Author: Aylin D. Miller

  • ECHR GRAND CHAMBER VERDICT OF OCTOBER 15, 2015 : PROS & CONS

    ECHR GRAND CHAMBER VERDICT OF OCTOBER 15, 2015 : PROS & CONS

    A comprehensive evaluation by Ergϋn KIRLIKOVALI,

    November 16, 2015

    Abstract:  On October 15, 2015, Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR or “the Court”) delivered its  judgment  in the case of Perinçek v. Switzerland ,application no. 27510/08 ( “the verdict” .)   By a majority, 17 judges held that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights, perpetrated by Switzerland.  By its criminal conviction of a Turkish politician (Perinçek) for publicly expressing his views on Swiss soil, regarding the “Turkish-Armenian Conflict,” Switzerland breached Dr. Perinçek’s right to free speech.  Dr. Perinçek stated that the mass deportations and massacres suffered by the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the following years had not amounted to genocide.  The ruling is nothing less than a spectacular legal victory for Dr. Perinçek, Turkey, and Turks around the world and a game-changer.

     

    Now that the initial feedback and reflexive reactions are over, perhaps we can take a more composed look at this milestone of a legal verdict.  The verdict with its 300 paragraphs, conclusions, and dissenting opinions, each of which could easily inspire a long article like this, would perhaps be more suited for a book later on.  I shall, therefore, confine my analysis to the press release issued by the Registrar of the Court, marked ECHR 325 (2015) and dated 15.10.2015, which is an excellent summation of the verdict.  Still, there are so many aspects to consider, that I decided to number and title each one of them for easier comprehension, quick reminders, and future reference.  Let me start with house-keeping facts and then gradually move on to thought-provoking findings.  I also took the liberty, for your enjoyment, to grade each fact and/or finding as pro or con for Armenians and/or Turks.

