On Tuesday, in the Ataturk Center in Baku was hosted the presentation of a 0-euro euro banknote dedicated to the outstanding historical figures of Azerbaijan and Turkey – the founder of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) Mammad Emin Rasulzade, as well as the Ottoman army general, commander of the Caucasian Liberation Army Nuri Pasha .
Portraits of these two prominent figures are depicted on a bill made in the framework of the Euro Souvenir Bank project.
The ceremony was attended by the project’s initiator, Turkish collector Ozgur Honcha, Turkish Ambassador to Azerbaijan Erkan Ozoral, public figures of Azerbaijan.
The presentation became the basis for discussing the problems of the formation of the modern Azerbaijani state, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, perpetuating the memory of the leaders who founded the First Democratic Republic of 1918-1929 and laid the foundations of the Azerbaijani national idea.
“The issue of this banknote should be taken as a call to perpetuate the name of Rasulzade as the founder of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, and Nuri Pasha, as the military leader who liberated Azerbaijan from the Dashnak-Bolshevik terror and instilled the faith of Azerbaijanis in its future,” said MP Fazil Ganfaroglu.
Ozgur Honche, Serhat Jemil Kuchuk, who provided comprehensive support for the project, also played an important role in preventing the issuance of the Artsakh souvenir euro banknote, which was ordered by the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh.
“All necessary diplomatic and legal steps have been taken to prevent this provocation against Azerbaijan. Our actions were correctly understood by Euro Souvenir Bank and the issue of banknotes was prevented, ”said Ozgur Honche.
One of the initiators of the presentation, Yagut Misirkhanli, announced that 10 thousand commemorative banknotes were issued. Souvenir banknotes with a face value of 0 euros are printed on the official machines of the European Central Bank and are registered as a trademark. A considerable part has already been transferred to statesmen and public figures in Azerbaijan, Turkey in European countries.
An unique artifact was discovered in Baku – the decree of the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent.
According to Day.Az with reference to qaynarinfo.az the document was discovered by an employee of the Institute of Manuscripts named after Fizuli of the National Academy of Sciences Naila Suleymanova. The publication notes that the document is a decree on donating land.
It is reported that the decree of the Turkish Sultan dates back to the 975th year of the Hijra (1566), it was signed in Istanbul with black, gold and blue ink. The dimensions of the scroll of the document are 30 by 180 centimeters.
The decree also bears the signatures vezirs of the sultan Mohammed bin Abdulkhaya , Partav bin Abdulkhaya, Farhad bin Abdulkhaya, the Kaziaskers Ahmed bin Mustafa, Hussein bin Abdulkhaya and witness Ahmed bin al-Daftari.
Suleiman I the Magnificent (Ganuni) – the tenth sultan of the Ottoman Empire (1520-1566) and the 89th caliph since 1538. Suleiman is considered the greatest sultan of the Ottoman dynasty; under him the Ottoman Porta reached the peak of its development. In Europe, Suleiman is most often called Suleiman the Magnificent, while in the Muslim world Suleiman Kanuni.
The Turkish economy grew 7.3 percent in the last quarter of 2017, and 7.4 percent the entire year. This growth is a sign of a fundamental change for Turkey in terms of both its composition and the situation of the world.
The danger of recession in Turkey was even mentioned at the beginning of 2017. We also saw the signs of recession in some industries. Those that constituted net foreign exchange such as exports and tourism were signaling a slowdown. Many foreign institutions said that the trend of a slowdown that started following the coup attempt in the second half of 2016 would continue in 2017, as well. For instance, a highly reputed global research company said the following in its report on Turkey’s economy: “After the July 15 coup attempt, [the] slowdown trend in Turkey’s economy will continue to deepen. We anticipate that the Turkish economy will grow by 2.6 percent in 2016 and by a similar rate in 2017.” Such assessments were generally accepted both at home and abroad, and the best forecast for the Turkish economy at the end of 2016 was that it would be good if the economy did not enter a stagflation process in which stagnation and inflation go together.
Of course, there is no need to say that these assessments would dampen investments to the extent that they disrupted forecasts. So much so that, even those at the heart of the economy considered growth of 4 percent to 5 percent, let alone 7 percent, to be a distant dream.
