Author: Aylin D. Miller

  • RESEARCH DOCUMENT : Chiquita Papers Document over $800,000 in Payments to Colombian Guerrillas

    RESEARCH DOCUMENT : Chiquita Papers Document over $800,000 in Payments to Colombian Guerrillas

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    Fax cover sheet enclosing a confidential security report from Juan Manuel Alvarado, Chiquita’s security chief in Colombia.

    Chiquita Papers Document over $800,000 in Payments to Colombian Guerrillas

    Internal Security Reports Detail Negotiations with Subversive Groups

    Company Sought Quid Pro Quos with Insurgents; Funded Group That Went on “Joint Patrols” with Paramilitaries

    Posted May 11, 2017
    National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 592
    This is the third in a series of articles published jointly by the National Security Archive and mevansTwitter: @colombiadocs

    The FARC, the ELN, and to a lesser extent, the EPL, along with their dissident offshootsand political allies all profited from Chiquita’s security payments. Newly declassified documents on this little-known episode in the violent history of Colombia’s banana-growing zone shine a spotlight on the sometimes- blurry line between paying extortion, making contributions, and the deliberately financing of violent actors. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a tribunal established as part of peace accord with the FARC, will have the final word.

    Ten years have passed since Chiquita Brands was sentenced in the United States for financing an international terrorist group. In 2007, the company confessed to paying the paramilitary United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and also admitted that between 1989 and 1997 it funded the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country’s two largest rebel groups.

    But unlike payments to the AUC, Chiquita’s financial ties to guerrilla groups were not a concern of U.S. courts. The FARC and the ELN had not yet been declared foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S. when those payments were made; and while both groups were so designated in October 1997, the court found no evidence that the company had paid either of them beyond that date.

    In Colombia, the Justice and Peace tribunals have documented how money that banana companies gave to private security cooperatives known as Convivir ended up in the coffers of the right-wing AUC. But until now there has been little evidence of how cash from the fruit multinational made its way into the hands of leftist Colombian guerrilla groups.

    These kinds of records are all the more important now, following a December 2016 ruling by the Colombian Attorney General that the voluntary financing of paramilitary groups by banana companies is a crime against humanity, and that payments to guerrillas from the FARC, the People’s Liberation Army (EPL), the ELN and the Socialist Renovation Current (CRS) are to be treated in the same manner. The ruling means that the crimes are still actionable in Colombian courts despite the passage of time and that the Colombian justice system must fully investigate the violations to punish those responsible.

    As these processes get underway, a new batch of declassified documents obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by the National Security Archive provides a detailed accounting of the payments that Chiquita Brands and three other banana companies made to Colombian insurgent groups between 1989 and 1997. The records for the first time reveal the minimum amounts of money Chiquita paid to the various Colombian guerrilla groups, and provide a unique, first-hand account of the harrowing and complicated security situation in Urabá from the practical and calculated perspective of one of the world’s biggest fruit companies.

    How much money went to the Guerrillas?

    Based on the documentation provided to U.S. authorities by Chiquita and subsequently obtained through FOIA requests, it is possible to document payments from Chiquita to Colombian guerrilla groups of an estimated $856,815 in a little more than five years, from October 1991 through 1996. These totals do not include any money transferred to guerrillas before October 1991 or after 1996. Payments are said to have begun in the late-1980s and continued through part of 1997.

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    Source documents for above information: 19920904; 19930311; 19950516; 19950616; and 19950000.

    The U.S. dollar amounts shown above reflect a range of possible exchange rates for those years, which are not specified in the underlying documentation. The upper end of this range brings us closer to the estimated grand total of $856,815 for all guerrilla payments, most of which was found expressed in true dollar amounts in the auditing records.

    That figure covers all payments from 1992-1996 and draws on information found in two key records laying out payment totals for different periods of time.

    • One is an internal auditing worksheet reporting an exact total of $618,578 paid from 1993-1996.
    • For 1992, the clearest evidence comes from an internal security report with payments totaling some 129,979,000 Colombian Pesos for that year (estimated to be around $260,000 at an approximate 1992 exchange rate of 500:1).
    • We have also taken care to subtract $21,763 from that total, the amount paid to Convivir groups in 1996. These are the first known payments to the controversial self-defense organizations that collected money from Chiquita on behalf of anti-guerrilla paramilitary groups. Information about these early Convivir payments is drawn from an annotated general ledger found among the Chiquita Papers.

    There are some additional caveats. The collection does not include detailed information about payments made in 1993. As a result, while we know the total amount of all guerrilla-related payments made that year, we do not have information about the specific amounts paid to each group. Rather than estimate those amounts, we have simply left them out of the per group totals. These caveats mean that the totals shown above, and the numbers for at least some, if not all, of the groups are likely too low, in some cases by significant amounts. The auditing worksheet from 1997 records more than $134,000 in guerrilla payments (listed here under “Security-Other”) for 1993—money that is not accounted for in the per group totals above.

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    Banadex, Chiquita’s main subsidiary in Colombia, played a fundamental role in this scenario. At the beginning of the 1990s the banana sector was a vital part of the Colombian national economy. The coffee crisis of the previous decade and the expansion of the international market turned bananas into the country’s primary agricultural export.

