Author: fdemirmen

  • Armenian ‘G’ claims: A matter of balance and due process

    Armenian ‘G’ claims: A matter of balance and due process

    Hurriyet Daily News, April 28, 2012

    ferruh demirmen

    FERRUH DEMİRMEN

    We have just passed April 24, when Armenians of various walks of life commemorate the anniversary of the arrest of the Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul 97 years ago, alleged to have been the beginning of “Armenian genocide.” So the pundits chastise, woefully, Turkey for “denying” genocide, and demand that Turkey extend an apology and offer restitution (meaning money and land) to the Armenians.

    This is no place to dwell on history to explain why such demands lack rational basis, e.g., if the Ottoman Turks had intent to exterminate the Armenian minority, why they gave Armenian citizens high positions in the government, why they waited for more than 6 centuries – when they were in much better position – to deliberately target Armenians.

    Nor is this the proper place to elaborate why some critical pieces of “evidence” e.g., the Andonian files, that the proponents of genocide cite to support their thesis, were forgeries, or that the orders issued by the Ottoman central government to relocate Armenians proscribed that all measures were to be taken to ensure the safety of the deportees and meet their needs during and after relocation.

    But there are two aspects the proponents of genocide conveniently ignore, that call for special attention: balance and due process.

    Regarding balance, no one denies that Armenians suffered during relocation, and some lost their lives, in a time of war when chaos, lawlessness and depravation prevailed. Surely we must mourn the sufferings and loss of life. But do we ever hear about the sufferings and loss of lives of non-Armenians? During that tragic period more than half a million Muslims – and some Jews – perished at the hands of armed, marauding Armenian gangs that terrorized the countryside and helped invading enemy armies.

    Do the lost lives of Muslims not matter?

    If we are to recall history, do Armenians carry any sense of guilt and culpability for aiding the enemy and terrorizing the local civil population?

    And why do we not hear, one must ask, any remorse on the part of Armenians for the killings by the ASALA organization of more than 40 Turkish diplomats in the 1970’s and ‘80’s?

    As for due process, it must be emphasized that “genocide” is a special crime, and the term should not be used lightly. To quote the 1948 UN Resolution on the Prevention of Genocide, determination on genocide can only be made “by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.” In the case of the alleged Armenian genocide, there has been no such determination. No court verdict; none, period. The U.N. resolution also makes no attribution to “Armenian genocide.”

    A parliamentary body, often beholden to special interests, and acting as both the prosecutor and judge, is no substitute for a duly authorized court of law.

    So, one must ask, without a court verdict, how can the Turks be accused of the “g” crime? Where is the respect for due process?

    In fact, the only judicial proceeding that comes close to being an international tribunal on the Armenian case is the Malta Tribunal, held by the victorious British after WWI. The proceedings, investigating charges against 144 high-ranking Ottoman officials accused of harming Armenians, failed to bring about a single conviction. Even searching through the U.S. State Department files in Washington D.C. failed to produce any incriminating evidence. Off went the dispatch from the British Embassy to Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in London: “I regret to inform Your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial at Malta.” All the detainees were set free and returned to Turkish soil.

    Armenian genocide allegations, apart from being legally unsustainable, create discord and animosity in society. Nearly a century has passed, and it is time to move on toward greater inter-communal harmony.

    Will the Armenian Diaspora take note?

    [email protected]

     

    April/28/2012

  • Analysis: Turkey helps pull the rug from under Nabucco

    Analysis: Turkey helps pull the rug from under Nabucco

    By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.
    Houston, Texas

    Judging from the press reports, one would not know it, but Turkey, the presumed supporter of the Nabucco gas project, recently helped kill the project.

    It was not to be so. After all, the Nabucco project was designed not only to supply natural gas to the EU from the Caspian region and the Middle East, but also help Turkey meet its domestic needs. The intergovernmental agreement signed in Ankara amid media publicity in July 2009, followed by parliamentary seal of approval in March 2010, gave all the indications that Turkey would stand by the project.

    Turkey’s BOTAS was one of the 6 partners that developed the project. The Vienna-based NIC (Nabucco International Company) represented the consortium formed by the partners. The 3,900 km-long pipeline’s planned destination was Baumgarten in Austria.

    Not that the project was ideal for Turkey (). But compared to its rivals ITGI (Italy-Greece Interconnector) and TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), not to mention a host of “exotic” Black Sea options flagged by Azerbaijan, it was the most mature and most comprehensive gas pipeline project to connect Turkey and the EU to the supply sources to the east. Strategically it deserved Turkey’s support. It was the only project among its rivals that aimed to transport Azeri as well as non-Azeri gas. Turkmen gas was a high-priority objective.

    Surely, with its ambitious design capacity of 31 billion m3 (bcm)/year, Nabucco was under stress. What was holding the project from implementation was the lack of feed (throughput) gas. The feed gas problem caused delays in the project, and the capital costs soared (up to EUR 14-15 billion by most recent estimates). The Azeri Shah Deniz-II gas was identified as the initial start-up gas as from 2017-2018.

    But Azerbaijan, that owned the gas, and the Shah Deniz consortium that would share and produce it, were non-committal about supplying gas. That meant major headache for Nabucco. Turkmen gas input required the cooperation of Azerbaijan, and would be added to the gas stream at a later date.

    In the meantime, the rival projects ITGI and TAP emerged. Like Nabucco, these also counted on Shah Deniz-II gas for throughput. A winner-take-all pipeline contest was in the works.

    Still, Nabucco had a good fighting chance. On October 1, 2011, NIC submitted its proposal to the Shah Deniz consortium tabling transport terms. The rival projects ITGI and TAP did the same. A high-stakes waiting game would then start, during which the Shah Deniz consortium would pick the winner.

    The spoiler project

    All that changed when BP (British Petroleum), at the last minute before the October 1 deadline, came up with a new, “in-house” project: SEEP (South-East Europe Pipeline). It was a shrewd move, and immediately caught the attention of the Shah Deniz consortium – where BP is the operator and a major (25.5%) stake holder. The Azeri partner SOCAR, in particular, quickly warmed up to BP’s proposal.

