Author: Media Watch

  • Rasmus Paludan: Meet the far-right leader who wants to deport all Muslims from Denmark 21

    Rasmus Paludan: Meet the far-right leader who wants to deport all Muslims from Denmark 21

    Rasmus Paludan: Meet the far-right leader who wants to deport all Muslims from Denmark

    Convicted of racism, accused of Nazi ties, known for burnings of the Quran… and about to become a Danish MP?

    Danish lawyer Rasmus Paludan was little known a few months ago but his far-right party has gained traction ahead of a general election on June 5.

    His political movement — Stram Kurs (Hard Line) — calls itself the party for “ethnic Danes”, wants to ban Islam and deport all Muslims from Denmark.

    His party is forecast to win 2.3%, according to a recent poll published by Voxmeter, which would be enough to enter parliament.

    Hard Line’s rise comes as support for the country’s biggest nationalist movement, Danish People’s Party, has fallen.

    “Hard Line’s only agenda is to be extremely tough on refugees, immigrants and Muslims in particular, and that attracts a small group of voters who think anti-immigration policies can always get harder and more radical,” said elections specialist and professor of political science at Copenhagen University, Kasper Møller Hansen.

    Since founding his party in July 2017, Paludan has earned a following on YouTube and Snapchat but in recent months he emerged from virtual stardom among teenagers to securing election candidacy by gathering the required 20,000 digital signatures of endorsement from voters.

    In April, a Danish court found Paludan guilty of racism after he argued that people from Africa are less intelligent.

    Paludan said in a December 2018 video: “The enemy is Islam and Muslims. The best thing would be if there were not a single Muslim left on this earth. Then we would have reached our final goal.”

    The foundation of Hard Line is “ethnonationalism” and Paludan says you need at least two grandparents of Danish origins to prove you are Danish.

    Martin Krasnik, editor-in-chief of the Danish newspaper “Weekendavisen”, called Paludan a Nazi in a recent editorial. He said that Paludan is “clearly familiar with the Nuremberg laws” from Nazi-era Germany.

    Paludan denies having any associations with Nazism.

    He and his supporters are known for burning or throwing the Quran in the air. Police have spent almost €6 million on protecting Hard Line’s leader during his protests this year.

    In April, Paludan demonstrated in the ethnically diverse Nørrebro district of Copenhagen where large numbers of Muslims live. It caused a violent reaction and unrest that spread to several parts of the capital.

    “I strongly disagree with Paludan’s meaningless provocations that have no other purpose than sow disunity. Meet him with arguments – not with violence,” Denmark’s prime minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, wrote on Twitter.

    However, journalists have found it difficult to argue with Paludan, who recently claimed on air that there are 700,000 Muslims in Denmark.

    There are no official figures but experts estimate there to be 320,000.

    Danish media has been under fire for giving Paludan a platform to promote his agenda and Paludan’s protest and many interviews have once again ignited the heated debate about freedom of speech in Denmark.

    “Paludan is acting much like Trump, he is pointing fingers at the establishment and the media and often lies. But his voters do not care”, said Hansen. “Despite the rise of Hard Line, right-wing populism has weakened a lot in this election.”

    The opposition “red bloc” is forecast to win the general election, which would make the leader of The Social Democrats, Mette Frederiksen, prime minister.

    Their bloc is estimated to gain more than 50% of the vote after the Social Democrats adopted a stricter migration policy, which has helped them to win back left-leaning anti-immigration voters who had previously abandoned them for right-wing parties.

    “The right-wing parties will get fewer votes this time and the government will most likely be based on the Social Democrats, which means that a party like Hard Line will be alienated on the far-right and probably they will not have much to say in the coming term and law-making process”, Hansen said.

     

  • Turkey: A Rerun of the Istanbul Mayoral Election Raises Economic Risk

    Turkey: A Rerun of the Istanbul Mayoral Election Raises Economic Risk

    2

    The Big Picture

    In pushing for an election rerun in Istanbul, Turkey’s cultural and economic capital, the ruling AKP is prioritizing political continuity at home above peaceful relations abroad and near-term economic stability. Still, the party must tread carefully, lest it deepen the economic pain as it courts the nationalist vote that could help it regain the city.

    See Turkey’s Resurgence

    What Happened

    Just over a month after Turkey’s main opposition scored a stunning victory in local elections in Istanbul, the residents of the country’s largest city are going back to the polls. On May 6, Turkey’s Supreme Election Board (YSK) canceled the March 31 Istanbul mayoral poll results in a 7-4 vote on account of “unlawful appointments to some ballot box boards,” ordering new elections for June 23. Ekrem Imamoglu, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate who assumed office just over two weeks ago, will now have to return his mandate for the mayoral post while Istanbul Gov. Ali Yerlikaya and Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) handpick an interim mayor to govern the city until the new election.

    Why It Matters

    The contentious decision sets up a historic contest between the AKP, which exercises enormous influence over government institutions (including the YSK), against a political opposition that managed to grab a rare but unprecedented win in Turkey’s most important city. The CHP won Istanbul on March 31 thanks to the strategic support of other opposition parties, and it is likely to have even more support this time from other AKP detractors in its battle against the government. But whether the CHP can eke out another win in what is sure to be a tight race will depend on its success in fending off the media onslaught that will come from the AKP, which controls most of the country’s media outlets, as well as its ability to overcome other systemic challenges stemming from the AKP’s strong hold over Turkey’s institutions. The AKP’s leader and the country’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, can focus all his attention on campaigning for Istanbul — a city the AKP is loath to lose given that it is a major source of wealth and an important site for patronage networks.