    1. It is final: There are no more appeals or higher courts. This is it.  Grand Chamber judgments are final (Article 44 of the European Convention on Human Rights .)  All final judgments are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of their execution. (Grade: Good  for Turks and others who are fed up with incessant Armenian propaganda.)
    1. It holds the lower court’s ruling of December 17, 2013:    The Grand Chamber of ECHR agrees with lower court and this is “the law of the land” now.  As Americans like to put it, there is a new sheriff in town and he says disputing an opinion (such as the Armenian allegations of genocide) is an exercise of freedom of speech, which right is protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  It fine-tunes the “denial laws” and teaches Switzerland (and the rest of the world) that only “genocides supported by the verdict of a competent court” shall benefit from the protection afforded by the “denial laws.”  That is, while the Jewish Holocaust, Rwanda, and Srebrenica are protected because they are court-proven genocides, the Armenian claim of genocide is not protected because it remains an “opinion.”  Disputing an opinion is not hate speech, as Armenian lobbies insist; it is an exercise in freedom of speech.  (Grade:  Bad for Armenians.)
    1. Civilized Dialogue:  ECHR verdict checks a hundred years of  Armenian arrogance, deception, and lawlessness, all masquerading as “sole and blameless victims” of a complex and tragic conflict,  dubbed “Genocide” in mid-1960s, i.e. 50 years after the event, purely for political reasons.  In case you missed, the verdict also makes the way forward crystal clear: civilized dialogue based on facts, honesty, and fairness; not propaganda, censorship, bias, or bigotry.   Now, we will be able to hear the other side of the story and get a fuller understanding of the complex history of 1915.  We will be able to grieve for all human suffering jointly, without dividing and segregating the victims into camps based on their faith, ethnicity, race, language, or nationality.  No more “selective morality” leaving out the archives showing blatant Armenian complicity and guilt.  No more ignoring  Turkish and other Muslim suffering at the hands of Armenian revolutionaries, while exaggerating Armenian suffering by ridiculously manipulating demographic data in total disregard for even the most basic rules of mathematics.  No more perception management by stereotyping, intimidating, silencing, and censoring.  No more one-sided editorials in New York Times, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and other big media; or passing political resolutions dictating a certain view on history, in defiance of critical thinking.  No more glut of one-sided “academic” books ignoring half the story.   (Grade: Good for Turks, bad for Armenians)
    1.  “Dignity and identity of modernday Armenians”:  ECHR press release says: ” Being aware of the great importance attributed by the Armenian community to the question whether those mass deportations and massacres were to be regarded as genocide, the European Court of Human Rights held that the dignity of the victims and the dignity and identity of modernday Armenians were protected by Article 8 (right to respect for private life) of the Convention. ”  This statement is in favor of Armenian community, although it seems to unfairly single out Armenian suffering while ignoring Turkish and other Muslim suffering.  What about the “Dignity and identity of modernday Turks and other Muslims”, like my father’s folks in the village of KIRLIKOVA and my Mother’s in Skopje, and millions of others in the Balkans and the Caucasus, who also suffered greatly from forced marches and starvation and epidemics and wars, at the same time period?  What about the 518,000 Muslims, mostly Turkish, who met their tragic end at the hands of Armenian revolutionaries?  This matter remains the crux of the “Turkish-Armenian Conflict.” (Grade:  Good for Armenians.)
    1. “Protect(ing) the rights of the Armenian community”:  ECHR press release says the judges strived to strike a balance between two Convention rights: freedom of expression and respect for private life.  “The Court concluded that it had not been necessary, in a democratic society, to subject Dr. Perinçek’s to a criminal penalty in order to protect the rights of the Armenian community at stake in the case.”   One cannot help but ask whether the rights of the Armenian community really need protecting by such preferential treatment, bordering on religious discrimination.  What about the rights of Muslims, mostly Turks, during WWI—and Azeris more recently, in 1992-1994 when they were expelled from their homes in Karabagh at gunpoint by Armenians?   This language, it seems, needs work to include all deserving parties. (Grade:  Good for Armenians.)
    1. No more censorship hiding behind the false claims of hate speech:    The Court finds that Mr Dr. Perinçek’s statements “did not amount to a call for hatred or intolerance.”   This ECHR decision is definitely a huge win for the contra-genocide scholars, as one of the major harassment techniques used by the Armenians has always been labeling  responsible opposing views as “hate speech and intolerance.”  This way, the Armenians were able to censor dissent, cancel speaking engagements  by well-informed critics of the Armenian claim of genocide, stop the publishing of scholarly books by university publishing houses, and/or smear the academic record of scholars.  This door is closed now for Armenians.  (Grade:  Bad for Armenians.)
    1. Dissenting speech does not justify a criminal law response:   ECHR-Grand Chamber adds:  “…The context in which they were made had not caused heightened tensions in Switzerland and the statements could not be seen as affecting the dignity of the members of the Armenian community requiring a criminal law response in Switzerland…”  That means, now, the victims of Armenian intimidation will be able to seek legal redress and base their move on this very ECHR decision.  (Grade:  negative for Armenians and Switzerland.)   There was no international law obliging Switzerland to criminalize statements opposing the Armenian claims of genocide and the Swiss courts “appeared to have censured Dr. Perinçek’s simply for voicing an opinion that diverged from the established ones in Switzerland ; and the interference with his right to freedom of expression had taken the serious form of a criminal conviction.”  While Switzerland is  rebuked and reprimanded severely here for needlessly censoring free speech, the message is to the entire world, especially those who seek proliferation of “denial laws” to control thought and speech,  that  censoring “opinion that diverged from the established ones” is not acceptable.  This is a remarkable indirect warning to big media, especially the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, and the Washington Post  which are notorious for censoring responsible opposing views on the Turkish-Armenian Conflict.  (Grade: Good for Turks and friends.)
    1. An arduous legal odyssey that exculpates dissenters in one fell swoop:  The applicant, 73-year-old Doğu Perinçek, is a Turkish national, an Ankara resident, holder of a doctor of laws degree, and chairs the Turkish Workers’ Party.  In 2005 Dr. Perinçek’s participated in three public events in Switzerland, in the course of which he expressed the view that the mass deportations and massacres suffered by the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire from 1915 onwards had not amounted to genocide. At a press conference held in May 2005 in Lausanne, Dr. Perinçek’s stated that “the allegations of the ‘Armenian genocide’ are an international lie… (I)mperialists from the West and from Tsarist Russia were responsible for the situation boiling over between Muslims and Armenians. The Great Powers, which wanted to divide the Ottoman Empire, provoked a section of the Armenians, with whom we had lived in peace for centuries, and incited them to violence.”  At a conference held in July 2005 in Opfikon to commemorate the Lausanne peace treaty of 1924, concluding the First World War for Turkey, Dr. Perinçek’s stated that “the Armenian problem … did not even exist”, and handed out written statements in which he denied that the events of 1915 and the following years had constituted genocide.  Lastly, at a rally of the Turkish Workers’ Party held in Köniz in September 2005, Dr. Perinçek’s stated that “the Soviet archives confirm that at the time there were occurrences of ethnic conflict, slaughter and massacres between Armenians and Muslims. But Turkey was on the side of those defending their homeland and the Armenians were on the side of the imperialist powers and their instruments … (T)here was no genocide of the Armenians in 1915.”  This is more or less what we have been saying and writing for decades; only now, we have the stamp of approval by ECHR that our position is not hate speech and it is an exercise freedom of thought and expression. (Grade:  Good for Turks; bad for Armenians and other “thought police”.)
    1. Delusional Armenian arrogance hits the wall of law… and reality:  The Switzerland-Armenia Association (SAA)  filed a criminal complaint against Dr. Perinçek on account of the statement made at the first event. The investigation was later expanded to cover the two other oral statements as well. On 9 March 2007 the Lausanne District Police Court found him guilty of the offence under Article 261 bis § 4 of the Swiss Criminal Code, holding in particular that his motives appeared to be racist and nationalistic and that his statements did not contribute to the historical debate. The court ordered him to pay 90 day-fines of 100 Swiss francs each, suspended for two years, a fine of 3,000 Swiss francs, which could be replaced by 30 days’ imprisonment, and 1,000 Swiss francs in compensation to the Switzerland-Armenia Association for non-pecuniary damage. Thanks to this ill-advised act of greed and arrogance by SAA, today we are enjoying the protection of our rights to freedom of speech, afforded by the verdict.    (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Armenians.)
    1. Dr. Perinçek’s appeals: He asks that the Swiss judgment be set aside and additional investigative measures taken to establish the state of research and the positions of historians on the events of 1915 and the following years.  Here is how things develop after this point: The Criminal Cassation Division of the Vaud Cantonal Court (Switzerland) dismisses the appeal on 13 June 2007. The Swiss Federal Court dismisses a further appeal by Dr. Perinçek in its judgment of 12 December 2007.  Dr. Perinçek protests that his criminal conviction and punishment for having spoken his mind had been in breach of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10.  He also complains relying on Article 7 (no punishment without law), that the wording of Article 261 bis § 4 of the Swiss Criminal Code was too vague. (For instance, it does not differentiate between fact and opinion; genocides supported by a court-verdict and opinions held by a segment of society.)   The application is lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 10 June 2008. In a judgment of 17 December 2013 a Chamber of the Court holds, by five votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention by the Swiss courts.  The Swiss Government, although promises the Turkish government not to pursue this matter any further, reneges on  its promise and requests that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 (referral to the Grand Chamber), and on 2 June 2014 the panel of the Grand Chamber accepts that request. A Grand Chamber hearing is held on 28 January 2015.  (Grade:  Bad for Swiss Government and Armenians, good for Turks.)
    1. Everyone gets in on the final act:   In the Grand Chamber proceedings, third-party comments are received from:    11.1) the Turkish Government, who had exercised their right to intervene in the case (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention);    11.2) the Armenian and French Governments, who had been given leave to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2);     11.3) The Armenian Government are in addition given leave to take part in the hearing.      11.4) Non-governmental organizations and persons: (a)the Switzerland-Armenia Association; (b) the Federation of the Turkish Associations of French-speaking Switzerland; (c) the Coordinating Council of the Armenian Organizations in France (“CCAF”); (d) the Turkish Human Rights Association, the Truth Justice Memory Centre and the International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies; (e) the International Federation for Human Rights (“FIDH”);  (f) the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (“LICRA”); (g) the Centre for International Protection; and (h) a group of French and Belgian academics.  (Grade:  Good for the truth.)
    1. Delicate language by ECHR about legal meaning of the term genocide:   The Court states that “it was not required to determine whether the massacres and mass deportations suffered by the Armenian people at the hands of the Ottoman Empire from 1915 onwards could be characterized as genocide within the meaning of that term under international law; unlike the international criminal courts, it had no authority to make legally binding pronouncements on this point.”  Please note, the UN Convention of 1948 requires that a competent court taken on a genocide case, go through due process, and prove “intent to destroy” before coming to a genocide verdict.  So, ECHR-Grand Chamber is right in saying that it had no authority to make legally binding pronouncements on this point.  Please also note that while the highest court in Europe respects the need for a “competent court” to make a genocide decision, Armenian advocates and their supports have no need for law as they freely pass a judgment on 1915 events every day, calling it genocide.  If they will decide on such controversies, then why do we need the International Court of Justice established (ICJ) by the UN?  Genocide proponents need to learn to respect law.  I thank the court for teaching a lesson to the genocide-pushers in respecting legal definitions, competent courts, due process, proof of intent, and other legal aspects.  (Grade:  Good for all.)
    1. Unanimous ECHR agreement on Switzerland’s violation of free speech:  The court agrees Mr Dr. Perinçek’s conviction and punishment, together with the order to pay compensation to the SAA,  had constituted an intrusion in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10. The Court does not find that the interference is justifiable “under Article 16 of the Convention, which provides that nothing in Article 10 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens. Article 16 had never been applied by the Court. It had to be borne in mind that clauses that permitted interference with Convention rights had to be interpreted restrictively. The Court found that Article 16 should be interpreted as only capable of authorizing restrictions on activities which directly affected the political process, which had not been the case here.”  Translation:  If you believe the political activity of some will affect the entire political process negatively, then you can be justified in restricting them without worrying about their free speech rights.  Switzerland, thus, tries to hide their blatant violation under Article 16, which the Court does not buy.  (Grade:  Nice try, Switzerland, but you get an “F” in this test.  Go study your laws harder and come back for a make-up test.  Result:  Bad for Switzerland and Armenians; good for Turks.)
    1. Could the Swiss Court’s action be motivated by “prevention of disorder”? The Grand Chamber agrees with the lower Chamber that the interference with Mr Dr. Perinçek’s free speech ” had been prescribed by law within the meaning of Article 10 § 2. The Court finds that Dr. Perinçek’s could reasonably have foreseen that his statements might result in criminal liability under Swiss law. As regards the question whether the interference had pursued a legitimate aim, the Court was not satisfied that it had been necessary for the ‘prevention of disorder’.” In other words, Swiss action is not justified on grounds that public disorder might erupt if Mr. Dr. Perinçek’s free speech is not restricted and punished. (Grade:  Again, nice try, Switzerland, but you get another “F” in this test. Go study the laws harder and re-take this test.)
    1. Could the Swiss Court’s action be motivated by ” protection of the rights of others “?  Like the lower Chamber, the Grand Chamber of the Court finds ” that the interference could be regarded as having been intended ‘for the protection of the … rights of others’ within the meaning of Article 10 § 2.”  After all,  the court declares, “…many of the descendants of the victims of the events of 1915 and the following years, especially in the Armenian diaspora, constructed their identity around the perception that their community had been the victim of genocide.” The Court thus accepted that the interference with Mr Dr. Perinçek’s rights had been intended to protect that identity and thus the dignity of present-day Armenians.”  Translation:  Because Armenians take the genocide claim seriously, maybe Dr. Perinçek’s should have expected that his free speech would be restricted on Swiss soil, out of Switzerland’s respect for Armenian dignity.  I respectfully and strongly disagree with the Grand Chamber on this, because protests against some fanatic groups, even terrorist organizations, could be silenced under such an interpretation.  (Grade: Good for Armenians.)