    At the time, this vital region was home to two primary guerrilla organizations, each with strong ties to banana industry trade unions: the FARC and the EPL. When the latter demobilized in 1991, two groups emerged: a dissident EPL faction under Francisco Caraballo that refused to lay down its weapons and a new political movement that went by the same initials, Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (Hope, Peace and Liberty). In the face of attacks by the FARC and the Caraballo group against the “Esperanzados,” who were viewed as traitors by the remaining guerrilla factions, some of the demobilized decided to rearm themselves and create the Comandos Populares (Popular Commands), a group that later merged with paramilitary AUC.

    Although the ELN did not maintain a strong presence in the zone, the country’s second-largest rebel group also showed up in the accounts of the banana companies, along with a group of dissidents from the CRS whose members signed a peace accord with the government on April 9, 1994. The end of the 1980s also saw the sporadic emergence of the first paramilitary groups in the region.

    Between 1989 and 1997, when the guerrilla payments were made, there were 54 massacres in the banana zone municipalities of Apartadó, Carepa and Turbo, according to information from the Observatory of Conflict and Memory of the National Center of Historical Memory in Colombia. The guerrillas assassinated 181 individuals in 21 of these massacres. Fifteen of these were the work of the FARC.

    Chiquita’s internal documents show the company funded all of these armed groups, dissidents and political movements, but in amounts that varied depending on the terms negotiated with each organization. In accounting records the company used color code names to record the destination of the payments without mentioning the names of the recipient guerrilla groups. In underlying documentation, company officials often used fictitious, misleading or euphemistic descriptions for the payments to subversive organizations, such as “chopped wood,” “gasoline,” or “boys in the hills.”

    To conceal the payments, Chiquita invented an accounting system that we described in the second article in this series.

    The guerrilla payments were consigned to the so-called “Citizen Security Account” and were made primarily through Banadex and the Compañía Frutera de Sevilla, Chiquita’s two main Colombian subsidiaries, but some payments also were made by way of the multinational’s Colombian partners, like Banazuñiga y Banacosta. There are also outlays registered under the name “Henríquez,” a possible reference to the Henríquez Gallo family, which was heavily invested in the banana plantations in Urabá. In 2014, two members of the Henríquez clan, Jaime and his brother Guillermo, were identified as paramilitary financiers by former AUC chiefs Raúl Hasbún and Freddy Rendón Herrera.

    In January 2000, as part of secret testimony before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Robert F. Kistinger, a top Chiquita executive in Cincinnati, insisted that the company was being extorted by guerrillas. Nevertheless, drafts of confidential internal memoranda show that company officials did not want to characterize the payments as extortion, instead suggesting the term “citizen security payments,” as seen in the following record.

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    Neither did the company denounce the extortion attempts or inform the Colombian government that it was being threatened by guerrillas. VerdadAbieta.com has learned that the Attorney General’s office recorded only one complaint made by Chiquita to Colombian authorities, and only in reference to paramilitary groups.

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    According to Mario Agudelo, a former EPL guerrilla who went on to lead the Esperanza political movement and who knows well the history of Urabá, “in the case of the ‘paras’ and the FARC there was permanent financing.” This was distinct, in his view, from the sporadic payments that were made to other armed groups in the zone. “To what extent was this the result of armed pressure? I’m in no position to say in which case yes and in which case no, but what is tangible is that they provided support and this was the result of a long-term agreement.”

    The basic situation was well-understood by actors in the zone at that time. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, a former Colombian Army colonel assigned to the 17th Brigade in Urabá in the mid-1990s, remembers hearing similar things from his commanding officer, Gen. Víctor Álvarez: “I was told one day, ‘those bananeros, those ranchers, they come here to ask for support, that the guerrillas are threatening them, that they are being extorted by them, but I know that they give them money under the table.”

    Negotiating with the ELN

    One of the earliest available reports on the guerrilla payments was prepared by Colombia security chief Juan Manuel Alvarado and faxed to his boss, the longtime head of corporate security in Cincinnati, Alejandro “Al” Bakoczy, on March 11, 1993. Alvarado’s report covers payments made through so-called “Citizen Security Accounts” from December 1991 through December 1992. Alvarado said his team was more comfortable making deals with the ELN and the FARC, since these larger, more established groups had a “widely-respected hierarchical structure that is adhered to before any decisions are made.”

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    In the first years of the 1990s it was the ELN that received the lion’s share of Chiquita’s guerrilla payments, in part because “from the beginning it had complete knowledge of the conformationof Banadex” and could thereby justify charging higher fees than other groups. The ELN also maintained a strong presence in the banana-producing zone of Magdalena, where another Chiquita subsidiary known as Samarex was located.

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    The total amounts to be paid to the groups were set forth each year along with a schedule laying out when each payment was due. The sums were not imposed by the guerrillas so much as they were the result of a negotiating process. As John Ordman, a regional manager who served as a bridge between Chiquita’s Colombia operations and top executives in the U.S., explained in his testimony to the SEC, “you don’t just pay what you’re told or you’ll end up paying a filthy fortune. I mean, you’ve got to negotiate, you’ve got to say I can’t pay, I’m not going to pay, you’ve got to kind of be dragged to the wedding kicking and shouting or it really gets out of hand. But you have to kind of know when to eventually show up or it also gets out of hand.”

    For example, in 1993 the company negotiated the ELN’s initial request for 20 million Colombian Pesos down to 12 million. But this was still too much for the person who approved the payments, who wrote in the margins of one record, “To me 12 [million] is too much for these guys. . . What kind of deal is that?”