    Instead of building a new pipeline across the Turkish territory, SEEP envisioned the use of BOTAS’ existing network (with upgrades) in Turkey and construction of new pipelines and their integration with existing interconnectors past Turkey. Azeri gas would be the feed gas. The destination would still be Austria, but the cost would be much less than that of Nabucco.

    Nabucco had come under threat.

    Behind the scenes

    Events behind the scenes further undermined Nabucco. On October 25 Ankara and Baku signed an intergovernmental agreement in Izmir in western Turkey. Details released to the press were sketchy, but one of the accords reached was to use initially BOTAS’ existing network in Turkey, and later build a new pipeline when needed, to ship Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey and the EU. Starting in 2017 or 2018, of the total 16 bcm gas to be produced annually from the Shah Deniz-II phase, Turkey would receive 6 bcm, and the rest 10 bcm would be shipped to the EU.

    Azerbaijan would be the direct seller of gas to the EU, with Turkey being a mere bridge or transit route.

    No mention was made of Nabucco, ITGI, TAP, or SEEP in the press release, but the footprints of SEEP were unmistakable.

    Demise of Nabucco

    Still worse news followed. On November 17, during the Third Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum held in Istanbul, SOCAR chief Rovnag Abdullayev announced that a new gas pipeline, which he named “Trans-Anatolia,” would be built in Turkey from east to west under the leadership of SOCAR. The new pipeline would deliver Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey and Europe.

    Azerbaijan and Turkey had already started working on the pipeline project, he said, and others could possibly join later. The planned capacity was at least 16 bcm/year –large enough to absorb all future Azeri exports after depletion of Shah Deniz II.

    While not stated so, the announcement made Nabucco effectively redundant. The announcement was an offtake from the Izmir agreement, and signaled a surprising, 180-degree turn on the part of Turkey on Nabucco.

    Turkey’s energy minister Yildiz Taner tried to put the best face in the press by claiming that Trans-Anatolian would “supplement” Nabucco, while the NIC chief Reinhard Mitschek expressed his “confidence” in Nabucco.

    More recently SOCAR’s Abdullayev maintained that Nabucco was still “in the race,” and NIC started the pre-qualification process for procurement contractors.

    For all these business-as-usual pronouncements, however, there was little doubt that Nabucco had received a fatal blow. If Trans-Anatolia, dedicated to Shah Deniz II gas, is built, Nabucco will lose its start-up gas, and with it the justification for a new infrastructure across Turkey.

    Without synergy from the Azeri gas, a full-fledged Nabucco project dedicated solely to Turkmen gas will also have a virtually zero chance of implementation.

    Nabucco, in its present form, was dead. (See also . A much-modified, “truncated” version of Nabucco, starting at the Turkey-Bulgaria border, may well emerge, however.

    Conclusion

    With Nabucco frozen in its tracks, the geopolitics of energy in Turkey and its neighborhood has changed dramatically ). What is surprising is that Turkey assisted in undermining a project that it had long supported. It was a project that encompassed both Azeri and Turkmen gas. To reduce its dependence on Russia for its gas exports, Turkmenistan has been eager to ship its gas to the West.

    Azerbaijan, apparently viewing Turkmen gas exports to the West a threat to its own gas exports, has been reluctant to cooperate with Ashgabat on this issue.

    Turkey acceded to the aspirations of the Azeri brethren, while ignoring those of the Turkmen brethren. Over the past year, as the EU delegates approached repeatedly Ashgabat for Turkmen gas (vis-à-vis a TCGP or Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline), Turkey chose to stay on the sidelines. This was a strategic mistake.

    Both Baku and Ashgabat could benefit from a synergy between the Azeri and Turkmen gaz exports, and Turkey could use gas from both sources to enhance its energy security. Being pro-active on TGCP and nudging Azerbaijan in that direction would have been a wise move for Turkey. On balance, there is little doubt that on the gas issue Azerbaijan has played its cards well – perhaps too well!

    [email protected]

  • Atatürk will remain a towering figure among Turks

    Atatürk will remain a towering figure among Turks

    Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.
    Houston, Texas
    [email protected]

    It has been a fashion in Turkish media in recent years to question and attack the ideology and accomplishments of Kemal Atatürk – a hero figure for the vast majority of Turks. Columnist Mustafa Akyol, who writes in Turkish Daily News, and who for years has been trying to discredit Atatürk, is one such media personalty.

    This disturbing trend gained acceptance in certain journalistic circles within the past decade, in particular after the AK Party’s second electoral victoy in 2007. The growing influence of the Gülen Movement has given impetus to the Atatürk-bashing trend.

    The attack comes mostly from radical conservatives and idealogs – some outright religious bigots -that cannot make peace with Atatürk’s legacy. These critics typically yearn for a “Second Turkish Republic” that have the markings of a bygone Ottoman era. In a conference held 3 months ago at the Kadir Has University in Istanbul, for example, Mr. Akyol reportedly expressed preference for the “democracy” of the Ottoman era!

    The putative reason for Atatürk’s failing, according to these circles, is that Atatürk was anti-Islam, depriving Turks of the freedom to practice their faith. There are even some critics who castigate Atatürk for abolishing Caliphate.

    It would be unrealistic to expect these critics, being imbued by religious prejudice, to appreciate what Atatürk has accomplished. Many of these critics like Mr. Akyol are apologists if not the products of the Gülen Movement, and they advocate an Islamist Turkey instead of a secular one. Most of them have joined hands with quack Creationists that assault Darwin’s Evolution Theory. All because it doesn’t fit with their religious dogma.

    To realize the hollowness of their arguments, and why Atatürk was not anti-Islam, these opponents should read the works of such researchers as Sinan Meydan (e.g., “Cumhuriyet Tarihi Yalanları”) and Professor Ethem Ruhi Fiğlalı (e.g., “Atatürk And The Religion of Islam”). They will learn, for example, that Atatürk tried to free Islam from the shackles of dogma and advanced the notion that religion is a matter between an individual and God. This is also what Islam teaches. Atatürk eschewed “false prophets” that stood between man and God. He held that Islam should be in conformity with reason and logic. He sponsored the construction of mosques in Tokyo and Paris.

    These are not the hallmarks of a leader who was anti-religion or anti-Islam.

    But Atatürk’s accomplishments go far beyond religion: He freed the Turkish nation from the shackles of imperialism and introduced reforms toward a civil society, science and modernity – from alphabet to secularism to women’s rights. Thanks to his reforms, the decadence and backwardness of the waning years of the Ottoman Empire was left behind.

    It was a call for the Turkish nation to catch up with the West in science and modernity. Turks could still practice their religion, but the State did not adopt or sponsor a particular religion.

    If the opponents of Atatürk like Mr. Akyol are breathing freedom in Turkey today, they owe it to the leadership of Atatürk.

    If Turkey has any realistic hopes to join the EU, it is because a measure of westernization that Atatürk’s reforms have ushered in. (Reversals in recent years notwithstanding ).

    The secular establishment Atatürk founded – through the Republic – was requisite for democratization in Turkey.

    It was for good reason that Professor Arnold M. Ludwig of Kentucky University, after 18 years of study of the world leaders of the 20th century (“King of the Mountain”), picked Atatürk as the top winner among the contestants. That makes Atatürk a towering figure in world history. Opponents of Atatürk would do well to read that seminal book.

    And it is also remarkable that the Greek Premier Eleftherios Venizelos, a former enemy of Turkey, nominated Atatürk for the 1934 Nobel Peace Prize.

    The bigotry and ignorance of these opponents – pathetic as they are in their efforts – could be ignored if it were not for the fact that they regularly pontificate in printed and visual media. It is lamentable that these opponents do not show greater respect for the legacy of a visionary figure beloved by the vast majority of Turkish people. In no major newspaper in the U.S., for example, would one find derogatory remarks about George Washington.

    Notwithstanding, there is little doubt that Atatürk will remain a towering historical figure among Turks. Reactionary forces that resist change and want to hold on to the past will not hold the Turkish nation hostage to their hatred and bigotry.

    The West fought a hard and grueling battle for Enlightenment, and it eventually won. Turkey eventually will also win; for it must. This is what progress is about.

  • Taner Akçam, amid contradictions and charges of betrayal, loses credibility

    Taner Akçam, amid contradictions and charges of betrayal, loses credibility

    By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.

    Taner Akçam, Associate Professor of History at Clark University (Worcester, MA) and the “prince charming” of the Armenian lobby, got himself trapped in contradictions on interpreting the results of Turkey’s recent (September 12) referendum on Constitutional changes. He inadvertently brought to surface some unsavory aspects of his past. Akçam’s younger brother, Cahit Akçam, used the occasion to mock the elder brother and charged him with betrayal.

    taner akcam
    taner akcam

    Taner Akçam is an occasional contributor to Turkey’s Taraf, an off-base newspaper that is a staunch supporter of Turkey’s AKP (AK Party, Justice and Development Party). Rumored to be funded by the USA-based Gülen movement, and according to some also by the CIA, it is staffed largely by ex-liberal socialists that are now far to the right. Cahit Akçam is a columnist at Turkey’s left-leaning Birgün newspaper. The AKP is Turkey’s Islamic-rooted ruling party.

    What got Taner Akçam into trouble was an op-ed he wrote in Taraf titled “Seeking Milosevic” that attacked Birgün. He took issue with Birgün’s headline news that the referendum had confirmed the 60% right-wing and 40% left-wing split in the country, and that the nationalist conservative votes had consolidated at the AKP. In what was a victory for the AKP, the referendum passed by a margin of 58%.

    By drawing an analogy between Birgün and Slobodan Milosevic of ex-Yugoslavia, Akçam implicitly accused the newspaper of supporting nationalistic, racist and genocidal sentiments.

    Neighborhood concept

    Taner Akçam couldn’t accept Birgün’s view that the 40% of the referendum voters, that had voted “no,” were really left-wing. Noting that mass-killer Slobodan Milosevic, while called a communist and a socialist, had done horrible things, he argued that likewise in Turkey those who voted “no” couldn’t be called true socialists. The naysayers were the main opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the military-bureaucracy faction. The latter had organized and defended military coups in Turkey, he argued.

    According to Akçam, labeling these groups “socialists,” as Birgün did, stemmed from a hatred of the AKP. Akçam called the 40% the “bourgeois group.” He maintained that this hatred is best explained through the “neighborhood” metaphor.

    In Akçam’s view, Turkey is founded on “our” and “other” neighborhoods. The first neighborhood is one of “city people” that includes bureaucrats, the military, and the like. The CHP and the Ottoman-era İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) are included in this group.

    The “other” neighborhood comprises artisans and peasants that have strong religious identities. This neighborhood is now expanding and encroaching on the “city people” neighborhood.

    Akçam sees himself in the “city people” neighborhood, which he calls “ours.”

    Contradiction and myopia

    But by doing so, Akçam fell into a gasping contradiction, because this is also the group that he labeled “bourgeoisie.” How could someone, with a well-known Marxist background, and calling himself a socialist, be part of the bourgeois group? (Separate from his self-confessed connection to the terrorist PKK organization during 1981-84, Akçam escaped from Turkish prison in 1977 after having been convicted of left-wing terrorist activities aimed at, among others, NATO military and American personnel).

    Surprisingly enough, Akçam supports the “other” neighborhood – the conservative, Islamic group solidly backed by Taraf. This is because he thinks this group has strong democratic credentials.

    It doesn’t take a professor’s prescience to know that such an argument is plain vacuous.

    With the AKP in control – political lords of the 60% group – Turkey today is far removed from democracy – the illegal wiretappings, indefinite detentions and imprisonment of the opponents (including 47 journalists) of the government, an atmosphere of fear permeating the country, mandatory religious education, widespread penetration of Gülenist elements in the state apparatus, in particular the police, appalling inequality between men and women, systematic efforts (re: the referendum) to bring the judiciary under the control of the government, parliamentary immunity, etc. None of these inequities seems to bother the professor.

    In Turkey today the press is under siege, and by Prime Minister’s own admission, “Those that are impartial [to the AKP] should be eliminated.” There are more detainees in prison than those convicted. Many detained under the so-called “Ergenekon case” don’t even know the exact charges against them.

    No scruples, and no loyalty

    Akçam’s contradictions and distortions also caught the attention of his younger brother Cahit Akçam. Responding to the elder Akçam in Birgün, Cahit Akçam couldn’t hide his scorn. In a blistering, two-part rebuttal titled “Really, you are the child of which neighborhood?” he chastised his brother, and mockingly called on him to come to his senses. His article started with a quotation (and an admonition) from Anton Chekhov: “Others’ sins do not make you a saint.”

    Cahit Akçam called the elder Akçam’s “our” vs. “other” neighborhood analysis, with “Marxist-smelling” questions, “light” and meaningless because it was not founded on class distinction. Neither neighborhood as described by Taner embraced the working class. Asking the rhetorical question as to how Taner could overlook the working class, the younger Akçam thought that his brother, in what appeared to be sheer hypocrisy, didn’t really care for the working class.

    Continued the younger brother sarcastically: “Luckily, Taner at least didn’t ignore the bourgeois class in ‘our’ neighborhood.” He chaffed at his brother for not mentioning the bourgeois class in the “other” neighborhood, i.e., the Islamist businessmen that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan had braggingly called “The Anatolian Tigers.”

    Wondering how his brother could not know that the bourgeois class cannot exist without a working class, Cahit mocked his brother: “He is a big professor. True, not a sociology professor, but a history professor nonetheless. He has licked and swallowed a thousand times more than we have. He knows that, to be so ignorant, one does not have to be a professor. For Taner, the working class has little value.”

    The elder Akçam was tersely reminded of the struggles of Turkey’s working class since 1900.

    Cahit continued his criticism by making reference to a Turkish metaphor – referring to lentil meal – that this is all that the Taner could muster as an argument. Referring to Taner’s claim that all the “infamous” events in Turkey’s history emanated from “our” class, he bristled at Taner’s suggestion that the socialists, through the CHP, were like relatives to the military- bureaucracy.

    He mockingly called attention to the fact that the socialists had suffered immensely from the 1980 fascistic military coup.

    Recalling how the elder Akçam had defended the causes of right-wing, fascist elements in Turkey’s recent history, how he had failed to come to the defense of socialists who had been falsely accused of coup attempts, his denialist past, and how he had let down even his own family, the younger Akçam weighed in angrily: “How can Taner accuse his old friends, and even his own brother, as potential perpetrators of genocide?”

    Barely concealing his disdain, Cahit asked of his brother: “As you place the blame on your own neighborhood, can there be a more harrowing psychological ruin [for you]?  … Where is your heart, and your conscience?”

    The ultimate indignity came when the younger Akçam concluded that only someone who was politically and ideologically blind, and someone who had lost his scruples and his sense of loyalty, could do what his brother had done.

    In the background of such emotional outburst was the fact that, while Taner Akçam jumped the prison in 1977 into the safety of Germany and escaped the tribulations of the 1980 military coup, in the coup’s aftermath his brother was put on trial for unauthorized activities, faced death by hanging, and was imprisoned for 8 years. Obviously, a lecture on fascism and the struggles of socialists was the last thing the younger Akçam wanted to hear from a sibling he considered unscruppled and untrustworthy.

    A revisionist professor

    There was more to Akçam’s false accusations. He twisted history and put finger on “our neighborhood’ as the perpetrator of the May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971) and – obliquely – September 12 (1980) military interventions in Turkey. Evidently to hide his own past, and the embarrassment therewith, in his accounting he glossed over the 1980 military coup and the events (including his role) that preceded it.

    He dallied further into the past and noted that his “neighborhood” was also responsible for the so-called “Armenian genocide” and the Dersim events (1937).

    But he was quick to disown any blame – a point that also drew ridicule from the younger Akçam. Instead, Taner Akçam conveniently placed the blame on “our administrators.” Socialists like him, while closely affiliated with the administrators, had deep disagreements with them. It was all the fault of the administrators, not the socialists like him, he argued.

    Nice scapegoat, these administrators were! All that exonerated Akçam and made him squeaky clean!

    As to why “we socialists” never faced up to the criminal acts in Turkish history, Akçam argued that animosity toward the “other” neighborhood was far more important than facing up to criminal acts. “Our culture was such that we [preferred to] blame the Armenians for cooperating with the imperialists while we were fighting our war of independence, and the Dersimians represented a backward and feudal system.”

    Then Akçam made his grandstand by calling on “our” neighborhood to face up to its crimes.

    In such argumentation Akçam conveniently dismissed the criminality of the Armenian gangs in the massacre of more than a half-million Moslems, the fatal blow that the Armenian rebellion had inflicted on the fighting ability of the Ottoman armies in wartime, and ignored the fact the Dersim episode was instigated by reactionary feudal lords that had conspired against the young Turkish republic.

    Akçam also chose not to mention the bloody 1993 Madimak episode in the Anatolian city of Sivas. A crowd of fanatic Islamists (from the “other” neighborhood), amid chants of “Allah-ü Ekber,” set fire to a hotel where a group of left-leaning intellectuals had assembled. In the ensuing mayhem 37 artists and writers lost their lives.

    Akçam’s analysis of past events is the hallmark of an academician who follows a one-track, necessarily biased, approach to historical events.

    In his call to confront one’s criminal history, Akçam should turn the tables and first ask the Armenians and “other” neighborhood to confront their criminality. Why, for example, are the Armenian archives in Yerevan and Boston closed while all Turkish ones open? What are the Armenians hiding?

    And when will the likes of the “Madimak crowd” see the light of Enlightenment?

    Summing it up

    The Taraf-Birgün episode raised the specter of a history professor who, by the reckoning of his own brother, was long in false accusations but short in scruples and trustworthiness. The episode also caught the professor in contradictions and brought to light his biased, one-track approach to traumatic events in Turkish history in the past 100 years.

    Will all this make any difference as regards Akçam’s credibility as a scholar for the Armenian money masters who sponsor his academic career – like the Zoryan Institute and the Cafesjian Family Foundation when Akçam was at the University of Minnesota, and now the Arams, the Kaloosdians and the Mugars at Clark University? Considering that the professor’s criminal past has so far made no difference, the answer must be a firm “no.” Obviously, the professor is serving a useful – in fact very useful – purpose for the Armenian lobby.

    It must be a wondrous world when the “golden” Armenian coffers can sustain an academic chair in history when, as in Akçam’s case, the holder of that chair happens to have his degree in sociology.

    In fact, we should not be too surprised if the spinmasters of the Armenian lobby call on their “prince charming” to come to the aid of the Armenian mob charged last month with the largest Medicare fraud in U.S. history. Could the professor argue that the mob job was actually the “dirty work” of the Turks? Never say “no.”

    To rephrase his brother’s question, in which “neighborhood” does Taner Akçam stand when it comes to truth?

    Surely, the professor must be able to answer that question himself without help from his old-time mentor, Professor Vahakn Dadrian.

    A deeper question is, why Akçam-the-professor would write in a newspaper such as Taraf which has a reputation of acting as a rogue agent of the government on unsubstantiated allegations relating to the opposition, and whose executive editor, Ahmet Altan, in his own words, would be willing to sell out his country “for a woman’s breast and the shade of a cherry tree.” …. But that would be a different story.

    [email protected]

    Addendum: The above article was first submitted (as an exception) to “Armenian Genocide Resource Center,” .  Initially, the host welcomed the article and published it as an “exclusive” on its website. Half a day later the post was mysteriously removed from the website. Query as to why it was removed elicited no satisfactory response.

  • Taner Akçam, amid contradictions and charges of betrayal, loses credibility

    Taner Akçam, amid contradictions and charges of betrayal, loses credibility

    By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.

    Taner Akçam, Associate Professor of History at Clark University (Worcester, MA) and the “prince charming” of the Armenian lobby, got himself trapped in contradictions on interpreting the results of Turkey’s recent (September 12) referendum on Constitutional changes. He inadvertently brought to surface some unsavory aspects of his past. Akçam’s younger brother, Cahit Akçam, used the occasion to mock the elder brother and charged him with betrayal.

    taner akcam
    taner akcam

    Taner Akçam is an occasional contributor to Turkey’s Taraf, an off-base newspaper that is a staunch supporter of Turkey’s AKP (AK Party, Justice and Development Party). Rumored to be funded by the USA-based Gülen movement, and according to some also by the CIA, it is staffed largely by ex-liberal socialists that are now far to the right. Cahit Akçam is a columnist at Turkey’s left-leaning Birgün newspaper. The AKP is Turkey’s Islamic-rooted ruling party.

    What got Taner Akçam into trouble was an op-ed he wrote in Taraf titled “Seeking Milosevic” that attacked Birgün. He took issue with Birgün’s headline news that the referendum had confirmed the 60% right-wing and 40% left-wing split in the country, and that the nationalist conservative votes had consolidated at the AKP. In what was a victory for the AKP, the referendum passed by a margin of 58%.

    By drawing an analogy between Birgün and Slobodan Milosevic of ex-Yugoslavia, Akçam implicitly accused the newspaper of supporting nationalistic, racist and genocidal sentiments.

    Neighborhood concept

    Taner Akçam couldn’t accept Birgün’s view that the 40% of the referendum voters, that had voted “no,” were really left-wing. Noting that mass-killer Slobodan Milosevic, while called a communist and a socialist, had done horrible things, he argued that likewise in Turkey those who voted “no” couldn’t be called true socialists. The naysayers were the main opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the military-bureaucracy faction. The latter had organized and defended military coups in Turkey, he argued.

    According to Akçam, labeling these groups “socialists,” as Birgün did, stemmed from a hatred of the AKP. Akçam called the 40% the “bourgeois group.” He maintained that this hatred is best explained through the “neighborhood” metaphor.

    In Akçam’s view, Turkey is founded on “our” and “other” neighborhoods. The first neighborhood is one of “city people” that includes bureaucrats, the military, and the like. The CHP and the Ottoman-era İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) are included in this group.

    The “other” neighborhood comprises artisans and peasants that have strong religious identities. This neighborhood is now expanding and encroaching on the “city people” neighborhood.

    Akçam sees himself in the “city people” neighborhood, which he calls “ours.”

    Contradiction and myopia

    But by doing so, Akçam fell into a gasping contradiction, because this is also the group that he labeled “bourgeoisie.” How could someone, with a well-known Marxist background, and calling himself a socialist, be part of the bourgeois group? (Separate from his self-confessed connection to the terrorist PKK organization during 1981-84, Akçam escaped from Turkish prison in 1977 after having been convicted of left-wing terrorist activities aimed at, among others, NATO military and American personnel).

    Surprisingly enough, Akçam supports the “other” neighborhood – the conservative, Islamic group solidly backed by Taraf. This is because he thinks this group has strong democratic credentials.

    It doesn’t take a professor’s prescience to know that such an argument is plain vacuous.

    With the AKP in control – political lords of the 60% group – Turkey today is far removed from democracy – the illegal wiretappings, indefinite detentions and imprisonment of the opponents (including 47 journalists) of the government, an atmosphere of fear permeating the country, mandatory religious education, widespread penetration of Gülenist elements in the state apparatus, in particular the police, appalling inequality between men and women, systematic efforts (re: the referendum) to bring the judiciary under the control of the government, parliamentary immunity, etc. None of these inequities seems to bother the professor.

    In Turkey today the press is under siege, and by Prime Minister’s own admission, “Those that are impartial [to the AKP] should be eliminated.” There are more detainees in prison than those convicted. Many detained under the so-called “Ergenekon case” don’t even know the exact charges against them.

    No scruples, and no loyalty

    Akçam’s contradictions and distortions also caught the attention of his younger brother Cahit Akçam. Responding to the elder Akçam in Birgün, Cahit Akçam couldn’t hide his scorn. In a blistering, two-part rebuttal titled “Really, you are the child of which neighborhood?” he chastised his brother, and mockingly called on him to come to his senses. His article started with a quotation (and an admonition) from Anton Chekhov: “Others’ sins do not make you a saint.”

    Cahit Akçam called the elder Akçam’s “our” vs. “other” neighborhood analysis, with “Marxist-smelling” questions, “light” and meaningless because it was not founded on class distinction. Neither neighborhood as described by Taner embraced the working class. Asking the rhetorical question as to how Taner could overlook the working class, the younger Akçam thought that his brother, in what appeared to be sheer hypocrisy, didn’t really care for the working class.

    Continued the younger brother sarcastically: “Luckily, Taner at least didn’t ignore the bourgeois class in ‘our’ neighborhood.” He chaffed at his brother for not mentioning the bourgeois class in the “other” neighborhood, i.e., the Islamist businessmen that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan had braggingly called “The Anatolian Tigers.”

    Wondering how his brother could not know that the bourgeois class cannot exist without a working class, Cahit mocked his brother: “He is a big professor. True, not a sociology professor, but a history professor nonetheless. He has licked and swallowed a thousand times more than we have. He knows that, to be so ignorant, one does not have to be a professor. For Taner, the working class has little value.”

    The elder Akçam was tersely reminded of the struggles of Turkey’s working class since 1900.

    Cahit continued his criticism by making reference to a Turkish metaphor – referring to lentil meal – that this is all that the Taner could muster as an argument. Referring to Taner’s claim that all the “infamous” events in Turkey’s history emanated from “our” class, he bristled at Taner’s suggestion that the socialists, through the CHP, were like relatives to the military- bureaucracy.

    He mockingly called attention to the fact that the socialists had suffered immensely from the 1980 fascistic military coup.

    Recalling how the elder Akçam had defended the causes of right-wing, fascist elements in Turkey’s recent history, how he had failed to come to the defense of socialists who had been falsely accused of coup attempts, his denialist past, and how he had let down even his own family, the younger Akçam weighed in angrily: “How can Taner accuse his old friends, and even his own brother, as potential perpetrators of genocide?”

    Barely concealing his disdain, Cahit asked of his brother: “As you place the blame on your own neighborhood, can there be a more harrowing psychological ruin [for you]?  … Where is your heart, and your conscience?”

    The ultimate indignity came when the younger Akçam concluded that only someone who was politically and ideologically blind, and someone who had lost his scruples and his sense of loyalty, could do what his brother had done.

    In the background of such emotional outburst was the fact that, while Taner Akçam jumped the prison in 1977 into the safety of Germany and escaped the tribulations of the 1980 military coup, in the coup’s aftermath his brother was put on trial for unauthorized activities, faced death by hanging, and was imprisoned for 8 years. Obviously, a lecture on fascism and the struggles of socialists was the last thing the younger Akçam wanted to hear from a sibling he considered unscruppled and untrustworthy.

    A revisionist professor

    There was more to Akçam’s false accusations. He twisted history and put finger on “our neighborhood’ as the perpetrator of the May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971) and – obliquely – September 12 (1980) military interventions in Turkey. Evidently to hide his own past, and the embarrassment therewith, in his accounting he glossed over the 1980 military coup and the events (including his role) that preceded it.

    He dallied further into the past and noted that his “neighborhood” was also responsible for the so-called “Armenian genocide” and the Dersim events (1937).

    But he was quick to disown any blame – a point that also drew ridicule from the younger Akçam. Instead, Taner Akçam conveniently placed the blame on “our administrators.” Socialists like him, while closely affiliated with the administrators, had deep disagreements with them. It was all the fault of the administrators, not the socialists like him, he argued.

    Nice scapegoat, these administrators were! All that exonerated Akçam and made him squeaky clean!

    As to why “we socialists” never faced up to the criminal acts in Turkish history, Akçam argued that animosity toward the “other” neighborhood was far more important than facing up to criminal acts. “Our culture was such that we [preferred to] blame the Armenians for cooperating with the imperialists while we were fighting our war of independence, and the Dersimians represented a backward and feudal system.”

    Then Akçam made his grandstand by calling on “our” neighborhood to face up to its crimes.

    In such argumentation Akçam conveniently dismissed the criminality of the Armenian gangs in the massacre of more than a half-million Moslems, the fatal blow that the Armenian rebellion had inflicted on the fighting ability of the Ottoman armies in wartime, and ignored the fact the Dersim episode was instigated by reactionary feudal lords that had conspired against the young Turkish republic.

    Akçam also chose not to mention the bloody 1993 Madimak episode in the Anatolian city of Sivas. A crowd of fanatic Islamists (from the “other” neighborhood), amid chants of “Allah-ü Ekber,” set fire to a hotel where a group of left-leaning intellectuals had assembled. In the ensuing mayhem 37 artists and writers lost their lives.

    Akçam’s analysis of past events is the hallmark of an academician who follows a one-track, necessarily biased, approach to historical events.

    In his call to confront one’s criminal history, Akçam should turn the tables and first ask the Armenians and “other” neighborhood to confront their criminality. Why, for example, are the Armenian archives in Yerevan and Boston closed while all Turkish ones open? What are the Armenians hiding?

    And when will the likes of the “Madimak crowd” see the light of Enlightenment?

    Summing it up

    The Taraf-Birgün episode raised the specter of a history professor who, by the reckoning of his own brother, was long in false accusations but short in scruples and trustworthiness. The episode also caught the professor in contradictions and brought to light his biased, one-track approach to traumatic events in Turkish history in the past 100 years.

    Will all this make any difference as regards Akçam’s credibility as a scholar for the Armenian money masters who sponsor his academic career – like the Zoryan Institute and the Cafesjian Family Foundation when Akçam was at the University of Minnesota, and now the Arams, the Kaloosdians and the Mugars at Clark University? Considering that the professor’s criminal past has so far made no difference, the answer must be a firm “no.” Obviously, the professor is serving a useful – in fact very useful – purpose for the Armenian lobby.

    It must be a wondrous world when the “golden” Armenian coffers can sustain an academic chair in history when, as in Akçam’s case, the holder of that chair happens to have his degree in sociology.

    In fact, we should not be too surprised if the spinmasters of the Armenian lobby call on their “prince charming” to come to the aid of the Armenian mob charged last month with the largest Medicare fraud in U.S. history. Could the professor argue that the mob job was actually the “dirty work” of the Turks? Never say “no.”

    To rephrase his brother’s question, in which “neighborhood” does Taner Akçam stand when it comes to truth?

    Surely, the professor must be able to answer that question himself without help from his old-time mentor, Professor Vahakn Dadrian.

    A deeper question is, why Akçam-the-professor would write in a newspaper such as Taraf which has a reputation of acting as a rogue agent of the government on unsubstantiated allegations relating to the opposition, and whose executive editor, Ahmet Altan, in his own words, would be willing to sell out his country “for a woman’s breast and the shade of a cherry tree.” …. But that would be a different story.

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    Addendum: The above article was first submitted (as an exception) to “Armenian Genocide Resource Center,” .  Initially, the host welcomed the article and published it as an “exclusive” on its website. Half a day later the post was mysteriously removed from the website. Query as to why it was removed elicited no satisfactory response.

  • Armenia engagement derailing Turkey’s energy policy

    Armenia engagement derailing Turkey’s energy policy

    by Ferruh Demirmen

    Türksam, December 9, 2009

    (Turkish Center for International Relations & Strategic Analysis)

    A misconceived engagement with Armenia has boomeranged beyond diplomacy to impact Turkey’s energy policy. The developments so far are already worrying, and further negative consequences may follow. Turkey’s energy policy is held hostage, and the culprit is a short-sighted Armenia rapprochement that has ignored Azerbaijan’s legitimate concerns on Nagorno-Karabakh.

    While some may view the energy “fallout” as a case of “unintended consequences” for Turkey,  the effects could have been foreseen easily.

    Background

    The secret, Switzerland-based Turkish-Armenian normalization process that surfaced in April 2009 in the aftermath of President Obama’s visit to Turkey, albeit launched with good intentions, turned out to be a disappointment for the Turkish side. The “road map” that was announced had a glaring omission: trustworthy preconditions or commitments requisite for normalization of bilateral relations.

    In particular, there was no assurance that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, vital for Azerbaijan, would be resolved before opening the Turkey-Armenia border. Baku was concerned, and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations soured.

    The two Turkish-Armenian protocols later initialed on August 31 and signed on October 10 confirmed the absence of any caveat on Nagorno-Karabakh, and further alienated Azerbaijan.

    For the better part of 2009 Turkey has been trying to placate Azerbaijan, with promises that it will not open the Turkey-Armenia border unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is first resolved.

    The promise is like a double-edged sword. If Turkey reneges on its promise to Azerbaijan, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations will receive a serious, possibly fatal blow. If Turkey keeps its promise, and Turkish-Armenian normalization fails as a result, Turkey will be criticized in the West for being insincere or manipulative on Armenia “opening.” Armenian “genocide” allegations in the US Congress will come to the forefront again. April 24, 2010 is not too far ahead.

    In either case, unless the Armenian parliament refuses to ratify the normalization protocols before the Turkish parliament does, Turkey will be the loser.

    That will be the price paid for an ill-conceived political process. Armenia has made it clear repeatedly that it sees no linkage between the normalization process and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So, Turkey is facing a major quandary.

    At present, neither Turkey nor Armenia has submitted the protocols to their respective parliaments for ratification. The fate of the normalization process will hang heavily on the actions of the two parliaments. But for Turkey, and the West in general, some energy projects are at stake.

    The fallout on energy

    From energy point of view, worsening Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, if not stemmed, will come at a heavy price for Turkey. Alarmed at the Turkish-Armenian normalization talks conducted behind his back, an angry and resentful Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, announced in May that, if forced, Azerbaijan would resort to military force to recapture the Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh territory it lost to Armenia in 1994. (See also recent analysis, ref. 1)

    Aliyev had the sympathy of Turkey and a host of other nations and several UN resolutions to back him up, but that was not enough. Peace talks mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group were also not producing palpable results. (Armenian-Azeri talks in Munich in late November were also inconclusive, ref. 1).

    To give credibility to his warning, or threat, Aliyev decided to play the gas card as a strategic tool. Partnership with Russia, at least on energy initially, was the strategy he had in mind. And Russia, given the opportunity to exploit the South Caucuses conflict, was more than willing to appear cooperative.

    The gas card Aliyev was mulling over was the Shah Deniz gas lying below the bed of the Caspian Sea. Aliyev was already unhappy over the prolonged, yet unresolved, dispute with Turkey over the price of Shah Deniz-1 gas that Turkey had been importing since July 2007. The price of gas was up for negotiation in April 2008, but discussions had reached a deadlock. Aliyev complained that Turkey was paying, at $120/1000 m3, one-third of the market price for gas, and Turkey’s counter offers were not high enough.

    On June 29, Russia’s Gazprom and Azerbaijan’s state-owned company Socor signed a gas agreement in Baku in the presence of respective presidents. The agreement stipulated that, starting in 2010, Gazprom would buy Azeri gaz, including, apparently, Shah Deniz-2 gas when it becomes available (currently in 2015). This would be the first time in Azerbaijan’s history that Azeri gas would be exported to Russia.

    The gas volume initially involved was small (annually 500 million m3), but it was announced that the volume would increase in future. Gazprom would have the right of first refusal on additional supplies of gas when available. The agreement paved the way for a broad Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation that could possibly extend beyond gas.

    The June 29 deal received further endorsement in Baku on October 14.

    The Russian-Azerbaijani accord was a clear message to Turkey, and the West in general, from Aliyev that Azerbaijan would keep its options open as far as exporting its gas from the planned Shah Deniz Phase-2 development. This cast doubt not only on future Shah Deniz-2 gas supplies to Turkey, but also on Azeri gas supplies to the planned west-bound Nabucco project that Turkey had boastfully committed itself to in Ankara on July 13 (ref. 2).

    To export its gas, Azerbaijan is now pursuing other options that circumvent Turkish territory: a subsea line in the Black Sea running from Georgia to Romania (White Stream project), tanker transport of compressed gas from Georgia to Bulgaria, and a swap or direct gas sale deal with Iran. Preliminary agreements have been signed on all of these. The existing pipeline connections with Iran and Russia would facilitate Russia and Iran options.

    Broader implications

    Turkey’s ill-founded Armenia engagement process, lacking any meaningful preconditions, is derailing Turkey’s energy policy. A distrustful Azerbaijan has now moved closer to Russia, and Shah Deniz-2 gas exports to Turkey for its domestic needs, as well as for onward transit to Europe via the planned Nabucco pipeline, are put in jeopardy.

    Import of Turkmen gas via a future Trans-Caspian pipeline, that could also feed the Nabucco pipeline, is also at risk. For Turkmen gas to reach Turkey via the Trans-Caspian pipeline, Azerbaijan’s cooperation is essential.

    Turkey needs Azeri gas in excess of the currently imported Shah Deniz-1 gas to diversify its gas supply sources and routes. Currently there is excessive (some 60%) dependence on Russian gas supplies for Turkey’s domestic needs.

    Despite its shortcomings, Nabucco project is still a vital project for Turkey both from energy and political point of view (ref. 2). If Nabucco does not receive throughput from Azeri or Turkmen sources, Turkey’s long-avowed strategic position as an energy corridor to the West will be seriously compromised.

    Public outcry stemming from alienation from the brotherly Azeri nation is also a price that Turkish policy makers must consider.

    The above considerations leave no doubt that the Ankara-Baku rift should be mended. The sooner the better. The onus of this burden rests mainly on Turkey, not Azerbaijan. Otherwise Azerbaijan will move even closer to Russia, and Turkey may have to do without new Azeri (Shah Deniz-2) gas supplies. That would be rather unfortunate.

    While it would entail a higher cost, Azerbaijan has options to export its gas without transiting Turkish territory.

    Aliyev has indicated a number of times that Azerbaijan is interested in the Nabucco project, but unless Turkey is more accommodating, that interest may go nowhere.

    All indications are that Turkey has overplayed its hand as far as its geographic position as an energy conduit, and has also stonewalled too long to meet reasonable Azeri requests for a gas price that closely reflects market conditions.

    Turkey should not be seen as being obstructionist for the implementation of the Nabucco project. In this connection, the possible ramifications of Turkey’s support for the rival South Stream project during the August 6 Russia-Turkey-Italy energy summit in Ankara were not lost on the EU, and may dampen the EU’s interest in Nabucco.

    It is telling that Austrian OMV (the flag-bearer for Nabucco), Italian ENI and French EDF have signed preliminary agreements with Gazprom recently about joint implementation of the South Stream project. In the light of these developments, one wonders whether the EU’s support for Nabucco is as good as before, and whether Turkey’s apparent wavering on Nabucco is playing a role. The financing problem of Nabucco is also at a standstill.

    Another fallout from strained Turkish-Azerbaijani relations could be the curtailment of the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) throughput, with some of the crude diverted to the Russian and Georgian ports of Novorossiysk and Supsa, respectively. Lukoil, ExxonMobil and Devon, shareholders of AIOC (Azerbaijan International Oil Company) but not the BTC consortium, are already using these routes to export their entitlements from the ACG (Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli) field in Azerbaijan.

    Export of Kazakh crude through the BTC could also be delayed or blocked. An ominous sign in this respect comes from the Russian-Kazakh oil transit agreement signed in Yalta on November 20. The agreement signaled support for the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, which Russia, at Turkey’s strong urging, recently endorsed. Samsun-Ceyhan will undermine plans to export Kazakh oil through a trans-Caspian pipeline link to the BTC.

    An irony for the US

    As a footnote to the above, it is also worth observing an irony in Turkey’s “opening” to Armenia. It is no secret that US pressure, in particular the urging of President Obama in person, played a key role in launching the Armenia engagement process. Yet, the process has not only damaged the close Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership, it has drawn Azerbaijan into Russia’s orbit of influence. This runs counter to the long-established US policy of weaning Soviet-era Turkic republics from Russia’s sphere of influence, in particular on energy.

    The maxim, “unintended consequences,”  describes this situation well for the US.

    Concluding remarks

    An ill-conceived political normalization process undertaken with Armenia has pushed a nervous Azerbaijan closer to Russia and has driven this small nation to seek alternative gas export options that circumvent Turkish territory. Future Azeri, and in the longer term Turkmen, gas imports to Turkey are jeopardized.

    Some of the throughput to the BTC may be diverted, and plans to channel Kazakh oil to the BTC may be cancelled or postponed indefinitely.

    In parallel, Turkey’s role to act as an energy corridor to the West is compromised.

    The energy projects impacted are all important for Turkey. If for no other reason than to safeguard these projects, it is vitally important that the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are put back where they belong, and where they traditionally have been: good, friendly terms.

    Despite rosy statements from Turkish government circles, Turkish-Azeri relations are severely strained. Rapprochement with Armenia should not come at the expense of brotherly relations with Azerbaijan.

    Turkish policy makers who now claim the Turkey-Armenia border would not be opened until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, should answer the question: If that were to be so, why did the normalization protocols signed with Armenia not contain the requisite precondition in the first place? It is no secret that the Armenia engagement started under external pressures, both from the US and the EU.

    The adverse energy-related effects stemming from the ill-conceived Armenia normalization process were no surprise, and could have been foreseen in advance.

    Those who are entrusted to lead the nation should be cognizant of the fact that one-sided foreign-policy initiatives that are launched without due consideration of underlying risks can have boomerang effects that may undermine national energy interests.

    If the rift in energy cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan deepens, in a sense it will be a betrayal of the legacy of the late Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev, who, with resolute determination, championed the realization of the BTC project despite many roadblocks. Turkey will bear the lion’s share of responsibility for this state of affairs.

    Separate from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the Armenia normalization process has ignored other legitimate concerns that are important for Turkey (ref. 3).

     A far-sighted national energy policy requires vision, foresight and perseverance. Whether Turkey’s policy makers have these traits, the readers should ponder.

     References cited

    (1)   “Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations in Munich and the possibility of war,” by Sinan Oğan, Türksam, Nov. 23, 2009.

    (2)   “Nabucco: A challenge for EU and a partially fulfilled promise for Turkey,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Eurasia Critic, September 2009.

    (3)   “Current Turkish ‘opening’ to Armenia cannot be supported,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Turkish Forum, October 9, 2009.

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