How did this picture begin to change rapidly as of the end of the first quarter of 2017? The Credit Guarantee Fund (CGF) and many financial incentives began to take effect in the first half of 2017 and the period in which exports and industry contributed positively to the economy started around the end of the first quarter of 2017. Its effects began to be felt immediately, even without any planned delay. Perhaps we can explain this by the potential and dynamics of the Turkish economy that some never know or never want to know, which is a topic for another discussion.
Here, the inflationary effect of both the CGF and financial incentives were criticized in the whole process. Let me just say that, until March 2017, when CGF loans started, we see that inflation paradoxically accelerated in a recession-driven process in both producer and consumer sides.
In March 2017, the Producer Price Index (PPI) peaked at 16 percent. Due to stock and the financing cost burden on industrial enterprises and the enterprises’ failure to make distribution investments, there was deterioration stemming from rapid productivity loss. This led to a loss of competition in exchange rates in exports and to a rise of market losses. In these conditions, manufacturers could not reach financing through traditional methods such as mortgages and the like, and the overall economy rapidly entered a spiral of stagnation and producer inflation.
At this point, the CGF first stopped this process and then reversed it. The import weight seen in growth in 2016 also started to be quickly replaced by exports. We started to see its first impacts in the second quarter growth of 2017. Here, the contribution of sectoral growth came to reach the desired level. In this period, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) also started to rise and the contribution of public-private sector investments reached 9.5 percent. This rate also indicated that bank resources were allocated to the right places. Meanwhile, there was a rapid recovery in the banking system balance sheet. Thanks to the CGF, banks rapidly boosted their asset quality and it became easier for them to find resources from abroad on more appropriate terms and with better rates. In this period, some circles started to claim that while deposit inflows were weak, the CGF caused rapid resource outflow from the banking system, suggesting that since there is a resource problem, it should stop a bit.
Actually, the opposite was true. Some foreign banks transferred some European resources to Turkey just for the sake of the CGF.
All these statements were driven by the innovative growth tools implemented in 2017 that started to spoil the game of those who voiced opposition to them. After all, the only hope of those who failed in the July 2016 coup attempt was the expectation that the economy would not be able to recover afterward.
Those who saw that the order they built would not always continue in the same way got into a big flap after the 2017 achievements.
They started to repeat their failed and falsified thesis that there had been growth over 5 percent and the current account deficit and inflation have increased. This growth is not possible at all with such low savings, and if it is, it will hit the wall, so hike interest rates. As I said in a previous piece, the issue of savings is a paradigm debate along with interest and inflation issues. In an open economy in which the floating exchange rate regime is practiced, the exchange rate level is indisputable and, consequently, savings are not seen as an internal variable. Moreover, in an open economy and in a period when the global economy builds itself on technology efficiency, saving is a direct business of capital, not of households. And it is a phenomenon the government should expect from capital. In this respect, recent statements and steps that associate savings with technology efficiency and research and development investments are quite proper.
Consequently, the growth in 2017 was a historic achievement that shows the country’s potential when old clichés are left aside. It is also the beginning of a paradigm shift.
Alexey Sinitsin, Head Expert of the American-Azerbaijani Progress Promotion Foundation
The article was written on the platform of the online conference “Referendum in the Kurdish Autonomy of Iraq: Realities and the Future” orqanised by Internatinal online analytical center Ethnoglobus (ethnoglobus.az) (Azerbaijan) and the American-Turkish resource “Turkishforum” (turkishnews.com) (USA).
On September 25, Iraqi Kurds will head to the polls not only in Iraqi Kurdistan, but also in territories disputed between Erbil and Baghdad to vote in a referendum on whether Iraqi Kurdistan should become independent. Nobody waits any surprise. Everything is solved. As the Book says, “meneh, tekel, upharsin”. During a previous, non-binding referendum in 2005, almost 99% of Kurds voted in favor of independence. Nothing has changed. Kurds will vote overwhelmingly in favor of independence.
A Kurdish Regional Government has existed in northern Iraq since 1992, when its territory was protected by a US-led no-fly zone after the first Gulf War. Now, after helping to defeat Islamic State, the Kurds want to form their own nation and their own state, in fact, on the Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria territories.