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    The payments allowed the company to continue its operations. And even while none of the records associated with the ELN openly suggest that the money was offered in exchange for any service, the document below shows that in some instances Banadex officials were interested in establishing a quid pro quo with the group. “As with R [a reference to the FARC, known by the color code Rojo or Red] they shouldn’t block anything we do with sindicato [labor union].”

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    At the beginning of the 1990s, an intense political debate within the ELN resulted in the creation of the dissident CRS faction that laid down its weapons in April 1994. For the company, the creation of this organization from the body of the ELN was a significant concern since they believed that the splinter group also knew the true extent of Chiquita’s holdings in Colombia.

    “Brown [Café, a reference to the CRS], as a relatively new dissident group, is eager for money and uses any mean necessary to get it,” according to the “Citizen Security Accounts” report prepared by Alvarado for Bakoczy. In one incident, the CRS kidnapped an individual connected to Chiquita as a way of signaling it was an independent organization to be dealt with separately and not under the previously-negotiated accord with the ELN.

    Nevertheless, the communiqués from the security staff show that CRS was never seen as a serious threat and received only a small fraction of well over one million dollars in payments to Colombian guerrilla groups.

    Accords with the FARC

    According to the Chiquita accounting records, between 1991 and 1992 the FARC did not have much contact with the company and in particular did not make demands for money. A report from the security staff said that frequent confrontations with the Colombian Army kept the guerrillas too busy to arrange meetings during those years.

    Chiquita, nevertheless, did not doubt the extent of the FARC’s power and influence in Urabá. “It is so influential that through a single order it has the ability to paralyze operations in the production areas, generating problems for commercial and social order,” according to a report from Compañía Frutera de Sevilla dated September 4, 1992. The staff of the Chiquita subsidiary in Santa Marta said the FARC resorted to extreme violence in cases where people did not comply with their demands.

    The FARC shared the company’s concern about the proliferation of new subversive groups in search of money—a situation that had led to a “destabilization of the zone,” according to the company’s reports, and confrontations among the competing factions.

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    This survey of the general security situation in and around company facilities in the port city of Turbo also refers to an agreement between the Institute for Social Insurance (Instituto de Seguros Sociales), the Banazuñiga group and the labor unions. One of the union representatives, who the company said was clearly “allied with the FARC,” had refused to sign the accord and convinced others to do the same. For Chiquita, it thus became a priority to gain a better understanding of the “real situation” with the FARC.

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    By 1993 the balance had shifted, and soon the FARC became the leading recipient of Chiquita’s cash payments to guerrilla groups. In a request for disbursement on May 11, it is evident that the FARC had identified three of the farm groups that worked with Chiquita Brands and knew the names of staff members. But although the FARC was now demanding more money from the company, the company still did not consider the payments to be significant. In the document below, security staff characterize the new arrangement with the FARC as “advantageous.”

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    The records show that there were not any serious setbacks in the company’s relationship with the FARC, and that even the intermediaries said that it was “easy” to negotiate with the oldest rebel group. When a problem arose, such as a stolen vehicle in Magdalena, they would simply set up a meeting and resolve the problem. As was the case with the ELN, records from May 1993 show Banadex management seeking “an understanding” with the FARC (“R”) that they not “block anything we do with the sindicato.”

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    In 1995, with the arrival in the zone of the increasingly powerful United Self-defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU), under the command of Carlos and Vicente Castaño, company officials seemed concerned about a deterioration in relations with the FARC. “Despite the fact that we fulfilour obligations in terms of salary, taxes, trade, etc., the name C.I BDX has been mentioned in a supposed relationship with paramilitary groups,” according to a security report from September 18, 1995.

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    Over many weeks, and through various channels, VerdadAbierta.com tried to communicate with members of the FARC Secretariat, including Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, alias “Timoleón Jímenez,” top leader of the insurgent organization, and Luciano Marín Arango, also known as “Iván Márquez,” chief negotiator in peace talks with the national government. It was Márquez who led the group’s operations in Urabá during the era when Chiquita was making payments to the FARC. But despite a number of attempts to get their valuable perspectives on the matter, there was no reply, raising doubts about the group’s willingness to come clean and tell the truth before the tribunals of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and Colombian society.

    The Fractured EPL and the Arrival of Paramilitaries

    On March 1, 1991, in camps around the country, a little more than 2,000 guerrillas from the EPL abandoned the armed struggle and embarked on the construction of the Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (Hope, Peace and Liberty) political movement. Around 150 guerrillas did not demobilize and reorganized under the leadership of Francisco Caraballo, who began to launch attacks against his former comrades with assistance from the FARC.

    In their pragmatic reports, Chiquita’s security staff in Colombia registered deep concern about the proliferation of new armed groups and the infighting among them, and decided that it would be necessary to come to separate agreements with each group. In the “Citizen Security” report dated September 1992, for example, the company said the Caraballo group was committing crimes to collect money. Among other things, they hijacked and raided the company’s trucks along access roads from Medellin to the coast, so Banadex chose to use the name of third parties to transport their merchandise.

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    “I acknowledge that we imposed a series of fees, and the precise deployment that we had in Urabá allowed us to broaden the base theprovided the tributes, and we collected what was necessary for our subsistence and the development of the organization,” Francisco Caraballo told VerdadAbierta.com. “These tribute payments, in the majority of cases, were a kind of agreement. It is a very special situation, some collaborated, and I should say it clearly, so as not to create problems, so they collaborated, you could say, voluntarily.” Caraballo added that, “as revolutionaries, we were not trying to become a wealthy organization, but something much less.”

