Author: Harut Sassounian

Azerbaijan’s armed forces committed a criminal act on November 12, shooting down an unarmed Armenian helicopter inside Artsakh’s borders and killing three military officers. This is the first time since the 1994 ceasefire that Azerbaijan has attacked an Armenian aircraft.

Armenia should not only retaliate against Azerbaijan, but also take all appropriate diplomatic measures to identify and condemn the country that sold Baku the missiles used to down the helicopter. It should be noted that in recent years Israel and Russia have sold billions of dollars of sophisticated military hardware to Azerbaijan.

This unwarranted attack is partly due to 20 years of tit-for-tat border skirmishes during which Azeri sharpshooters kill Armenians and Armenian soldiers return fire killing Azeris. Sitting in his Palace in Baku, Pres. Aliyev does not seem to be bothered by the loss of young Azeris, so long as an equal number of Armenians are killed, since there are several times more Azerbaijanis (close to 10 million) than Armenians (less than three million) in their respective countries. For Aliyev, sacrificing Azeri soldiers is a worthwhile investment for the sake of keeping the focus of the international community on the unresolved Karabagh conflict.

Armenians worldwide are relieved that leaders of Armenia and Artsakh have announced their serious intent to respond to the latest Azeri aggression with a massive and disproportionate attack. One would hope that after a major Armenian counteroffensive, Aliyev might realize that Azerbaijan is paying a heavy price for his self-defeating military adventures.

Sadly, the Armenian unwillingness to launch a large-scale retaliation over the years emboldened Azerbaijan’s despot to resort to more brazen attacks, culminating in last week’s downing of an unarmed helicopter. What’s next? Blowing up a civilian plane with a large number of Armenian passengers, as he has repeatedly threatened to do?

Another puzzling situation is the continued high-level peace talks between the two countries, while one of the sides — Azerbaijan — keeps on shooting! How is it possible to talk peace and fire at the same time? At the end of every summit meeting, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, along with Minsk Group mediators representing the United States, France and Russia, routinely declare that the Karabagh conflict should be resolved through peaceful means, while Azerbaijan continues its aggressive behavior before, during, and after the peace talks!

To make matters worse, after each Azeri attack, the Minsk Group urges both Armenia and Azerbaijan to exercise restraint and places the blame equally on both sides. Such unfair and false parity only emboldens Azerbaijan to intensify its aggression. If the international community truly seeks a peaceful resolution and wants to prevent unnecessary bloodshed around Artsakh, it should ban the sale of weapons to Azerbaijan and issue a strong condemnation each time it violates the ceasefire.

Meanwhile, the Armenian government needs to take all necessary defensive measures to protect the people of Armenia and Artsakh from wanton Azeri attacks, even if it has to launch pre-emptive strikes deep inside Azerbaijan. Aliyev should not forget that his country’s oil and gas pipelines, oil fields and refineries are highly vulnerable to such attacks which could cause billions of dollars of damage to the economy.

To discourage Azerbaijan’s aggressive behavior, Armenia must declare that it would not only retaliate, but also freeze the peace talks by six months after each Azeri attack. Because Aliyev hopes to get back through negotiations some of the territories on the periphery of Artsakh, the suspension of peace talks would delay and eventually block the return of any territory. Thus, after a lengthy suspension of the talks, Aliyev would learn a valuable lesson: You can’t talk peace and make war at the same time!

Should Azerbaijan persist in its hostile behavior, Armenia could terminate all negotiations and decide either to recognize the Republic of Artsakh, or officially declare that Artsakh is an inseparable part of Armenia.

If Aliyev is foolish enough to make war, he may end up losing more territory and leave his country’s considerable energy infrastructure in total shambles. No one should take seriously Aliyev’s repeated threats to invade Armenia and Artsakh. Most military experts acknowledge that Azerbaijan’s military is inferior to Armenia’s, despite the lavish expenditure of billions of petrodollars to acquire the latest weaponry.

Harut Sassounian

I just learned that the Turkish government has quietly corrected the signpost near the historic Holy Cross Church (Sourp Khach) on Akhtamar Island in Lake Van, by indicating its “Armenian” origin.

For decades, Turkish authorities systematically concealed the true identity of thousands of Armenian churches and monuments so no one would remember that Armenians lived for thousands of years in lands presently occupied by the Republic of Turkey. By not disclosing the traces of Armenian civilization, Turkish officials calculated that there would be no need to explain the disappearance of Armenians — another manifestation of Turkish denialism.

Back in 2007, the Turkish government held an elaborate opening ceremony after renovating the 10th Century Holy Cross Church. While some Armenians naively participated in this Turkish propaganda exercise, I wrote several critical editorials pointing out that Turkish officials did not permit Armenian church services (except once a year), and refused to allow a cross displayed on its dome. Instead, the Sourp Khach Church was officially designated as a museum and placed under the administration of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and not under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul. Since then, a cross has been placed on the Church dome.