However, point is that Kurd’s power has very important intrinsic causes to hold a referendum. Local economic experts agree that the Kurdish market is off balance, with the Kurdistan market’s consumption far outpacing its production, in part due to a lack of robust manufacturing and service industries, agricultural output, and tourism. Since February 2016 the public sector in Kurdistan has protested corruption and unpaid wages. These demonstrations have now incorporated demands for KRG leaders to step down and dissolve the government. And although these are civil protests, members of the security forces and Peshmerga are also participating. Even Erbil—a traditional bastion of stability—has experienced protests. So I think the referendum is a good opportunity of switching the public, national consciousness to another subject.
But let’s make up our mind to understand if the referendum will lead to an “Independent Kurdish State”. I don’t think so. In any case, it won’t happen in visible prospects. Firstly, there are lots of political, tribal, religious, and even mental contradictions. Really Curds are at variance with each other, and a lot of experts consider that Curds parties and movements are on the brink of civil war. Secondly, neighbours of Curds strongly object against holding this referendum because they apprehend that such an action will give moral support to their local Curds.
Turkey, which is battling a three-decade Kurdish insurgency in its southeast, is concerned the referendum could further stoke separatist sentiment among the 15 million Kurds in Turkey. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Iraq, where he conveyed to Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani Ankara’s concerns about the decision to hold the referendum, planned for Sept. 25. But Turkish nationalist leader Devlet Bahceli says Iraqi Kurdish referendum a potential reason for war.
Of course, Iran is afraid of holding of referendum by expecting the Irania Curds’ government actions. Iran also has additional reasons to block Kurdish independence. The Kurds of Iraq control key border regions with Iran and Syria, regions which Iran plans to dominate to create a land-corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean, thought Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. I think it’s very important that the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, made a rare visit to Ankara. On the agenda was Iran and Turkey’s joint military opposition to Kurdish independence.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has opposed the referendum from the start, fearing the impact on the Kurds in Syria. His top priority in Syria is to stop the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that yave been moving to the South. The YPG is Washington’s Syrian partner of choice and also aligned with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). (Though the United States consider the PKK a terrorist organization). Al-Assad and Moscow are sure that YPG are the most efficient troops that are ready successfully to resist to Syrian government forces and even win them within the territory of the “Syrian Kurdistan”. I remark while the KRG does not support the YPG in public, and is a rival of the PKK, both the YPG and the PKK are popular with many Iraqi Kurds and their political movements.
The United States, other Western nations, Russia and China are also worried that the vote could ignite a fresh conflict with Baghdad and turn into another regional flashpoint. Turkey, Iran and Syria, which together with Iraq have sizeable Kurdish populations, all oppose an independent Kurdistan.
Hoever, “The date is standing, Sept. 25, no change,” said Hoshyar Zebari, a close adviser to Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani, after U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson asked Barzani to postpone the referendum.
So I don’t doubt that the Kurds referendum will be held on 25 Sept. Many experts consider that the Kurdish divorce from Iraq will be more akin to Sudan and South Sudan; Ethiopia and Eritrea; or Serbia and Kosovo rather than the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It’s impossible because the Iraqi Kurds are not going to proclaim their real independence in the day after Kurdish referendum. There are too many risks and challenges for all Iraqi Kurds but not only Barzani. I’ve said the “Independent Kurdistan” would be able to become the reality only in rather remote future.
Gulnara Inandzh, Director of International online information-analytical center “Etnoglobus”, the editor of the Russian section of the US-Turkish resource tirkishnews.com, representative of “Gumilev” center in Azerbaijan, mete62@inbox.ru
Collapse of the Soviet Union, then start of globalization has created a new environment for the realization Ethnopsychological self-identy.
Soviet policies aimed at developing the conscience of the Soviet man, erasing ethnicity and religion, suddenly painted in bright colors the most radical of these factors of identity.
During first years of the new independent states, in Azerbaijan, political nationalism ran in parallel with ethnic nationalism, including with numerous, mainly Turkic ethnic groups. With the strengthening of state nationalism of Azerbaijani Turks declined in parallel reducing ethnic nationalism which is not the major ethnic groups living in the country.