    Former EPL insurgent Jaime Fajardo Landaeta, one of the leaders who pushed for peace accords with the national government, said that following the demobilization the majority of the resources that the ex-guerrillas received came from the government: “We had a very complicated problem: the people left who were left in control of the organization’s resources at the time of the demobilization were from the secretariat, which was in the hands of Francisco Caraballo and two others, ‘Danilo’ and ‘Eduardo’, who did not negotiate the demobilization.”

    The group also got support from the Asociación de Bananeros de Colombia (Augura) to launch its political movement, payments that were permitted under Colombian law. In the case of Chiquita Brands, according to its own reports, during the first half of 1992 members of the Esperanza group tried to collect funds from as many Banadex farms as possible, after which the company agreed to channel payments through Augura.

    From the moment of the demobilization, dissidents under Caraballo working with the FARC launched an extermination campaign against members of Esperanza, Paz y Libertad, who they viewed as traitors. As a result, a group from Esperanza decided to rearm to defend themselves, creating the Comandos Populares (mentioned above).

    “The dissidents of the EPL formed the group because they did not think that the peace process had provided them with any space, so they left and they took up arms; the others, the Comandos, they believed the leaders of Esperanza, Paz y Libertad were not helping with security issues, that the leadership had their own vehicles and their own security schemes, so they were not interested in the security of the others,” explained Mario Agudelo.

    Chiquita viewed the Comandos as “the armed wing” of the Esperanza political movement and increasingly came to see the militia as something more akin to a right-wing paramilitary group. As early as 1992 the Colombia security team said the group was widely considered to be “on the side of the government” and that the Army “on occasions allowed them to move freely around the zone.”

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    The security staff said the Comandos Populares relied on the same tactics they used “when they were part of the guerrilla group,” including “threats, intimidation, blackmail, etc.,” adding that banana growers had filed complaints against them through Augura. In the case of Chiquita, the group had only asked for little things like “drugs, boots and ammunition.”

    From June 1992 through May 1995, Chiquita transferred at least 36,000,000 Colombian Pesos to Esperanza and the Comandos Populares, primarily through Augura. By that point, Colombia’s security team reported the existence of a “nexus” between the Comandos and a group of paramilitaries that had recently arrived in the region and who were “ready to do away with everything that smells communist.” The Comandos were said to have “initiated joint patrols” with the newly-arrived paramilitaries, according to the report from Chiquita’s subsidiary in Colombia.

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    Whatever concerns the company may have had about the tactics employed by Esperanza and its allies in the Comandos Populares, by 1996 the general impression held by senior Chiquita officials in Cincinnati was that the groups had been helpful. In a September 1996 meeting with internal auditors, Al Bakoczy, the corporate security chief in Cincinnati, said that Esperanza (here as “EPL”) had “helped us out a lot with the labor issue.”

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    Why did the guerrilla payments stop?

    The arrival of paramilitaries to the zone in 1995 was a watershed moment for Chiquita. Two years later, the guerrilla payments had ceased completely, and the company had begun to redirect the money toward paramilitaries and their allies in the Convivir self-defense groups. The key moment, by most accounts, was a meeting between Carlos Castaño, leader of the ACCU paramilitary group; Charles Keiser, general manager of Banadex; and Reinaldo Escobar de la Hoz, a lawyer for Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiary.

    Irving Bernal Giraldo, who was a member of Augura and one of the founders of the Convivir Papagayo, which secretly directed money to paramilitary groups, remembered this episode in a June 30, 2015 hearing before the Colombian prosecutor’s office: “You all are giving money to the guerrillas and I am not going to allow that,” Castaño told them. Bernal, who had just been released from a kidnapping, denied the paramilitary chief’s accusation and floated the possibility that Augura could finance Private Security Cooperatives such as the Convivir.

    “Then we both calmed down a bit, and he looked at Mr. Keiser and said to him, ‘But you are giving money to the guerrillas,’ to which Keiser nodded.” Bernal said Castaño and Keiser talked in private after which the paramilitary chief said, “Now the matter is clear.”

    The story behind this meeting is, for the most part, hidden history. In 2007, Chiquita Brands admitted that it paid $1.7 million to paramilitary groups and paid a $25 million fine to the U.S. government. In Colombia, the company has not indemnified a single victim, and the judicial process has been stuck, immobile, for ten years.

    Will the alleged financiers of the conflict in Urabá remain unpunished in the face of all of this new evidence? Wait until next week and the fourth and final installment of the series of articles by VerdadAbierta.com and the National Security Archive.

    READ THE DOCUMENTS

    Document 01

    1992-09-04

    Compañía Frutera de Sevilla, Department of Industrial Protection
    Informe general sobre seguridad en la Division Turbo
    [General Report on Security in the Turbo Division]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 02

    1993-03-11

    To: A. Bakoczy
    From: J. Alvarado, Banadex and Compañía Frutera de Sevilla, Department of Industrial Protection
    Cuenta de Seguridad Ciudadana Movimiento General [Citizen Security Account General Movement], includes cover sheet

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 03

    1993-04-05

    Negociación con Respecto a Azul [Negotiation with Respect to Blue]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 04

    1993-05-11

    To: [Redacted]
    From: Protección Industrial [Industrial Protection]
    Programa de Reducción de Celadores [Reduction in Security Guards Program]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 05

    1993-05-11

    To: [Redacted]
    From: Protección Industrial [Industrial Protection]
    Solicitud Desembolso [Disbursement Request]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 06

    1995-04-24

    Confidencial [Confidential Security Report]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 07

    1995-00-00

    C.F.S. (SAMAREX) Santa Marta
    Gastos Seguridad Causados 1.995
    [Security Expenses Realized in 1996]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Document 08

    1995-05-16

    Division Turbo
    Security Account

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 09

    1995-06-16

    Banadex, Department of Industrial Protection
    Informe General

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 10

    1995-09-18

    Banadex / Samarex
    Informe de Seguridad [Security Report]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 11

    1996-09-13

    Bakoczy Explanation of How Extortion Payments Work

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 12

    1997-00-00 ca.