    1. Had the interference been “necessary in a democratic society” under Article 10 § 2?   the Court clarifies that it was not required to determine whether the criminalization of the denial of genocide or other historical facts might in principle be justified. At this point, may I remind you the Appel de Blois of 2007 when a group of prominent French historians led the world intellectuals and scholars in taking a stand against “memory laws” and “memory police”.  The freedom of historical debate had came under serious attack—mostly by promoters of the alleged Armenian genocide who were intent on stifling free and open debate by forcing upon the public only a single version of partisan history and banning all responsible opposing views.  The Court here is simply saying “We were not asked if the memory laws are good or bad.”  (Grade:  Good for the truth.)
    1. ECHR narrows the task to a balancing act and focuses on it:   The court says “It was only in a position to review whether or not the application of Article 261 bis § 4 of the Swiss Criminal Code in Mr Dr. Perinçek’s case had been in conformity with Article 10.  In the light of the Court’s case-law, the dignity of Armenians was protected under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court was thus faced with the need to strike a balance between two Convention rights (EK’s note: free speech versus dignity of victims) , taking into account the specific circumstances of the case (EK’s note:  Armenian identity, passion, and fanaticism) and the proportionality between the means used (EK’s note:  restricting free speech)  and the aim sought to be achieved (EK’s note: to prevent public disorder). In examining the nature of Mr Dr. Perinçek’s statements, the Court did not seek to establish whether they could properly be characterized as genocide denial or justification for the purposes of the Swiss Criminal Code. That question was for the Swiss courts to determine.”  (Grade:  Bad for Switzerland, good for the free speech, scholarship, and truth.)
    1. Perinçek attack was on “imperialists” and their tools, not Armenians loyal to their  state:    The Court decides that Perinçek ” had not expressed contempt or hatred for the victims of the events of 1915, noting that Turks and Armenians had lived in peace for centuries. He had not called the Armenians liars, used abusive terms with respect to them, or attempted to stereotype them.” (But Armenians do defame and stereotype Turks  all the time; Armenian literature is replete with degrading comments for Turks.  The court needs to strike a balance here, too, in future.)  The Court says “His strongly worded allegations had been directed against the “imperialists” (EK’s note: Mainly Russia, Britain, France, and the U.S.) and their allegedly insidious designs with respect to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.”  (Grade:  Good for Turks; bad for Armenians.)
    1. The Court separates, again, court-proven Holocaust from popular-opinion of Genocide:   Here is the exact language:  “While in cases concerning statements in relation to the Holocaust, the Court had – for historical and contextual reasons – invariably presumed that they could be seen as a form of incitement to racial hatred, it did not consider that the same could be done in this case. The context did not require automatically to presume that Mr Dr. Perinçek’s statements relating to the 1915 events promoted a racist and antidemocratic agenda, and there was not enough evidence that this had been the case.”   Furthermore, I have the benefit of another ECHR verdict on yet another  Article 10 case, where ECHR punished a comedian for his statements on Jews and Holocaust.  I am, of course, referring to the M’BALA vs France case decided on October 20, 2015.  Thus, within a span of days, as if to drive the point how, the ECHR taught all of us an vital lesson that denying Holocaust is hate speech and punishable by the denial law while disagreeing with the opinion of Armenian of genocide is an exercise of freedom of speech, therefore, not punishable by the same denial law.  This stark contrast should be clear by now to even the most ardent supporter of Armenian claims.    (Grade:  Good for Turks; bad for Armenians.)
    1. Dr. Perincek was a member of Talaat Pasha Committee (TPC); so what?   This statement by ECHR is another striking part of the landmark verdict.  “The Swiss courts had referred to the fact that he was a self-professed follower of Talaat Pasha, who was historically the initiator of the massacres of 1915.”  (EK’s note:  Please note; the second half of this statement happens to be presumptuous.  First, massacres were not the work of the Ottoman government, even though some in government’s employ may have been involved.  To call them “Armenian massacres” is to ignore Armenian excesses committed by Armenian revolutionaries.  The correct term should be “mutual massacres”  or “Turkish-Armenian irregular warfare”, as they were, at least  in part, due to retaliation motives perpetrated to exact revenge on the Armenians for previous Armenian cruelty on Muslims. Honesty, fairness, and balance are needed here. Second, Talaat Pasha initiated the TERESET—short for “temporary relocation”—for homeland security reasons and as a wartime military measure, not massacres. There is extensive documentation in the Ottoman archives, which the genocide advocates conveniently ignore, that the Ottoman government tried its best to conduct an orderly TERESET.)  Back to the ECHR quote:  “However, the Swiss courts had not elaborated on this point, and there was no evidence that Dr. Perinçek’s membership in the so-called Talaat Pasha Committee had been driven by a wish to vilify the Armenians.”  There it is, set in stone, that one’s membership in the TPC is not grounds to automatically blame one for “vilifying Armenians”, like the Armenian lobbyists almost always do.  The witch hunt associated with TPC members, the stigma cultivated for membership in TPC, and all other similar intimidation tactics must be abandoned by the Armenian camp now or face the consequences in court to be humiliated with verdicts in support of freedom of speech.  (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Armenians.)
    1. In the Court’s opinion,  Dr. Perinçek’s statements are not hate speech: The Court decides that Dr. Perinçek’s statements, “read as a whole and taken in their immediate and wider context, could not be seen as a call for hatred, violence or intolerance towards the Armenians.”  Given the public interest in this matter,  the Court concluded, “Dr. Perinçek’s statements were entitled to heightened protection under Article 10, and that the Swiss authorities had only had a limited room for maneuver (“margin of appreciation”) to interfere with them.”  Translation:  Swiss authorities must let the guy speak his mind on a matter of controversy that is also of public interest.  The Swiss should not interfere with free speech on “the Turkish-Armenian conflict”,  especially in view of the historical experience of a Convention State concerned by a complaint under Article 10 was particularly relevant with regard to the Holocaust.  (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Armenians.)
    1. “Holocaust denial, even if dressed up as impartial historical research, implies anti-Semitism:  ECHR-Grand Chamber is, again, careful with the language:  “For the Court, the justification for making (Holocaust) denial a criminal offence lay in the fact that such denial, in the historical context of the States concerned, even if dressed up as impartial historical research, had to be considered as implying anti-democratic ideology and anti-Semitism. The Article 10 cases concerning Holocaust denial examined by the Court had been brought against Austria, Belgium, Germany and France. The Court considered that Holocaust denial was especially dangerous in States which had experienced the Nazi horrors (EK’s note: mainly Austria, Belgium, Germany, Holland, and France, although almost every state in Europe felt it to varying degrees) and which could be regarded as having a special moral responsibility to distance themselves from the mass atrocities that they had perpetrated or abetted, by, among other things, outlawing their denial. (EK’s note:  This ECHR-language may need some work, as its reverse reading may suggest that Holocaust denial is not as dangerous in States which had not experienced the Nazi horrors.)  (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Armenians.)
    1. Swiss actions cannot be justified by the alleged situation of Armenians in Turkey:  The Court does not mince words when it comes to possible excuses used  for violating free speech rights in Switzerland.  “The Court did not consider that Dr. Perinçek’s criminal conviction in Switzerland could be justified by the situation in Turkey, whose Armenian minority was alleged to suffer from hostility and discrimination. (EK’s note:   Armenian citizens make up 0.1 percent of Turkey’s population, but are represented disproportionately by 0.5 percent of the Turkish parliament.  Compare this five-fold inflated representation Armenian-Turks to that of Turkish-Germans: 5 percent of Germany’s population represented by 1.1 percent of Bundestag, i.e. five-fold deflated  representation;  or Turkish-Americans; 0.1 percent of US population represented by zero percent of the US Congress. The claim that Armenians suffer hostility and discrimination is not supported by facts on the ground.)    “When convicting him, the Swiss courts had not referred to the Turkish context. While the hostility of some ultranationalist circles in Turkey towards the Armenians in that country could not be denied, (EK’s note:  Just like hostility of Nazis and other far-right Christian fundamentalists to Turks and other Muslims in Europe manifested as anti-Turkism—similar to anti-Semitism—and/or Islamophobia)… Europe   in particular in view of the assassination of the Turkish-Armenian writer and journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007, possibly on account of his views about the events of 1915 and the following years, (EK’s note: Overwhelming majority of Turks protested Dink’s murder from president on down to Turkish citizen on the main street.  Dink statement ignores Armenian terrorism from 1973 to 1994 which caused deaths of about 40 Turkish diplomats worldwide for which Armenians still show no noticeable or appreciable remorse.)  … this could hardly be regarded as a result of Dr. Perinçek’s statements in Switzerland.” (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Switzerland and  Armenians.)
    1. The Court rejects ‘Armenian sensitivity and dignity” arguments tabled by Switzerland:  The Courtrules against Switzerland on “Armenian sensitivity and dignity” issues:  “While the Court was aware of the immense importance attributed by the Armenian community to the question whether the tragic events of 1915 and the following years were to be regarded as genocide, it could not accept that  Dr. Perinçek’s statements at issue had been so wounding to the dignity of the Armenians as to require criminal law measures in Switzerland.”  (EK’s note:  While I accept that Armenians are sensitive about how 1915 events should be viewed, this sensitivity should not be allowed to blind all others to heretofore ignored and/or dismissed historical evidence that Armenians were engaged in armed and violent revolts (1862-1922), extremely bloody terrorism (1871-1922), and supreme treason as in joining invading enemy armies (1877-1922); and tortured and killed 518,000 Muslims, mostly Turks (1914-1922). “Turkish sensitivity and dignity” also must enter the picture for fairness and justice to be served.)  (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Switzerland and  Armenians.)
    1. Dr. Perinçek’s remarks describe, not defame or demonize, Armenians:   Here is another critical assessment by the Court:  ” (Dr. Perinçek) had referred to Armenians as ‘instruments’ of the ‘imperialist powers’, which could be seen as offensive. However, as could be seen from the overall tenor of his remarks, he did not draw from that conclusion that they had deserved to be subjected to atrocities or annihilation. Coupled with the amount of time that had elapsed since the events, this led the Court to the conclusion that his statements could not be seen as having the significantly upsetting effect sought to be attributed to them.”  (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Switzerland and  Armenians.)
    1. Denial laws are worded and applied differently across Europe, not single standard:  This point should be well understood by those who stubbornly still promote proliferation of denial laws.  If this Court finding is not sufficient for them to abandon their anti-free-speech agenda, then may I offer an excellent book by Guenter Lewy, Outlawing Genocide Denial (University Of Utah Press, 2014.)   “The Court observed that there was a wide spectrum of positions among the member States as regards legislation on the denial of historical events, from those States which did not criminalize such denial at all to those which only criminalized denial of the Holocaust or the denial of Nazi and communist crimes, and those which criminalized the denial of any genocide. The Court, acknowledging this diversity, did not consider that the comparative law perspective should play a significant part in its assessment, given that there were other factors with a significant bearing on the breadth of the applicable room for maneuver. It was nevertheless clear that Switzerland, with its criminalization of the denial of any genocide, (EK’s note:  whether a court-proven fact or a politically-motivated opinion) without the requirement that it be carried out in a manner likely to incite violence or hatred, stood at one end of the comparative spectrum. (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Switzerland and  Armenians.)
    1. No international treaty forcing Switzerland to impose criminal penalties on genocide denial:  The Court points out that there is no legal basis for the Swiss action:  ” (T)here were no international treaties in force with respect to Switzerland that required in clear and explicit language the imposition of criminal penalties on genocide denial as such. It was true that Article 261 bis § 4 of the Swiss Criminal Code had been enacted in connection with Switzerland’s accession to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). However, there was no indication that the clause which had served as the basis for  Dr. Perinçek’s conviction was specifically required under the CERD, or under other international law rules, whether treaty-based or customary.” (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Switzerland and  Armenians.)
    1. Criminal conviction of Dr. Perinçek’s  was one of the most serious forms of interference free speech:     The Court compares Swiss action with other cases under Article 10 and notes that Switzerland may have gone too far.  The Court finds that the interference with free speech had consisted of, for instance, a restriction on the dissemination of a publication. “The very fact that Dr. Perinçek’s had been criminally convicted was significant in that it was one of the most serious forms of interference with the right to freedom of expression.”  This is a clear embarrassment for Switzerland for which they have no one but themselves to blame.  The Swiss government had promised its Turkish counterpart that Switzerland would not appeal December 17, 2013 verdict by ECHR.  But then, they surrendered to Armenian political pressure (and possibly their covert anti-Turkism and Islamophobia) and reneged on their word by filing the appeal.  Look where this move got them: Switzerland not only lost face in the global arena, but also they lost the trust of the Turkish government.  How, do you think, would the latter behave if Switzerland “promised” to not do something else tomorrow?  Trust is a slippery thing.  (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Switzerland and  Armenians.)
    1. Conclusion: A lesson by the Court to Switzerland in democracy:  The Court’s language is crystal clear:  “Based on all of the above factors, the Court concluded that it had not been necessary, in a democratic society, to subject Dr. Perinçek’s to a criminal penalty in order to protect the rights of the Armenian community at stake in this case. There had accordingly been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. See paragraphs 255-57 of the judgment.”  (Grade: A severe embarrassment for Switzerland, owing to bowing to the arrogance and greed of the Swiss-Armenians who sued Perinçek.)  (Grade:  Good for Turks; embarrassing for Switzerland and bad for Armenians.)
    1. Other articles: Article 17 of the Convention (prohibition of abuse of rights):   The Court joins the question whether to apply Article 17 of the Convention (prohibition of abuse of rights) to its examination of the merits of the complaint under Article 10.  Article 17 allows the Court to reject an application if it judges that the applicant has relied on the provisions of the Convention to engage in an abuse of rights. “It followed from the Court’s finding under Article 10 that there were no grounds to apply Article 17.” Nice try Switzerland, but that wily move did not work, either.  (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Switzerland and  Armenians.)
    1. Other articles: Article 7:   Article 7 requires parties to undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  Majority decision by the Court is,  “…that the complaint under Article 7 amounted to a restatement of the claims under Article 10. There was therefore no need for a separate examination of that complaint.”   Another cunning move by Switzerland that fizzles out.  (Grade: Good for Turks; bad for Switzerland and Armenians.)
    1. Other articles: Article 41 (just satisfaction):   The Court holds, by a majority, “that the finding of a violation of Article 10 constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by Dr. Perinçek’s. The Court further dismissed, unanimously, the remainder of his claim for just satisfaction.”  (Grade: Bad for Turks; good for Switzerland and Armenians.)
    1. Dissenting opinions of the judges, for the record:

     

    Joint dissenting opinion: Silvis, Casadevall, Berro, Kūris, De Gaetano, Sicilianos, and Spielmann;

     

    1. Additional dissenting opinion: Silvis, Casadevall, Berro and Kūris;  Partly concurring/partly dissenting opinion: Nußberger;  Source: ECHR Registry Press release, non-binding to the  Court;  Decisions, judgments and further information about the Court can be found on www.echr.coe.int . (Grade:  Bad for Turks; Good for Armenians.)

    Conclusion:

    Switzerland violated the right of an individual to freedom of speech, just because he disagreed with the widely held opinion on a controversial, much-debated subject. Swiss authorities misinterpreted and misapplied a denial law that was meant for “court-proven” cases of genocide, such as the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, not unproven and much-debated claims like the alleged Armenian Genocide.  The latter is an opinion, not a court verdict.  Expressing dissent on an opinion, therefore, is not punishable by law.

    Future Trends:

    The Swiss authorities are looking at re-writing that denial law that embarrassed them.

    German Parliament has shelved indefinitely the second reading of yet another alleged Armenian genocide resolution.  Some Armenians are in denial, perhaps convinced by their perpetually losing attorneys, interpreting “the verdict” (October 15, 2015  verdict by the ECHR-Grand Chamber) as victory.  But that is harmless delusion.  After all, sooner or later even they will see that the runaway freight train that is “the verdict”  is about  to hit them hard when the Turkish NGOs and individuals start suing the state and federal governments that took fraudulent Armenian claims at face value to pass one-sided resolutions, defaming Turks, Turkish history and heritage.  What I worry about is those die-hard fanatics who see this verdict as an encouragement to further violence and terrorism.  At least one Armenian seems to write Armenians are left no chance but to resort back to terrorism.  As you can see, progress, some good, some scary, is already happening and change seems irreversible and inevitable. 100 years of Armenian propaganda, ironically, imploded through the greedy and arrogant actions of Armenians themselves and in the much-ballyhooed centennial, no less, of an alleged genocide.
    That said, I believe the world will be a better place with “the verdict”, because people will finally be able to hear, freely, the other side of the story on the Turkish-Armenian conflict, which was, up to now, censored by Armenian intimidators and their supporters in media, academia, and politics.  This is a good thing as more civilized dialogue will lead to more honest evaluations, rapprochement, peace, and eventually, closure.  People like me, whose family’s pain and suffering, from both paternal and maternal sides, are ignored, dismissed, or sometimes even ridiculed, will finally be able to tell their stories without the threat of intimidation, harassment, or terrorism.  Books and articles will be published mentioning Armenian revolts, treason, terrorism, territorial demands in the 19th and 20th centuries.  Turkish and other Muslim non-combatant civilians, to the tune of 518,000 between 1914-1918, who lost their lives at the hands of Armenian revolutionaries will be documented.  Debates of 1915 events will gradually and correctly turn into evaluation of 1862-1922 time period, exposing Armenian war crimes and hate crimes.  All primary sources, archives, and aspects will be honestly considered.  Genocide claims based on misrepresented 1915 events will transform into “an inter-communal warfare fought by Christian and Muslim irregulars”, against the backdrop of a raging world war,  like 69 Historians and experts on Turkish-Armenian conflict have declared in the New York Times and Washington Post on May 19, 1985.

    For starters, here is single frame of a photo of Armenians cadets, that refutes the entire Armenian narrative of “poor, starving, unarmed, peaceful Armenians” myth.  Here, one can see thewell trained and well-supplied Armenian soldiers, armed by Russian-made Mosin rifles, at an Armenian military Academy established in 1906 in Bulgaria.  To counter the baseless Armenian claims of Genocide, I was compelled to coin a new companion term back in 2003, ETHOCIDE, my humble gift to the English language (and its Turkish translation, AHLAKKIRIM, my modest contribution to the Turkish language) whose short definition is:  “Systematic extermination of ethics via mass deception for political gain.”  All “ethocidal” behavior in future will be challenged under the light of “the verdict”, which exposed the two soft bellies of the corrupt Armenian narrative:  history and law.

    Propaganda is finally out, truth and honesty are in, thanks to “the verdict”… and Dr. Perincek.

     

  • I was held hostage by Isis. They fear our unity more than our airstrikes….. Nicolas HCnin

    I was held hostage by Isis. They fear our unity more than our airstrikes….. Nicolas HCnin

    between an army of Muslims from all over the world and others, the crusaders.’ Photograph: AP

    Monday 16 November 2015 15.25 EST Last modified on Tuesday 17 November 2015 07.23 EST
    As a proud Frenchman I am as distressed as anyone about the events in Paris. But I am not shocked or incredulous. I know Islamic State. I spent 10 months as an Isis hostage, and I know for sure that our pain, our grief, our hopes, our lives do not touch them. Theirs is a world apart.

    Most people only know them from their propaganda material, but I have seen behind that. In my time as their captive, I met perhaps a dozen of them, including Mohammed Emwazi: Jihadi John was one of my jailers. He nicknamed me “Baldy”.

    Even now I sometimes chat with them on social media, and can tell you that much of what you think of them results from their brand of marketing and public relations. They present themselves to the public as superheroes, but away from the camera are a bit pathetic in many ways: street kids drunk on ideology and power. In France we have a saying – stupid and evil. I found them more stupid than evil. That is not to understate the murderous potential of stupidity.

    Terror can only succeed with our cooperation

    Simon Jenkins

    Simon Jenkins

    Read more

    All of those beheaded last year were my cellmates, and my jailers would play childish games with us – mental torture – saying one day that we would be released and then two weeks later observing blithely, “Tomorrow we will kill one of you.” The first couple of times we believed them but after that we came to realise that for the most part they were bullshitters having fun with us.

    They would play mock executions. Once they used chloroform with me. Another time it was a beheading scene. A bunch of French-speaking jihadis were shouting, “We’re going to cut your head off and put it on to your arse and upload it to YouTube.” They had a sword from an antique shop.

    They were laughing and I played the game by screaming, but they just wanted fun. As soon as they left I turned to another of the French hostages and just laughed. It was so ridiculous.

    It struck me forcefully how technologically connected they are; they follow the news obsessively, but everything they see goes through their own filter. They are totally indoctrinated, clinging to all manner of conspiracy theories, never acknowledging the contradictions.

    After all that happened to me, I still don’t feel Isis is the priority. To my mind, Assad is the priority

    Everything convinces them that they are on the right path and, specifically, that there is a kind of apocalyptic process under way that will lead to a confrontation between an army of Muslims from all over the world and others, the crusaders, the Romans. They see everything as moving us down that road. Consequently, everything is a blessing from Allah.

    With their news and social media interest, they will be noting everything that follows their murderous assault on Paris, and my guess is that right now the chant among them will be “We are winning”. They will be heartened by every sign of overreaction, of division, of fear, of racism, of xenophobia; they will be drawn to any examples of ugliness on social media.

    Central to their world view is the belief that communities cannot live together with Muslims, and every day their antennae will be tuned towards finding supporting evidence. The pictures from Germany of people welcoming migrants will have been particularly troubling to them. Cohesion, tolerance – it is not what they want to see.

    Mindless terrorists? The truth about Isis is much worse

    Scott Atran

    Read more

    Why France? For many reasons perhaps, but I think they identified my country as a weak link in Europe – as a place where divisions could be sown easily. That’s why, when I am asked how we should respond, I say that we must act responsibly.

    And yet more bombs will be our response. I am no apologist for Isis. How could I be? But everything I know tells me this is a mistake. The bombardment will be huge, a symbol of righteous anger. Within 48 hours of the atrocity, fighter planes conducted their most spectacular munitions raid yet in Syria, dropping more than 20 bombs on Raqqa, an Isis stronghold. Revenge was perhaps inevitable, but what’s needed is deliberation. My fear is that this reaction will make a bad situation worse.

    While we are trying to destroy Isis, what of the 500,000 civilians still living and trapped in Raqqa? What of their safety? What of the very real prospect that by failing to think this through, we turn many of them into extremists? The priority must be to protect these people, not to take more bombs to Syria. We need no-fly zones – zones closed to Russians, the regime, the coalition. The Syrian people need security or they themselves will turn to groups such as Isis.

    Canada withdrew from the air war after the election of Justin Trudeau. I desperately want France to do the same, and rationality tells me it could happen. But pragmatism tells me it won’t. The fact is we are trapped: Isis has trapped us. They came to Paris with Kalashnikovs, claiming that they wanted to stop the bombing, but knowing all too well that the attack would force us to keep bombing or even to intensify these counterproductive attacks. That is what is happening.
    Emwazi is gone now, killed in a coalition air strike, his death celebrated in parliament. I do not mourn him. But during his murder spree, he too followed this double bluff strategy. After murdering the American journalist James Foley, he pointed his knife at the camera and, turning to the next intended victim, said: “Obama, you must stop intervening in the Middle East or I will kill him.” He knew very well what the hostage’s fate would be. He knew very well what the American reaction would be – more bombing. It’s what Isis wants, but should we be giving it to them?

    The group is wicked, of that there is no doubt. But after all that happened to me, I still don’t feel Isis is the priority. To my mind, Bashar al-Assad is the priority. The Syrian president is responsible for the rise of Isis in Syria, and so long as his regime is in place, Isis cannot be eradicated. Nor can we stop the attacks on our streets. When people say “Isis first, and then Assad”, I say don’t believe them. They just want to keep Assad in place.

    At the moment there is no political road map and no plan to engage the Arab Sunni community. Isis will collapse, but politics will make that happen. In the meantime there is much we can achieve in the aftermath of this atrocity, and the key is strong hearts and resilience, for that is what they fear. I know them: bombing they expect. What they fear is unity.

    • Nicolas Henin is author of Jihad Academy, The Rise of Islamic State

     

  • Invitation to Remembrance Ceremony to Honor Atatürk…America Ataturk Society

    Invitation to Remembrance Ceremony to Honor Atatürk…America Ataturk Society

    Invitation to Remembrance Ceremony to Honor Atatürk

    IN REMEMBRANCE OF ATATÜRK
    On the 77th anniversary of the death of the greatest Turk of them all, we mourn Atatürk’s death, as well as the assault on his creation, the secular Republic of Turkey by the present government. Losing sight of his prescient vision for Turkey represents a lost opportunity for his Nation and the rest of the world.

    Reason over Dogma
    Peace over War
    Enlightenment over Ignorance

    Remembering Atatürk…
    Sunday, November 15th, 2015,  1:00 pm

    Welcome Message 

    Statement by Atatürk Society of America (ASA)
    by Burak Şahin, Board Member of ASA

    Lecture on “Gallipoli, Command Under Fire
    by Professor Ed Erickson, Guest Speaker

    Documentary Film: “The Name of the Sun, Kemal Atatürk”

    Atatürk’s Address to the Youth

    *******
    Location of the Event:
    American University
    School of International Service
    3401 Nebraska Avenue, NW
    Washington, DC 20016
    (At the intersection of New Mexico and Nebraska Ave.)

    Complimentary parking under the building
    Shuttle bus service between Tenley Town Metro Station and University

    Followed by Refreshments
    Open to the Public

    Founded 1995 in Washington DC, the Atatürk Society of America (ASA) is a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization, dedicated to promoting the ideals of Atatürk.
    Celebrating 20th Year Anniversary!4731 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC 20016
    Phone: (202) 285-2979  info@ataturksociety.org

     

    Ataturk Society of America · 4731 Massachusetts Ave NW · Washington, DC 20016 · USA
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    Atatürk Society of America 10:55 PM (14 minutes ago)

    cleardot
    IN REMEMBRANCE OF ATATÜRK On the 77th anniversary of the death of the greates…
  • Turkey’s Troubling ISIS Game

    Turkey’s Troubling ISIS Game

    From: Demirtas Bayar [mailto:[email protected]]

    Photo

    08cohen master675

    Kurdish protesters and Turkish riot police officers clashed in Diyarbakir on Nov. 1, after election results showed a clear victory for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist Justice and Development Party. Credit Bulent Kilic/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

    New York Times – NOV. 7, 2015
    SundayReview | Op-Ed Columnist
    Roger Cohen
    SANLIURFA, Turkey — ABOVE a restaurant specializing in sheep’s head soup, with steaming tureens of broth in the window, two young Syrian journalists took up residence in this ancient town in southeastern Turkey. They had fled Raqqa, the stronghold in Syria of the Islamic State, or ISIS, and devoted their time to denouncing the crimes of the barbarous jihadi group. Today, their second-floor apartment is a crime scene, with a red police seal on the door.
    On Oct. 30, the Islamic State beheaded Ibrahim Abdel Qader, age 22, and slit the throat of 20-year-old Fares Hammadi. They later posted a video of their handiwork, saying enemies “will never be safe from the blade of the Islamic State.” The killers have not been found; a new unease inhabits this bustling town about 30 miles from the Syrian border. “It was shocking to have a first beheading in Turkey,” Omer Yilmaz, the owner of the restaurant, told me. “We are used to bullets, but that, no. To slaughter a human like an animal is unthinkable.”
    The unthinkable is becoming conceivable in a combustible Turkey. Syrian violence has seeped over the border. The Islamic State is now entangled in the age-old conflict of Turks and Kurds. During several days near the Syrian border, often in areas with Kurdish majorities, I found simmering anger among Kurds and predictions of worsening bloodshed.
    The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, bolstered by the electoral triumph of his conservative Islamist Justice and Development Party, or A.K.P., has shown a troubling penchant for benign neglect toward the jihadi Islamists — enough for them to establish a Turkish network.
    What does Erdogan — in theory a key American ally leading a NATO state — see in the knife-wielding jihadis of the Islamic State? They are useful in confronting Turkey’s nemesis, the Kurds, who have taken over wide sections of northern Syria and established self-government in an area they call Rojava. That in turn has raised the specter of a border-straddling Kurdistan, the nightmare of the Turkish republic.
    Hence the unpersuasive Turkish balancing act that sees Erdogan offering the United States use of Turkish air bases to fight the Islamic State even as Turkey twice strikes the positions in Syria of Kurdish militias who, as my colleague Tim Arango put it, are the “most important allies within Syria of the American-led coalition fighting the Islamic State.” Hence, also, the bungling and inaction that produced, on Oct. 10 in Ankara, the worst terrorist attack in Turkish history.
    The Ankara suicide bombing followed another suicide bombing in the border town of Suruc that killed 33 pro-Kurdish activists in July.
    One of the Ankara suicide bombers was the older brother of the Suruc suicide bomber. Their father tried without success to alert the government to the danger. Almost three months elapsed between the bombings, both of which principally targeted Kurds, and Erdogan did nothing. After the Ankara attack, his prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, said the government had a list of potential suicide bombers but could not detain them because “as a country with rule of law, you can’t arrest them until they act.” (Not easy to do afterward either.) These words were uttered even as countless Kurdish militants were rounded up in the months between the June and November elections.
    The impression has been inescapable that, for the government, having Islamic State militants kill Kurds with impunity was a palatable option with the bonus of creating the climate of instability that secured the Nov. 1 electoral victory for Erdogan.
    For Erdogan’s A.K.P. government, the terrorist organization par excellence is the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., which has fought an intermittent insurgency against Turkey since the 1980s, is linked to the Kurdish militias in Syria and is designated a terrorist group by the United States. The president, infused with post-electoral vim, vowed this week to fight P.K.K. members until they would lay down their weapons “and pour concrete over them.” The Islamic State, by comparison, is the object of no such ruthless language or action.
    I found Gultan Kisanak, the mayor of Diyarbakir, the effective capital of Kurdish aspirations for autonomy within Turkey, watering roses on the terrace outside her office. There was not a cloud in the sky on a mild late-fall day. But her mood was grim. Kisanak is a member of the Kurdish-dominated Peoples’ Democratic Party, or H.D.P., which took over 70 percent of the vote in Diyarbakir but saw its national vote share fall to 10.7 percent from 13.1 percent in June as Erdogan’s fear tactics worked. “ISIS became such a large force thanks to an open-door policy from Ankara,” she told me. “Militants come and go. ISIS has been delegated to fight a proxy war against Kurdish Rojava, and all kinds of support has been given to them.”
    THE government dismisses such suggestions. Did Turkey not, in extremis and under great international pressure, allow arms to reach the Kurdish-held Syrian town of Kobani and so prevent its fall to the Islamic State? Are Turkish air bases not being used by the American-led coalition? Do the Kurds not have in the H.D.P. representation in Parliament, as well as control of many municipalities? What do the Kurds want that they do not already have unless it’s territory — and that Turkey will never give.
    “For us, ISIS and the P.K.K. have the same aim,” Abdurrahman Yetkin, a prominent businessman and Erdogan supporter in Sanliurfa, told me. “Both organizations are being used by external powers to destabilize Turkey.”
    You hear a lot of such talk from the Erdogan camp these days — talk that implausibly conflates Islamist jihadis and Kurdish militants, as in the official characterization of the Ankara bombing as a “cocktail” involving both. It is this sort of manipulation of the facts that undermines the government’s insistence that it’s in the Islamic State fight for real.
    Certainly it is targeting the Kurds. The P.K.K. made a big mistake by answering Suruc with the killing of two Turkish policemen. Violence could only serve Erdogan, who embarked on a fierce bombing campaign on P.K.K. strongholds in northern Iraq and has shown equal ruthlessness within Turkey. Diyarbakir and other majority Kurdish towns in the southeast have been under intermittent curfew. Attempts to establish autonomy in certain city districts have been crushed.
    Reeling back what he has unleashed after a dozen years in power is going to be hard for Erdogan. Power and money seem to have gone to his head. Turkey has veered into violence and polarization. “Erdogan is scared and he deals with it by making everyone more scared than he is,” Soli Ozel, a university lecturer, told me.
    The Turkish president needs to get back to the negotiating table with the Kurds, get serious about crushing the Islamic State in Turkey and beyond, ensure a transparent and credible investigation of the brutal killings in Suruc and Ankara (as well as the double murder in Sanliurfa) and stop his assault on a free press. President Obama should press his ally hard on all these fronts.
    Turkey, a heterogeneous nation, cannot be homogenized under the banner of Erdogan’s Sunni Islamist nationalism. Intolerance will backfire, as it has in Syria. “They don’t want the Kurds even to breathe,” Ahmet Turk, the mayor of the beautiful southern town of Mardin, told me. “Kurds do not want violence, but if Erdogan does not stop, things could get much worse.”
    In Sanliurfa, as night fell, I met Ahmed Abdel Qader, the older brother of the beheaded journalist. He told me, “The guys who did this killing are now threatening me.” His dark eyes seemed haunted. Turkey’s tide of violence, cynically cultivated, must now be curbed. It won’t be easy.

  • Statistical study of Turkey’s general election suggests widespread vote manipulation

    Statistical study of Turkey’s general election suggests widespread vote manipulation

    Ben Aris

    A statistical study of the voting patterns in Turkey’s November 1 general election found strong evidence that is “consistent with widespread voting manipulation”.
    That was the conclusion of a paper released by assistant professor Erik Meyersson at Stockholm School of Economics entitled “Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey’s November Elections”, and released on November 4.
    The result of the elections came as a shock as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s defied the almost universal polling consensus and won some 9 percentage points more than expected – just enough to rule alone, but not quite a constitutional majority.
    Some have speculated that faced with external and internal instability Turks have turned to a strong leader to see them through uncertain times in what might be called a “Sultan complex”. However, drilling down into the voting statistics Meyersson concludes that Sunday’s result was not so much an AKP victory as a defeat for the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP).
    “As in last elections, much of the change in voting seems to have occurred among nationalist as well as Kurdish voters, with this election seeing a difference of priority among them. Whereas June’s election was HDP’s to win, this one appears to have been to a large extent the nationalist MHP’s to lose,” Meyersson said in his paper.
    Meyersson concentrated on the differences between June’s election and this one, where that time AKP was the recipient of the shock and had its majority grip on power broken after HDP entered parliament for the first time.
    “Plotting the difference in vote share between November and June, the AKP’s gain appears to come predominantly at the expense of MHP. In some other cases, the vote swing seems to be driven by voters in Kurdish provinces leaving the other main opposition party pro-Kurdish and left-leaning Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for AKP,” says Meyersson.

    1115 turkey politics elections results regional differnces

    ​ The main statistical test the paper explores is the use of the so-called Benford’s Law that is a widespread statistical technique for spotting cheating in polls and has a big body of academic literature behind it.
    The way it works is simple: in a fair vote the last number of the final tally for each polling station should be randomly distributed. As humans are very bad at generating random numbers if the vote count has been tampered with then this randomness is destroyed and a discernable pattern emerges.
    Fun fair owners use Benford’s law and count the small change in the till in much the same way to catch attraction staff who have their hands in the till: dishonest employees tend to steal round numbers of notes and coins. The Benford distribution of final digits in the numbers should look something like this:

    1115 gbl politics benfords law

    A similar technique was used to show that Russia’s Duma election in 2011 was fixed and the authorities added an estimated 12% to the winning, and now ruling, United Russia party. Instead of a smooth Benford curve, the statistical analysis found there were spikes in the tally results ending with a 5 or a 0. The crooked vote counters naturally, and without thinking, were rounding up results in United Russia’s favour. The same spikes were seen in the votes for Just Russia (aka Fair Russia), the leading opposition party, which strongly suggests its votes were stolen and gifted to United Russia.
    That result was so clearly unfair it led to the first mass street protests Russia has seen since president Vladimir Putin came to power more than a decade earlier.

    1212 russia politics duma elections voting parties

    Meyersson’s study finds a very similar thing seems to have happened last weekend. The analysis was complicated by the fact that some ballots only produced 300-350 ballot papers, which is too small a number to be a good statistical sample. To get round this problem Meyersson decided to use the June vote as the basis of the comparison for the randomness of the last number – but that also assumes the summer’s vote was free and fair.
    Those caveats aside, the results are striking. As the chart below of the frequency of each of the appearance of the numbers from 0-9 in the last place of the final tally clearly show there are too few zeros in the AKP party vote counts and too many for MHP.  The same is true for HDP, but the number of zeros at the end of the tally for Republican People’s Party (CHP) were the same in both elections and conforms to the Benford distribution above.

    1115 turkey politics elections results statistics 0

    These charts would be consistent with election officials stealing votes from MHP, and to a lesser extent from HDP, and giving them to AKP, but leaving the CHP vote tally untouched. Other charts in the paper suggest that unlike the Russian 2011 election, officials were rounding MHP results down to the nearest whole number and giving the difference to AKP.
    Meyersson goes on to drill into more detail and compares the votes in the five biggest cities as well as look at a sample of vote results in small rural cities and towns were election observers are less likely to go. The same results are repeated at all levels. Finally, Meyersson looked at the voting in the 35 provinces where MHP won more than 20% last time round, against its 10% share of the overall election.
    “In this ‘nationalist sample’, even though the AKP’s last digits do not differ systematically from the previous elections, both that of CHP and MHP do. And as before, it shows abnormally large occurrences of lower last digits and smaller occurrences of larger last digits, Meyersson concluded.
    Finally as a control Meyersson tested these results with another test based on separate research by Beber and Scacco, which show that in fixed elections officials have a habit of number pairs in adjacent places when making up results (12, 34, 65, etc) when again the distribution of numbers inside the final tally result should be random.
    In a table that measures this frequency of number pairs Meyersson found that, “In all but one cases does  the occurrences of adjacent digits change between November and June for the MHP, and for the HDP there is a statistically significant change in the five largest provinces sample.”
    “Overall, this analysis shows evidence that would be consistent with widespread voting manipulation, not proof of it, both in terms of the change in the distribution of last as well as adjacent digits,” Meyersson concludes the paper with.
    Sunday’s landslide victory by the AKP represents a remarkable comeback for a government that according to the overwhelming majority of polling companies looked set to repeat its June loss. Many are now pointing fingers at these pollsters (and analysts overall) asking how they could have been so wrong. But what if they weren’t?”
    story/statistical-study-turkeys-general-election-suggests-widespread-vote-manipulation

    Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey’s November Elections

    Posted on November 4, 2015 by Erik
    Sunday’s elections in Turkey were a landslide for the ruling AKP. Its vote share rose nearly 9 percentage points from what it received in June. One interpretation is that AKP’s political strategy since its summer defeat has paid off, a chilling evaluation of one that has at times seemed both divisive and violent, not to mention authoritarian.
    As in last elections, much of the change in voting seems to have occurred among nationalist as well as Kurdish voters, with this election seeing a difference of priority among them. Whereas June’s election was HDP’s to win, this one appears to have been to a large extent the nationalist MHP’s to lose. As the below figure shows, plotting the difference in vote share between November and June, the AKP’s gain appears to come predominantly at the expense of MHP. In some other cases, the vote swing seems to be driven by voters in Kurdish provinces leaving HDP for AKP (likely the poor and pious I have discussed in this blog before).
    provdiffshr
    Part of the story could be explained by turnout. After all, several provinces show significant changes in turnout compared to the June elections. Several Kurdish provinces like Agri, Batman, Hakkari show substantial reductions in turnout, likely a result of the ongoing conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state.turnoutprov
    Election night was particularly embarrassing to Turkish pollsters who in unison (almost, at least) were predicting a repeat of the June elections. In fact, using the mean and standard deviations of this sample of pollsters, predictions were off by an incredible 4.9 standard deviations.
    There were of course curious aspects of this election. The media raids just days before the election, making sure government-controlled agencies would have effective control over information dissemination on election night. Then there was the speed at which vote counts occurred, the very early victory declaration in government press. Moreover, the 670,000 new valid votes that appeared in Istanbul as the share of invalid ballots shrank back five percentage points from June (which can be seen in the figure above) was quite noteworthy. But so far, there have been relatively few accusations of voter fraud or manipulation (although this could change).

    Digit tests

    A common method for detecting election irregularities is digit tests. This rests on the assumption that a particular digit of a number (say the last or the second digit in a vote count) should, if the election was done fairly, be randomly distributed according to some underlying distribution (see for example the very interesting work by Beber and Scacco (here for an analysis of Nigerian elections, and here for an analysis of Iranian elections) as well as that of Walter Mebane. The specific underlying distribution depends on the order of the digit, which in statistics is often referred to in broader terms as Benford’s Law. This Law specifies specific distributions for each digit depending on the order in which it appears.
    The idea behind digit tests rests on people effectively being unable to randomize numbers, and so demonstrating that an empirical distribution is not of the relevant benchmark distribution is taken as a sign that something is wrong. (Although there is some criticism against digit tests ability to discover election fraud, see here and here).
    Applying digit tests to Turkey and its ballot boxes that rarely include more than 300-350 votes, it’s not obvious which digit distribution should be the benchmark one. If one focuses on the last digit it would seem straightforward to assume that digit ought to follow the uniform distribution (with each number being equally likely), but if the sample includes many vote counts below 100 the last digit would then also be the second digit, which carries with it another benchmark distribution. As such, simply testing whether ballot box-level vote counts follow the uniform distribution would then likely result in a false positive.
    A somewhat different approach I’ll employ here is to remain agnostic about the true underlying benchmark distribution and instead use the past election as the benchmark. The relevant benchmark distribution is thus not whether the last digits of vote counts in the  November elections match either the standard last, second, or first-digit distribution stipulated by Benford’s Law, but rather whether it’s fundamentally different from the corresponding distribution in the June elections.
    Whereas this cuts around the issue of which Benford’s Law distribution to expect is the correct one, it instead requires two different but quite critical assumptions. The first is that the June 2015 election is not subject to fraud or any other severe irregularities that could affect its distribution of digits. The second is that the change in voting is not by itself large enough to change the underlying benchmark distribution. For example, if in one election all vote counts for party X are between 10-99, and in the second election they are all between 0-9, a naive test of the difference in digit distributions would reject the null hypothesis, and proclaim something is wrong when there isn’t. As such, the size of the vote counts could matter by itself. In order to accommodate for this, I will adjust for this directly in the statistical testing (see next paragraph) and I will also examine different subsets of the Turkish electorate where the relative size of the vote counts across parties differ.
    In order to investigate this, I below plot the distribution of the last digit in vote counts for the AKP, CHP, HDP, and the MHP respectively for the whole dataset of 174,648 ballot boxes in November 2015 and 174,220 in June 2015 comparing the November 2015 and the June 2015 elections. Accompanying each plot are two p-values. One is from a simple test of whether the mean of the last digit for the vote count of party X is the same across the two elections.  The second p-value is from the coefficient estimated in a regression of the last digit of party X’s vote count on a dummy for the November election. This regression further includes three dummy variables for whether the district (ilce) median of party X’s vote count is in the single-, double-, or third digits. (For example, if a district’s median vote count for the AKP is 98, then only the second dummy variable is equal to one. If the median vote count had been 156, only the third dummy variable is equal to one etc.). This additional regression control method adds robustness to the test has area-level voter support for party X could be correlated with both the November election dummy as well as the last digit.
    Before I present the results, bear in mind:
    1. This statistical analysis is preliminary, and the particularly version of the digit tests method I use is not a standard one.
    2. The data used for the November elections is not (yet) official.
    3. Any rejection of the null hypothesis could, in principle, be due to other factors than voting manipulation (just not anyone I can think of at the moment).

    Results

    Below I plot the last digit distributions for the ballot-box-level AKP, CHP, HDP, and MHP vote counts using the entire sample of elections in the November and June elections.

    digits_2015_all

    Clear from the figure of the last digit distribution of the AKP vote count is how few cases there are where the vote count ended with a one or a zero.  Furthermore, the two p-values from two tests described above reject the null hypothesis that the average last digits are the same across the two elections. Whereas the AKP vote count tends to have too few zeroes, both the HDP and the MHP tends to have too many last digits ending with zeroes than in the June elections. The bottom right graph for the CHP shows no systematic differences – its last digits is not statistically different from that of the earlier election.
    Below I repeat this analysis for different subsamples of the Turkish electorate. Specifically, I look at the fourteen predominantly Kurdish provinces in the southeast, thirty-five provinces where the MHP scored above twenty percent of the province-level vote share, the five largest provinces in terms of population, as well as the sample of provinces excluding these largest five.

    Kurdish provinces

    digits_2015_k

    These figures uphold the finding that last digit distributions are statistically different in the two elections. What is particularly useful about this is that, whereas in the overall sample AKP vote counts are large and HDP tends to be small, in this subsample the positions are reversed having the relatively smaller vote counts and HDP the larger. (I’ve excluded the CHP and MHP as these parties have so few votes in the region to make the last digit test irrelevant).

    Provinces with relatively stronger MHP support

    digits_2015_n

    These provinces are the thirty-five provinces where the MHP won more than twenty percent in the November election. Thus, they include nationalist storngholds like Adana, Mersin, Antalya, but also several central Anatolian provinces such as Afyonkarahisar, Kayseri, and Konya.  (In this subsample I have excluded HDP as its median vote share in this region tends to be too small to make the digit tests relevant.)
    In this ‘nationalist sample’, even though the AKP’s last digits do not differ systematically from the previous elections, both that of CHP and MHP do. And as before, it shows abnormally large occurrences of lower last digits and smaller occurrences of larger last digits.

    The Big 5

    digits_2015_l
    If we only include the five most populous provinces in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana, none but the HDP’s last digits are significantly different from the June election.

    Excluding the Big 5

    digits_2015_s

    In the final subsample, I exclude the five largest provinces, and the result shows rejection of the null hypothesis of equal digit means for all parties but the CHP. As such, the evidence that “something might be wrong” (I prefer this term rather than the f-word at present) seems mainly driven by constituencies outside the largest cities.
    Many tend to disregard all but the largest cities at times of election, thinking that the main shifts occur in places like Istanbul or Ankara. But it’s important to remember that the five largest provinces in Turkey only account for about a third of all the voters in Turkey. And most independent election monitors are unlikely to venture outside the largest cities in any meaningful numbers. So, if you were going to rig an election and wanted to avoid detection, it would probably be easiest to do so in these areas.

    Adjacent Digits

    The above-mentioned paper by Beber and Scacco note that “laboratory experiments demonstrate a preference for pairs of adjacent digits, which suggests that such pairs should be abundant on fraudulent return sheet.” Such adjacent digits (like whether the vote count was 12 or 23) provide another way to test for voting manipulation.
    Below is a table where each cell represents the p-value from a test of whether the frequency of occurrences with adjacent last and penultimate digits are statistically different between the November and June elections. The rows represent the tests by party vote count and the columns represent the samples as described above.

    adjacent_tests

    In all but one cases does do the occurrences of adjacent digits change between November and June for the MHP, and for the HDP there is a statistically significant change in the five largest provinces sample.

    Robustness Checks

    One possibility is that differences in last or adjacent digits between the two elections are driven by shifts from one underlying type of a distribution to another (for example if there are more single-digit party vote counts  in one election than another). Another issue could be that bunching large groups together, either the entire Turkish electorate or different subsets of it, could result in a comparison across very different constiuencies. For example, the underlying distribution for the last digit of the HDP vote count in Manisa is bound to be very different from that in Diyarbakir, and so the unconditional comparison of means may not very informative.
    For this purpose, I below present results from regressing  last digits and adjacent digits respectively of party specific vote counts with a number of different control strategies. In particular I now add fixed effects for whether the vote count of a specific party has a single, double, or triple digit, turnout, the invalid share of ballots, and the log number of registered voters. I also add a number of geographic fixed effects for district and neighborhoods.
    regs_lastdigits
    This table shows that even if we control for whether the party count has one or several digits, geographic fixed effects, the results this hold. The distribution of the last digit changed systematically between the November and the June election. In some cases, such as for the HDP, the effects are not trivial. Using the third column in Panel C, the mean of HDP’s last digit increased by around 15 % relative to the mean once neighborhood-level fixed effects are accounted for. Moreover, in more nationalist provinces (where the MHP had more than twenty percent of the province-level vote share) the relative effect is around 7 %.
    Applying the same regression methodology to the adjacent digit case, now only including observations with more than one digit in the party vote count (this is why the number of observations change across panels), the results for the MHP are quite robust, and the results for HDP are significant in a few more cases than in the simple comparison above.

    regs_adjacentdigits

    Concluding Remarks

    Overall, this analysis shows evidence that would be consistent with widespread voting manipulation, not proof of it, both in terms of the change in the distribution of last as well as adjacent digits. But this requires both the assumption that the last digit distributions of the June 2015 elections were not somehow affected by voting manipulation, as well as that the change in votes were not so large so as to change the benchmark distribution of the digits themselves. If any of these assumptions are violated, then the difference in last digit distributions is not informative of voting manipulation.
    Something that stands out particularly strong is the degree to which MHP’s vote counts appear to have been adversely affected. The MHP is also the part that lost the largest vote share (4.4%). But the AKP and HDP vote counts also show evidence consistent with some form of tampering. The CHP vote count, on the other hand, shows predominantly little change across the different tests.
    Sunday’s landslide victory by the AKP represents a remarkable comeback for a government that according to the overwhelming majority of polling companies looked set to repeat its June loss. Many are now pointing fingers at these pollsters (and analysts overall) asking how they could have been so wrong.
    But what if they weren’t?
    Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey’s November Elections
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    Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey…

    Sunday’s elections in Turkey were a landslide for the ruling AKP. Its vote share rose nearly 9 percentage points from what it received in June. One interpretation i…
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  • Here’s The Latest Potentially Fatal Flaw In Obama’s ISIS Strategy

    Here’s The Latest Potentially Fatal Flaw In Obama’s ISIS Strategy

    Washington’s increasing coziness with the Syrian Kurds has made Turkey nervous.

    <span class='image-component__caption' itemprop="caption">Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG, fighters rest in Tal Abyad, Syria on June 19, 2015.</span>CREDIT: AHMET SIK/GETTY IMAGESKurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, fighters rest in Tal Abyad, Syria on June 19, 2015.

    ISTANBUL — The U.S. acknowledged on Wednesday that it has been supporting Kurdish forces in Syria with American aircraft deployed in Turkey, adding another tangle to its strategy to defeat the Islamic State group that hints at the precariousness of the entire campaign.

    Col. Steve Warren, a spokesman for the U.S. campaign against the extremists in Iraq and Syria, detailed that decision in a press briefing on Wednesday. The U.S. announced on Oct. 30 that it had based A-10 fixed-wing aircraft at Turkey’s Incirlik air base in the country’s southeast, Warren said. Those aircraft have since provided air support for Syrian fighters in a Kurd-Arab coalition in battles against Islamic State positions in northeast Syria’s Al-Hawl region.

    Though the U.S. has launched airstrikes to help Kurdish fighters in Syria fight the Islamic State since last fall, Warren’s comments appear to be the most public admission that it is doing so from a base in Turkey — a NATO ally that is skeptical of the Syrian Kurds and only granted the U.S. full flight capabilities at its Incirlik base this past July. Col. Christopher Garver, a public affairs officer for the anti-ISIS campaign, told HuffPost in a Friday email that U.S. flights out of Incirlik have previously aided Kurdish fighters as well.

    Warren was careful to note that the ground forces the U.S. was supporting were under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a recently formed alliance of Kurds, Arabs, Turks and Syrian Christians announced just last month. The Arab component of those forces was involved in the anti-IS offensive, which “is important because Al-Hawl is predominantly an Arab area,” Warren specified.

    But that Kurd-dominated coalition is widely seen as a politically convenient invention, cobbled together so the U.S. can funnel significant support to effective Kurdish fighters and their allies — as it did with an Oct. 12 airdrop — while saying it is engaging Sunni Arabs, the majority community in Syria.

    KOBANE, SYRIA - JUNE 20: (TURKEY OUT) A Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG women fighters pose as they stand near a check point in the outskirts of the destroyed Syrian town of Kobane, also known as Ain al-Arab, Syria. June 20, 2015. Kurdish fighters with the YPG took full control of Kobane and strategic city of Tal Abyad, dealing a major blow to the Islamic State group's ability to wage war in Syria. Mopping up operations have started to make the town safe for the return of residents from Turkey, after more than a year of Islamic State militants holding control of the town. (Photo by Ahmet Sik/Getty Images)
    KOBANE, SYRIA – JUNE 20: (TURKEY OUT) A Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG women fighters pose as they stand near a check point in the outskirts of the destroyed Syrian town of Kobane, also known as Ain al-Arab, Syria. June 20, 2015. Kurdish fighters with the YPG took full control of Kobane and strategic city of Tal Abyad, dealing a major blow to the Islamic State group’s ability to wage war in Syria. Mopping up operations have started to make the town safe for the return of residents from Turkey, after more than a year of Islamic State militants holding control of the town. (Photo by Ahmet Sik/Getty Images)

     

    CREDIT: AHMET SIK/GETTY IMAGESYPG fighters pose as they stand near a checkpoint in the outskirts of the destroyed Syrian town of Kobane on June 20.

    Talk of the new force gave Washington cover to send arms that could be used against IS without angering Turkey, a State Department official told The WorldPost soon after the airdrop. One administration official called the approach a “ploy” in a conversation with Bloomberg View. And a New York Times reporter who visited the northern Syrian regions home to the new alliance published a damning report on Nov. 2 that said the loosely aligned Syrian Democratic Forces exist “in name only.”

    While Turkey and the Syrian Kurds share the goal of undermining the Islamic State, the two U.S. partners deeply mistrust each other. Turkey accuses the dominant political group among Syria’s Kurds, the PYD, of being a branch of a Kurdish militant organization called the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. The PKK has waged war on Ankara for three decades in the name of Kurdish rights.

    Many Kurds, meanwhile, believe Turkey has aided the rise of extremists during the Syrian civil war and note that Kurdish forces have done more to damage IS on the ground than any Turkish action has. Though these tensions have mostly been expressed verbally, Turkey shelled Syrian Kurdish positions on Oct. 27

    Analysts worry Washington’s new maneuver could lose either the support of the Kurds — who are reportedly attempting to strengthen ties with Russia, now a key player in the Syrian war — or the Turks, whose military and geographic position make them key to any effort to change the situation in Syria.

    Washington’s balancing act between Turkey and the Kurds has worked thus far. But its willingness to now publicly acknowledge support for the PYD from Incirlik could force it to choose between reducing support to the Kurds, the strongest anti-IS force, or placing more pressure on the Turks, who have great influence over the situation in Syria.

    CREDIT: ASSOCIATED PRESSTurkish soldiers hold their positions with their tanks on a hilltop on the outskirts of Suruc, at the Turkey-Syria border, overlooking Kobani, Syria, during fighting between Syrian Kurds and ISIS last year on Oct. 10, 2014.

    “We’re not trying to cover anything up,” Warren said during his briefing when asked by a reporter to respond to the New York Times report. “We’re providing weapons, or in this case, ammunition, to the Syrian Arab coalition. That’s what we said we’re doing, that’s actually what we’re doing.”

    A Turkish official made clear to The WorldPost that his government remains worried about the Kurds in Syria.

    “We are deeply concerned about the PYD’s links to the PKK,” the official said. Turkey ended a ceasefire with the PKK in July and has been striking the group in Turkey’s Kurdish-majority southeast and in Iraq ever since. The Kurdish militants have claimed responsibility for frequent attacks on police forces and soldiers. Today, the PKK formally ended a one-month ceasefire, citing the state’s “war policy.”

    Ankara shows no evidence of letting up after Sunday’s election, in which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party won back majority rule after painting the campaign as a choice between chaos and stability. Erdogan has vowed to “liquidate” every PKK fighter.

    Turkey’s government was not yet prepared to comment on the U.S. strikes launched from Incirlik, however, the official added.

    “Another concern is that divisions among opposition forces will ultimately serve the regime’s interest,” the official added, vocalizing a commonly reiterated state allegation that the Kurds care more about their own interests than the broader future of Syria.

    Turkey is a staunch opponent of Syrian dictator President Bashar Assad, and it supports a range of Syrian Arab groups that are trying to bring down his regime. Ankara and many members of those Syrian opposition groups are wary of the Kurds because they have allowed some regime forces to remain in the Kurdish city of Hasakah, and because they believe the Kurds want a de facto break-up of Syria.

    <span class='image-component__caption' itemprop="caption">Firefighters extinguish the fire after a car bomb attack on YPG headquarters in Hasakah, Syria on September 15, 2015. At least nine people were killed and other 30 people wounded after the attack.</span>CREDIT: ANADOLU AGENCY/GETTY IMAGESFirefighters extinguish the fire after a car bomb attack on YPG headquarters in Hasakah, Syria on September 15, 2015. At least nine people were killed and other 30 people wounded after the attack.

    Arabs in areas captured by the Kurds with U.S. support have also reported abuse at the hands of Kurdish forces, in interviews with outlets including The WorldPost and advocacy organizations like Amnesty International. Those allegations suggest that the Turks may have a point: If Washington does empower the Kurds without real engagement with Sunni Arabs, it could push many Arabs into the embrace of the Islamic State or other extremist, anti-Western groups in Syria.

    The U.S. appears to be managing Turkey’s concerns by tacitly agreeing that Syrian Kurdish forces will not be allowed to pass into areas west of the Euphrates river, according to Aaron Stein, a Turkey expert at the Atlantic Council.

    Turkey is nervous that the success of the Syrian Kurds will inspire Kurds in Turkey to try and carve out their own statelets, and it pointed to the Euphrates as a red line when announcing its  recent attacks on the Syrian Kurds. Ankara fears Syrian Kurdish forces will connect the areas they control in northeast Syria to their third region, or canton, in the northwest, thereby creating a powerful Kurdish corridor along the Turkey-Syria border.

    The focus on vanquishing the Islamic State, which U.S. officials say will only happen with help from the Syrian Kurds, puts Turkish policymakers in a difficult position.

    “In any case, Turkey is certainly indirectly aiding the YPG’s advance east of the Euphrates,” Stein told The WorldPost, using the acronym for the Syrian Kurds’ fighting force. “American drones provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance for these missions, and tankers based at Incirlik most certainly refuel U.S. bombers flying from Qatar.”

    Max Hoffman, a policy analyst at the Center for American Progress, told The WorldPost that the U.S. seems largely willing to pursue its goal of bringing down IS regardless of Turkish sensitivities.

    “It seems unlikely to me that coalition air controllers would ignore a credible ISIS target relayed by YPG on the ground, or divert coalition aircraft from further away, just because the closest coalition airplane was launched from Incirlik,” Hoffman wrote in a Wednesday email. “But I have no way of confirming that, and it’s certainly in the U.S. interest to allow Turkey to preserve that useful political fiction [that the Kurds are not supported from Incirlik] (if it is, in fact, a fiction).”

    <span class='image-component__caption' itemprop="caption">YPG fighters in downtown Tal Abyad, Syria on June 19, 2015.</span>CREDIT: AHMET SIK/ GETTY IMAGESYPG fighters in downtown Tal Abyad, Syria on June 19, 2015.

    The U.S has struggled to find reliable partners against the Islamic State on the ground other than the Kurds and an array of Arab-dominated groups the CIA has armed to fight Assad. In early October, the Obama administration announced that a $500 million Pentagon program to train anti-IS Syrian rebels had largely failed and was being restructured.

    The White House’s approach now seems to be to support the Kurds and nationalist Arabs in the north as intensely as possible. It announced on Oct. 30 that President Barack Obama would deploy dozens of American special operations forces to northern Syria to coordinate airstrikes and arms supply.

    The war in Syria has claimed at least 250,000 Syrian lives. With no end in sight to the conflict, IS remains in control of large tracts of land and the Assad regime continues to kill civilians daily, prolonging a conflict that has forced millions to seek refuge in neighboring countries and fueled the largest mass migration of people since World War II.

    International players involved in the conflict — either supporting Assad or the opposition to him — are holding negotiations to work out whether the dictator can be removed so that a more stable Syria can be established, but those talks have yet to bear fruit.

    The latest round, involving the U.S., Turkey, and states like Russia and Iran that are helping Assad, concluded without significant progress last week.

    This story has been updated to include Garver’s comments about ealrier U.S. aid to Kurdish fighters. 

    Sophia Jones reported from Istanbul and Akbar Shahid Ahmed reported from Washington.