biggest threat to the eurozone in 2019 as concerns grow over the country’s rising debt levels and fragile banking sector. Financial markets and dangerously wide spreads in bond yields — rather than threats from Brussels — will prove to be Rome’s biggest disciplinarians. Brussels will simultaneously work to avert a no-deal Brexit scenario with the United Kingdom, but a British parliamentary veto remains the single biggest obstacle to its orderly exit from the European Union.
The Next Steps in the Anti-Iran Campaign. With far-reaching secondary sanctions in place, the United States will forge ahead with its campaign to isolate Iran regionally and weaken the country from within. This will increase friction between Washington and Tehran and diminish the already scant likelihood of a constructive negotiation. A common agenda opposing Iran will help insulate strategic, high-level ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia despite rumblings within the royal family and foreign governments over Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership.
An Eye on Growing Supply in Global Energy Markets. Saudi Arabia and Russia will carefully manage oil output to prevent a price plunge as they monitor the effects of residual Iranian exports on the market. There is also the potential for production growth out of Iraq and Libya and a significant easing of export capacity constraints on the United States later in the year. Global liquified natural gas markets will be shaken up when the United States assumes its place among the top three LNG exporters in the world in 2019.
Disruptive Forces at Work in the Americas. Hard-line and U.S.-aligned governments in Brazil and Colombia could drive an atypically proactive regional effort to contain spillover from Venezuela’s ongoing crisis. Brazil’s efforts to shake up and reform the Mercosur trading bloc will come up against a politically hamstrung Argentina. The power of the referendum will meanwhile be put to the test in Mexico, where an aggressive populist agenda will raise investor risk.
Ethiopia Drives Big Change in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s ambitious agenda is generating economic interest and attracting outside powers to the Horn of Africa. But internal challenges to the current leadership and ethnic strife risk slowing Addis Ababa’s momentum.
Nov 19, 2018 | 20:19 GMT 16 mins read
Global Trends
In today’s world, nations are becoming increasingly interconnected by air, land, sea and cyberspace. As globalization has knitted countries and continents closer together, the borders of the map and the barriers of geography have been rendered, in some ways, obsolete. Now events in one region can more easily have consequences in another, at times even rippling across the globe. We explore those with the greatest impact on international decision-making during the forecast period below.
section Highlights
A great power rivalry among the United States, China and Russia will accelerate a high-stakes arms race and increase competition in cyberspace. Global governance around these building threats will prove elusive as divisions deepen in the international system.
Even as the United States escalates a strategic offensive against China with additional tariffs and regulatory blocks, sanctions, increased backing for Taiwan, and maritime challenges in the South China Sea, Beijing will rely on its heavy economic leverage to chip away at U.S. alliances.
A White House showdown with the World Trade Organization could grind the body’s dispute settlement process to a halt, forcing countries back to a less predictable bilateral track to sort out their trade frictions.
As Iranian oil exports diminish under sanctions, U.S. production is set to increase, and as the global economy experiences more sluggish growth in 2019, Saudi Arabia and Russia will remain highly reactive to global oil markets to prevent a steep price plunge. Global liquefied natural gas markets, meanwhile, will grow more competitive as the United States earns its place among the world’s top LNG exporters in 2019.
A New and Uncomfortable Global Reality
More than a year ago, Stratfor noted that the intensifying competition among the United States, China and Russia would emerge as the defining feature of the international system, creating a conundrum for the middle powers caught in the throes of great power rivalry. It didn’t take long for trade wars, cyberattacks, shifting defense strategies and arms races to convince the world that this is the new and uncomfortable global reality.
Great power competition is set to only intensify in 2019. The White House will double down on its attempts to short-circuit China’s advances across a number of strategic fields. Beijing will take some blows along the way, but China still has the means and more motivation than ever to accelerate its timetable and efforts toward reaching parity with the United States. And while there is no love lost between China and Russia, the potential for a tighter alignment in 2019 is likely to overcome the friction points in their uneasy partnership.
This new global dynamic creates a massive headache for middle powers and globally exposed businesses attempting to navigate an increasingly complex landscape.
The year will expose the limits the United States faces in trying to isolate China both from within tightly interwoven supply chains and from even the most dependable U.S. allies, caught between maintaining a tight security relationship with the United States and a growing need to expand their economic ties with China. This global dynamic will create a massive headache for middle powers and globally exposed businesses trying to navigate this complex landscape. Even as major European powers try to assert EU sovereignty on the global scale to avoid becoming collateral damage, they will remain largely reactive to the broader competition. And for those powers lying along the borderlands, from Poland to Turkey to Taiwan, a tenser geopolitical climate will translate in some cases into strategic opportunities as they try to work quickly to shore up security alliances and extract special economic benefits from powerful suitors.
Disruptive technologies and fractured treaties will reshape military arsenals in the years ahead.
The rapid development of disruptive weapons technology combined with the steady deterioration of arms control pacts will accelerate the high-stakes arms race among the United States, Russia and China. Washington’s likely imminent withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and a shakier negotiation over the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will deepen divisions in Europe as Western powers try to avoid getting caught in an arms buildup while states on the front lines with Russia, like Poland, the Baltic states and potentially Romania, volunteer to host U.S. military assets. At the same time, the United States will be freeing itself to build up a formidable arsenal to challenge China, all while Beijing strategically avoids entering such arms pacts and continues apace with its own buildup in the Western Pacific.
The ideological dimension to the great power competition will play out more subtly. The United States is rising to the challenge of competing with a China-Russia axis, but it is relying on unorthodox tactics and a broadly unilateral course that will risk alienating many of the middle-power allies it needs on its side. With the Western front divided and the United States no longer actively defending — and in some cases actively battling — the postwar rules-based system of managing the global order, China will find plenty of inroads among middle powers to blunt the U.S. offensive. Moreover, the technology-driven form of digital authoritarianism that China is harnessing to manage affairs at home and export abroad will offer a compelling alternative to powers with autocratic leanings that have grown wary of the liberal political conditions that traditionally come with partnering with the West.
U.S. and China, Ready to Rumble Into 2019
The U.S.-China competition will escalate on practically all fronts in 2019. Not only will China face heightened economic pressure from tariffs and regulatory blocks against Chinese firms, but the United States will also use sanctions to tighten the screws on Beijing over potential issues including cyberattacks and human rights. (Beijing’s treatment of the Uighurs and other minority groups, for example, will present a prime target for U.S. sanctions policy.)
On the security front, the United States will more assertively challenge China directly in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, possibly leading to more standoffs and close calls between U.S. and Chinese forces in maritime hot spots. U.S. economic efforts to directly counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in contrast, will face much greater limitations, as Beijing leverages joint economic access and partnership deals with powers big and small to dilute U.S. alliances.
Despite imposing tariffs on around $250 billion in Chinese imports, the White House can still hit China with another round of tariffs if concessions from Beijing don’t materialize.
On trade, temporary truces between Washington and Beijing will be possible as the two sides negotiate some economic reprieve, but the key word is “temporary”: The gulf between U.S. demands for deep structural reform in China’s economy and the reality of what Beijing is willing to offer without compromising its critical industrial technology strategy and stability at home is simply too wide to allow for a more comprehensive and enduring deal to emerge between them. The United States has already imposed tariffs on roughly $250 billion in Chinese imports. Frustrated by the limited concessions it will be able to extract from Beijing, the White House can still blast China with another round of tariffs targeting a remaining $267 billion in imports.
Potential export controls on “dual-use” targets will prove highly disruptive to many corporations.
U.S. economic pressure against China will also extend well beyond tariffs. U.S. tech firms will face more regulatory oversight as the United States tries to restrict Chinese access to dual-use technologies and scrutinizes the U.S.-China supply chain for national security vulnerabilities. Potential export controls on “dual-use” targets, from high-performance chips to general artificial intelligence research, will be highly disruptive to many corporations. The United States has already been erecting barriers to Chinese investment and research in strategic sectors, but it will also be heavily lobbying other countries — particularly Japan, Canada, European nations, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan — to downgrade their ties with major Chinese tech companies, like Huawei and ZTE, that will be branded as a critical national security risk to their countries.
Timing is key: 2019 marks the rollout of revolutionary fifth-generation telecommunications technology in the developed world.
The next two years will bring a game-changing level of speed and connectivity to underpin transformative technologies, like the “internet of things,” virtual and augmented reality, artificial intelligence processing, autonomous vehicles, and telemedicine — which are already areas of intense U.S.-Chinese competition. And since Huawei and ZTE are two among a small handful of technology companies that have developed the technological infrastructure and standards around 5G, the U.S. government will do whatever it can to prevent its biggest strategic competitor from embedding itself deep inside the economic nervous systems of itself and its allies. That growing imperative will naturally add fuel to an already building fire between the state and the corporation in several advanced economies as multinational tech firms with deeply layered supply chains try to resist a rise in regulatory handicaps to business models that rely on open trade and cross-border data flows.
Any kind of global consensus on the priorities and methods needed to govern cyberspace will remain elusive in 2019.
Intensifying great power competition in cyberspace will only aggravate state-corporate friction over policy. As the biggest target of cyberattacks, the United States is moving down a more offensive path, with China and Russia squarely in its sights. (The lead-up to the 2020 U.S. presidential race will draw additional attention to the cyberthreat posed by China, in particular.) A growing trend can be seen in Western countries where governments will rely on heavy fines and the buildup of consumer lawsuits to hold corporations accountable for large-scale data breaches. Calls among major powers to develop global norms for cyberspace will grow more urgent, but consensus and enforcement for any such agenda will remain elusive given widely divergent positions among the United States, Europe, Russia and China over the priorities and methods needed to govern cyberspace.
The Global Headwinds of U.S. Trade Policy
Outside of the tight U.S. economic focus on China, the looming threat of U.S. auto tariffs and a showdown between the United States and other major powers at the World Trade Organization (WTO) will reverberate throughout the global economy. The White House’s economic policy, while prone to the machinations of rival ideological camps, remains largely driven by an interest in reducing trade deficits through bilateral negotiations. The U.S. administration is also not afraid to use heavy-hitting tactics as leverage. Even as the White House threatens tariffs on auto imports — a major driver of the U.S. trade deficit — in the name of national security, it will not settle on trade deals that fail to include significant concessions in markets like agriculture, where U.S. exporters are more competitive. The United States will also use bilateral trade agreements to discourage U.S. trading partners from signing free trade agreements with China (Canada’s pursuit of such a deal will test the credibility of that tactic).
The finalization of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which already includes greater protections for U.S. auto manufacturers and quota provisions, will largely insulate Mexico and Canada from the threat of U.S. auto tariffs. A diminished economic threat to North American trade will reduce urgency from the U.S. Congress to impose legislative checks on White House trade policy.
Germany has the most to lose from a trade battle with the United States over autos but won’t be able to force the European Union — and France in particular — into making concessions on agriculture to satisfy the White House.
Japan runs a good chance of mitigating the threat of U.S. auto tariffs through a limited trade deal with the United States given the agricultural concessions it made in its free trade agreement with Canada and in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2018. South Korea will also likely agree to quotas to fend off auto tariffs. In contrast, the prospects for a comprehensive U.S.-EU trade resolution in 2019 look outright dismal. Germany has the most to lose from a trade battle with the United States over autos but will not be able to force the European Union as a bloc, and France in particular, into making concessions on agriculture to satisfy the White House. Depending on which administration trade hawks and pragmatists have the president’s ear at the time, the White House will likely choose between reneging on a truce, imposing auto tariffs anyway and doubling down on Europe in hopes that it will eventually drive Brussels to a deal; or tempering its ambitions and focusing instead on ongoing negotiations over regulations and standards that fall short of formal free trade talks.
Parallel to these troubled trade negotiations is a growing confrontation between major economic powers and the WTO.
The World Trade Organization is currently arbitrating a number of national security-related cases, including one regarding the U.S. justification for imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum in early 2018. The White House will make an example of these cases to argue that the multinational body has no right to arbitrate matters of national security in the first case. Should the White House win this argument, it could make it easier for other states to erect protectionist barriers in the name of national security.
Should the White House lose, the decision will only add to its building crusade against the WTO’s credibility. To be clear, Congress has the authority to prevent an outright U.S. withdrawal from the WTO, which would upend the global economy. But the United States does have the means to paralyze the organization’s dispute resolution process. Because of the United States’ continued block on new appointments, by December 2019 the appellate body risks falling below the minimum three members required to rule on cases.
This form of protest by the United States, which preceded the presidency of Donald Trump, is designed to spur support from the European Union, Japan, Canada and other major trading partners for WTO reforms that would speed its rulings and clarify jurisdictional boundaries as the United States tries to prevent the body from stepping into sovereign trade territory. It’s also intended to get the WTO to hold China and other developing nations more accountable for trade abuses including state subsidization and intellectual property theft. Relatedly, a WTO panel on a case brought against the European Union by China, which is seeking recognition as a market economy, will wrap up in 2019. If the European Union loses this case, it will add momentum to the U.S. argument that the WTO is unfit to regulate China on trade.
An increasing number of influential countries are pushing for WTO reforms to speed up the organization’s rulings and clarify jurisdictional boundaries to limit forays into sovereign trade territory.
But U.S. demands for reform will be a lot to ask from the slow-moving and fractious multinational organization that’s ruled by consensus. There’s a real threat that the United States will grind the dispute settlement process to a halt, a scenario that would drive economic powers back into bilateral negotiations to sort out their differences as they did under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the pre-WTO system that governed global trade in a geopolitical climate oozing with uncertainty.
The Global Energy Outlook
A collapse in oil markets is unlikely in the first half of 2019 as sanctions diminish Iranian oil exports and pipeline constraints limit U.S. production growth. But that supply picture will shift significantly in the second half of the year when U.S. pipeline capacity expands. Saudi Arabia and Russia will remain highly reactive to any signs of oversupply that could send oil prices into a tailspin. Iran still will be able to export about 1 million barrels per day for around the next five months under limited sanctions waivers, and there’s potential for Libya and Iraq to sort out internal political differences long enough to notably affect the market. At the same time, the potential of an internal meltdown decreasing production in Venezuela and discord in the Persian Gulf impeding tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will be closely watched for more acute supply disruptions.
The United States, meanwhile, is preparing to shake up global liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets. By the end of 2019, the United States will join Qatar and Australia as one of the world’s largest LNG exporters. The broader geopolitical effects will take several years to play out as a more competitive LNG market drives short-term contracts and gas-on-gas pricing, particularly in Asian markets with rapidly growing demand. U.S. trading partners under siege by the White House will try to leverage increased purchases of U.S. LNG to temper trade frictions, while Eastern European powers will use U.S. LNG purchases to better insulate themselves from Russia.
Slow and Steady as She Goes for the Global Economy
When we step back and look at all the factors likely to drive instability in the global economy in 2019, there is cause for concern, but not necessarily panic. Growing levels of corporate and sovereign debt, slow growth in workers’ incomes, demographic stresses and building political constraints to structural reform make a troubling backdrop to the longer-term economic outlook. Nonetheless, the biggest threat to the U.S. economy from White House trade policy — the collapse of NAFTA — has been mitigated. The potential for more U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports and on U.S. auto imports from outside North America will create localized, sectoral pains but will have a limited impact on the U.S. economy and global economy at large. The White House will point to stable U.S. economic growth to justify an aggressive approach on trade, though the stimulant effects of U.S. tax cuts and fiscal spending will wane in the next few months and keep U.S. monetary tightening on a relatively moderate course.
As long as U.S. economic growth remains relatively stable, U.S. importers struggle to find cheap alternatives to Chinese products and American consumers continue to tolerate slightly higher prices on Chinese goods, China will be able to weather the economic blows from its enduring competition with the United States while relying more heavily on fiscal adjustments at home to maintain stability.
In Europe, a no-deal Brexit scenario can still be averted, even if narrowly. Even as the Italian government and European Commission will avoid escalating their confrontation into a systemic crisis, the fragility of Italy’s banking sector will remain the biggest risk to eurozone stability. The European Central Bank will implement its shift toward monetary tightening slowly and cautiously as the Italian risk hangs over the eurozone and as economic expansion in Europe slows overall.
Emerging markets will remain under strain from a strong dollar, weak currencies, high inflation, heavy import bills and domestic political constraints on economic reform.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout agreement is preventing the Argentine economy from collapse, but is also raising the potential for a more fiscally lax Peronista comeback in October elections. Turkey will have a bit more political room to pursue light reforms in 2019 while trying to prevent the more controversial aspects of its foreign policy from aggravating economic stability at home. Pakistan is cobbling together IMF and foreign assistance to avoid a balance-of-payments crisis, while the Indian government will prepare for spring elections by avoiding big trade concessions and pressuring the central bank to keep monetary policy loose. Mexico’s new government was spared a NAFTA nightmare but will drive up political risk for investors with an aggressive populist agenda. And while smaller Asia-Pacific economies, including Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan, will be caught in the crosshairs of the U.S.-China trade battle, they are also among the first places that U.S.-based companies in China looking to diversify supply chains will consider as the competition between the economic giants endures.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
Amid a high-stakes race for technological supremacy, global powers will grapple with the challenge of establishing artificial intelligence governance and ethical norms.
The United States, China and Russia will accelerate efforts to militarize space in the absence of international standards to regulate space conduct.
Even as the great power rivalry with China and Russia pushes the United States to downgrade its military commitments in Africa and the Middle East, a U.S. campaign against Iran along with persistent terrorism and proliferation concerns will fight for U.S. attention and resources.
Anti-corruption is an increasingly popular and potent political weapon that can be harnessed by Western governments and strongmen alike to shape policy at home and abroad.
Great powers will compete over lucrative arms contracts around the world.
A divided and less accommodating Congress will have mixed results for U.S. foreign policy.
A longer-term global energy transition toward renewables will continue in 2019, with corporations assuming more leadership in this shift.
Key Dates to Watch
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Nov 19, 2018 | 20:48 GMT 8 mins read
Middle East and North Africa
The Middle East and North Africa is the world’s crossroads. It encompasses the Arabian Peninsula, the mountains of Iran, the plains of Turkey, the deserts of the Levant, the lands north of the Sahara and all coasts in between. The story of the region, as is so often the case of places stuck between foreign players, is the story of trade, exchange and conflict. The traditional powers of the region are Turkey and Iran — Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the current Arab powers — and their competition for influence over the region’s weaker states makes the Middle East and North Africa an arena of violence and instability.
Key Trends for 2019
The U.S.-Iran Collision Course
The U.S.-led sanctions campaign will hurt Iran, but it won’t lead to the collapse of the Iranian government even as the country’s economy struggles. By increasing sanctions, the United States hopes to coerce Iran to return to the negotiating table. This will not work; while Iran is known for its political feuding, its parties will prioritize regime stability over their usual politicking. Moreover, sanctions have intensified popular unrest, which strengthens the political capital of conservatives and hard-liners against the administration of moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Furthermore, Iran’s assertive intelligence and security apparatus will be empowered by the need to deepen Iran’s defensive strategy in the face of the intensifying pressure.
Iran will do what it can to retaliate against its aggressors, stopping just short of provoking a conventional military response — for now.
Tehran will be tempted to retaliate by harassing U.S. and allied vessels in the Persian Gulf, conducting ballistic missile tests or resuming its nuclear activities, but it will only do so when absolutely necessary. Instead, Tehran will more readily employ cyberwarfare, conduct covert operations, or use its key regional proxies to strike back at the United States, Israel and the Gulf states. Iran wants to avoid provoking a conventional military strike against itself, but as political support from the European Union weakens over 2019 and economic guarantees are replaced by political rhetoric, Tehran will be more willing to engage in sharper retaliatory measures. Learn more about Iran’s strengths and vulnerabilities.
The United States Bolsters Regional Allies
In carrying out its regional strategy, which hinges on containing Iran, the United States will lean on two sets of allies with similarly aligned objectives. The first set includes allies most concerned about Iran and willing to embrace hard-hitting anti-Iranian policies: Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These countries are rapidly overcoming decades of mistrust and conflict to better coordinate against Tehran in cyberspace, in enforcing sanctions, and even militarily.
The United States will rely on its allies in the Persian Gulf to assist with Washington’s Iran containment strategy.
The second set of allies, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, is more loosely aligned and less willing to take a tough position on Iran. These countries can provide strategic, diplomatic and economic value to the United States in certain regional conflicts and crises. An improved alignment between them could reduce the intensity of the Qatar blockade, but the underlying conflict among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council will endure. Learn more about how these countries will attempt to demonstrate their strategic utility to the United States.
Spotlight on Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia will have to manage growing concerns over Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman throughout 2019. In the wake of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, the crown prince’s actions will come under increasing international scrutiny. Although he remains well entrenched within the Saudi monarchy, Crown Prince Mohammed’s dominant position still depends on support from his father, King Salman, and quiet resistance will continue to build within the royal family. Some of Riyadh’s key allies will limit military support and foreign direct investment to Saudi Arabia, but crucial relationships are unlikely to shift.
The stain of the Khashoggi affair will linger on the House of Saud into 2019.
Riyadh will continue to advance its Vision 2030 goals over the coming year, easing austerity measures in response to positive economic signs — higher oil prices in 2018, the opportunity to make up for decreased Iranian oil exports, and a relatively successful non-oil revenue generation strategy. This means the kingdom can avoid making hard structural changes to the Saudi economy, especially the labor markets. Complaints over housing, salaries and quality of life will compel the state to use its fuller royal purse to douse grievances with cash. Read more about the troubles facing Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Khashoggi affair.
The Syrian Cauldron Could Spill Over
In the closing stages of the Syrian civil war, five key powers — Turkey, Russia, Iran, the United States and Israel — are competing for influence and control. Moscow and Tehran firmly back Syrian President Bashar al Assad but differ not only in the levels of support they provide but also in their overall objectives. Russia has used the Syrian conflict to expand its footprint in the Middle East and will be protective of its gains and materiel, though Moscow has little desire for open conflict with Turkey, the United States or Israel. Iran, on the other hand, will be more aggressive in its support for Damascus, especially in opposition to Ankara and Washington. Tehran will also continue to build up its forces inside Syria as a deterrent to Israel and as a means to supply Hezbollah, its powerful ally in nearby Lebanon. Israel will attempt to foil Iran’s plans but is intrinsically wary of sparking an unintended conflict with Russia.
Turkey and the United States remain opposed to Assad’s rule, but despite being NATO allies, they will pursue their own agendas in Syria. The United States is focused on eradicating remnants of the Islamic State in the country, though Washington more broadly seeks to remove Iranian influence from Syria as part of its anti-Iran strategy. Challenging Iran in Syria creates tension between the United States and Russia — Moscow cannot and will not force out Iran. Despite efforts to deconflict, the possibility of a military incident involving U.S. and Russian assets is not beyond the realm of possibility.
The possibility of a breakout conflict involving the major powers overseeing the Syrian conflict is conceivable in 2019.
Turkey, for its part, will maintain its focus on containing Kurdish forces in Syria. This is problematic for the United States, which uses the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group Ankara sees as a terrorist organization, as an ally against the Islamic State and as a proxy against Iran. In Syria’s northwest, Turkey’s pledge to protect Idlib province could stretch Ankara’s credibility as a local partner, especially given Damascus’ stated goal of total reconquest. Idlib could well become a flashpoint among Turkey, Iran, Syrian loyalist forces and, more remotely, Russia. Given the opposing interests in Syria, the potential for accidental escalation or even a state-to-state confrontation in 2019 is higher than ever, though every power will take steps to avoid this. Learn more about the possibilities for state-to-state confrontation and what 2019 will hold for the Syrian conflict.
Handling Turkey’s Fragile Economy
The biggest challenge facing Turkey in 2019 will be its distressed economy. As well as managing record inflation, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have to contend with a privately held corporate debt bill roughly equal to a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product — all while avoiding another lira crisis. Erdogan will be politically compelled to broaden his support base ahead of local elections in the spring, courting financially concerned Turks from across the electoral spectrum, some of whom have been turned off by the president’s nationalist policies. Turkey’s brittle economy also weakens Ankara’s position when it comes to dealing with key partners in the West. The U.S. relationship with Turkey is increasingly fractious thanks in part to Ankara’s growing ties with Russia and Washington’s support for the YPG in Syria.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have his work cut out in 2019 to stabilize the Turkish economy.
Because of its vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure, Turkey will attempt to shore up foreign investment and maintain stable economic relations with Europe. However, Turkey’s historically complex relationship with the European Union will complicate that effort. Beyond stabilizing its economic situation, Ankara will continue to pursue other core imperatives in 2019, including the containment of autonomous Kurdish movements in Turkey’s former Ottoman domains. Ankara will exert whatever influence it can in northern Syria and continue military strikes against Kurdistan Workers’ Party positions in northern Iraq. Learn more about Turkey’s precarious economic position going into 2019.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
Saudi Arabia will continue efforts to build up its own defense sector so it won’t have to rely on foreign arms suppliers.
Algeria’s government will batten down the hatches in 2019 in advance of a presidential election that risks destabilizing the country’s fragile plan for succession.
Israel will continue to seek investment for its infrastructure development projects, but taking Chinese money will have U.S. consequences.
The Khashoggi Affair could lead the United States to rethink its contribution to the Saudi-led war in Yemen, with consequences that could influence its course.
An unpopular tax bill contributed to Jordan’s recent economic protests, but there is no shortage of issues that could trigger the next political crisis in the Hashemite Kingdom.
Iran’s missile arsenal poses a key threat to Israeli security — especially given Tehran’s proclivities for supplying arms to regional proxies — and Israel will take whatever action it can to mitigate the risk.
The new Iraqi government will struggle to strike a balance between competing external influences, including Iran’s.
Competition between France and Italy complicates Libya’s already formidable struggle to unite its rival factions.
Key Dates to Watch
January: The inaugural meeting of the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) — dubbed the “Arab NATO” — could take place.
January: The heads of state of the African Union will hold a summit in Egypt.
Feb. 17-22: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) plenary meeting in Paris at which Iran’s status will be discussed.
March: Local elections will be held in Turkey.
April: The presidential election in Algeria will be held.
August: Annual Iranian naval drills take place in the Strait of Hormuz.
November: Israeli parliamentary elections must be held by the end of the month.
Unknown Date: 2020 Iranian parliamentary elections will be announced.
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Nov 27, 2018 | 13:49 GMT 8 mins read
Asia-Pacific
The Asia-Pacific is home to more people than any other region. Centered on the western rim of the Pacific Ocean, this region includes the easternmost countries of continental Asia as well as the archipelagos that punctuate the coast. Several of these countries, most notably China, experienced rapid economic growth in the second half of the 20th century, giving the region a new sense of global economic relevance that continues today. That relevance, however, depends largely on China, a power in transition whose rise is testing the network of U.S. alliances that have long dominated the region. How effectively Beijing manages its transition will shape the regional balance of power in the decades to come.
Key Trends for 2019
China Weathers the Trade Storm
Beijing will try to keep its lines of communication with Washington open on trade by offering to buy more U.S. goods and selectively lower barriers to investment, but its concessions won’t meet U.S. demands for structural economic reform. Still, China will only respond in kind to U.S. measures targeting Chinese firms and entities and not take any blanket punitive action against U.S. businesses. Beijing will also deepen public-sector reforms by soliciting foreign investment for its financial, auto and energy sectors. Furthermore, it will ease restrictions in sectors that align with China’s prime interests, such as medical services and education.
China’s refusal to concede to U.S. demands will prolong the ongoing trade dispute.
The United States will maintain its demand that China ease state support for its tech sector, but that will only compel Beijing to accelerate its efforts to ease China’s dependence on foreign technology and diversify its supply chain — thereby necessitating increased state support for the sector. Needless to say, China’s refusal to bow to U.S. pressure on tech will prolong their trade dispute. At the same time, China will strive to acquire technology and cooperate on sector-specific activities with advanced tech powers like Japan, Israel, Taiwan and the European Union, but such activities will face increased scrutiny over concerns about Chinese investment and industrial espionage. Read more on China’s efforts to reform its state sector.
Beijing Battens Down the Hatches
Because the extended trade war threatens the economy in China’s coastal regions (and, thus, social stability), Beijing will ease its tight regulations designed to contain debt and protect the environment while upgrading infrastructure, generating credit and offering direct subsidies to boost growth. China will also carefully manage the yuan’s value to mitigate the damage to exports, allowing it to cope with reduced growth. But an accumulation of debt and the fragility of the housing market will limit Beijing’s ability to use massive credit flows and sharp currency devaluations as a means of economic stimulus.
China will have to rely more on fiscal stimulus — including reducing taxes — to encourage consumption and private sector activity.
It will also encourage the increased use of the yuan in currency swaps and in trade with countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative to mitigate currency volatility. And to keep hedging against U.S. trade pressure, Beijing will pursue bilateral and regional free trade agreements, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific region and trilateral negotiations with Japan and South Korea, all while forging ties with new export markets along the Belt and Road and in Africa. Southeast Asia’s emerging economies, meanwhile, will be ready to lure any factories that relocate from China amid the trade war. Threats to the overall regional supply chain and external financial volatility could also present challenges to countries with higher debt or current account deficits, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Learn more about why state-owned enterprises are so important to China.
Great Power Competition in the Asia-Pacific
As it tries to chip away at the U.S. regional alliance structure, China will continue its conciliatory outreach to Japan, India and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by privileging dispute resolution efforts and economic partnerships while also making overtures to Australia, whose April elections could foster some rapprochement. At the same time, Washington will bolster its naval presence in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and further challenge the One China principle by elevating Taipei’s status at international associations and regularizing arms sales, naval patrols and high-level visits.
The U.S. Navy will be more prevalent in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, which will provoke China to adopt a more robust military posture.
In response, China will adopt tougher naval and aerial postures to assert its territorial claims, increasing the chances of accidents involving the U.S. military. The United States is considering making a naval port call in Taiwan — an event that would trigger a more direct Chinese military response. Japan, India and Australia will increase security cooperation with Washington, but they will refrain from joining U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea or patrols in the Taiwan Strait. Elsewhere in the region, U.S.-ASEAN military exercises and U.S.-Vietnamese defense cooperation will complicate Chinese efforts to limit the further regional expansion of U.S. influence. Find out more about Taiwan’s role in U.S.-China competition.
A Fraying Consensus on North Korea
The United States is intent on extracting tangible concessions from North Korea in 2019. But this is also the year that Pyongyang hopes to squeeze the most out of the Trump presidency before the United States becomes distracted by its election cycle. Given the obviously high stakes of open warfare, neither will deliberately scuttle the dialogue. North Korea will carefully offer tangible pledges but will also expect concrete progress on sanctions relief or toward a peace deal; throughout the process, it will obfuscate and delay where it can. Pyongyang will also insist on assurances that any bilateral deal will have staying power beyond the current administration.
The United States will hesitate to extend an economic lifeline to North Korea by lifting sanctions, but time is on Pyongyang’s side as the international consensus on maintaining sanctions unravels.
For the moment, Washington’s veto power on the U.N. Security Council will allow it to block any effort to repeal the multilateral measures, even as China and Russia push for the international community to reward North Korea for its cooperation. At the same time, the United States will pressure others to fall into line on sanctions by shaming transgressors and threatening secondary sanctions against those who deal with Pyongyang. Complicating matters, inter-Korean detente is reaching the point where it cannot proceed much further without sanctions exceptions — something the United States will only approve after careful consideration. The growing discrepancy between the pace of the inter-Korean dialogue and the pace of the U.S.-North Korean discussions will leave room for China to extend its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Overall, while swings towards breakthroughs and breakdowns will occur throughout the year, North Korea will still maintain possession of many elements of its hard-won nuclear program at the end of 2019.
Moving the Belt and Road Forward
With its access to U.S. markets under strain, Beijing will redouble its efforts to find new export markets and partners through the Belt and Road Initiative. Washington will work principally with Japan and Australia to offer alternative infrastructure investments to counter China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, but Beijing will temper potential partners’ concerns regarding financial sustainability, political influence and national security threats by attracting third-party investors. It will also work to undermine Washington’s regional initiatives by pursuing joint projects with middle powers, including Japan, the European Union and India. Take a more in-depth look at the resistance to the Belt and Road Initiative.
A Japanese Awakening
Secure in his position through 2021, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will aim to pass constitutional reforms before the end of 2019 while offsetting the economic impacts of a consumption tax hike through public works spending, incentives for private sector investment and tax exemptions for certain products. And though Russia and Japan will continue to negotiate over the disputed Kuril Islands, a larger standoff between Moscow and the West will scuttle any hopes of a deal.
When it comes to trade, the United States and Japan have an arrangement for now, but much will depend on how far Washington pushes Tokyo.
Meanwhile, Tokyo will grant concessions that will partly placate U.S. trade concerns — so long as the U.S. push for agricultural access does not exceed the limits outlined in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and EU-Japan trade deals. If Washington pushes further, Tokyo will experience a backlash from its powerful farming lobby — although it will weigh whether to sacrifice its agricultural sector to avoid U.S. tariffs on its critical auto sector. Beyond that, Tokyo will also resist U.S. attempts to limit any future Japanese trade deal with China. Read more on Japan’s calculations on automotive and agricultural trade in the face of U.S. pressure.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
The U.S.-China trade war could benefit Vietnam economically but will complicate Hanoi’s delicate balance between the two.
China’s large debt accumulation will hamper Beijing’s efforts to stimulate the economy.
China’s tech sector will become an increasing concern for the United States, particularly as the two battle over artificial intelligence.
Key Dates to Watch
Early 2019: Release of a World Trade Organization panel report on China’s challenge of the European Union’s refusal to grant China market economy status.
Early 2019: Next Trump-Kim summit may occur.
Jan. 1: Date that the United States could possibly raise the tariff rate on $200 billion worth of Chinese imports to 25 percent.
Jan. 14: First day the United States can hold formal trade deal talks with Japan.
January: First round of CPTPP’s tariff cuts will take effect.
March: Joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises Foal Eagle, Double Dragon and Key Resolve normally held.
May 18: Australia’s Senate elections must be held before this date, with House of Representative elections due by November.
June 28-29: A G-20 summit is scheduled to be held in Osaka, Japan.
August: U.S.-South Korean Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercise normally held.
Nov 27, 2018 | 20:43 GMT 8 mins read
Europe
To the west of Eurasia lays Europe, a region predisposed to division. It is surrounded on nearly all sides by islands and peninsulas that make it difficult for Europe to cohere. The northern half of the continent, moreover, sits on a plain whose short, meandering rivers tend to empower countries without forcing them to work with others. The southern half is situated on more mountainous terrain that has historically impeded the creation of strong, unified economies. As a result, Europe is a continent riven by pockets of distinct cultures whose differences are all too often irreconcilable.
Key Trends for 2019
Risk in the Eurozone
Italy will remain the main source of financial risk within the eurozone. Rome could make cosmetic changes to its fiscal policies to delay sanctions from the European Commission over its 2019 budget, but the real threat to the country’s financial stability will come not from Brussels but from the financial markets. Rome’s fiscal policies will create uncertainty among investors about the sustainability of its debt.
If Italy’s political and financial turbulence continues, Southern European countries could suffer increased borrowing costs.
The billions of euros in Italian debt held by its banks leaves them vulnerable. Should those banks require assistance, Rome may have no choice but to negotiate a rescue program with the European Union. At the same time, disputes within Italy’s coalition government could prompt early elections, adding to political uncertainty. Italy’s political and financial turbulence will increase the chances of higher borrowing costs and of banking uncertainty in other Southern European countries. Read more about what’s motivating the Italian government’s policies.
The Year of Brexit
While there is no shortage of disruptors around the Brexit process, London and Brussels will work to minimize the economic effects of the United Kingdom’s exit from the bloc. London’s first choice will be to leave with a comprehensive exit agreement, but it may take more than one vote to persuade the British Parliament to approve it. If lawmakers ratify the deal, the United Kingdom will remain in the EU single market in 2019. But even if Parliament rejects it, London and Brussels will still reach temporary agreements, or in some cases act alone, to contain economic disruptions as much as possible. Such measures could include extending the negotiation period under Article 50, to delay Britain’s exit. Still, a British parliamentary veto would throw the logistics of the bilateral relationship (from trade to commercial flights to migration) into flux.
To make Brexit even more interesting, the sitting British government could fall at any point in the negotiations and a new election could be scheduled.
No matter how Brexit happens, the United Kingdom and the European Union will discuss a permanent post-withdrawal trade arrangement, and London will hold free trade talks with other countries, including the United States. Considering their complexity, those negotiations will likely extend beyond 2019. Read about why fragmentation in Europe’s financial system will grow after Brexit.
Trade in Focus
The European Union will not sign a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States in 2019, but it will be willing to discuss a more modest agreement that covers industrial goods. Brussels will also be open to talking about the elimination of some nontariff barriers to trade. With these gestures, the bloc will try to dissuade the United States from introducing higher tariffs on vehicles produced in the European Union. Should the White House raise the tariffs, the union would retaliate with its own countermeasures. At the same time, it will try to keep the United States engaged in multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organization, and it will side with the White House when it pressures China on issues such as state subsidies and foreign investment limitations.
The EU will continue to seek opportunities with countries such as Australia and New Zealand, South America’s Mercosur trading bloc, and even look to open new export markets in South and East Asia.
Brussels will also see Beijing as a counterbalance to the United States when it comes to defending multilateralism. But large economies such as Germany and France will resist China’s penetration into Europe — especially in sensitive areas such as technology and infrastructure — while smaller states will welcome Chinese investment as an opportunity to boost their economies. In other trade issues, the European Union will hold talks with Australia and New Zealand, seek to complete negotiations with South America’s Mercosur bloc, and look to open new export markets in Asia. Issues such as agriculture and geographic descriptors for food products will prove difficult to solve, but the union will try to make as much progress as possible in its trade talks. Read more on EU-U.S. trade disputes.
The Battle for the EU Leadership
Elections for the European Parliament in May will produce a fragmented legislature; pro-EU parties will retain control, but nationalist and Euroskeptic forces will have a strong following. These divisions will, in turn, make it harder to pass legislation. The selection of the new European Commission president will follow and lead to ideological disputes within the bloc. A conservative commission would probably focus on such issues as trade agreements and reducing immigration from outside the bloc, while a progressive one would more likely focus on ensuring greater economic cohesion within the bloc.
Regional disagreements will slow the pace of policymaking and reduce the possibility of major reforms.
Southern Europe will push for a commission that promotes higher spending and deeper risk-sharing across the bloc, while Northern Europe will push for a body that promotes fiscal discipline and risk reduction. EU governments will also select a new European Central Bank president. The south will push to continue the bank’s expansionary monetary policies, and the north will push to reverse some of them. The regional disagreements will slow the pace of policymaking, reducing the chances of significant reforms. Read more about the competition for EU institutions.
Trouble in Germany and France
As Germany’s governing parties seek to set themselves apart, the country’s politics will be stretched further to the left and right, hollowing out the center. Conflict within the government will reduce its efficacy and could lead to early elections. A new vote would again produce a fragmented parliament and lead to complex coalition talks, further reducing Berlin’s EU leadership role. In France, the government’s push for institutional and economic reform, including a drive to overhaul the pension system, will lead to protests, some of which will disrupt the economy. Paris will succeed in implementing most of its plans, but citizens will be increasingly vocal in rejecting their government’s policies. Domestic issues and France’s dependence on others to get things done in the bloc will limit Paris’ influence on Continental affairs. Read more about the implications of political uncertainty in Germany.
The East-West Divide
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe will take advantage of the global environment to preserve, and potentially deepen, their political and military ties to the United States. The White House will look to Poland and Romania to help increase its presence or even to serve as hosts for American missile systems as the arms race with Russia intensifies. At the same time, Poland, Hungary and Romania will selectively challenge EU institutions and rules, while also making sure not to do anything that puts their memberships in the bloc in jeopardy. These countries will also look to deepen cooperation with their neighbors on issues that vary from energy diversification to infrastructure, and they will get together to resist cuts in EU agricultural and development funds. Read more on Poland’s geopolitical strategy.
The Push for Autonomy
EU countries will tighten cooperation on defense, through initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund. France will lead the push to enhance Europe’s military capabilities, but disagreements between member states could slow progress. To streamline decision-making, the bloc will try to switch its voting system so changing foreign and taxation policies would require majority approval instead of unanimity. But that will probably fail, because changing the voting mechanism requires unanimous approval, and several countries will want to preserve their veto power.
The European Union’s ambitions will be hampered, in classic fashion, by convoluted leadership and the curse of consensus.
The bloc will also discuss ambitious plans to create international payment channels independent of the United States, replace the dollar with the euro as the world’s reserve currency and increase capital market integration among member states. But a leadership vacuum at the Continental level and the complexity of their implementation will prevent the bloc from realizing them in 2019. Read more on Europe’s push for strategic autonomy.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
The European Union will continue to take the lead on protecting individual privacy.
Plans in southern Europe to introduce structural reforms will lead to economic and political disruptions.
European governments will keep pushing initiatives to encourage innovation in artificial intelligence and robotics, but companies will struggle to keep up with their Chinese and U.S. counterparts.
The Baltic countries will seek to keep close ties with NATO and the United States to prevent a potential Russian aggression.
Key Dates to Watch
March 29: The United Kingdom’s scheduled exit from the European Union.
May 23-26: Elections across the European Union for members of the European Parliament.
Aug. 25-27: A G-7 summit is scheduled to be held in France.
Late October: Deadline for EU governments to select the presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank.
November: General election in Poland.
November: Selection of the new president of the European Council.
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Nov 28, 2018 | 15:14 GMT 7 mins read
South Asia
Everything that informs geopolitics can be found in South Asia: challenging demographics, geographic diversity, and contentious, ill-defined borders. The Himalayan Mountains form the northern border of South Asia, whose two main rivers, the Indus and the Ganges, support the region’s great population centers. India is the region’s dominant country, home to the world’s fastest growing economy. But its rivalry with neighboring Pakistan, a fellow nuclear power and growing consumer market, has made South Asia one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoints. The region is also a testament to how militancy and militarism can undermine the regional integration needed to unleash higher economic growth.
Key Trends for 2019
India and the U.S.-Russia Balance
India will cautiously advance its defense partnership with the United States in spite of disputes over trade and sanctions. After all, their shared rivalry with China makes the U.S.-Indian partnership mutually beneficial. At the same time, to maximize its strategic autonomy, New Delhi will safeguard India’s relations with Russia, which it depends on for arms. To support indigenous production, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will emphasize technology transfers from key U.S. and Russian weapons suppliers. All the while, he will resist U.S. pressure to lower tariffs — especially on dairy products and medical devices – and will seek expanded access for India’s services sector ahead of the 2019 elections as he tries to protect jobs under his “Make in India” campaign. Read more on India’s cautious approach to tightening U.S. relations.
Managing Tensions With China and Pakistan
India and China will maintain their phase of managed tension during 2019. India is the reactive power in the relationship, and Modi’s focus on winning re-election means that New Delhi will not provoke Beijing. But his stance doesn’t preclude skirmishes or incursions along their disputed border. It does mean that neither country will deliberately escalate tensions to the point of a Doklam-style standoff.
As long as the United States remains China’s primary focus in 2019, Beijing will seek to maintain stable relations with the powers on its periphery, including India.
Once Indian elections conclude in May — and given that Pakistani elections took place in 2018 — the two rivals will have the space to restart negotiations stalled since 2016, even if the talks don’t lead to a resolution of their dispute over Kashmir. Pakistan, in particular, wants to bring tensions to a more manageable level as its military focuses on securing the volatile border with Afghanistan and as Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government explores the possibility of trade talks with New Delhi. For more on the what Indian elections will bring, read our latest assessment.
Contesting the Indian Ocean
Even as India manages tensions with China on the tactical level, its strategic competition with Beijing for basing rights, infrastructure projects and defense partnerships will play out across the Indian Ocean. To bolster its position in the Indo-Pacific, India will move to strengthen relations not only with the United States but also with Japan and Australia using a bilateral, more than a multilateral approach, with emphasis on building its relationship with Japan, especially. New governments in Bhutan, the Maldives and Bangladesh, all of which have signed on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative will lead India to renew its engagement with them. This analysis explains more about India’s strategic approach to China’s growing presence.
The Spotlight on India’s Elections
The Indian political opposition will focus on uniting in an effort to dislodge Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from power. Although Modi will have the advantage going into the state and parliamentary elections, the BJP will fail to win as big a majority as it did in 2014 as frustration rises among voters over economic and job-creation problems. Ahead of the elections, the party will emphasize Hindu nationalist issues. Meanwhile, a strengthening dollar means the rupee will remain weak, and the persistent threat of inflation will compel the Reserve Bank of India to maintain a monetary tightening policy, which will be a key point of contention between the government and the central bank.
If the Indian government attempts limited labor reforms after elections, the opposition will do its best to thwart them — meaning major legislation on the subject will fail to materialize.
Finally, India will delay concluding a deal on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) until after the elections. India has a trade deficit with 10 of the 16 RCEP countries — China accounts for the biggest share — so New Delhi’s acceptance of any deal will hinge on earning concessions that can protect its industry from a surge of Chinese imports that would threaten local jobs. India will also seek expanded market access for its information technology services sector to address the trade imbalance, a key part of its offensive trade strategy. Learn more about the ruling party’s strategy as elections approach.
The U.S. Status Quo in Afghanistan
Despite limited success thus far, the United States will maintain its current strategy in Afghanistan, deploying a mix of military and diplomatic force to pressure the Taliban on the battlefield while urging Pakistan to bring the Taliban to negotiations. The U.S. pressure will continue to drive Pakistan toward a stronger security partnership with Russia and Iran as part of its regional foreign policy pivot. And Islamabad, Moscow and Tehran will use the threat of the Islamic State to strengthen their security partnership.
The situation in Afghanistan is unlikely to change drastically in the year ahead.
As the United States runs out of medium-pressure tactics (such as cutting off funding, revoking Pakistani officer training and curbing defense sales), it is more likely to impose harsher measures such as revoking Pakistan’s non-NATO major ally status. The Taliban will express more serious interest in negotiations, but talks will only begin if NATO commits to a drawdown, which is unlikely next year given concerns that the Afghan army isn’t strong enough to handle security on its own. Read more on the growing relationship between Pakistan and Russia.
Pakistan’s Trade Deficit and Slowing Growth
As the prime minister implements austerity measures to strengthen Pakistan’s economy, growth will slow and unemployment will rise, compelling him to focus on anti-corruption measures to demonstrate his administration’s progress. He will also push China to emphasize agriculture projects in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor while pushing for jobs creation and inviting third-party countries to invest in the country.
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s focus on economic growth won’t affect his deference toward the country’s military.
But a strong dollar means that dollar-denominated purchases will maintain pressure on the trade deficit. On the political front, Khan will avoid tampering with the army, meaning its hold over foreign policy will endure. If the prime minister tries to assert his authority over the military, the army will either engineer parliamentary defections causing his coalition to collapse, or corruption cases will suddenly arise against members of his administration. Take a more in-depth look at Khan’s balancing act in office in our latest assessment.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
New Delhi will seek to protect its Indian Ocean shipping routes and deny China a regional military advantage.
Even as India strengthens its defense partnership with the United States, its doctrine of strategic autonomy means it will avoid treaty alliances and will try to balance relations among the great powers.
Afghanistan is becoming another space for great power cooperation and competition, as major powers try to prevent the Islamic State from using it as a base.
Key Dates to Watch
December: India and China hold military drills.
December: The Indian states of Rajasthan, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Kashmir conduct elections.
Dec. 30: Bangladesh conducts national elections.
January: Deadline for International Monetary Fund bailout talks with Pakistan
January: Sri Lanka to hold snap elections.
April 1: Start of India’s fiscal year.
April 20: Afghan scheduled to hold presidential elections.
April-May: Indian parliamentary elections and state elections in Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are held.
July 1: Start of Pakistan’s fiscal year.
Summer: India, Japan and the United States participate in Malabar naval exercises.
September: Deadline for Pakistan to complete Financial Action Task Force plan to be removed from anti-terrorism “gray list.”
December: Preparations begin for Sri Lanka’s 2020 presidential elections.
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Nov 28, 2018 | 17:57 GMT 6 mins read
Eurasia
Eurasia is the world’s most expansive region. It connects the East to the West, forming a land bridge that borders Europe, the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and South Asia. Forming the borders of this massive tract of land are the Northern European Plain, the Carpathian Mountains, the Southern Caucasus Mountains, the Tien Shan Mountains and Siberia. At the heart of Eurasia is Russia, a country that throughout history has tried, to varying degrees of success, to extend its influence to Eurasia’s farthest reaches — a strategy meant to insulate it from outside powers. But this strategy necessarily creates conflict throughout Russia’s borderlands, putting Eurasia a near constant state of instability.
Key Trends for 2019
Military Buildups and an Intensifying Arms Race
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) will intensify ongoing military buildups by the United States and Russia throughout 2019, particularly in the European borderlands. Poland, Romania and the Baltic states will be the most willing to host additional U.S. assets, though it will be at least another year before the United States deploys intermediate-range missiles in the region. For its part, Russia will add to its military presence and assets in Kaliningrad, western Russia, Crimea and the Black Sea. Negotiations between Washington and the Polish government about building a permanent U.S. military base in the country will move forward, though construction will not likely begin in 2019.
Beyond its saber-rattling, Russia will physically bolster its military footprint in the former Soviet periphery through 2019.
In turn, Russia will advance its own efforts to increase its military presence and infrastructure in Belarus, including the opening of an air base. Another front in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia will continue to develop in the Sea of Azov. Both countries will build up naval assets, and the United States will weigh in with security support for Ukraine. The U.S. withdrawal from the INF will put pressure on other arms control arrangements but will not cause a full break between Russia and the United States over New START, the strategic arms treaty signed in 2010 that limits the number of nuclear warheads each country can deploy. Read more about the ramifications of the U.S. withdrawal from the INF in this assessment.
The Hybrid Warfare Campaign Intensifies
Russia will vigorously pursue its hybrid warfare campaign against Western and Western-leaning countries by interfering in national politics, spreading propaganda and launching cyberattacks and covert operations in a bid to undermine European Union and NATO unity. EU parliamentary elections in May will give Russia an opportunity to support far-right and anti-establishment parties throughout Europe, particularly in Hungary, Italy and France. Russia will also target the Balkan states, especially Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, with a mix of political meddling, disinformation tactics and economic sweeteners to try to stymie their EU integration efforts. Russia will be most effective in its hybrid warfare efforts in Moldova, where parliamentary elections in February are likely to produce political gains for the pro-Moscow Socialist party. That result would drive Moldova to deepen its pivot to Russia while freezing — if not reversing — its integration efforts with the European Union.
The West will counter Russian hybrid tactics by increasing sanctions pressure while intensifying and coordinating cybersecurity and counterpropaganda strategies.
The United States can be expected to impose sanctions on more Russian officials and entities and cut off trade channels and could perhaps downgrade diplomatic ties. The U.S. Congress could pressure the White House to take the more extreme option of targeting Russian sovereign debt or banning dollar transactions with its largest state banks. Sanctions will be more controversial in the European Union, but the bloc will maintain them throughout the year. Russia’s efforts to insulate itself from sanctions by building up foreign exchange reserves and wealth funds, diversifying trade ties, and decreasing its exposure and dependence on dollar transactions will enable it to avoid a major economic crisis in 2019. As the United States increases security support for pro-Western states such as Ukraine and Georgia, Washington will also push back against Russian influence in states closer to Moscow’s orbit, like Armenia and Uzbekistan. See our assessment of the U.S. outreach on Russia’s former Soviet periphery.
Challenging the U.S. World Order
Russia will seek to expand its ties and involvement around the world to peel back Western hegemony and challenge the U.S.-led world order. China, whose interests in challenging Washington within the great power competition align with its own, will be a key focus of Russia’s efforts. Russia and China will ramp up their economic and energy ties this year, and Beijing will also increase its investment in building factories, pipelines, roads, railways and other infrastructure projects in Russia, especially in its Far East. The countries will also strengthen military ties, likely increasing the size and scope of their joint military exercises both bilaterally and multilaterally such as through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Moscow and Beijing will sustain their trade in weapons despite sanctions pressure from the United States and their competition for the same weapons markets.
Elsewhere in Asia, Russia will seek to strengthen its economic relationship with Japan, though their lingering territorial spat over the Kuril Islands will limit significant expansion of ties. Russia will sustain political and economic support for North Korea — including pushing for inter-Korean infrastructure projects — while resisting and circumventing U.S. sanctions against Pyongyang. In the Middle East, Russia will maintain its military support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and increase ties with Iran as a source of leverage against the United States. Read our assessment for a more in-depth look at the deepening relationship between Russia and China.
Russia’s Domestic Challenges
Unpopular economic reforms like the increases in the Russian retirement age and the value-added tax will drive domestic protest, spurred by opposition figures like Alexei Navalny. The Kremlin will respond to demonstrations with a mix of crackdowns, political reshuffles and selective concessions to public demands. The ruling United Russia party’s dominant position will diminish as systemic (or Kremlin-friendly) opposition parties like the Communists, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and A Just Russia contest gubernatorial and parliamentary seats in regional elections in September.
Russia can expect continued domestic turbulence in 2019, but political parties opposing President Vladimir Putin’s rule will struggle to seriously challenge him.
Opposition parties will increase their cooperation with one another to form a more potent challenge to United Russia, a move that President Vladimir Putin will cautiously allow to prevent the rise of non-systemic opposition forces. On the security front, Russia will reshuffle the leadership of the GRU military intelligence agency following a series of controversial operations abroad and disperse some of its responsibilities and assets among other security organs, most notably the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Read our assessment of United Russia’s recent political defeats for more on Russia’s internal political shifts.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
Regardless of who wins its presidential and parliamentary elections, Ukraine will keep its broader foreign policy toward integration with the West.
Azerbaijan’s relationship with Iran will come under strain as the government pivots toward the U.S. containment strategy.
Russia and China will cooperate in counterterrorism initiatives in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan and the Tajik-Afghan border area.
Russia’s resumption of natural gas imports from Turkmenistan to help ease a prolonged economic downturn and to stave off the West’s overtures related to the Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline project.
Key Dates to Watch
Early 2019: Japanese Prime Minister Abe is expected to visit Russia.
Early 2019: Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit Washington, D.C.
Jan. 1: Russian pension and value-added tax reforms take effect.
Jan. 1: Russia is scheduled to resume natural gas imports from Turkmenistan.
Feb. 24: Moldova holds parliamentary elections.
March 31: Ukraine holds a presidential election.
June: Kyrgyzstan hosts a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
September: Russia holds regional elections.
Oct. 27: Ukraine holds parliamentary elections.
December: The Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline from Russia to China is expected to come online.
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Nov 28, 2018 | 19:59 GMT 7 mins read
Americas
The Americas stretch from the Arctic Circle in Canada to the southern tip of Chile. This geographically, culturally and politically diverse region is home to the United States, a nation whose geography helped it become the foremost economic and military power in the world — an ascendance aided in part by bringing Mexico and Canada into its sphere of influence. Farther south, the nations of South America are like islands, separated by vast spaces of impenetrable mountains, rivers and jungles. Try though these countries may to integrate more closely, deeper ties such as those that characters North America will prove elusive.
Key Trends for 2019
In North America, Domestic Issues Are Front and Center
Now that they’ve put the finishing touches on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the pact’s three members will face less risk of trade upheaval in 2019. The divided political control of the U.S. Congress will be a key factor shaping President Donald Trump’s policy agenda. Lawmakers will not significantly curtail the president’s powers on foreign trade, especially related to the auto industry, given that White House actions will have less effect on the domestic vehicle sector. Still, the House of Representatives, led by the Democratic Party, won’t cooperate with the administration’s plans for foreign policy, military spending, immigration and tax reductions. Gridlock will hinder policymaking, meaning the White House will make little headway on immigration reform or tax cut plans.
A divided U.S. Congress reduces Trump’s ability to taper foreign aid to Central American governments in response to illegal immigration from their countries.
Accordingly, Mexico’s success in stemming the flow of people from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador to the United States will be crucial to the administration’s immigration policy. To avoid a political confrontation with the United States, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador will not significantly alter his country’s policy on countering illegal immigration or its domestic security policy against organized crime.
The United States, Canada and Mexico will continue to spar throughout 2019.
In Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party will face stiff competition from the opposition Conservative Party in October’s federal elections. During the year, Trudeau will try to seal a trade agreement with China, although that will raise the ire of both Washington and the Canadian opposition, particularly as U.S., Canadian and Mexican lawmakers prepare to ratify the USMCA. Though that negotiation will irk Washington, it is largely powerless to prevent Ottawa and Beijing from pursuing the talks. For more about what changed and what remained the same in the NAFTA overhaul, see our most recent analysis.