    General Manager’s Expenses, Colombia, 1993-1996

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

    Document 13

    1997-02-28

    CBI Internal Audit Department
    1996 General Manager’s Expenses

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Department of Justice

  • RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Hungary 1956 : Reviving the Debate over US (In)action during the Revolution

    RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Hungary 1956 : Reviving the Debate over US (In)action during the Revolution

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    The toppled head of Joseph Stalin sits on Rákóczi út in Budapest on October 23, 1956. (Photo: Róbert Hofbauer, Fortepan, from Wikimedia Commons)

    Hungary 1956 : Reviving the Debate over US (In)action during the Revolution

    Eisenhower’s Caution Broadly Justified, Declassified Defense Department Study Finds

    But Swifter, More Imaginative Response Might Have Brought Different Results

    U.S. Officials Weighed but Rejected Many Options Including Tactical Nukes

    Posted May 10, 2017
    National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 591
    Edited by Dr. Ronald D. Landa
    Introduced by Malcolm Byrne
    For more information: nsarchiv, 202.994.7000

    Washington D.C., May 10, 2017 – The United States’ cautious response to the unexpectedly powerful popular uprising in Hungary in 1956 grew out of the Eisenhower administration’s policy of “keeping the pot boiling” in Eastern Europe without having it “boil over” into a possible nuclear conflict, according to an unpublished Defense Department historical study posted for the first time by the National Security Archive at The George Washington University.

    Eisenhower and his top aides, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles – often seen as one of the most aggressive Cold Warriors – opted for the long view of encouraging a gradual erosion of Soviet domination of the socialist camp.

    The study, by Dr. Ronald D. Landa, is a follow-on to another recently posted here entitled, “Almost Successful Recipe: The United States and East European Unrest prior to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.” Readers are encouraged to examine both documents together since they contain complementary information.

    Defending Eisenhower’s reticence to take stiffer action, including covertly assisting the Hungarian rebels or threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons on supply routes into Hungary, the study notes his concerns about inadvertently touching off a nuclear war with the USSR. At the same time, the author points out that Eisenhower “let the matter slide” by early in the crisis rejecting a recommendation that he convene a special meeting of the National Security Council to consider possible responses, which “undercut the urgency for action.”

    This study differs markedly from a number of Hungarian, American, and other historical accounts that take a harsher view of U.S. policy, accusing it of cynicism, hypocrisy, and plain obliviousness about the nature of the crisis. For one thing, it suggests that the U.N. decision to send an emergency force to the Middle East during the Suez crisis, more than the administration’s rhetoric about loosening Moscow’s ties with the East European satellites or hopes of liberation fostered by Radio Free Europe, was chiefly responsible for any expectations of Western military assistance that Hungarians had.

    Today’s posting is the third and final in a series Landa completed for the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense during 2011 and early 2012. The National Security Archive thanks him for donating these materials.

    READ THE DOCUMENT

    Document 1

    2012-02-00

    The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A Fresh Look at the U.S. Response (Draft, February 2012)

    Draft study by Dr. Ronald D. Landa, prepared for the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

  • RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

    RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

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    Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

    Colombia Payments a “Leap of Faith”

    “We are funding their activities, or we are protecting ourselves. It’s questionable.”

    CFO asks: “How can I audit that? I cannot ask them to sign a receipt.”

    Posted May 2, 2017
    National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 589
    Edited by Michael Evans
    For further information, contact: mevansTwitter: @colombiadocs

    Washington, D.C., May 2, 2017 – Chiquita’s Colombia-based staff questioned the company’s payments to illegal armed groups, and asked whether Chiquita had gone beyond extortion and was directly funding the activities of leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups, even while top company executives became “comfortable” with the idea.

    This is the second in a series of stories jointly published by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com documenting how the world’s most famous banana company financed terrorist groups in Colombia.

    The New Chiquita Papers are the result of a seven-year legal battle waged by the National Security Archive against the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and later Chiquita itself, for access to tens of thousands of records produced by the company during an investigation of illicit payments made in Colombia.

    The Archive has used these records to identify individual Chiquita executives who approved and oversaw years of payments to groups responsible for countless human rights violations in Colombia, but whose roles in the affair have been unknown or unclear until now.

    In this installment, we examine the roles of financial officers, security staff and hired intermediaries on the ground in Colombia who managed an unorthodox payments process one official described as a “leap of faith.”

    The following article was also published today in Spanish at VerdadAbierta.com.

    * * *

    Payments to Armed Groups Generated Internal Conflicts at Chiquita Brands

    The banana company invented an accounting system to hide payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia that they admitted were “impossible to audit.” Even while senior Chiquita officials became “comfortable” with the way the payments were made, officials based in Colombia had their reservations.