However, the ethnic self-identity of the Azerbaijani citizens calling themselves as “Azerbaijanis” and citizens calling themselves as “Turks”, ” Lezghian”, “Avars”, “Talish” runs parallel. But in the mass consciousness there is no aggression and absolutism in self-identity. But also an understanding of the definition of “Azeri” as a political nation or state is too weak.
For example, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to explain the Azerbaijani Turks, still retained the format of the Soviet definition of “Azeri” that Lezghians Talish and Jew living in Azerbaijan, are also “Azeri”. Also jealous Lezghians Talish and Avar does not want to plead Azerbaijani as again under Soviet format believes that this is definition element, diverting his identity by the wayside.
Such an approach to the title “Azerbaijani” takes place among ethnic groups that do not have their own state. Deep in the subconscious behind it there is self-preservation instinct on the background of globalization, when the process of integration and merger of cultural values.
The so-called “Arab Spring” again exposed ethnic and religious feelings. Studies, as well as own fieldwork shows that in this international call, in Azerbaijan religious expression and ethnic identity prevails over, sometimes mixing them.
But the rise of ethnic consciousness is based on mythologizing history, historical figures searches among their ethnic group. (1)
Azerbaijan, participating in transnational and regional projects, accelerates the process of engaging in the process of globalization and its reverse side – localization. Localization develops regional and local identity. As a result of globalization, localization also acts as a catalyst of ethnic mobilization. (2)
The above identification format proposes a new way of thinking and identification – Eurasianism. This kind of format is new thinking for the Azerbaijani society. Part of the country is included in the European and Asian geographical space. One of the two villages located nearby according to this section may be both in Europe and Asia. What do they think of it? What continent do the residents of these villages belong to? They are likely to be called the name of his village, then their ethnicity, depending on where it is rural or political nation – Azerbaijani, then religious affiliation – Muslims. But they don’t care whether they are European or Asian.
Outside the country Azerbaijanis are considered as the eastern people, Muslims. And by presenting to our public consciousness a new format of thinking, we need to define and explain what the purpose of it is. If there is still a debate about ethnicity and political nation, those who do not want to consider himself a nation, and remains in its ethnic house, suggest a Eurasian identity.
Gumilev’s Eurasian idea was transferred to the political arena and has become a leading link in Russia’s foreign policy thus becoming virtually a new format for the unification of the Eurasian geography. That is, this is the idea of Eurasian identity manifested itself on the political plane. In such a case Eurasianism will be dictated from above, if the political authorities decide to join it. Dictated from above new factor of integration or association will not be framed as an ideological component, and would mean only to carry political- geographical name. It means that Azeri do not have to adapt to the new identity. In this case, the proposed policy of Eurasian idea does not compete or clash with ethnic and national identity, but it is the basis for cultural and economic integration.
With the growing economic and political status of Azerbaijan, national identity takes a new quality. Today being an Azerbaijani is prestigious, for example, equals with Europeanized Eastern man, a Muslim with a modern way of thinking. Azerbaijanis are now not only migrant workers but also employers. Azerbaijan already began to receive migrants from southern Russia, Asia and Iran. This is due to participation of Azerbaijan and the role of Azerbaijani business as an employer in the south of Russia.
Here it would be appropriate to consider the involvement of Azerbaijan in the economy of the south of Russia, which includes not only economic, but also cultural and social integration.
Economic and political development of Azerbaijan assigns it the role of the employer that changes the attitude towards the state and the people. Russia invited foreign private and public companies, including Azerbaijani investors to participate in the development of economy in southern Russia.
Southern borders of Russia, bordering with two regional states, Azerbaijan and Georgia, is a strategically important reference point of Russia. In order to establish peace in the south of the country, the federal center along with operational activities implement economic reforms, aimed at serving as establishment of new jobs, growth of social conditions of the population and reduction of migration.
But at the same time, given the desire of foreign powers to separate the south of the country, including the North Caucasus from Russia, the Kremlin approaches the foreign investors carefully, without allowing them into the regional economy.
In this case, absence of geopolitical ambitions in the North Caucasus and the reluctance to become an instrument of foreign games in the region, makes Azerbaijan successful and trusted source of investment in the economy of the south of Russia. Many factors contribute to this, including economic potential, similarity of mental traits, natural infrastructure, a large market, etc.
State border treaty, signed in 2010 between Baku and Moscow accompanied the opening of the North Caucasus economic fields for the Azerbaijani business.
In the summer of 2011 Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, the special representative of the President of Russia in the North Caucasus Federal District (North Caucasus Federal District ) Alexander Khloponin, with the delegation of heads of all the North Caucasian Republics came to Baku to discuss the subject. Immediately thereafter, the Minister of Economic Development of Azerbaijan Shahin Mustafayev visited seven republics of the North Caucasus and business forums and business meetings were held. (3)
Paying particular attention to economic cooperation with Azerbaijan, plenipotentiary representation of the Russian President in the North Caucasus Federal District creates a special council to supervise the execution of the decisions relating to the subjects of the federation in the region and also plans to open a representative office of North Caucasus Federal District in Azerbaijan.
According to the deputy envoy to North Caucasus Federal District Sergei Subbotin, “A task was put before North Caucasus Federal District leaders aiming at development of relations with Azerbaijan, and it is high time to control the effectiveness of these tasks. Effective solution of all tasks depends primarily on effective control. ” (4)
Participation of Azerbaijani business is particularly felt in Stavropol and Krasnodar regions of Russia. For example, in 2009, Azerbaijan won the 3rd place in terms of foreign trade with the Stavropol Territory – $ 123.3 million, which is 8.7 % of the total foreign trade turnover of the region, and trade with the Krasnodar Territory – $ 71.4 million.
In 2010 national company “Azersun Holding” put into operation a tea-packing factory in Belorechensk (Krasnodar region) with a total of more than $ 3 million. and started the construction of a cannery in the same amount. Totally the company has invested in the infrastructure of the Krasnodar Territory $ 22 million.
In September 2011 Azerbaijani company “Matanat – A” started construction of Materials Plant in Uspensky district of Krasnodar region ( project worth of 30 million euros).
In early June of this year in Volgograd during the fourth forum “Russia -Azerbaijan: interregional dialogue 2013” business exhibition was organized where the Russian regions and Azerbaijan demonstrated products of industrial and processing enterprises. The exhibition was attended by more than 40 producers in the region , including plants such as “Volgogradneftemash “, ” VZBT “, ” united Tsarician manufactory “, ” Volzhsky Abrasive Plant ,” ” Kamyshinsky textiles “, “Brewers”, “Config”, “Gardens Pridonya” , “King – product” and other productions.
According to the Minister of Economy, Foreign Economic Relations and Investment Elvira Lagutina, Azerbaijan today is one of the largest customers of the Volgograd region. Currently, the region has 10 enterprises with the participation of the Azerbaijani capital, trade is growing with the republic – by the end of 2012 it exceeded $ 140 million.
– Azerbaijan is interested in Volgograd APK, bus manufacturing, chemical products and other enterprises. Besides, there are also prospects in the implementation of joint investment projects, including the construction of hotels and the creation of platforms in the field of agricultural processing. Azerbaijan also purchased Drilling Equipment Plant in Volgograd. (5 )
Federal center is very interested in the development of the region and creates maximum conditions for investment.
“The district used the most advanced tools to stimulate investment and development – government guarantees and investment insurance that does not exist in any other region of Russia. North Caucasus Development Corporation was established” – said Russian presidential representative in the North Caucasus Federal District Alexander Khloponin, inviting Azerbaijani investors to the region. (6 )
We also should note the need to establish a free trade zone in the region, which should abolish movement between Azerbaijan and Russia, to promote mutually beneficial trade and rapprochement and closer ties of the two countries, to attract Azerbaijani investors. This should also be accompanied by the creation of conditions for labor migration between Azerbaijan and in southern regions of Russia.
Russian side is trying to bring economic relations between Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus Federal District from framework of trade relations into the direction of the development of modern industry and technology and innovation. It is noteworthy that as evidenced above examples, the participation of Azerbaijani business in southern Russia is seriously interested in Moscow.
(Speech at the conference titled “Alternatives for regional developmen” The Shabunin readings, 11-12 October 2013, Volgograd)