    On a broader level, Turkey’s domestic political turmoil will further color its government’s often-turbulent interactions with the outside world.

    On a broader level, the domestic political turmoil will further roil the Turkish government’s often-turbulent interactions with the outside world. Already, countries in the European Union, including Germany, have criticized Ankara for ordering a new election, adding yet another issue to the many grievances Turkey’s Western allies have leveled against Ankara. (At the same time, Ankara knows that Brussels cannot push too far, since the European Union counts on Turkey in the summer to prevent migrants from seeking a new life in Europe.) The AKP’s need to stoke nationalist fervor in Turkey to help secure victory could result in it promoting hypernationalist positions on controversial issues like Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia, its intentions to drill for oil and natural gas in Cypriot waters, and its anti-Kurdish militant operations in Syria and Iraq. The Turkish government will be further willing to stoke tension in the Eastern Mediterranean against Cyprus, Greece and Israel. In addition, Turkey could rail against Israel as the latter beats a war drum against Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip, and refuse to toe the U.S. line on sanctions against Iran — although Turkey’s economic woes could temper some of Ankara’s obstinance.

    What About the Economy?

    Beyond politics, Erdogan’s insistence on new elections in Istanbul will have economic ramifications, as a nosedive in Turkey’s relations with its largest investment and trade benefactors, the European Union and the United States, could hurt the country’s fragile economy. The lira’s value versus the dollar behaved erratically leading up to and after the YSK’s decision, thereby lowering investor and consumer confidence in the Turkish economy even further. Although the AKP’s candidate, former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, will likely promise some of the populist measures for which the AKP has become famous (such as subsidized food supplies), such measures won’t help shore up foreign investor confidence in the Turkish economy. But by pushing for an electoral rerun, the AKP has already demonstrated its preference for possible political gain over probable economic pain.

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    • Copyright ©2019 Stratfor Enterprises, LLC. All rights reserved.

     

  • Close interaction of Alans with Huns, Khazars and Kipchaks

    Close interaction of Alans with Huns, Khazars and Kipchaks

    Tracing the Alanian history, it is not difficult to notice that they cooperated most closely with Türks, at first with Sarmatians and Sarmatian people, Roxolans (in Türkish – Uraksy Alans, ‘Alans-farmers’), Siraks (i.e. Sary-ak people ‘white – yellow’, ancestors of Cumans), Aorses (Aor-Awar-Avars, -os is a Greek ending), Yazygs (Türks – Uzes). All historians admit the close link of Alans with these peoples, only in the definition of ethnolinguistic classification of these peoples do the opinions differ. Iranists classify them as Iranian speaking, Türkologists – as Türkic speaking, as supported by numerous historical facts.

    Prior to sorting out the Alanian-Hunnish links, one should visualize Huns. The official historical science postulates that Huns, first mentioned in the Chinese sources, sometime in the II c. migrated from Central Asia to Urals, and from there in 70ties of the 4 c. poured into the Eastern Europe, thus initiating, supposably, the so-called The Great Migration of Peoples, allegedly Huns were the first Türks appearing in Europe, on the way to Europe they would have subdued Alans in the Northern Caucasus, and, led by the leader Balamber, crossed river Don, defeated Goths, Ostgoths, and Vestgoths, who infiltrated the Northern Pontic, and expelled Vestgoths to Thracia, supposedly crossing through Caucasus, they devastated Syria and Cappadocia, settled in Pannonia, and kept attacking the Eastern Roman empire. In 451 under Attila they invaded Gaul, but at Catalaun fields the Romans, Vestgoths, and Franks defeated them. After the death of Attila (453.) there were conflicts among Huns, and the German tribes devastated them in Pannonia. The Hunnish union broke up, and they left to Northern Pontic. Gradually, Huns disappeared as people, though their name still lingered for a long time as a common name for Northern Pontic nomadic pastoralists [Gumilev L.N. Huns]

    Such an unreal explanation of the history by L.N.Gumilev raises questions: whether could nomads, having forded Volga, defeat strong Alans, Goths, Syrians, Anatolians (in Cappadocia), population of Pannonia, Gaul, Northern Italy? Certainly, this is unreal. How could L.N.Gumilev determine that Huns disappeared, while their ethnonym continued to last as a common name of the Pontic nomads? How he could know that ethnonym Huns for long time designated not Huns, but others? Whom? Why the advancing Romans, and together with them other peoples (more correctly, armies and colonists), did not constitute the Great Migration of Peoples, while creating a huge Roman empire, but the movement from the periphery to the central regions of the Roman empire of other peoples (liberation army, avenging colonists) is called a Great Migration of Peoples? Why Türks, at first as Huns, and then under the names of Avars, Türks, Khazars, Cumans, and Kipchaks constantly migrated from Asia to Europe? Where would they disappear there? How did they procreate so quickly in Asia? Etc. Trying to answer these questions makes it clear that the traditional presentation of Türks’ history is fashioned tendentiously, irrespectively of the real historical conditions.

    Summarizing impartially all historical data based on real historical grounds, it is not difficult to suggest that Huns (Sen or Hen) at first were an undistinguished Türkic people among Türkic Scythians and Sarmatians. They started making themselves known in the 1 c. AD. The Greek historians, marking their presence in Europe, did not say a word about their arrival from Asia.

    Thus, Dionysus (the end of the 1st – beginning of the 2nd c.) notes that on the Northwestern side of the Caspian sea live Scythians, Uns, Caspians, Albanians, and Kaduses… [Latyshev V.V., 1893, 186]. As we were proving more than once, Scythians were basically Türkic speaking (see ETHNIC ROOTS OF THE TATAR PEOPLE, § 3), Uns are Huns, with sound h dropped, Caspians also are Türkic ‘people of rocks’ (kas ‘rock’, pi~bi~bai ‘rich owner’), Albanians are Alans, Kaduses are Türkic Uzes~Uses among kath ‘rocks’.

    Ptolemy (2 c. AD, B.3 Ch.5 – Translator’s note) writes that in the European Sarmatia ‘below Agathyrsi (i.e. Akatsirs~agach ers‘forest people’- M.Z.) live Savari (Türkic Suvars – M.Z.), between Basternae and Rhoxolani(Uraksy Alans, i.e. ‘Alans-farmers’ – M.Z.) live Huns [Latyshev V.V., 1883, 231-232].

    Philostogory, living in the end of the 4 c. (i.e., when, in the opinion of certain scientists, Huns moved to Eastern Europe), describing Huns, does not say a single word of their arrival from the Asia, and writes: ‘These Uns are probably the people who the ancients named Nevrs, they lived at Ripean mountains (Don Ridge S. of Donets river, Mid-Europian Uplands N. of it – Translator’s note), from which come the waters of Tanaid’ [Latyshev V.V., 1893, 741].

    Zosim (2nd half of the 5c.) suggests that Huns are Royal Scythians [Ibis, 800]. The impartial analysis of the ethnographic data provides a basis to state that Royal Scythians were ancestors of Türkic peoples [Karalkin P.I., 1978, 39-40].

    Thus, among the peoples named Scythians and Sarmatians, at the beginning of our era, the Huns make themselves known, in the Assirian and other Eastern sources they were mentioned among the people living in the 3rd millennium BC. In the 4-th c. in a fight for a domination in the Northern Caucasus they defeated the Alanian power, and together with them revolted against the colonial policy of the Roman empire, at first in Cappadocia, then in the western part of the empire, where appeared new Gothic colonizers. Naturally, neither the Huns, nor the Alans, did not move to the West as a people, as it is imagined by the supporters of the ‘Great Migration Of Peoples’, it was the Hunnish-Alanian army that penetrated deep into the West. The main body of the Hunnish and Alanian peoples remained in the same old places of habitation.

    In the end of the 4 c. the Huns, together with the Alans, fell on the Goths, who wanted to colonize the Northern Pontic. The main historian of the Huns and Alans of this period, Ammianus Marcellinus, frequently equated them, for they were ethnically very close. ‘Ammianus Marcellinus not only emphasized that precisely the assistance of Alans helped Huns, but also quite often called attackers Alans’ [Vinogradov V.B., 1974, 113].

    After the death of Attila (453), the Hunnish union gradually disintegrated, and Huns as a ruling power do not appear any more, they fused with the Türkic Alans and Khazars, while keeping their ethnonym Hun (Sen).

    In the Gaul the Alans entered into a close contact withthe Vandals (Eastern Germans), together they devastatedthe Gaul, and in the 409 they settled in Spain, wherethe Alans received the middle part ofthe Lusitania (later – Portugal) and Cartagena. However, in the 416the Vestgoths entered Spain and defeatedthe Alans. Inthe May of the 429 the Vandal King Geizerix together withthe subordinated Alans went to Africa, and, defeating the Roman armies, created a new Vandal and Alan state. As the result the Alanian troops dissolved amongthe Vandals andthe local population. But in the Northern Pontic and in the Caucasus the Huns and Alans continued to cooperate closely.

    Following the disintegration of the Hunnish empire, in the decentralized period, various tribes and peoples tried to become the ruling group, therefore in the Byzantian sources frequently appear ethnonyms: Akathirs, Barsils, Saragurs, Savirs, Avars, Utigurs, Kutigurs, Bolgars, Khazars. All these ethnonyms belong to the Türkic populations. The Barsils are the inhabitants of the Berselia (Berzilia), which in many sources is considered as the country of the Alans. Here is an obvious identification of Alans with Barsils~Bersuls, deemed related to Khazars [Chichurov I.S., 1980, 117]. More than that, the Khazars also came from Berzilia. So, Theophan in 679-680 writes: ‘From the depths of Berzilia, the first Sarmatia, came the great people Khazars and began to dominate all the land on that side down to the Pontic Sea’ [Chichurov I.S., 1980, 61].

    From the 5 c. among the Caucasian Alans, i.e. numerous Türkic peoples, also began to make themselves knowntheother tribes: Khazars, Bulgars, Kipchaks etc. After the brilliant performance of the Türkic peoples, led by the Huns, against the colonial policy ofthe Goths andthe Romans, the Huns ceased to be ruling, andtheAlans and Khazars took their place, competing on the political arena up to the 10-th c. ‘From the 5-th c. the push of the Khazar Khaganate grows, establishing control overthe Alans’ [Vinogradov V.B., 1974, 118]. In the 8 c., at the time of the Alanian expansion, the Alans once again proved that they supported Khazars. ‘The 10-th c. marks a turn. Now the Khazars had to recognize their former vassals with the following words: ‘The Alanian Kingdom is stronger and tougher than all other peoples around us’ [Vinogradov V.B., 1974, 118-119].

    In the 11-th c. others nations begin to raise in the Northern Caucasus, Kipchaks (Russ. Polovets), who at once joined with the Alans, and established peaceful and loving relations [Djanashvili M., 1897, 36]. In this area the Alans, together with the Kipchaks, adopted Christianity.

    In the 1222 Alans and Kipchaks come out together against the Mongolo-Tatars. Seeing that they together represent an undefeatable force, the Mongolo-Tatars used a trick. ‘Seeing a danger, the leader of the Chengizkanids (Subetai – Translator’s note)… sent gifts to the Kipchaks and ordered to tell them, that they, being the same kin as the Mongols, should not rise against their brothers and be friends with Alans, who are entirely of another lineage’ [Karamzin N.M., 1988, 142]. Here the  Mongolo-Tatars figured, apparently, that their army at that time consisted primarily of the Kipchak Türks of the Central Asia, therefore they addressed Kipchaks as kins, andthe Alans ofthe Caucasus were partially Kipchaks (ancestors of Karachai-Balkars), and partially Oguzes (ancestors of Azerbaijanis -the inhabitants ofthe Caucasian Albania, Alania).

    It is known that soon all Kipchak steppes passed into the hands of Mongolo-Tatars. The Volga Bulgaria, the main component of whose population was referred to as the Yases, subordinated to the Mongolo-Tatars in 1236, and the Alans – Yases of the Northern Caucasus in 1238.

    Thus, Alans made their celebrated military and political route hand-to-hand with their Türkic kins: Huns, Khazars and Kipchaks. From the 13 c. Alans-Yases cease to be ruling among the other Türkic people. But it does not mean at all that they physically disappeared, they lived among others Türkic people and gradually entered into their ethnicity, accepting their ethnonym. Such a strong, scattered along all Eurasia people as Alans-Yases, cannot be equated to Iranian speaking Ossetians by a single trait, and could not be suddenly reduced ‘by a miracle’ to the strictures of the Caucasus Ossetians.

    If the Scythians, Sarmatians and Alans were Ossetian speaking, all Eurasia should have Ossetian toponyms. They do not exist, unless artificially (quasi-scientifically) produced. Thus, in all their attributes the Alans were Türkic, and took part in the formation of the many Türkic peoples.

    Zakiev M. Z.

     

    PROBLEMS of the HISTORY and LANGUAGE
    Collection of articles on problems of lingohistory, revival and development of the Tatar nation
    Kazan, 1995
  • Turkey’s Opposition Takes the Shine off Erdogan’s Victory

    Turkey’s Opposition Takes the Shine off Erdogan’s Victory

     Apr 1, 2019 | 21:24 GMT

    st

    (YASIN AKGUL/AFP/Getty Images)

    Stratfor’s geopolitical guidance provides insight on what we’re watching out for in the week

    Turkey’s government and political institutions are heavily controlled by Turkey’s powerful ruling party, the Justice and Development Party of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In March 31 local elections, the largest opposition party challenged some of that dominance in Turkey’s largest cities when it won mayoral races in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul, according to preliminary data. The close races in Turkey’s biggest cities show that Turkish voters worried by the country’s unstable economic conditions are divided over whether the ruling party or the opposition can best help Turkey emerge from a nascent recession. To maintain its dominance over the next several years before the next elections, the ruling party will have to adjust its messaging and reassess its alliances.

    What Happened

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won yet another election on March 31, but few victories have been as pyrrhic as this. Twelve parties competed for thousands of local government posts at the municipal and provincial level. According to preliminary results (official results might not be available for many weeks) the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an Islamist and populist party that has governed Turkey since 2002, gained 44.3 percent of the votes in mayoral contests, ahead of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), a secularist party, with 30.1 percent. Trailing behind was the AKP’s right-wing ally, the National Movement Party (MHP) at 7.31 percent; the CHP’s nationalist ally, the Good Party, at 7.45 percent; as well as the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) at 4.24 percent. The AKP also won 41.61 percent of the overall vote for the provincial assemblies across the country, far ahead of the MHP, which garnered 18 percent.

    Crucially, however, the AKP lost the capital, Ankara, and appears to have come second in the country’s largest city, Istanbul. Indeed, the AKP’s candidate in Istanbul, former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, said early April 1 that his CHP challenger, Ekrem Imamoglu, received 25,000 more votes than he did but that election clerks declared 216,000 votes invalid. As a result, both parties are calling for a recount.

    Why It Matters

    The results are mixed for the government. The AKP has won an overall victory in terms of votes, especially the provincial assembly vote. But in the mayoral races in several key cities, including Ankara and Istanbul, as well as the CHP stronghold of Izmir, the main opposition beat the AKP, according to the Supreme Election Board. If the results in Ankara and Istanbul are confirmed, it would deal a highly symbolic blow to the AKP. The party (or one of its predecessors) has ruled each since 1994. Moreover, Erdogan launched his political career as mayor of Istanbul in the mid-1990s, while Ankara has long been a bastion of AKP support.

    Losing the popular vote in Turkey’s major cities highlights the AKP’s tough balancing act: It needs to court popular support at a time when the fragile economy demands that the AKP do the exact opposite by implementing structural reforms.

    What We’re Looking for Next

    How will the government deal with citizens’ economic stress? The shift in Turkey’s urban centers, the first in a quarter century, stemmed in part from the deep economic strain which many Turkish citizens are feeling — and which more and more are blaming on the government. On the day after the election, Erdogan promised to enact better economic policies, while his son-in-law and finance minister, Berat Albayrak, promised to double down on the government’s economic rebalancing program, which envisions a reduction in fiscal spending on government programs. But losing the popular vote in Turkey’s major cities highlights the AKP’s tough balancing act: It needs to court popular support, which it has typically done through economic stimulus, at a time when the fragile economy demands that the AKP do the exact opposite by implementing structural reforms, including austerity measures.

    What does this say about Turkey’s demographics? This is the first local election in five years, and Turkey’s population is younger than ever. Young citizens might have tuned out the AKP and its populist and Islamist values in favor of the CHP, which is stronger in urban secular areas. This is one reason why the AKP will have to reassess its platform. Whatever the case, the close margins highlight Turkey’s intense polarization over social and economic issues, which suggests that authorities will encounter more difficulties making policy and implementing reforms in the years to come.

    What does this mean for the AKP’s alliance strategy? The AKP will also reassess its alliance strategy, in which the party has recently relied on working closely with nationalist allies like the MHP. That alliance might have worked against the AKP by splitting some of the votes it could have garnered. The AKP will recalibrate its platform and message after these races, even though there are still four years to go until more important general and presidential races.

    What does this say about the opposition? Turkey’s typically fragmented opposition finally figured out a way to work together and support a single candidate in many key races. The HDP, for example, did not field candidates in Turkey’s five largest cities, and encouraged its followers in those cities to vote for the CHP candidate, thereby tipping the balance. Mansur Yavas of the CHP won the Ankara mayoral race by uniting a combination of nationalists, leftists, secularists and conservatives on a platform to restore Ankara’s prestige and improve the city’s overall conditions. Yavas’ victory in Ankara sets him up to be a prominent future opposition figure in the often unwieldy CHP. Meanwhile, Imamoglu is a young (he was born in 1970) businessman who was formerly the mayor of the western Istanbul district of Beylikduzu. If he survives the coming recount, Imamoglu will have the chance to use Istanbul — which, at more than 15 million people, is almost as large as neighboring Greece and Bulgaria combined — to build a national platform and become a potentially major player in the CHP and the opposition in general.

    Turkey’s typically fragmented opposition finally figured out a way to work together and support a single candidate in many key races.

    What does this say about the government’s relationship with Turkey’s Kurds? In addition to acting as kingmaker in major races in western Turkey, the HDP also won most of its key races in the Kurdish-dominated southeast, particularly Diyarbakir. In the latter, the party scored more than double the figure of its main rival, an AKP candidate who had been running the city for more than two years as a government-appointed trustee after authorities removed the erstwhile HDP co-mayors for alleged ties to terrorists. The HDP’s success in the southeast and strategic support for the CHP in the west highlight how the AKP has lost some of its ability to court Kurds, who make up roughly 20 percent of Turkey’s population. This was the first local election in five years, during which time the AKP moved more aggressively against Kurdish politicians in an attempt to damage their appeal to the Kurdish voter base. Already, Erdogan has extended an olive branch of sorts, referring to Turkey’s “Kurdish brothers” in an indication that he might need to appeal to the oft-maligned community, even as he works to contain Kurdish militants in the southeast and in Iraq and Syria.

    What happens next? Both the government and the opposition will continue to trade accusations of election fraud; at present, the Istanbul race will come down to the electoral board’s decision. The opposition doesn’t trust the electoral board, which has frequently sided with the government in past elections. The AKP is well-positioned to challenge the results — as appears likely to happen. The election board has already conceded that the CHP has more votes than the AKP in Istanbul, but each will push for a recount before either one can claim ultimate victory in Turkey’s most important municipal race.

    • Copyright ©2019 Stratfor Enterprises, LLC. All rights reserved.

    st2

  • is Turkey and an armed system completely independent from the NATO possible?

    is Turkey and an armed system completely independent from the NATO possible?

    Why should Turkey buy the S-400 and have an armed system independent from the USA?

    2288
    Experts:
    • Mehmet Perincek

    Turkish-American relations have never been in such a crisis. The causes of this crisis are clear:

    – US support for Kurdish separatists and its plan for a great Kurdistan.

    – The role of Washington in the attempted coup on June 15, 2016 and the use of US Gulenist against Turkey.

    – Trump’s announcement of an economic war against Turkey.

    Facing threats from the United States, to ensure their national security, Turkey began to look for alternative armed systems. Although Turkey is a member of NATO, it has become a target of Washington. Because of this, firstly the Americans stopped supplying the necessary weapons, secondly the armed systems dependent on the USA did not meet the needs of present times.

    In this regard, Turkey decided to buy the Russian anti-aircraft missile system S-400, which annoyed Washington very much, and the crisis between the two countries has grown. Even Trump’s administration saw this purchase as a betrayal and has threatened Ankara several times.

    On this issue, we reached out to Turkish political scientists and military experts to discuss the S-400 crisis with them and the actual needs of the Turkish Army for its armed system.

    “INCREDIBLE DEGREE OF MISTRUST BETWEEN US AND TURKEY”

    Commenting on Turkish-American relations for USA Really, Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal, an expert on Turkish foreign policy, pointed out that there has been a security and political dimension all along:

    “There has been an incredible degree of mistrust between the two NATO allies. The US’s efforts to carve out a Greater Kurdistan in the Middle East of Iraq, Syria in particular, and Turkey, linking it through a corridor to the Eastern Mediterranean is certainly a very disturbing element in US-Turkish relations from Ankara’s point of view. Notorious US efforts to bolster up the PYD in Syria, for example, despite repeated warnings from Ankara, have fostered this mistrust to a considerable degree. Ankara does not presumably think that it is going to have to encounter Russia or any Russia-backed force in the foreseeable future in this part of the world.”

    “TURKEY WILL NOT CHANGE ITS MIND”

    On the other hand, everyone is wondering if these threats of sanctions repeatedly pronounced by US officials about the purchase of the S-400 air defense systems from Russia will scare off Turkey. Prof. Ünal emphasizes that Turkey’s decisions are already determined by the needs of the country, and not by threats from the Atlantic:

    “I would say that it is less likely than otherwise that these threats are going to make Turkey give up. To put it into some perspective, Turkey desperately needs air defense systems. It would like to buy and jointly produce these systems together with Russia, and Russia’s agreement to sell these sophisticated weapons and to produce them together with Turkey at a later stage is an important inducement. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Turkey had earlier approached the US with a view to buying them from it but it had been turned down by Washington. The US not only did not want to sell its Patriot missiles, which are not as effective as the S-400s, but it also did not agree with Turkey’s offer of co-production, let alone transfer the technology to Turkey. After Turkey made a deal with Russia about the purchase of the S-400s, the US appears to be more than willing to sell the Patriots but I suppose that it is too late.”

    WHAT CHARACTERIZES S-400s AS COMPARED OTHER AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

    After Prof. Unal explained the geopolitical reasons for purchasing the S-400s, we asked Beyazıt Karataş, the retired Air Force Major General (TUAF), the following question: Is the S-400 responsive to Turkey’s military needs? First he said that the most important indicator for NATO and the West is their opposition to Turkey’s territorial integrity; In this case, it is necessary to question the relations of alliance with these simple facts and take measures accordingly. Then, he told us about the characterization of S-400s as compared to other air defense systems:

    “The S-400 Long Range High Altitude Air Defense System has properties two to five times better when compared to other long-range high-altitude air defense systems in terms of their ability, as shown in the table.”

    Why should Turkey buy the S-400 and have an armed system independent from the USA?

    ARE THE S-400s DANGEROUS FOR NATO?

    Having found such an expert, it was imperative to find out whether the S-400 was a danger for NATO, as Washington said it is:

    “The S-400 is an air defense system and not an attack weapon. In particular, Turkey, having felt the lack of a long-range system since the 1990s will fill an important gap in its high-altitude air defense system. Very clearly ‘our country, our motherland’ will constitute a threat and it will be used against enemy attacks. This means that it is a system to be used against threats from an enemy country, as it is raised most, not directly against NATO, but from the air, whether it is coming from a NATO member or any country.”

    “S-400s ARE ENOUGH FOR TURKEY’S DEFENSE”

    Then the conversation with Major General Beyazıt Karataş came to the most important point: Are the S-400s enough for Turkey’s defense?:

    “There will never be an air defense system alone. Because every air defense system itself needs air defense protection. In contrast, in the S-400 contract with Turkey, Russia will provide a significant deterrence for the protection of our airspace.

    The S-400s will enter our inventory in the 2019-2020 year, according to the agreements to be made to produce our future long-range high-altitude national air defense system. Turkey will make an important contribution to the experience and Turkey-Russian political relations, the military, the defense industry, and the economic dimension will contribute to this development.

    As a result, the US and NATO are still hoping that the S-400 agreement will be canceled, as happened with China. The US is putting all sorts of pressure and blocking against Turkey and threatening not to provide F-35 aircrafts if Turkey buys the S-400. It is seen that the US will continue these threats and blackmail until the end. The implementation of the agreement signed on the supply of Russia’s S-400, for safety, also holds great importance in terms of cooperation with neighbouring countries and prestige in the international arena.”

    “THE F-35 SYSTEM WILL DAMAGE TURKEY IN TWO WAYS”

    On Turkey’s agenda there is not only the purchase of the S-400s, but American F-35s are also being discussed. Major General Karataş considers the F-35s very dangerous for Turkish defense. According to Karataş, in case of a possible war with the US, Turkey could lose control of these fighters. He says that Turkey has other reliable alternatives:

    “As it’s known, in January 2019, US President Donald Trump signed the 2019 year budget, and according to the relevant clauses contained in it, if Turkey buys S-400s from Russia, they will prevent the delivery of F-35 aircraft, sa they have repeated in every platform and continues to repeat.

    Meanwhile, the Trump administration will try to compensate for possible radical steps regarding Turkey as Congress has done so far. Indeed, in the case of the S-400 coming to Turkey, Congress would not execute the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)–the US State Department would decide. Of course, the State Department will have to move with instructions from Trump. However, Trump may not be able to bypass the Congress in these processes.

    Technical characteristics of the F-35 aircraft include invisibility, a combination of antennas, sensors and cryptographic links to enable NATO to operate jointly, to transfer information to land maritime and other elements. These features can create the perception of “perfect planes.” But from the national logistics point of view, as particularly important considering the problems experienced between Turkey and the US, the F-35 will be out of Turkey’s control. The F-35 system will damage Turkey in two ways.

    The first is the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and the second Performance Based Logistics (PBL). You are now procuring services from a US company and transferring logistics planning to the US nationally. For example, you want your 25 planes to be active. Under the agreement with Lockheed Martin, the parent company of the F-35s, the company manages this system to provide the activities of these aircraft to keep 25 active. So you can’t manage the activity of your own aircraft. You cannot manage your own logistics system according to the old national system. Yes, this method is economically good, but Turkey-US relations are not as they used to be.

    As a result, the US does not give the F-35s to do Turkey a great favor. Because of Turkey’s decision on F-35s, the Air Force will make Turkey 100 percent dependent on the US. This will prevent the development of our national aircraft. While the Turkish Air Force has already been tied to the US by 90-95 percent, it should be lowered. The F-35’s polished, exaggerated charm to be in the US’s orbit will make you 100 percent dependent on the US.

    If Turkey does not buy the F-35 aircraft, it won’t be the end of the world. Turkish-Russian military relations are not limited to the intake of air defense missiles, they are also increasing cooperation in space with the production of joint combat aircraft (TF-X), which should be among the priority targets. We can also say that the chance to develop new collaborations outside the US and NATO is now much more important and this is the exactly what the US fears.”

    “A NEW ERA IN RUSSIAN-TURKISH MILITARY RELATIONS”

    All our interlocutors emphasized the importance and necessity of an armed system independent from the United States. According to the Turkish political scientist Prof. Ünal, since it’s admission, Turkey has learned to develop some sort of an independent security policy for itself. He recalled that initially in the 1950s and early 1960s, it was perhaps like a US/NATO garrison in the Middle East and the Balkans and after the arrival of the infamous Johnson Letter in Ankara, in the summer of 1964, Turkey certainly moulded an independent foreign policy, though it remained in NATO:

    “It was after this 1964 policy re-evaluation that Turkey began to cultivate the best possible relations with the Soviet Union, a period that continued right up to the 1980s and even after. During these years, Turkey and the Soviet Union were on the best possible terms on trade and economy and, short of cooperating in security matters, they cultivated very good relations indeed.

    Since the end of the Cold War, things took a sharp turn for the better. Despite the Syrian crisis and the shooting down of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey, relations between Ankara and Moscow seem to be steady, and the purchase of the S-400s and possibility of co-production of several systems including S-400s seem to be heralding a new era in Russian-Turkish relations in which cooperation on security and military matters would well be on the agenda too.”

    TURKEY CHOOSES ITS FRONT

    Based on this, we can say that serious conflict and possible clashes with the United States force Turkey to have an armed system independent from NATO. In this sense, Russia and China are potential partners for Turkey.

    Turkey’s choice of the S-400 is not only an economic or technical choice. Although the S-400 has better properties compared to other systems, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 primarily comes from geopolitical and strategic reasons. Turkey is choosing its front, its side. It is responding to threats from the United States by relocating in Eurasia.

    And this is not a choice but a necessity for Turkey. Turkey cannot survive in the Atlantic system, and maintain its territorial integrity and overcome the economic crisis. That is, to continue to exist, Turkey needs Eurasian cooperation.

    Beyazıt Karataş is a retired Air Force Major General (TUAF). Major General KARATAŞ served as the 2nd Tactical Air Force Command Chief of Staff in 2005-2006, and the 8th Main Jet Base Commander in 2006-2007. After being promoted to the rank of Major General on August 30, 2007, he served as Deputy Commander of Air Training Command and was assigned to the post of Deputy Undersecretary for Technology and Coordination of the Turkish Minister of National Defense (TMND) from September 10, 2007 to August 13, 2010. Major General KARATAŞ was assigned as the Deputy Commander of 2nd Tactical Air Force Command in 2010-2012 and retired from the Turkish Air Force on August 30, 2012. He has more than 3000 flight hours on different types of aircraft.

    Hasan Ünal is an expert on Turkish foreign policy. He holds a Ph.D. from Manchester University, Britain, where he lived between 1986 and 1993. Upon his return to Turkey, he took up a teaching job at Bilkent University, Ankara, in the Department of International Relations. Having worked at several other universities in Ankara, he recently moved to Istanbul Maltepe University.

    Author: Mehmet Perincek
    #usa
  • Why Turkey’s export rise is hard to sustain

    Why Turkey’s export rise is hard to sustain

    Article Summary
    A heavy reliance on imported inputs to manufacture goods for export casts a shadow on Turkey’s hype about headway in foreign trade.

    As Turkey’s March 31 local elections draw nearer, debates over the ailing economy are flaring up, marked by attempts to use economic data for propaganda, minus any objective and prudent analysis. Turkey’s economic woes last year resulted in a 3% contraction in the fourth quarter, officials announced March 11. Amid the downturn, Turkey’s imports have declined and exports have grown — a trend that both the economy management and some industrialist groups present in exaggerated terms to the public.

    In early March, Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan made the following comments on the still unofficial foreign trade figures for February: “Despite all problems in global trade, we had the highest February export figure in Turkey’s history. Exports increased 5% in the first two months of the year, while imports decreased 23.1%.” She maintained that the rate of exports covering imports was the most important economic indicator this year and it had reached 87.3% in the first two months, up from about 64% in the same period last year.

    The relative increase in exports and the sharp decline in imports is obvious, but what really matters are the dynamics underlying the trend and how sustainable it is.

    Turkey’s economy grew only 1.8% in the third quarter of 2018 before shrinking 3% in the fourth one. As a result of the sharp contraction, the importation of items used by the industry — intermediate goods, inputs and investment machinery — has dropped. The decline is a direct reflection of decreasing production and stalling investments. Similarly, the increase in exports is hardly the sign of some industrial boom but has to do with goods produced of now-depleted or stocked raw materials. Hence, the uptick that Pekcan hails is hard to sustain for the time being.

    Indeed, the big increase in Turkish exports in recent years has been accompanied by a similar increase in imports. In 2017, exports hit $157 billion, increasing 234% from $47 billion in 2003. Imports, meanwhile, rose 239% to $234 billion from $69 billion in the same period. Consequently, the country’s foreign trade deficit expanded to $77 billion in 2017 from $22 billion in 2003.

    In other words, production depends heavily on imports; hence, exports cannot grow without imports. In major export items such as automotive products, food, textiles, apparel, white appliances and iron and steel, the equivalent of up to 60% of export proceeds is spent on imported inputs. Without those imports, production and therefore exportation is not sustainable.

    The dependency on imports varies between sectors, but on average it stands at about 60%. This could be observed in the so-called inward processing permission certificates, which denote government incentives to exporters. The “inward processing regime” is the backbone of export activities and, as a policy, has contributed to the exports’ dependency on imports. Under the system, tax exemptions and other perks are granted to industrialists who do processing at home and export their products within a certain period of time. The incentive certificates are published monthly in the official gazette.

    Since its introduction in 1996, this incentive system has come to encompass nearly half of Turkey’s exports. Under the system, companies notify the authorities of their export plans, asking for exemption from taxes and fees. In their applications, they specify export commitments and identify what they need to import for that purpose, for which they receive incentives as well.

    Though figures vary from year to year, the value of incentivized imports is equivalent to around 60% of the value of exports within the scope of the inward processing regime. In 2010, for instance, the ratio hit 60%, with incentivized import permissions of $33 billion for exports worth $55 billion. In 2017, the ratio was 55%, with the import and export figures standing respectively at $34 billion and $62 billion.

    In the 2003-2017 period, dependency on imports reached up to 75% in some categories such as base metal, computers and electronics, while generally standing at some 60% in the automotive sector and around 50% in the food industry.

    Several recent examples could give a better idea. According to incentive certificates issued in July 2018, Ford Otosan, a leading automotive company that is part of the Koc business empire, received incentives for exports worth some $1.5 billion, for which it needed to import goods worth $887 million. This means that for the said batch of exports, the need for imports was some 60%. Similarly, tire maker Birsa declared a need for $42 million imports for an export batch of $76 million, meaning a 55% dependency on imports. Icdas, a major company in the iron and steel industry, needed to import items worth $153 million — probably scrap iron — to export goods worth $199 million, which means a dependency ratio of up to 77%.

    The reliance on imports is not limited to intermediate and capital goods, extending to subsectors such as food, textiles and apparel, where Turkey is generally known as a competitive country. The importation of wheat to make flour for export is a typical example. In the apparel sector, even basic items such as cloth and yarn are being imported.

    The share of imported inputs particularly grew in the 2003-2013 period, when Turkey enjoyed low foreign exchange prices under the impact of an abundant inflow of foreign funds, stimulated by favorable external and domestic conditions. As a result, the importation of many inputs was seen as more profitable than buying them domestically, which, in turn, brought about the demise of many local suppliers.

    Such a reliance on imports in the industry has a damaging impact on competitiveness once foreign exchange prices shoot up, as happened last year, making imports more expensive and thus increasing production costs.

    To make the old scheme work, one needs to bring foreign exchange prices down, which, in turn, requires an increase in the inflow of foreign capital. This, however, appears a distant prospect for Turkey in the near future. There are serious signs that the Turkish lira has again entered a downward trend, which means that the headway of exporters is limited to stocks since the uptick in exports can hardly be sustained with foreign inputs purchased on the current exchange rates. The replacement of imported inputs and machinery with local ones, meanwhile, requires a steady long-term effort, including most notably a review of Ankara’s growth paradigm, which has for years encouraged construction while ignoring the industry.

    Found in: Economy and trade

    Mustafa Sonmez is a Turkish economist and writer. He has worked as an economic commentator and editor for more than 30 years and authored some 30 books on the Turkish economy, media and the Kurdish question.