    By Tatiana Navarrete and Juan Diego Restrepo E.
    Edited by Michael Evans – This is the second in a series of articles published jointly by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com

    “[These] were payments that, you know, are questionable, payments to the guerrillas that at the end are payments that, you know, are questionable,” said Jorge Forton, chief financial officer for Banadex, Chiquita’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Colombia, in his April 27, 1999 statement to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). “We are funding their activities, or we are protecting ourselves. It’s questionable.”[1]

    The deposition of this Peruvian accountant, who worked for Chiquita from 1990-1998, turns out to be key evidence on a little-known chapter in the history of Colombia’s banana-growing zone: payments made by the multinational fruit company to anti-government guerrilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and the funding of political organizations like the Current for Socialist Renovation (CRS), Hope, Peace and Liberty, and the Popular Commands.

    Forton began in 1990 at Chiquita headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio, looking for opportunities to expand the company’s worldwide operations. In the middle of 1994, he was sent to Colombia to assess how the local economy was affecting the prices of banana production. Over the next few months, Forton returned to the country several times and proposed alternatives for reorganizing Colombian operations. At the end of the year, Forton accepted a new position as chief financial officer for Banadex in Medellín.

    Since his arrival in Colombia in early 1995, the accountant knew that Chiquita made “sensitive payments” to illegal armed groups to ensure, as he was told, that its workers were not killed or kidnapped and that its plantations were not burned to the ground. “My role was to see how we could standardize and have a good control of those payments,” he said to the SEC.

    At that time, there were two Chiquita offices in Colombia: Banadex, in Medellín, and Samarex, in Santa Marta; each with independent accounting systems and separate sets of books to record payments not only to guerrillas but to the Colombian Armed Forces, which also benefitted from the company’s secret security fund. Forton’s job was to unify the accounts so Cincinnati could better track the payments. The company asked him to prepare a report on all the “sensitive payments” realized since 1992, something that, according to Forton, was almost impossible given the “poor accounting records” that had existed up to that point.

    image001 2

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, pp. 45-46.

    So Forton implemented a new procedure to better account for the payments. He introduced two basic rules: there would be no more cash payments, and none would be authorized without an invoice.

    Forton said he was “not comfortable” with the guerilla payments: “How do I feel those payments are really going to those groups? I mean, how can I audit that? I cannot ask them to sign a receipt.”

    The fact that Colombian guerrilla groups could not be counted on to provide receipts elevated the role of the Security Department and the intermediaries they relied on as go-betweens with the insurgent factions, military units, and paramilitary groups at the receiving end of those payments. These are the names and signatures that appear on the forms used to request payments to the various armed groups.

    The fewer people who knew about the “sensitive payments,” the better, so the payments only needed the authorization of the general manager, Charles Keiser, and the signature of Forton. Keiser was followed as general manager by Álvaro Acevedo, who later oversaw several years of payments to the paramilitary United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and today works for a fruit producer in Ecuador. VerdadAbierta.com tried to contact Acevedo, but did not receive a response.

    Forton instituted the “1016” form to register all of the payments and to camouflage them among the fruit multinational many other expenses. To do so, he created two new accounts: “Logistics,” for payments to government agencies; and “Operations” for payments to guerrilla groups.

    This rigorous accounting system coldly recorded the harsh reality of life in the violently-contested region of Urabá during the 1990s. Forton was aware of the impact that the payments had on public order and thought it indispensable to know whether the money found its way to the intended recipients. At the very least, the ultimate destination of the payments mattered more to Forton than to his superiors in Cincinnati, who had not witnessed Colombia’s war in person.

    In a vivid account to the SEC, Forton said the surge in paramilitary groups (or “anti-guerrilla groups,” as he called them)—who were also financed by the company—had intensified conflict in the region. He recalled a day when some 20 bus riders were killed, and a subsequent call from company staff in Urabá asking what to do. “I have a wife that carried the body of her husband into the office to ask for money to bury him,” he remembered.

    image002 1

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, p. 57.

    “There were situations where, I mean, things that I hope not to live again. But after being exposed to those horrible stories, I understood better if the money was reaching the end or not,” he explained.

    Forton left Colombia in 1996 and was effectively fired from the company in 1998 for his role in authorizing bribes to Colombian port authorities in Turbo, Antioquia. Forton is now a high-ranking official at Dun & Bradstreet, according to his LinkedIn account. VerdadAbierta.com did not receive a response from a message sent to Forton through the social media network.

    Where did the money actually go?

    The names of the individuals from the Security Department who handled the “sensitive payments” to armed groups in Colombia during that time, Juan Manuel Alvarado and John Stabler, are found in a draft Chiquita legal memorandum dated January 5, 1994.

    One of the chief intermediaries used as a bridge between the company and the insurgent groups was René Alejandro Osorio J., an attorney from Antioquia who in 1992 signed a services contract with the Compañía Frutera de Sevilla, another of Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries.

    image003 1

    His role as a “Security Consultant” for Chiquita is revealed in an earlier draft of the same memo, dated January 4, 1994, which identifies Osorio as the company’s “contact with the various guerrilla groups in both Divisions.” The professional middleman was responsible for making “guerrilla extortion payments” for Chiquita. In many internal company records, he is referred to by the initials “R.O.”

    image004 4

    Another document obtained by the National Security Archive is a copy of a contract signed by Osorio indicating that he was paid five million Colombian Pesos (about five thousand U.S. dollars) every three months. Osorio assumed all risks involved with the assigned work, but Chiquita would provide legal assistance if it ever became necessary. VerdadAbierta.com contacted him in Medellin, where he apparently resides, to hear his version, but made clear that he "was not going to refer to that subject".

    image005 1

    The sort of informality that existed between Chiquita Brands and the intermediaries made it even more difficult to determine if the money was actually reaching the guerrillas and generated suspicions among some of the managers in Medellín.

    Even when the payments were made in cash, before the arrival of Forton as CFO, it was never really known whether they arrived in their totality to the guerrillas. John Ordman, based in Costa Rica, was a key link between Chiquita’s Colombian operations and top executives at the company’s headquarters in Cincinnati (as explained in the first article in this series). Ordman called these payments "a leap of faith."

    “Now does it get distributed to the people that it should be? Does it get distributed – you know, there’s a commission for this guy [name redacted]. Does he take half of it and put it in his pocket? How do you tell? There’s no way of determining that.”

    SEC Testimony of John Ordman, November 23, 1999, pp. 124-125.

    In spite of this, Ordman said he felt “comfortable that this was being handled in a responsible way.” The view of Robert F. Kistinger, head of Chiquita’s Banana Group, was much the same. He told the SEC he saw the guerrilla payments as an “ongoing cost” of company operations, like the purchase of fertilizers or agrichemicals.

    Forton told the SEC that he took the concerns about his inability to track the payments to a top executive in Cincinnati, asking, “How can I audit this?” And the response was: “If nobody is killed, it’s because the money is reaching the end. That’s the only way to say that the money is there.”

    image008 1

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, p. 58.

    The person who provided that response may well have been Robert Kistinger, since SEC investigators asked him about this same episode during his interview, but denied ever having such a conversation with Forton.

    SEC Testimony of Robert Kistinger, January 6, 2000, pp. 66-67.

    Forton was not the only person who worried that the money could not be tracked. His replacement in Colombia, John Paul Olivo, who arrived in 1996, voiced similar concerns in his SEC testimony. Olivo’s name has been known to Colombian investigators since 2009 when the Attorney General opened an investigation against him and two other officials, Charles Keiser and Dorn Wenninger, for conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony—a process that has gone nowhere in eight years.

    In his December 1999 testimony to the SEC, Olivo said he did not feel comfortable with the way the company made the payments, since it was impossible to know whether Alvarado, Osorio and the others were actually delivering the money to the armed groups. “The only person that requests funds and payments for guerrillas is the head of security,” he said. “No one ever knows who – or negotiates with this groups, except for himself. And that’s been my . . . concern since day one.”

    image011 1

    SEC Testimony of John Paul Olivo, December 15, 1999, p. 64.

    More than extortion?

    In his declaration, Kistinger said the company made the payments because they were being extorted and wanted to protect the lives of their workers amid constant threats. For this reason, Chiquita also paid Colombian military and police forces, above all when they needed special security services.

    While the internal discussions of Chiquita employees mostly revolved around the technical aspects of the payments, Forton’s deposition is testament to the thin line between paying extortion and willingly funding the operations of a violent group.

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, pp. 90-91.

    Other documents obtained by the National Security Archive indicate that Chiquita’s outlays to guerrillas were perhaps not as innocent as the company portrayed them in negotiations with Colombian and U.S. authorities. As the following draft legal memorandum demonstrates, at least some Chiquita officials believed the payments were illegal under Colombian law, while others wanted to eliminate evidence of such knowledge from the record.

    The same memo also suggests that not all of the payments were the result of extortion. If indeed the multinational made the payments to protect itself from guerrilla threats, it is equally clear that some of Chiquita’s farms were supplied with “security personnel” from “Guerrilla Groups.”

    Why did Chiquita Brands make payments to virtually every guerrilla group in Urabá? How much did the FARC, ELN, EPL and the other groups receive each year, according to company records? Were there any contracts or agreements with insurgent groups?

    The complex relationship between Chiquita Brands and Colombian guerrillas will be the subject of the next report in this series, to be published next Tuesday by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com.

    • The depositions of the seven Chiquita employees interviewed by the SEC were obtained by the National Security Archive after seven years of litigation. Although the names of those officials remained hidden, it was possible to identify them by comparing the transcripts to other official sources.

    READ THE DOCUMENTS

    Document 01

    1992-12-14

    [Bill for Services Rendered]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Bill for services rendered to Compañia Frutera de Sevilla on letterhead of "Rene Alejandro Osorio J."

    Document 02

    1992-12-18

    ["Contract for Provision of Professional Services"] [Includes original attachment]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Copy of a contract between a Chiquita subsidiary and Rene Osorio, identified by the initials "R.O." The attached forms indicate that the three million Peso payment was to a "security advisor" who "works as liaison with activist groups."

    Document 03

    1994-01-04

    "Reportable Payments in Colombia and Manager’s Expense Payments" [Draft; includes original annotations

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Draft Chiquita legal memorandum on payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia identifies intermediary employed by Security Department to handle payments to guerrilla groups.

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Document 04

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>1994-01-05

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>"Reportable Payments in Colombia and Manager’s Expense Payments" [Draft; includes original annotations

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Draft Chiquita legal memorandum on payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia identifies members of the Security Department, John Stabler and Juan Manuel Alvarado.

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Document 05

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>1999-04-27

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>[SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 45-48.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton describes the challenge of auditing payments to guerrillas since the groups do not provide any kind of receipt.

    Document 06

    1999-04-27

    [SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 57-60.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton recounts a call with company staff who told him about a massacre of some 20 bus travelers in Urabá.

    Document 07

    1999-04-27

    [SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 89-92.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton says it was “questionable” whether payments to guerrillas were for self-protection or for “funding their activities.”

    Document 08

    1999-10-23

    [SEC Testimony of John Ordman], November 23, 1999, pp. 121-128.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Ordman says there is “no way of determining” whether money channeled through the Security Department and third-party intermediaries ever reached the intended recipients.

    Document 09

    1999-12-15

    [SEC Testimony of John Paul Olivo], December 15, 1999, pp. 61-64.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Olivo says his “concern since day one” was that he could never be sure that money intended for guerrillas and other groups was not being stolen by a third-party intermediary.

    Document 10

    2000-01-06

    [SEC Testimony of Robert Kistinger], January 6, 2000, pp. 65-68.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Kistinger does not recall telling “Jorge” the way to know whether company funds had reached illegal armed groups was “if there are no killings.”

    NOTE

    [1] While the name of the SEC witness identified here as Jorge Forton was redacted from the transcript, there is abundant evidence indicating that Forton is the Chiquita witness interviewed by the SEC on April 27, 1999.

    · A 1998 series in the Cincinnati Enquirer identified Forton as one of the officials central to the bribery case that triggered the SEC probe.

    · The witness describes the role he played overseeing Chiquita’s financial operations in Colombia from 1994-1998, while an account for “Jorge Forton” on the popular social media network LinkedIn indicates that he held various positions at Chiquita from 1990-1998, including “Country Controller.”

    · Throughout the testimony, the witness describes how he sent financial reports to his superiors about so-called “sensitive payments” that were made in Colombia, mainly to government officials and to guerrilla insurgent groups.

    · The witness describes a conversation he had about these payments with a superior at the company: “… I questioned the nature of the payment. And he said: [Redacted], don’t get involved in this. I’m handling this and I know this is correct.” And basically, that was an invitation to get out. I mean, I wasn’t—I shouldn’t worry about questioning those payments, because, as I said, if no killings are, meaning that the payments were correct, reached the end user.”

    · Another witness who has been separately identified as Robert Kistinger, is asked by the SEC about this same conversation during his later testimony: “[Redacted] also said that … that you had responded to him, “Jorge, if there are no killings, you know the money is getting to the guerrillas.”

    · Another witness separately identified as Orlando Dangond mentions “Jorge” as being present at a key meeting where the bribe was discussed: “[Redacted] and myself may have explained to Jorge what had been going on, and then I believe [Redacted] explained to him about the payment.”

    · While questioning a witness separately identified as John Ordman the SEC investigator mentions “Jorge Forton” during a discussion of how certain sensitive payments were recorded and reported to corporate headquarters: “… [T]his document related to Jorge Forton and this document contains disclosures…”

    · Information at beginning of interview reveals that the witness is from Arequipa (assumed to be Peru). The LinkedIn account for Jorge Forton (mentioned above) says that he is a graduate of Catholic University of Santa María, a university in Arequipa, Peru.

  • SECURITY FILES /// 5 Questions : Operation Euphrates Shield

    SECURITY FILES /// 5 Questions : Operation Euphrates Shield

    1. What are the technical details of the operation?

    The “Operation Euphrates Shield” is a military operation led by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) together with the Syrian opposition forces to eliminate DAESH from Jarabulus in the Syrian province of Aleppo. Along with the Turkish air and land forces, special TAF units and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) are also taking part in this operation, which is partially supported by the international coalition against DAESH. Turkey trained and equipped the Syrian opposition forces of Sultan Murad Brigade, Sham Front, Faylaq al-Sham, Jaysh al-Nasr, Jaysh al-Tahrir, Hamza Division, Liwa al-Muattasim, Nureddin Zengi Brigade, 13th Division and Liwa Suqur al-Jabal for the “Operation Euphrates Shield” in advance. It is noteworthy that additionally to groups that were part of the Hawar-Kilis Operations Room, which had liberated Al-Rai from DAESH, the Nureddin Zengi Brigade, 13th Division, Jaysh al-Nasr and Faylaq al-Sham participated in the operation.

    Turkey has been striving for a long time to take control from DAESH of the 90-kilometer-long Azaz-Jarabulus region with the aim of securing its border line as in the case of the zone between Azaz and al-Rai that was already liberated from DAESH. In this manner, the “Operation Euphrates Shield” is in fact the second phase of a controlled effort to secure Turkey´s border with Syria. The operation began at 4 a.m., August 24 with Turkish artillery and howitzer strikes. Following these shellings, the Turkish Air Force and the International Coalition targeted several DAESH positions and helped to create a corridor for 25 TAF tanks and Syrian opposition forces to cross the border to Syria along with TAF Special Forces and other special units of the intelligence agency. Constitutively, the “Euphrates Shield” operation had two phases. The first phase aimed to liberate several villages and areas in the west and south of Jarabulus in order to be able to lay siege to the city. In the second phase, an offensive attack enabled the entrance of the aforementioned forces to the city center. The numbers of the Syrian opposition forces involved in this operation is estimated at 2,000-3,000.

    2. What is the importance of Jarabulus? Why did Turkey start this operation?

    Jarabulus is very important for all actors on the ground. The city has a logistic importance due to its position on the west banks of the Euphrates. In addition to this, its border crossing with Turkey will allow the logistic support of Turkey-supported oppositional forces. This border gate was considered DAESH’s last door to the world by virtue of the presence of illegal crossing points. