Author: Harut Sassounian

It is amazing the lengths to which the Turkish government went to include Istanbul Armenian clergy and laymen in its propaganda campaign.

On November 5, 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Communications Office organized an exhibit in New York City featuring photos of the Armenian Holy Cross Cathedral located in Western Armenia, today’s eastern Turkey, near Van, on Aghtamar Island.

The opening of the exhibit was not only attended by Alper Aktas, Turkey’s Consul General in New York, but surprisingly, by several Armenian leaders as well as other Christian clergymen from Istanbul. Among the attendees were Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate’s Locum Tenens Bishop Sahak Mashalian; Shirvan Murzoyan, an Armenian priest from Istanbul; Yessayi Demir, Chairman of St. Kevork Church in Samatia, Istanbul; Mesut Ozdemir, Chairman of Dsnount Sourp Asdvadsadsni Church; Yetvart Ayvazian, Chairman of Sourp Krikor Lousavorich Church in Kouzgounjouk, Istanbul; Tamar Karasou, Director of the Turkish Branch of Sourp Krots Association; Aram Kouran from “Louys” biweekly; Chairman of the Board of Sourp Prgich Armenian Hospital in Istanbul, Bedros Shirinoglu and his wife; Turkish Minority Community Foundation Representative Moris Levi; Syriac Ancient Church Foundation President Sait Susin; American Greek Orthodox Church Archbishop Elpidophoros Lambriniadis; and members of the Turkish and Armenian communities. I am pleased that none of the clergy from the Armenian Church in the United States (Prelacy and Diocese) attended the opening of the exhibit in New York.

While it is understandable that given the tense relations between the United States and Turkey, the Turkish government would want to carry out a propaganda campaign in the US to improve its stained image, much less acceptable is the participation of the Armenian laymen and clergy as well as Syriac and Greek leaders. One can excuse the attendance of the Istanbul leaders given the fact that they are hostages in the hands of the oppressive Turkish regime. In the case of Bishop Mashalian, however, he may have come willingly, as he is one of the two candidates for the December election for the position of the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey. The Bishop knows well that any disobedience to the wishes of the Turkish government will cost him the seat of the Patriarchate.

Despite the strong desire of Erdogan’s government to carry out propaganda in the US, it failed to capitalize on this opportunity. Turkey spent a fortune to fly the 88 photographs of the Holy Cross Church to New York, pay for the rental of an exhibit hall in Manhattan, fly and accommodate over a dozen guests from Istanbul to New York City, and pay the expenses of making a film on the Holy Cross Cathedral, “The Hidden Monuments of Anatolia Coming to Light: Akdamar,” shown at the exhibit. Yet, the highly-paid US lobbying firms hired by Turkey either were not asked or failed to disseminate the exhibit propaganda to the American media. Secondly, the Turkish government did not think of delaying the opening of the exhibit by one week so Pres. Erdogan, who will be in the US this week, could attend the official ribbon cutting ceremony. In September, Pres. Erdogan was present in New York at a similar opening of the exhibit of the photos of Ara Guler, a Turkish Armenian, which was also sponsored by the Turkish President’s Office.

Here are the reasons why I consider the Holy Cross Church photo exhibit a manifestation of Turkish propaganda:

1)  The Turkish government has designated Holy Cross as a museum, not a church, allowing Armenian liturgy to be performed only once a year by special permission. Much more important than organizing an exhibition in New York would have been the designation of the Holy Cross edifice as a church, not a museum. What are the Armenian and other clergymen doing celebrating the exhibit of a museum? If they had any guts, they would have refused to attend the exhibit until the museum is designated as a church which was completed in 921 AD, under the sponsorship of Armenian King Gagik Ardsruni. Visitors have even to pay a fee to enter “the museum.”

2)  After the Holy Cross Cathedral was repaired in 2007, the Turkish government did not allow a cross to be placed on the dome of the church, giving the excuse that the cross was too heavy for the dome. Finally, after much criticism, in 2010 the Turkish government allowed a cross to be placed atop the Holy Cross Cathedral.

3)  The Turkish government turkified the name of the island by changing it from Aghtamar to Akdamar (which means “White vein” in Turkish).

4)  In his remarks, Bishop Mashalian praised Pres. Erdogan for organizing the exhibit in New York: “Under the leadership of the president’s vision, special attention and interest was shown in the Akdamar Church…. This is a cultural initiative to overcome the difficulties of communication between the Turkish and Armenian peoples, as well as a bridge to a better future and understanding based on goodwill.”

5)  Chairman of the Board of Sourp Prgich Armenian Hospital in Istanbul Bedros Shirinoglu stated that “President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made great efforts for minority communities…. We would like to express our gratitude to him for all his help and to the {President’s] Communications Office for this exhibition.

6)  American Greek Orthodox Church Archbishop Elpidophoros Lambriniadis reinforced the Turkish propaganda by underlining the significance of the photos at the exhibition in terms of showing the importance attached to the Christian minority in Turkey, saying: “Turkey is going in the right direction and it is good to tell the whole world about this.”

7)  Pres. Erdogan proudly told the Turkish media last week that 17 representatives of Turkish minority groups are in New York at this time for the photo exhibit of the “Akdamar Church.”

If the Turkish government was truly sincere in promoting the Armenian Church in Aghtamar, why did it allow a group of Azeris recently to visit the church and claim it to be a Caucasian Albanian Christian church? This is the usual lie that the Azeri government uses to describe all historic Armenian churches in Azerbaijan. The Azeri visitors displayed inside the Holy Cross Church the Azeri and Turkish flags with an “Azeri priest” claiming to say prayers. In a statement made outside the front door of the church, an Azeri representative accused Armenians of invading Azerbaijan and committing vandalism. The Turkish government should apologize to Armenians for allowing the perpetration of such a gross lie!

A 48-page Central Intelligence Agency Top Secret Report, prepared in August 1988 and made public in 2012 with some deletions, is titled “Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nationalism.” Despite the passage of time, the Report includes an interesting analysis of the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) conflict from the perspective of U.S. intelligence services.

The CIA analyst, in the introduction of his Report, traced the origins of the Artsakh conflict: “Enmity between Armenian and Azeri factions has existed for hundreds of years, and the 1920s settlement subordinating Nagorno-Karabakh — Armenia’s cultural and religious center — to the Azerbaijan Republic has been a continual, albeit long-muted, source of Armenian frustration and concern. Azeri animosity toward the Armenians has been intensified by political, economic, and demographic trends that have adversely affected the political status of Azeris and increased the gap in living standards between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In particular, the rapid expansion of Azerbaijan’s young adult population has put enormous strain on the Republic’s capacity to provide adequate jobs, housing, and education. Azeri frustration has found an outlet in attacks on Armenians.”

The unnamed CIA analyst reported that a split within the Politburo on how to handle the Artsakh crisis made the situation worse. Second Secretary Ligachev and KGB Chief Chebrikov were the hardliners who vehemently opposed the separation of Artsakh from Azerbaijan. They disagreed with Gorbachev’s reforms and blamed foreign powers for inciting unrest inside the Soviet Union.

When two prominent Armenian writers, Silva Kaputikyan and Zori Balayan, met with Gorbachev in Moscow in February 1988, they reported that he was well briefed and assured them that he wanted a “just solution.” He acknowledged “the peaceful nature of the [Armenian] demonstrations and emphasized his personal sympathy with the desire to reunite Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia….”

Upon the return of the Armenian envoys to Yerevan, in a radio broadcast on February 27, 1988, Kaputikyan called for Armenians to trust Gorbachev. “He knows about and understands our problem and wants to resolve it personally…. We must do our utmost to ensure that no harm” is done to him, Kaputikyan announced.

Regarding Soviet concerns about foreign, particularly Armenian-American interference in domestic Soviet turmoil, the CIA analyst reported: “The recent unrest appears to have made Soviet officials more fearful about the role of foreign actors in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Of the approximately 5.5 million people in the world today who speak Armenian, about 60% live outside the Soviet Armenian republic, about 1.4 million elsewhere in the USSR, and 2 million abroad. So far, Armenian emigres — most of whom see Turkey much more than Russia as the historic oppressor of their nation — have not been actively involved in pushing for change in the Soviet system or in Soviet policies. Moscow worries that diaspora attitudes could turn sharply critical of the USSR and that Armenians in the United States, particularly, could grow into a powerful anti-Soviet pressure group. Soviet officials are wary of the large concentration of Armenians in California and New York, states with large electoral votes that have been closely contested in previous presidential elections.”

In a footnote at the end of the previous paragraph, the CIA analyst specified that “the United States hosts at least 600,000 Armenians. About 90 percent of America’s Soviet Armenian immigrants came to California. Los Angeles — with 100,000 — has the largest community of Armenians outside Yerevan. The New York City region has about 70,000 Armenians, mostly from Lebanon and Iran.”

The CIA analyst added: “Moscow may be concerned that foreign Armenian terrorist groups like the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) could turn against Soviet targets — although we have no evidence that this is the case. Hitherto, the USSR has figured very little in ASALA’s blending of armed struggle with Marxist ideology; the dominant faction of ASALA considers Soviet Armenia as liberated territory and the group concentrates its attacks exclusively on Turkish officials. In fact, ASALA eventually would like to see ‘the Armenian provinces’ now located in Turkey and possibly Iraq [?] reattach themselves to the Soviet Armenian core. Furthermore, ASALA is now in a quiet phase, and its leader was assassinated on 28 April [1988]. Nevertheless, ASALA in early April did send a moderately worded appeal to Gorbachev supporting the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia, while characteristically stressing that Armenia is an integral part of the USSR and seeks only to rectify the border, not to pursue claims against Moscow.”

Finally, the CIA analyst explained the position of Turkey on the Karabakh conflict: “Although the Turkish Government has not explicitly sided with Azerbaijan, Turkey’s fear of resurgent Armenian nationalism makes Ankara sympathetic to Baku. When the crisis broke in February [1988], Turkish Government spokesmen indicated publicly that international agreements entitle Ankara to a voice in the crisis, an apparent reference to the 1921 treaty between the USSR and Turkey that led to the shift of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan. Turkey no doubt especially feared that transferring Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia would whet Armenian appetites and would lead to increased pressure to change the status of Nakhichevan and to acquire former Armenian regions in Turkey. Turkish officials probably also noted that some Armenian expansionist demands for a ‘Greater Armenia’ were based on historic claims rather than on the ethnic composition of the affected territories. Thus, some Armenians have demanded the return of Nakhichevan, even though Azeris now greatly outnumber Armenians in this region. Using such historical criteria, could give Armenians a claim even on some border parts of Turkey where only 50,000 Armenians now live.”

The CIA analyst concluded his Report by outlining five options the USSR had for the resolution of the Artsakh conflict:

1)  “Sticking with the Status Quo”

2)  “Making Further Economic Concessions” to Armenians

3)  “Enhancing Autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh Within Azerbaijan”

4)  Expanding “Extraterritorial Native Cultural Institutions”

5)  “Reconfiguration of Nagorno-Karabakh” by splitting it between Armenia and Azerbaijan.