AMLO Makes a Left Turn in Mexico’s Domestic Affairs
Now that he has formally assumed power, Lopez Obrador — popularly known as AMLO — will turn his attention to implementing his populist domestic agenda in 2019. Lopez Obrador’s coalition will strive to obtain the congressional support necessary to raise wages, adjust energy legislation and amend the constitution to hold more frequent binding referendums. But his proposed changes to energy legislation, such as local content increases, will make Mexican oil and natural gas less attractive to foreign companies.
Will AMLO’s populist agenda help or hinder Mexico?
Even without constitutional reform on referendums, the president and political parties in Mexico will promote a spate of informal votes to demand government action on certain issues, such as public works projects and fuel prices. More frequent referendums will raise the risk that Mexican courts or the government will side with voters against the private sector on controversial issues that are approved in nonbinding plebiscites. Read our analysis for more about how plebiscites could bring disruptions to Mexico.
Mercosur Takes a Cautious Step Toward Free Trade
Brazil’s government will negotiate with other member states in the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) to eliminate restrictions on bilateral trade and lower the bloc’s common external tariffs. To enact its desired changes, Brazil will require a unanimous vote from the bloc’s members.
Domestic political concerns among Mercosur’s member states will once again influence the trading bloc’s behavior in the coming year.
Argentina and Uruguay will be open to liberalizing the bloc’s trade restrictions, but the prospect of a tight presidential election in Argentina will make President Mauricio Macri reluctant to agree to a deal. If Macri hesitates, negotiations are likely to stretch into 2020. And if a candidate from one of Argentina’s populist Peronist parties beats Macri, he or she will favor more protectionist trade policies – which would put it on a collision course with Brazil. Read more about Mercosur and why the bloc won’t suffer many effects from U.S. auto tariffs in our assessment.
In Its Fight for Survival, Venezuela’s Government Irks Its Neighbors
Running on empty amid a dearth of oil revenue, Venezuela’s government desperately needs cash anywhere it can find it. The country’s plight will force Caracas to seek revenue from illicit avenues, such as the illegal mining of gold and other minerals, as well as shady financial transactions. The shift will give illegal miners incentives to expand their activities in eastern and southern Venezuela and into western Guyana and northern Brazil. But the spread of such activities into Brazil will attract the attention of the new presidential administration, giving Brasilia direct leverage over Venezuelan economic interests. To prevent a greater spillover of Venezuela’s crisis, Brasilia will coordinate with Washington and the new government in Colombia to ramp up financial and political pressure on Caracas, possibly through sanctions or greater scrutiny on Venezuelan financial flows.
Cash-strapped Venezuela’s ability to defend itself from internal threats, such as coup attempts or protests, will diminish throughout the year. Complicating matters, the shift away from oil revenue toward illicit funding will increase competition among Venezuela’s political elites, who will jockey for their share of national wealth. The government will try to generate more cash to satisfy the elites by diverting some oil shipments to cash-paying customers instead of using the money to pay down its debts. This makes it likely that Caracas will fall behind on debt repayments to Russia and China. In response, these lenders will slow funding to Caracas, exacerbating Venezuela’s oil production decline and contributing to greater conflict and competition among political elites intent on grabbing some of the government’s rapidly shrinking revenue. Take a closer look at how Venezuela’s illicit activities are angering neighboring Colombia, Guyana and Brazil.
Brazil’s New Ruler Gets Ready to Overhaul Security and Investment
Jair Bolsonaro, who will assume Brazil’s presidency on the first day of 2019, is preparing big changes to his country’s policy on Chinese investment and domestic security. Bolsonaro’s government will aim to manage or curb Chinese investment in strategic sectors, such as mining and energy infrastructure. The president will also begin courting congressional votes to implement security policies like lowering the age of criminal responsibility. But even if Brazil’s new government fails to find the votes for security reforms, it will deploy the armed forces and police to curb criminal activity, which will have short-term security benefits in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Read more about the strategies Brazil’s incoming president will use to try to enact his agenda.
The Argentine President’s Difficult Path to Re-Election
Argentine President Mauricio Macri will face an uphill battle if he is to win re-election in October 2019. Though he retains enough popularity to advance to a second round, he faces uncertain prospects for success in a runoff. Because Macri’s public approval is tenuous, any further currency depreciation or unhappiness over inflation will open the possibility that a populist challenger will defeat him in a second round in November. See more about the challenges awaiting Macri in 2019.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
In Mexico and Brazil, new leaders will look for ways to fulfill campaign promises to root out corruption in their respective countries.
A divided U.S. Congress will give the Democrats more leverage over the administration’s agenda as the party will wield greater influence over federal funding and lawmaking.
In Argentina, a populist opposition stands to gain the presidency due to Macri’s political troubles.
Bolivian President Evo Morales will stand for re-election, but that will likely incite protests that will disrupt trade and business activity.
Key Dates to Watch
Jan. 1: Jair Bolsonaro will take office as Brazil’s president.
Jan. 3: The 116th U.S. Congress convenes.
Feb. 3: El Salvador will hold elections.
May 5: Panamanians will cast their ballots in general elections.
June: Guatemala will go to the polls.
Oct. 21: Canada will hold federal elections.
Oct. 27: Bolivia will conduct presidential elections.
Oct. 27: Uruguayans will elect a new president.
Oct. 27: Argentina will stage the first round of federal elections for president and members of Congress.
Nov. 24: Argentines will vote in a likely runoff election.
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Nov 28, 2018 | 22:31 GMT 6 mins read
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is a study in diversity. Covering an area that spans the entire width of the continent beginning at the Sahara Desert and ending at the southernmost tip of South Africa, the region is home to countless cultures, languages, religions, plants, animals and natural resources. It’s no surprise that it captured the imagination of Europe’s earliest explorers — and that it continues to capture the imagination of current world powers eager to exploit it. And yet despite the region’s diversity, Sub-Saharan African countries have common challenges — transnational terrorism, rapid population growth, endemic poverty and corruption — that prevent them from capitalizing on their economic potential. The coming years will be critical for the region, especially as its political institutions mature in a rapidly globalizing world.
Key Trends for 2019
Ethiopia’s Rise in a Changing Region
Peace between landlocked Ethiopia and its erstwhile coastal province, Eritrea, allows for the reopening of transport routes and increased opportunities for foreign investment. Ethiopia is the region’s rising economic giant, and its reform-minded government intends to partially privatize state-owned enterprises, hoping to attract money from countries including the United Arab Emirates and China.
Ethiopia is a rising star in the Horn of Africa, but economic and ethnic factors could make 2019 a pivotal year for Addis Ababa.
Much depends, however, on the degree of transparency in the process — as well as the profit returns from completed megaprojects. Furthermore, the country’s need for continued structural economic reforms, along with its shortage of foreign exchange reserves, will hamper growth in the short term. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will have to carefully manage these key issues, as well as enduring ethnic divisions, if his country is to become a potent driver for change in the region. Take a more in-depth look at the promise and peril of Ethiopia’s economy.
A Rising Tide Buoys Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan
Ethiopia’s rise is generating interest in neighboring Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan from China, Russia and the United States. Somalia and the breakaway republic of Somaliland will try to harness that interest to strengthen trade and supply chains. For Eritrea, peace with Ethiopia means it can devote more resources to its economy than in recent decades, with manufacturing, mining and tourism most likely to attract investment. The lifting of U.N. sanctions will increase investment and security interest from Washington and others, but human rights concerns will prevent any investment rush.
Great power competition over countries in the Horn of Africa will be a feature of 2019.
Powers such as Russia are likely to increase ties with Eritrea, with Moscow promising to construct a logistics center at one of the country’s two ports. Meanwhile, Sudanese President Omar al Bashir will cooperate with Washington on counterterrorism measures to ingratiate himself as he seeks to extend his time in office beyond 2020. Even so, he will maintain balances by deepening ties with Moscow and Beijing, which are seeking greater influence across Africa. Djibouti will continue to leverage its geostrategically important position on the Bab el-Mandeb strait for influence and financial gain. China holds roughly 80 percent of Djibouti’s external debt, however, which gives Beijing a significant degree of influence. Read more about the United States’ growing interest in the strategic Horn of Africa.
South Africa’s ANC Braces for Elections
Ahead of South Africa’s 2019 general election, a weak economy will compel President Cyril Ramaphosa to pursue populist policies such as land expropriation without compensation to shore up electoral support among the traditional base of the ruling African National Congress. The impact will scare away some foreign investment, increase currency volatility and induce fears about the country’s direction.
Efforts to root out corruption, particularly in state-owned enterprises, will feature prominently in South Africa’s electoral run-up.
Ramaphosa’s administration will focus on reforming businesses such as the public power monopoly Eskom to tackle endemic corruption and improve services. Ultimately, however, if Pretoria fails to overhaul key state companies, it will become more inwardly focused, hindering its efforts to project influence across the continent. For a more detailed look at Ramaphosa’s political calculations ahead of national elections, see our analysis.
Buhari’s Last Stand?
When Nigerians vote in February, they will choose between two northerners battling it out for the country’s top office — a development guaranteeing that region’s hold over the south’s lucrative oil industry. President Muhammadu Buhari will continue his efforts to institutionalize the country’s struggle against corruption, but his challenger, Atiku Abubakar, will likely put the issue on the back burner if elected. Regionally, the next president will finally sign the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, whose largest non-signatory is Nigeria. Despite pressure from the domestic manufacturing industry and unions to steer clear of the deal, Abuja fears it will fall behind if it doesn’t ratify the agreement, which will significantly boost intra-African trade.
Nigeria’s general election in mid-February will be important to watch, but irrespective of presidential appointment, there are things the country needs to do in 2019.
On the security front, the Islamic State West African Province, which showed signs of resurgence around Lake Chad in 2018, will struggle to conduct attacks beyond Nigeria’s northeast in 2019 as its supply lines remain stretched and the government prepares more effective strategies to counter the group. Meanwhile, militants in the oil-producing Niger Delta remain dormant thanks to Abuja’s successful appeasement strategy, and both Buhari and Abubakar will avoid aggression against the fighters to maintain peace in the country’s most lucrative industry. Read more about the issues dominating Nigeria’s upcoming elections.
The Kabila System Fights for Survival
Whatever its result, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Dec. 23 election will be flawed as outgoing President Joseph Kabila seeks to maintain a system that maximizes the political and economic spoils for his family and minimizes the weaknesses of his hand-picked successor, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary. The ruling alliance’s control of the security services and other state institutions will enable it to win a tightly controlled contest despite opposition pressure. Subsequent stability in the key commodity producer will ultimately depend on the internal, regional and international reaction to the vote.
With the results likely to be dubious, opposition protests will result in violence and a government crackdown that will prompt the European Union and the United States to enact targeted sanctions. Elsewhere, Kinshasa will stick with the hard-line measures it implemented against international mining companies in 2018. After all, the government, which controls a significant chunk of the global cobalt supply, maintains the advantage — and Chinese producers will be only too willing to step in if Western producers push too far. Read more about the strategic importance of cobalt.
Related Forecasts These Stratfor analyses provide additional insights for the year ahead
Leadership changes in southern Africa are generating economic opportunities, but not all emerging or frontier markets are equal.
Ahmed, the Ethiopian premier, seeks greater ethnic stability inside his country, but the growth of interregional violence may challenge this effort. If Addis Ababa fails to foster calm before elections in 2020, ethnic factions are likely to take sides, endangering the ruling coalition and the country’s economic liberalization drive.
The rising popularity of Ugandan pop star and political upstart Bobi Wine highlights an emerging trend as a youth population disenchanted with the status quo becomes enamored with politicians promising change.
The threat from upstart jihadist groups in Mozambique remains limited for now, especially when compared to those posed by established organizations.
Key Dates to Watch
Dec. 23, 2018: The Democratic Republic of Congo holds its long-delayed presidential election.
January: The heads of state of the African Union will hold a summit in Egypt.
February: A conference of the heads of state of the Group of Five Sahel alliance will be held in in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
Pres. Donald Trump nominated on Sept. 4, 2018 career Foreign Service Officer Earle Litzenberger to serve as US Ambassador to Azerbaijan replacing Amb. Robert Cekuta who left Baku nine months ago.
A month before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s October 4, 2018 hearing on Litzenberger’s confirmation, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) issued a press release urging the Armenian American community, friends of Armenia, and human rights activists to call on their Senators to scrutinize Litzenberger’s nomination.
Aram Hamparian, Executive Director of ANCA, explained that “there’s never been a more urgent need for clarity regarding the nature and scope of American relations with the Aliyev regime. This confirmation process provides a much-needed opportunity for substantive Congressional oversight of an increasingly troubled U.S.-Azerbaijan bilateral relationship, characterized by escalating aggression against Armenians, a worsening crackdown on dissent, and a well-funded campaign to manipulate the American political process.”
Litzenberger has served as Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund; Deputy Chief of Mission to the United States Mission to NATO; NATO Deputy Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan; Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia; and Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Litzenberger earned a B.A. from Middlebury College and M.S. from the United States Army War College. He speaks French, Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian.
During the October 4, 2018 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Litzenberger came under intense scrutiny. The ANCA reported that Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) referred to Azeri President Ilham Aliyev’s “bellicose rhetoric and sporadic outbursts of violence,” when pressing Litzenberger about Azerbaijan’s violent strategies. Litzenberger responded that he would urge the Azerbaijani government to step back from behaviors that would disrupt the line of contact in the Artsakh conflict. He also stated that the U.S. is working along three lines — the non-use of force, respect for territorial integrity, and the right to self-determination.
In addition, Litzenberger referred to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which condemns “any violence and any threat of the use of violence along the line of contact” without specifically citing Azerbaijan’s attacks.
During the hearing, Sen. Menendez inquired whether providing weapons to Azerbaijan should be curtailed based on its human rights violations. Litzenberger responded that the State Department will be careful to ensure its decisions do not undermine efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the Artsakh conflict. He also mentioned an increased focus on Azerbaijani training in human rights.
Following the hearing, both Sen. Menendez and Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA) submitted written questions to Litzenberger. At the request of Sen. Menendez, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee postponed consideration of Litzenberger’s nomination to an unspecified date. Both Senators may have additional written questions to the nominee as a result of their concerns at National Security Advisor John Bolton’s offer to sell weapons to Armenia and Azerbaijan during his late October trip to the Caucasus.
Litzenberger was the only one of 19 ambassadorial nominations to be postponed, very likely until next year, when the Committee will hold its next business meeting.
ANCA’s Hamparian welcomed Litzenberger’s delay giving the Senators the “opportunity for more careful Congressional oversight of our country’s increasingly challenging bilateral ties with Azerbaijan’s aggressive and abusive Aliyev regime, particularly in light of National Security Advisor John Bolton’s controversial suggestion that the U.S. start selling arms to Baku.”
Hamparian went on to assert: “We join with our Senate friends in seeking greater clarity on this point, and, more generally, regarding the Administration’s policy on Aliyev’s worsening pattern of aggression against Artsakh and Armenia, incitement of hatred against all Armenians, unapologetic blacklisting of U.S. legislators, obstruction of the Royce-Engel peace proposals, threats to shoot down civilian aircraft, the destruction of the Djulfa cemetery and other Christian heritage sites, and – of course – his severe crackdown against domestic dissidents and ethnic-religious minorities.”
Azerbaijan’s Turan news Agency reported the news about the delay of the confirmation of the US Ambassador to Baku. Surprisingly, Turan speculated that Pres. Trump may make a recess appointment taking advantage of the absence of Senate sessions in December, which would mean that the President could appoint Litzenberger as Ambassador to Azerbaijan without Senate confirmation.
Readers may recall that Pres. Obama made such a recess appointment in the case of Matt Bryza dispatching him as Ambassador to Azerbaijan, after Sen. Menendez twice blocked his confirmation. Bryza could only serve in Baku for 12 months before being forced to return to Washington, after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to confirm his nomination.
In the case of Matt Bryza, the Armenian-American community had a good reason to object to his nominations as he had a serious bias against Armenia and favored Azerbaijan and Turkey. However, Litzenberger does not seem to have such biases and there is nothing personal against him. Delaying his nomination is simply a means to ensure that he would defend human rights in Azerbaijan and would urge the Aliyev regime to be less bellicose in the Artsakh conflict. Litzenberger’s delay would also send a message to John Bolton that the Senate does not welcome his offer to sell weapons to Azerbaijan.
The delay of the Ambassador’s Senate confirmation would serve the additional aim of upsetting the Aliyev regime by prolonging the lengthy absence of a US Ambassador to Baku, causing an irritation in Azerbaijan-United States relations.
Turkey has moved closer to Russia while its relationships with the United States and the European Union have suffered.
A Turkish realignment toward Russia is not likely to materialize given their vastly different strategic priorities and visions.
For practical reasons, Turkey will take additional steps over the coming months to rekindle its alliance with the United States and its partnership with the European Union.
Turkey’s relationship with Russia is historically fraught with suspicion and friction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the two countries have established an important economic relationship, and they have set a bold, perhaps unreachable target of $100 billion in bilateral trade. Even so, this economic aspiration is counterbalanced by differing prerogatives in the strategic and geopolitical realm. Turkey, representing NATO’s eastern flank, has partnered for decades with the United States and the European Union to contain Russian influence in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the Caucasus. Recent developments in the Syrian civil war have resulted in a strange congruence of interests and seeming cooperation between Ankara and Moscow, but it would be a stretch to argue that this cooperation will deepen into an enduring strategic relationship.
Frayed Relations With the U.S.
Since 2012, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been at odds with the United States, under Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, for actively supporting Kurdish rebels in Syria to defeat the Islamic State. Turkey considers the Kurdish rebels in Syria an offshoot of the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the Turkish government, as well as the United States, NATO and the European Union, lists as a terrorist organization. In turn, Russia has, with the help of Iran, established a process not only of defeating the Islamic State in Syria but also of defeating all rebel groups fighting the pro-Russian government of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. The situation in Syria has left policy analysts wondering whether Turkey is actively distancing itself from its American and European partners to adopt a closer strategic relationship with Russia.
To be sure, there are many issues that have resulted in a deep schism between Turkey and the United States. U.S. backing of Kurdish rebels can be seen as merely the tip of the iceberg. In return, Turkey has concluded the purchase (if not the actual deployment) of a Russian S-400 missile system to bolster its air defenses in clear preference to the U.S.-made Patriot missile system. U.S. authorities have threatened their Turkish counterparts that if they deploy the Russian missiles the United States will not transfer more than 100 F-35 fighters to Turkey, mainly because the Russian crews who would operate the S-400 batteries would be in a prime position to gain information regarding the F-35’s strengths and weaknesses. Further, Erdogan’s government has arbitrarily detained U.S. citizens as bargaining chips to compel Washington to accede to Turkish policy demands, specifically regarding Syria. In return, the United States, in addition to sanctioning Turkish Cabinet ministers, has threatened further punitive measures against Turkey — measures that could seriously damage its already debt-ridden and fragile economy.
Instead of mending fences with the United States and requesting emergency financial assistance from the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund and/or World Bank, could it be that Erdogan is more interested in turning to new “allies” such as Russia and China to achieve his regional and wider foreign policy agenda? The purchasing of sovereign debt by China is just one avenue by which Beijing is advancing its global ambition of unseating the United States as the sole economic and military hegemon, and it would be quite attractive to Erdogan’s government precisely because monetary loans from China are likely to carry fewer conditions than those obtained from the IMF and World Bank. Other than a historical security apparatus rooted in the Cold War, and limited trade relations, there is not much that binds Turkey and the United States together.
Other than a historical security apparatus rooted in the Cold War, and limited trade relations, there is not much that binds Turkey and the United States together.
On the other hand, Russia and Turkey have a significant economic partnership that not only spans a number of critical sectors but also makes Turkey increasingly dependent on Russia. Turkey derives 55 percent of its natural gas needs (natural gas produces 60 percent of its electricity) from Russia, for example. Both countries have also signed an agreement to build at least one Russian nuclear power plant in Turkey. Because of Turkey’s potential as a transit hub for Russian natural gas to Europe — one that bypasses Ukraine — Moscow and Ankara are building the TurkStream pipeline, which could begin carrying Russian natural gas through Turkey to the European Union via Bulgaria as early as late 2019. The Russian domestic market is a vital destination for Turkish exports, including but not limited to cars, agricultural produce and textiles.
Further, the influx of 4 million to 5 million Russian tourists to Turkey in 2017 represents 12 percent of the country’s total number of tourists and a significant source of revenue. To crown these vital areas of economic synergy, one must bear in mind that Turkey and Russia’s bilateral relationship does not depend on shared values such as human rights and democratic governance, a factor that has further embittered Turkey’s relationship with the United States and the European Union.
Signs of Improvement
Despite the economic ties, Turkey’s supposed realignment toward Russia and China — a clear preference that would put it in the Eurasia camp and possibly out of NATO — is not likely to materialize. Turkey and Russia have vastly different strategic priorities and visions. In the immediate future, Turkey is ambivalent about a Russian- and Iranian-backed military assault on the last rebel-held town of Idlib in Syria. Erdogan has so far succeeded in preventing the operation from taking place. This may not last for much longer. Russia has a clear interest in ending the Syrian civil war and seeing al Assad’s government fully in control of the country once again. This concern presents a number of problems for Turkey. The battle for Idlib would result in new waves of refugees destined for Turkey, which already hosts more than 3.5 million Syrians and isn’t in a position to cope with more. In addition, it is highly likely that the extremist elements making up the remnants of the Syrian resistance that Turkey has actively supported (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and other Islamic State or former al Qaeda elements) would flee to Turkey and pose an internal security threat.
In the long term, Turkey has little to gain with a re-empowered al Assad government, which is likely to present a resentful posture against Erdogan, precisely because he tried to topple al Assad’s government and replace it with a Sunni alternative. Strategically speaking, Turkey also remains largely isolated in the region, and in the event it does not patch up its relationship with its partners, it is likely to face increased security and economic challenges, which its NATO, U.S. and EU anchors so far have largely shielded Ankara from. Consider that Turkey has no real alternative to renewing and maintaining its military capacity independent of U.S.-made products — namely the F-35 fighter. It is for such reasons that Erdogan has recently initiated several overtures to begin rebuilding relationships with allies he has seriously strained. The freeing of U.S. cleric Andrew Brunson in mid-October was a clear attempt to de-escalate tensions with the United States and prevent further sanctions being levied against Turkey. More recently, the apparent murder of The Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul has resulted in Erdogan attempting to marginalize Saudi Arabia in the eyes of the United States and the European Union and to raise Turkey’s profile as a more credible partner, by divulging precise intelligence in Khashoggi’s death.
Turkey remains more distant toward its once stalwart alliance with the United States and partnership with the European Union than at any other point in recent history. However, in the coming months we are likely to witness more overt measures to rekindle and reaffirm these embittered ties, if only for pragmatic reasons.
The fallout from the Khashoggi affair underlines a larger battle between Turkey and Saudi Arabia for influence throughout the Sunni world that will continue in the religious, political and economic spheres.
Turkey may be trying to use its muted response to coax Saudi Arabia into stopping its cooperation with Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, or possibly into to reducing Saudi economic pressure on Qatar, Turkey’s major regional ally.
Their slowly growing defense and economic ties will mitigate the chances of a complete rupture between Ankara and Riyadh.
For weeks, allegations of criminality and a cover-up have consumed the Turkish media after Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed at Riyadh’s consulate in Istanbul on Oct. 2. Three weeks later, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told parliament that Saudi authorities had planned the dissident’s slaying. Erdogan has a penchant for bombast, but the speech was understated, and the president even issued a cordial appeal to Saudi King Salman to cooperate in exposing the truth in the Khashoggi affair. Conspicuously, Erdogan elected not to mention the elephant in the room: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to have played a role in the killing.
The Big Picture
Among the major states of the Middle East, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are rivals competing for dominance in the Sunni Muslim world. The fallout over the violent death of a Saudi journalist in Turkey has given Ankara some leverage against Riyadh, which it will use carefully.
The speech and the steady leak of information from Turkish authorities strengthen the view that Erdogan is trying to carefully pressure Saudi Arabia, whose worldview and regional policies are at odds with Turkey’s. Erdogan isn’t going so far as to risk destroying relations with Saudi Arabia — especially given the prospect that the crown prince could emerge from the scandal — but if international pressure against the crown prince rises, Erdogan is well-positioned to join in the campaign. For the moment, Turkey is seeking to alter the balances within the Saudi royal family by emphasizing that the king is a credible partner while explicitly questioning who instigated the killing, all without mentioning the crown prince by name.
The antagonism between the crown prince and the president is mutual. In comments earlier this year to the Egyptian press, the crown prince called Turkey, Iran and political Islam an “axis of evil.” Basically, the two leaders are revisiting a familiar history of Saudi-Turkish rivalry, which goes back decades. Economic priorities might prevent each side from damaging an otherwise productive relationship, but that doesn’t mean each won’t try to capitalize on the other’s moments of weakness and public relations stumbles — particularly in the way Turkey appears to building leverage against Saudi Arabia in the Khashoggi killing.
Who Leads the Sunni World?
At its core, the conflict is driven by their differing political visions for the Sunni world, as well as the struggle between the visions to get the upper hand. For Saudi Arabia, which is the custodian of Islam’s two holiest cities, Turkey’s challenge is seen as an attack on the legitimacy of the Saud family as rulers. For Turkey, whose sultans once held the same cities as the caliphs of the Sunni world, it is an opportunity to secure soft power in the Muslim world for decades to come.
At its core, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is driven by their differing political visions for the Sunni world.
The question of leadership in the Sunni world has been in flux since the nascent Turkish Republic abolished the caliphate in 1924. In the republican Turkish view, it is authentic expressions of Islamic thought, as espoused by morally upright Muslim citizens, that ought to guide and rule the Sunni world. The Saudis, in contrast, believe that traditional and clear hierarchies, with authority vested in Riyadh-appointed members of the ulama (Muslim clerics), should guide the Sunni world. In essence, Turkey posits that the legitimacy for leadership comes from the grassroots authenticity of everyday Muslims, while Saudi Arabia claims that it is based on the hierarchy of tradition.
This worldview explains Riyadh’s abhorrence of movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which holds views similar to Turkey and which has received political protection from Ankara. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, for example, has operated out of Turkey since Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi seized power from Mohammed Morsi, a member of the group, in 2013. Turkey’s worldview appeals to Muslims anywhere who believe that it is not tradition or social deference that must determine leadership, but commitment to the Islamic faith.
This is a direct political threat to the Saudi royal family’s legitimacy; the more Saudis are exposed to such thinking, the more they may question the tribal-cum-wasta (“influence”) social contract that underpins much of the monarchy’s authority. While the Saudis also claim to be pursuing true and authentic representations of Islam, their insistence on royal privilege and prerogative opens them to criticism that their religious scruples are not as consistent as they say. This creates a soft power contest between the two, and Riyadh hopes to keep this Turkish-derived influence as far away from Saudi subjects as possible.
Rival Camps
Because Turkey and Saudi Arabia view themselves as the Muslim world’s pre-eminent Sunni powers, they are broadly aligned on many foreign policy issues. For instance, both countries want to contain the spread of Iranian hegemony in the region, perceiving Persian power as a threat to their own ability to lead the Middle East and the Muslim world. This makes the two powers natural allies to the United States’ growing efforts to contain Iran’s influence. Washington’s increasing reliance on the two to help contain Iran rests on existing U.S. dependence on the pair to bolster regional counterterrorism efforts. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have, after all, committed to fighting the Islamic State alongside the United States.
But despite their broad alignment on Iran, Ankara and Riyadh have very different relationships with Tehran. While Saudi Arabia avoids as much contact with Iran as possible, Turkey shares a border and an economic and strategic relationship with the country. This might expose Turkey to certain risks (for instance, the risk of suffering harsher U.S. sanctions on Iran in the coming months and years if Turkish companies continue to trade with Iranian entities), but it also provides Ankara a certain freedom to maneuver that Riyadh does not enjoy, such as in the Syria conflict. Moreover, Turkey and Iran’s shared border and large Kurdish populations also give the pair common cause to contain Kurdish separatism.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia further have an interest in supporting the same political causes across the Sunni world, albeit from different angles. The two countries support Palestinian statehood but have pursued contrasting approaches to economic and political aid for the community. Turkey is closer to Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that rules Gaza, while Saudi Arabia primarily backs Fatah, the Palestinian faction that controls the West Bank and which is hostile toward Hamas. Turkey is also publicly healing its rift with Israel, which will broaden its ability to extend support to the Palestinians, at a time when Saudi Arabia has kept its ties with Israel as quiet as possible while expressing public support for the Palestinian cause.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia have also staunchly opposed Syrian President Bashar al Assad throughout most of the Syrian civil war, but they have supported different rebel groups in the conflict. In this, Saudi Arabia’s recent support for the Syrian Kurds has particularly irked Turkey, which view such rebel groups as terrorists.
Competition and Conflict
The Iranian-Saudi rivalry has attracted much attention, but the Turkish-Saudi rivalry — nuanced though it is — is also producing real policy effects, drawing regional Sunni countries into either the Ankara or Riyadh camp. Because Turkey’s political model threatens governments such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the two states have aligned themselves with Saudi Arabia’s regional endeavors. But other Sunni governments, such as Qatar, have grown closer to Turkey because Doha supports Islamist politics as a means of forming deeper connections to global Muslim communities. A few, such as Jordan and Lebanon, try to benefit from both.
Further afield in Africa, the two powers have sought to build the political, religious, economic and security influence that could bolster political legitimacy on the continent. In the Horn of Africa and across North Africa, both countries are opportunistic, taking advantage of political openings, as in Somalia, where Turkey supports political forces opposed to rivals backed by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In Tunisia, Turkey has tried to support the Islamist Ennahda party to help it counter more secularist parties, prompting Saudi Arabia’s (somewhat unsuccessful) efforts to back the latter. Saudi Arabia has also sought to weaken Turkey’s ability to make Africa an export market by undercutting Turkish efforts with donations or investments. By strengthening African economies, Saudi Arabia can help give them the strength to push for a harder bargain with Turkey or to seek imports from elsewhere.
As rivals, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have found ways to needle each other at points of weakness. Because preventing the development of an autonomous Kurdish polity is Turkey’s primary security objective, Ankara is increasingly nervous about Saudi and Gulf efforts to connect with Kurds in Iraq and Syria. Saudi Arabia also deeply opposes Turkey’s support for Qatar, which helped provide a political and security lifeline at the beginning of the June 2017 blockade. Riyadh especially wants to prevent Ankara from bolstering its military presence in Qatar. What’s more, the two have also supported different communities within the crowded and complex political spectrum in Lebanon, in some ways inflaming Beirut’s political problems.
Neither Turkey nor Saudi Arabia has a significant interest in stirring political waters that could upend valuable economic ties.
Economic Ties
Despite the rivalry, Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s burgeoning economic ties might mitigate the possibility of a serious rift — particularly in the realm of defense. Turkish-Saudi defense collaboration began in September 2013, when the two countries ratified a cooperation agreement. Late in 2017, Aselsan Corp., one of Turkey’s most important defense companies, formed a joint venture with Saudi Arabia’s Taqnia called Saudi Defense Electronics Co. (SADEC), which focuses primarily on electronics, including jammers, radars, electronic warfare suites and infrared receivers. As part of the joint venture, Aselsan and Taqnia have commenced construction on a factory in Saudi Arabia.
Turkey has not yet made any major arms sales to Saudi Arabia, although Ankara has been negotiating the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles to Saudi Arabia and has entertained hopes of selling its Altay tank, as well as other weapons and equipment. Because bilateral defense ties remain in their infancy, a serious rift between Turkey and Saudi Arabia would not upend any current arms deals, but it would certainly hinder Ankara’s ambitions of expanding into the lucrative Saudi market, meaning neither side would benefit from a profound rupture in relations.
In terms of trade, the relationship is not massive (the two conducted just $4.7 billion in largely balanced trade last year), yet both governments have pledged to increase trade and investment in sectors that matter to both. Accordingly, neither country has a significant interest in stirring political waters that could upend valuable economic ties. Turkish construction firms, which represent a strategic sector for Ankara, have won contracts to build Saudi Arabian housing projects — the number of which is set to grow substantially under Riyadh’s Vision 2030. Saudi tourists, whose numbers have also been increasing yearly, have also buoyed the Turkish economy by spending big when visiting Turkey. Saudi citizens have also been at the forefront of a campaign to gobble up Turkish real estate, highlighting just how important the kingdom’s customers are to the economic sector for Ankara. (Naturally, some of Riyadh’s influence over Ankara through the real estate market is mitigated by the $1 billion in investments that Qatar, an even bigger foe of Saudi Arabia, has made in Turkey’s housing market in the past three years.)
Keeping Calm, for Now
For now, Riyadh is playing it safe with Ankara as it tries to defuse the Khashoggi crisis. So what, ultimately, does Turkey want as it dangles the journalist’s case over Saudi Arabia? Economically, Turkey could be quietly soliciting Saudi financial support in exchange for an end to the media pressure on the crown prince or it might even be soliciting some diplomatic relief for Doha, which remains under the Gulf Cooperation Council’s blockade. Politically and security-wise, Turkey is also seeking a channel to contain Saudi support for the Kurds.
Ultimately, however, much of the Saudi-Turkish rivalry fits into the political and soft power spheres, in which personalities like Mohammed bin Salman and Erdogan compete for prestige and Ankara and Riyadh attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Sunni world. For now, Turkey appears to see the benefit in not rocking the boat with Saudi Arabia— but that’s no guarantee that it won’t change its mind.
NEW YORK, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11th, 1938…
ATATÜRK DIES AT 58; TURKS WILL ELECT A SUCCESSOR TODAY…
National Assembly Expected to Name General Inönü, Former Premier, as President…
NATION GOES IN MOURNING…
Peaceful Transition to New Era Seen… Unity is Stressed Under Ideal of Founder…
The Bad News in The New York Times…
ISTANBUL, Türkiye, November 10 th – Kemal Atatürk, President and creator of modern Türkiye, died today at Dolma Baghche Palace at the age of 58. He had survived thirteen wounds received in battle and a number of assassination attempts, but succumbed to cirrhosis of the liver.It is expected that General Ismet Inönü, former Premier and President Atatürk’s comrade-in-arms, will be chosen tomorrow morning by the Republican People’s party to succeed the dictator-soldier, hero of the reborn nation. The bulletin announcing the death of Atatürk and signed by eight doctors read :
“The President’s general condition, the gravity of which was announced in a bulletin published last night, grew steadily worse. On November 10th, 1938, at 9:05 A.M., our great chief, in a deep coma, breathed his last.”
Three minutes after his death Salih Bozük, former aide and one of the President’s closest friends, unsuccessfully attempted suicide by shooting. He was seriously wounded. Premier Stays at Bedside.
Throughout the night Ali Fethi Okyar, Ambassador to London Atatürk’s sister and his adopted daughter Sabihi Gueukschehn Honoum, the latter a famous air-woman, remained near the bedside. The first indication of the President’s death came at 11:30 A.M. when it was noticed that the flags on government buildings were at half-staff. Soon the flags of ships in the harbor were at half-mast, and gradually all shops and houses exhibited similar signs of mourning.
Later, however, the authorities requested the withdrawal of flags except those on government buildings. Although the flags at half staff the appearance of so much color gave the impression that Istanbul was on fete. All places of public entertainment were closed and no intoxicants will be sold in Türkiye until further notice.
The government’s communiqué issued this morning states:
“By Atatürk’s death Türkiye has lost her great creator, a nation its great Chief and humanity a great son. We offer our people deepest condolences in their great loss. Our only consolation in our affliction is our attachment to his great work and our service to our dear country. We declare that before all things his immortal work is the Turkish Republic.”
“Your government is at its post at this grave time through which we are passing. The great Turkish nation will, without doubt, work as one body with the government to preserve order.”
“In accordance with the Constitution Abdullah Haik Renda, president of the Kamutay [National Assembly] has assumed the interim Presidency of the republic and the Kamutay will proceed forthwith with the election of a new President of the republic. The government, the glorious Turkish Army with all its might and the whole people, which form an unshakable entity, will gather around whoever is elected to fulfill the highest office in Türkiye and to maintain her greatness.”
“Atatürk, whom we mourn today and always, had the confidence of the Turkish people. The continuation of his work he bequeathed to the Turkish nation. The Turkish people, which is eternal, will make it live eternally. Turkish youth will always defend the Turkish Republic, its precious legacy, and will march alone the path Atatürk traced. Kemal Atatürk will live always.”
Beside General Inönü, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of Staff, and Mr. Okyar also are in the running for the Presidency. The Marshal, as Chief of Staff, holds a position of great authority in the new Türkiye and he is universally respected as the father of the army. However, he is essentially a soldier and he is known to be reluctant to play a political role. It is said that before President Atatürk became seriously ill he asked the Marshal whether he would stand for the Presidency if Atatürk resigned. The suggestion was declined.
Mr. Okyar, once Prime Minister of Türkiye and lately Ambassador to London and an experienced diplomat, has been Atatürk’s most intimate friend. Since the suppression in 1930 of the short-lived Liberal party, of which he was a leader, he never joined the Republican People’s party and it seems unlikely that the Kamutay, composed almost entirely of adherents of the party the principals of which were lately embodied in the Constitution, would elect a non-party man President.
Moreover, neither Marshal Çakmak nor Mr. Okyar is a member of the Kamutay, from which a president is elected.
Inönü Is Likely Choice…
It’s seems, therefore, that the choice will fall on General Inönü. For many years he was a close collaborator and lieutenant of President Atatürk and until twelve months ago he had been Prime Minister continuously for twelve years. No man in Türkiye possesses his experience, and that is perhaps more important than his popularity, which for long has been second only to Atatürk’s. Much has been said about their estrangement last year when General Inönü resigned the Premiership, but in light of subsequent events it now seems clear that it was the result chiefly of temporary mutual irritation. President Atatürk was a sick man and General Inönü was suffering from the strain of the long, arduous years in office.
Ever since it was agreed between them that in the interest of the country the partnership should be dissolved, the general deliberately kept in the background, but the Turkish people, with the possible exception of a few private enemies, continued to regard him as the natural successor to his former chief.
Even if none of three is elected to the Presidency and the Kamutay decides to choose another who has not played a prominent part in the life of the republic, the loyal cooperation that is now manifesting itself between Marshal Çakmak, Mr. Okyar and General Inönü, toward Celal Bayar, the present Prime Minister, should be sufficient to guarantee a peaceful transition to the new era.
Change in Policy Unlikely – ISTANBUL, November 10th (AP)…
There were unconfirmed reports today that Kemal Atatürk had left a political testament to guide his successor in his own rigid doctrine of westernization and nationalism. No one expected Türkiye’s new leadership to turn in the immediate future from the domestic and foreign balance that Atatürk achieved for his nation, strategically situated between the East and the West. Before Atatürk became gravely ill in mid-October he was borrowing money for Türkiye with little discrimination from both Britain and Germany, although his early struggle for power was tinged with bitter hatred for the influence of both. The British and German Foreign Offices were known to have keen interest in his successor and the future course of Türkiye.
KEMAL ATATÜRK…
Atatürk, a Military Hero, Formed surging Nation…
He was called simply Mustafa when he was born in Salonika in 1880, the son of a Turkish custom’s officer. His mathematic’s teacher at military preparatory school added Kemal, meaning “rightness”, to his name. When he fought his way to leadership of the Turks, the title of Pasha was added. Most of his historic record was made as Mustafa Kemal Pasha. In 1934, when he had so modernized Türkiye that titles were abolished and he was able to decree that all Turks must thereafter have family names, he chose for himself the family name of Atatürk, which is translated as “Chief Turk” or “Father of All Turks.” Thenceforth he was known as Kemal Atatürk.
His death comes as a blow to a nation of 14,000,000 people, although he reformed their social customs, their religion and their economics with dictatorial zeal and speed. Out of the remains of the defeated and dismembered Ottoman Empire, he formed in 1923 a republic, which he armed and industrialized and made into a powerful nation. He repossessed the Dardanelles in 1936, conciliated the Greeks and steered a course between East and West in a manner that made Soviet Russia, Britain and Germany in turn glad to cultivate Türkiye’s friendship and lend her millions of further development.
Women Admitted to Parliament…
In twelve years of reform women in Türkiye were transported from the harem and the veil to membership in Parliament, to which seventeen women were admitted in 1935. President Atatürk even gave women the right to serve in the army, but said they would never be sent to the front because they were too precious to the nation. In another phase of reform, he stripped Mohammedan priests of their privileges and made Sunday instead of Friday the day of rest to conform with western usage. He devoted himself to the development of an army and navy with which to assure the Turkish position in dealing with the Western powers. By this year he had a modernized army of almost 500,000 men and was spending $70,000,000 of Türkiye’s annual budget of $210,000,000 to expand the national defense . He announced a five-year plan intended to bring Türkiye’s air force up to 1,000 of the latest military planes. He ordered twenty-five submarines and planned to equip Türkiye to manufacture arms and war materials within her own boundaries.
Türkiye’s control of the Dardanelles had already made her one of the most important powers in the Mediterranean, and she was prepared to defend her position instead of being a pawn of stronger European nations as in the past.
Straits Pact Repudiated…
She had gained this position finally when Atatürk decided that Türkiye’s new national stature justified the repudiation of the last remaining restriction on her sovereignty, the Straits convention of 1923, which forbade her to fortify the Dardanelles. The President declared his belief and assembled his troops. The powers interested in the Straits convention said it was a “grave move”, but a hurriedly summoned conference in 1936 at Montreux, Switzerland, gave Türkiye the Straits once more.
Atatürk was instrumental in the formation of the Balkan Entente, with Türkiye, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia, and thereafter in 1937 he formed the Moslem, or Middle-East bloc, with Türkiye, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan.
Early in 1937 Atatürk grew impatient with long-drawn-out negotiations with France over the Syrian mandate, which France was about to relinquish by recognizing Syria as a republic. The Turks wanted Alexandretta, containing Antioch and an important corner of the Eastern Mediterranian shore leading to the Mosul oil fields.
The Turks had their way. Alexandretta was made an autonomous State last July, under Franco-Turkish administration and defense forces, with the understanding that the French would eventually withdraw, leaving it to the Turks.
Policy Based on Expediency…
The course of Türkiye’s international relations was steered by Atatürk on an apparent chart of expediency, based on the position that Türkiye occupies as a strong power astride the Dardanelles, separating Russia from the Mediterranian, facing Germany on the historic route to Baghdad and balancing Italy’s growth along Britain’s “life-line” to the East.
Russia was the first to help Türkiye to power. In the post-war settlement the Soviet opposed in vain the partition of Türkiye. And when Kemal, not yet Atatürk, later undertook to drive out the Allies Russia supplied arms, materials and funds that contributed greatly to the final crushing of the Greeks in 1922. The Soviet thereafter enjoyed a position of preferred friendship in Türkiye, but this cooled about ten years later when it became evident that the Turkish dictator was willing to have other friends also. Britain and France were eager to oblige the Turks. Last July, when Russia held aloof, Britain lent Türkiye $80,000,000, mostly for arms. Germany, meanwhile, was courting Türkiye. So was Italy, Atatürk could not readily forget, however, that the downfall of the Ottoman empire had resulted from siding with Germany in the World War and that Türkiye had been among the Entente powers that Italy had deserted to side with the Allies. Germany came bearing gifts, however. She offered a commercial treaty. And she offered a huge credits under which she would undertake to construct docks for Türkiye along the Bosporus, deliver a fleet of coastwise steamers and build a variety of factories. Atatürk announced a five-year plan of industrialization. Moreover, as the Czechoslovak crisis developed he suffered disillusionment in his belief that Britain was the strongest power in the world. Türkiye concluded a commercial treaty with Germany, accepted a loan of 150,000,000 marks and proceeded to become Germany’s greatest foreign market. She is currently buying goods and services from Germany at a yearly rate of about $130,000,000, while selling to Germany at a yearly rate of $80,000,000. It became evident to the world that Atatürk had brought Türkiye to the receiving end of several competing international axes and to the profit position in the adjoining nationality blocs.
Scorned Doctors’ Advice…
During a quarter of a century of war, intrigue and the dictation of sweeping reforms, however, Atatürk had habitually disregarded all doctors’ orders to take better care of his powerful physique. Although he was stern and strict in his official life, he was known to be convivial and carefree in his social life. He frequently danced and drank all night, or played poker (with great success) all night, smoking incessantly the while. Then he slept twenty-four hours without interruption.
A French liver specialist ordered a complete rest for him early this year, but he disdained it. His people heard of this and raised such a clamor that Türkiye bought him a luxurious yacht from Richard M. Cadwaladen an American. It had gold-plated bathroom fitting and gold door knobs. On it he caught a chill last summer while entertaining King Carol of Rumania. He never completely recovered.
Almost to the day of death Atatürk struggled to disestablish the ancient methods of Turkish thought. When the medical profession of Türkiye, which he had reorganized on modern scientific lines, wished to express appreciation of what he had done for public health, the best medical thought decided to present a solid gold bath-tub, eight feet long, five feet wide and four feet deep.
The best Turkish doctors thought it was the only thing fitted for the Ghazi-the Conqueror. Atatürk ordered it melted down and the proceeds expended on bettering the public health.
Had a Food Taster…
Yet Atatürk could not escape being a traditional Turk in one respect; he had an official food taster. He was served by Mohammed Mouhi, who was paid $15,000 a year for about twenty minutes’ work a day. Mohamme d’s duty was to taste well of all food and drink intended for Atatürk. Thereafter the meal was kept in a hot table for an hour. If Mohammed did not die by that time the dictator ate and drank.
Atatürk presided over a republic about as large as California and New Mexico combined. Although he rose to power because of his military ability, a career for which his early education destined him, his post-war activities were those of a progressive and energetic administrator. Emil Ludwig, the German biographer once called him “A man compared with whom Napoleon was half a dreamer.” An outstanding fact about the dictator’s extraordinary career was his consistency and his patience, his courage and his silence. It was he who won the peace of Lausanne, the first time for 200 years that old Asia achieved a victory over Europe. He was a revolutionary officer who in his Salonika days had began to oppose the committee of Young Turks; a man for whom no measure of reform was adequate, who found the policy of Talat and Enver superficial, and the alliance with Germany fatal; the man who made no capital out of the military reputation he earned at Gallipoli, who twice withdraw from public life, who with threats warned the last Sultan to turn over a new leaf, and who after the war, contrived to defeat him and the people in power in Constantinople, and who was warned, recalled, deposed and sentenced to death by the then Turkish Government.
Having in his command 20,000 war-worn soldiers, he entered upon the conflict with the great powers of Europe, and then, for four whole years, surrounded by foes without and within, waited until he had overthrown the Sultan, abolished the Caliphate, set free the essential part of Türkiye from the ruins of the old empire, saved it and reestablished it as a republic. By these achievements he proved himself a great military leader and statesman. The President’s moustache and fez, prominent features in his portraits at the time when he rose to power, were given up after he had established himself. His medium sized, slight figure was clad in elegant civil dress. His hair was bright and blond. His furrowed countenance indicated what he had gone through. He lived, as the first citizen of his country, in a villa situated among the hills outside the new capital that he had founded. He had built it in that Turkish style that dates from the period when French tastes prevailed. Almost unguarded its doors were left open in true Oriental fashion.
Dates in His Career…
The historical dates of the Ghazi’s career after the World War are : On May 16th, 1919, the Greeks landed at Smyrna. On June 21st the future dictator called the assembly of a congress of patriots. The Sultan dismissed him from the army service on July 8th. Two weeks later the Ghazi presided at the Congress of Erzerum, which resolved that “with one accord the entire East will resist the occupation and the interference of the foreigner.” On September 4th he was elected chairman of a second congress at Sivas, which resolved “to fight for Turkish integrity.” In October national elections were forced by him, and these resulted in the defeat of the Sultan’s government. British troops, in March, 1920, took possession of Constantinople, now Istanbul, and in April he was outlawed and condemned to death by the Sultan.
Shortly afterward the Turkish National Assembly met, elected the Ghazi President and adopted the national pact, the Magna Charta of New Türkiye. In May the Sultan sent a “Caliph’s army” toward Angora to destroy the nationalist forces. This army was driven back into Constantinople by the Ghazi.
When the Greeks began their invasion of Asiatic Türkiye in June, 1920, he organized an army of defense. On August 10th the Treaty of Sevres partitioned the Ottoman Empire and divided it among the European powers. The Ghazi stopped the Greek army at Sakaria on September 13th, 1921. At the battle of Dumla Puvar, on August 26th 1922, he issued an order to his troops, “Soldiers, your goal is the Mediterranian! On to it !”. A few days later he drove the Greek army into the sea. He advanced upon Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and on October 11th, 1922, authorized the signing of the armistice treaty with the Allies at Mudovia, which, in effect, was an other diplomatic victory for Türkiye.
On November 1st, 1922, the Ghazi abolished the Sultanate, and on November 17th the Sultan fled from Türkiye on a British warship. Three days later the peace conference opened at Lausanne. Ably represented and supported by his brilliant colleague Ismet Pasha, the Ghazi won his great diplomatic victory and on October 29th, 1923, was elected first President of the Turkish Republic.
Atatürk was born when Abdul Hamid II was Sultan. He was an only son and he was intended by his mother for the mosque school, but he became fascinated by the uniforms of the army officers and was sent to the military preparatory school at Salonika.
Plotted Against Sultan…
After attending the military preparatory school at Salonika, the officers’ school at Monastir and the War Academy at Constantinople, Kemal, then a head strong youth of 22, entered the army in 1902 with the rank of lieutenant. Through forbidden literature he became acquainted with Western ideas of government, which soon led to his hatred of Abdül Hamid, whom he bitterly opposed. In a small apartment in the Stamboul section of Constantinople he founded the secret Society of Liberty. As a result he was arrested and after three months’ confinement in a cell at the ministry of police, was exiled, being sent to Damascus to join a cavalry regiment. There he founded local branches of his society, but, being too isolated, fled to Alexandria and finally reached Salonika by way of Piraeus in Greece.
When his secret activities were again discovered, he flew to Akaba and stayed for a while in Syria. He obtained a transfer to the Third Army’s staff at Salonika, merged the Society of Liberty into the Society of Progress and entrenched his forces in Salonika, Monastir and Uskup. The revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 failed, but the Sultan lost his absolute regime in the counter-revolution of 1909. A quarrel between Kemal and Enver Pasha, whose rule succeeded that of Abdül Hamid, followed, and Kemal withdrew from politics in bitter disillusionment.
During the following years he led the life of the average Turkish army officer. He was exiled by Enver to Tripoli, returned to Salonika, was transferred to Albania, and again sent to Salonika. Hated by Enver, he was military attaché at Sofia, Bulgaria, when Türkiye joined Germany in 1914 in a last desperate gamble for the life of the empire. Kemal, convinced from the first that the empire was in no condition to enter the war, received command of the Nineteenth Division and was dispatched to the Dardanelles. He soon commanded all the Turco-German forces on the peninsula, and his success in throwing back the British before Anaforta was the most brilliant achievement of his military career.
This victory made him a great hero in Germany, but it was not until its story was told in the Committee Year Book for 1917 that Enver permitted it to leak out in Constantinople. Two years later the Turkish papers began printing the story of Anaforta, and Enver caused the entire issues to be confiscated. By that time it had become politically dangerous to mention Kemal’s name in the capital.
Alarmed at Kemal’s popularity, Liman von Sanders, the German generalissimo, transferred him to the Russian front after the British had evacuated the Dardanelles. He was appointed major general, in command of the Sixteenth Army, but he came into conflict with Falkenhayn, threw up his command in protest, and returned to Aleppo, where he dispatched to Enver a remarkable statement, outlining the entire political situation at a moment when a German victory was expected. Pointing out Falkenhayn’s position, he warned: “We shall lose our own country and Falkenhayn will sacrifice every ounce of gold and every soldier he can squeeze out of us.”
Exiled to Germany…
Enver’ reply to this warning was to give Falkenhayn command of the Palestine front and to exile Kemal to Germany. For the next year he was on the German and Austro-Hungarian front. Then Enver recalled him and gave him the Yildirim command (Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Armies) on the Palestine front. But it was too late. Kemal reached his post just as Allenby’s great break-through brought the empire crashing down to its end.
It was figuratively the end of the world for Kemal. He returned to Constantinople, which had fallen into disorder. The members of his revolutionary committee had fled, and Damad Ferid Pasha was to succeed Talat and Enver. Türkiye was virtually surrounded by her enemies, the Allies forming an iron ring around the remnants of the old empire. Under the terms of the Mudros armistice, the Turkish Navy was interned at Constantinople and the army disarmed. With the Allies in occupation of the capital, Kemal knew that further attempts were useless. He fled to Asia Minor. When he ignored Ferid’s demand to return, the latter dismissed him from the army.
In the following struggle between Kemal and Ferid, Kemal was the final victor. The Anglo-Hellenic rapprochement sent whole provinces in Asia Minor scurrying to Kemal, with the result that this part was lost to Ferid. With the Greek occupation of Smyrna in 1919, which led Kemal to tear up Mudros armistice, the star of the Ghazi began to rise, and,after his strategic victories, reached its climax with his diplomatic victory at Lausanne and his election as first President of the Turkish Republic.
Kemal Atatürk, the “most terrible of all the terrible Turks,” as he was termed by Earl Balfour, who described him as a brigand, was always a man who insisted on having his own ideas accepted. The new Türkiye got rid of her Sultans in 1922 but she did not then dare abolish the Caliphate. The abolition of the Caliphate was the first step of importance in the life of the new republic. The next was the reform of the laws. This was achieved in the space of only a few weeks. The Swiss Civil Code was almost literally translated, and the best points of the Italian Penal Code were accepted. Thus the Ghazi, by imposing his will upon the nation, had altered within three months the entire judiciary. He ordered the first census ever to be held on Turkish territory. Although this was not a reform in itself, it led to reforms of vast importance which gave the country and the world a definite idea of Türkiye’s importance in Near Eastern affairs. The President also made the Turkish language obligatory as the official language, and ordered that it be written in Roman instead of Arabic characters. Capitulations (foreign privileges) were abolished. The Gregorian calendar was substituted for the Islamic, and the feast of the Ramazan was fixed by astronomical observation. In every direction Islamic precedence and prohibitions were broken and violated.
Changed the Old Order…
In its special aspects the revolution attempted to model the customs of the State upon Western fashions. The old order was changed. The traditional fez was abandoned and the Turkish women gave up their veils. Harems, survival of Byzantium, were forbidden, monogamy became the law and men and women received equal rights in the matter of divorce. In 1923 Angora, in the heart of Anatolia, became officially the capital, as a result of a decree by the President. He spent money freely to build it and developed a modern city. He started with Angora as an unkempt little Anatolian village with narrow streets and mud-brick houses, where the only big event was a weekly market for the peasants. According to a German architectural plan by Herman Jansen, the new capital was laid out in detached sections over an immense site. From a central citadel, broad paved avenues radiated, imperiously breaking the natural lines of a hilly plain.
These avenues were lined with handsome edifices in broad arches and tiles-schools, lyceums, hospitals, dwellings, factories, laboratories. Automobile traffic moves swiftly in Angora, where camel caravans used to plod within the memory of many of the inhabitants. The streets are lighted by electricity. A telephone exchange and a powerful wireless station were in operation in Angora by 1925.
A typical act in the Ghazi’s endeavor to reform the country was the changing of the name of Constantinople to the old Turkish title Istanbul. This removed a historic reminder of the days when Occidentals ruled on the Bosporus. It served also to bolster Turkish nationalistic feeling.
After the Ottoman dynasty, which for six centuries had been in power in the empire, had became mere history, Article II of the constitution of the Turkish Republic declared that “The religion of the Turkish State is Islam.” This article had to be removed as the final step in Atatürk’s endeavor to separate the church from the State. In 1928 the National Assembly struck out the article and provided that government servants should no longer swear by Allah in taking the oath of office, but should simply swear on their honor. Finally, an official translation of the Koran was made.
The President married in January in 1923, Latife Hanim, daughter of a wealthy Turkish merchant of Smyrna. It was reported that his bride brought him a dowry of 1,000,000 Turkish Lira. The Ghazi divorced his wife in 1925 by the simple old procedure of saying in the presence of witnesses, “I divorce you.”