One issue that I failed to mention back in 2007 was the inscription on
the signpost leading to the Church. The original signpost made no
reference to Armenians either in English or in Turkish. Below is the
heading and first words of the previous inscription, written in English:
“Akdamar Island & Monumental Museum. Fee 5 TL [Turkish Liras]. Akdamar
Island and Church. Akdamar Church was built by the monks of architects
Manuel between 915-921 by the order of Vaspurakan King Gagik I….”

Last week, during a chance encounter in a Glendale Armenian bookstore, Senem Cevik, Assistant Professor at Ankara University, showed me two different photos of the Holy Cross Church signpost. The first, taken by her a year ago, showed the foregoing inscription. The second, taken by one of her colleagues last month, displayed the new inscription that refers to the building as an Armenian Church:

“Akhdamar Armenian Church of the Holy Cross. The Church was built by monk/architect Manuel between 915 and 921, by the order of Gagik I, King of Vaspurakan. Built at the form of a four-leaf clover and under the plan of a cruciform, the church was covered by a dome from inside and by a pyramidal cone from outside. The church has two gates, one at the southern and another at the western side. During subsequent periods, the Chapel of Zacharias I, a jamatun and a bell tower were added to the church and the Chapel of Saint Stephanos was built separately. Built in the name of the Holy Cross, the church has been transformed into a monastery in 1131. On the stone reliefs of the façade of the church, religious scenes taken from the Old and New Testament, palace life, hunting scenes as well as human and animal figures are depicted. These depictions are important as they distinguish the church from similar ones. There are various wall paintings representing descriptions taken from the Bible on the inner side of the church’s walls.”

This new inscription clearly designates Holy Cross, both in English and Turkish, as an Armenian Church. However, there is still a problem. While the church’s name is correctly written in English as Akhtamar, in the Turkish language inscription it is referred to by its Turkified name, Akdamar.

I can only speculate as to why the Turkish government did not make a public announcement regarding the revised inscription of the Sourp Khach Church signpost. Here are some possible reasons:

— Oversight by low-level Turkish officials who did not realize the P.R. value of publicizing the change.
— Reluctance of high-ranking officials to draw attention to the change, fearing that they would appear ridiculous taking credit for something so obvious that should have been done long time ago.
— Concerns by Turkish officials that making public the revised text would impress the outside world, while triggering criticism at home for catering to Armenians.
— Preoccupation of newly-elected Turkish leaders with other urgent matters. They may yet make an announcement at a later date.

It is equally puzzling that no one on the Armenian side, including the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, has made any mention of the revised inscription reflecting the Armenian origin of Holy Cross Church.

One hopes that this single rectification of the Akhtamar Church signpost would be a prelude to similar recognition of Armenian cultural heritage in museums, churches, and monuments all across Turkey, including the City of Ani.

The Turkish government got a big slap in the face last week when the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly voted to turn down its application for a Security Council seat. In effect, the international community was rejecting Turkey’s hostile policies both at home and abroad.

Turkey’s new Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had arrogantly predicted securing the prestigious seat for their country. The night before the vote, Cavusoglu had hosted a posh party for UN Ambassadors at the world famous Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City.

After spending several days in New York to lobby personally the UN delegates, Foreign Minister Cavusoglu optimistically told the media: “We think all our nice efforts will, with the grace of God, be reflected onto the ballot tomorrow. Of course, this is a vote and all kinds of results may come out. But, we believe, God permitting, that we will get the result of the work we put in.”

Prime Minister Davutoglu was equally optimistic that Turkey would score a “historic victory.” Just two days before the UN vote, he proudly announced: “If we are elected, and we believe it’s a great possibility, we will be the first country in the world to be elected for a second time, after a five-year break. This shows Turkey’s importance.”

Unfortunately for the Turkish leaders, their expectations did not come true. Despite Cavusoglu’s intensive lobbying efforts and earnest wish for divine intervention, only 60 out of 193 UN General Assembly member states voted for Turkey, while its rival, Spain, received 132 votes, winning a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

Why did Turkey lose in 2014 more than half the 151 votes it received in its successful bid for a Security Council seat in 2008? Here are the key reasons for Turkey’s failure to get elected this time around:

— The vigorous campaign by a large number of countries against Turkey’s membership: Armenia, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, among others.
— President Erdogan’s ongoing acrimonious feud with powerful Turkish Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen, resulting in loss of General Assembly votes for Turkey from several African countries, where Gulen’s followers have an extensive presence. This is a major shift from 2008, when Gulen supporters had secured a large number of votes for Turkey.
— Turkish leaders’ poor judgment of deciding to reapply so soon after getting elected to the Security Council in 2009-2010. Turkey’s reelection would have deprived other countries from serving in that august UN body.
— Davutoglu’s self-aggrandizing neo-Ottoman yearnings had antagonized most Middle Eastern countries, turning his policy of “zero problems with neighbors” into zero neighbors without problems! Pew Research Center’s survey confirms that Turkey’s dismal standing throughout the Middle East has sunk to an all-time low.
— Erdogan’s autocratic rule at home, including the bloody quelling of protests at the Gezi Park, jailing journalists, and blocking Twitter and facebook. His dismissive words, “I don’t care what the international community will say,” had alienated countless people around the world. The vote against Turkey was UN members’ rebuke of Erdogan. Most delegates walked out of the hall during Pres. Erdogan’s pompous speech at the UN General Assembly in September.
— Tense relations with the United States and Western Europe over Turkey’s refusal to support the war against ISIS, and not defending Kurdish civilians who are being massacred by foreign Jihadists at a stone’s throw from the Turkish border. As a result, influential commentators called for Turkey’s expulsion from NATO and rejection of its application for membership in the European Union.
— Displeased with Turkey’s antagonistic stand, Pres. Obama sent a lowly charge d’affaires of the US Embassy in Ankara to attend Erdogan’s presidential inauguration on August 28.

By ignoring all these legitimate reasons for Turkey’s failure to win the Security Council seat, Foreign Minister Cavusoglu falsely attributed his country’s defeat to its reluctance to abandon “its values for the sake of getting more votes.” This ridiculous statement is made by the Foreign Minister of a country that has been pouring millions of dollars into the coffers of tiny island states around the world and poor African countries to buy their UN General Assembly votes.

Finally, the failure to gain a Security Council seat limits Turkey’s ability to exploit the powerful UN body to undermine the worldwide commemorative events next year on the Armenian Genocide Centennial.

On October 10, after lengthy heated debates, Armenia signed a treaty to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), composed of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The agreement goes into effect on January 1, 2015, subject to ratification by parliaments of the four countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have also expressed an interest in joining the Union.

The intended objective of forming EEU is to facilitate the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across member states, and to implement a coordinated policy in the energy, industrial, agricultural and transport sectors.

Views of analysts on the merits of Armenia’s membership in EEU diverge depending on whether they are proponents or opponents of the country’s leadership. The arguments advanced by opponents of EEU include the possible loss of Armenia’s independence and isolation of Artsakh (Karabagh) through the establishment of customs checkpoints at the border. EEU proponents, on the other hand, are stressing Armenia’s geostrategic and economic interests. It remains to be seen which of these arguments will eventually prevail.

Meanwhile, there are some basic facts that are self-evident. Armenia has had long-standing and multifaceted links to Moscow going back to the Tsarist era, the Soviet Union, and today’s Russian Federation.

It is imperative to recall that the livelihood of hundreds of thousands Armenian migrants in Russia will be impacted by Armenia’s EEU membership, in terms of their ability to reside and work in that country. Furthermore, Armenian businesses would be able to expand their small domestic market, exporting their products with favorable tax terms to over one hundred million potential consumers in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Armenia would also serve as an easy gateway for foreign investors interested in entering the vast and complex EEU markets.

In the final analysis, three essential questions need to be raised on Armenia’s membership in EEU:

1) Given the ongoing Artsakh conflict and Azerbaijan’s multi-billion dollar military spending spree, which country has sold and will continue to sell Armenia advanced weapons to mitigate the growing threat from Baku? Not the Unites States, Great Britain or France, but Russia!

2) Which country can provide Armenia with desperately-needed natural gas at any price, let alone at subsidized prices? Russia and Iran to a lesser extent through a small pipeline.

3) Since Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner, it makes more economic sense to have favorable tax terms with that country than with Europe. Not joining EEU would place Armenia at a serious tax disadvantage with devastating economic consequences.

While these are compelling reasons for Armenia’s decision to join EEU, no one should conclude that Yerevan has to remain exclusively in the Russian economic zone. Clearly, it is in Armenia’s interest to develop multilateral ties with the rest of the world, including Western Europe, North America, Middle East, and Asia. Armenian officials have repeatedly stated their interest in developing closer economic, political, and even military relations with Western countries, but not at the expense of Armenia’s historical ties with Russia.

Meanwhile, it would be far more productive if Western countries, particularly the United States, rather than urging Armenian leaders to cut off vital relations with Russia, would actually offer tax privileges and other incentives to their investors in Armenia, thus reducing Yerevan’s exclusive dependence on Russia. Similarly, U.S. criticism and warnings issued to Armenia for its commercial ties with Iran are manifestly counter-productive. It would be far more helpful if the Obama administration could muster the courage to press Turkey and Azerbaijan into lifting their joint blockade of the Armenian Republic which has been in effect for over 20 years.

In the light of the foregoing existential strategic and economic realities, Western countries would be better served to use carrots rather than sticks to help steer Armenia toward a more balanced relationship between East and West.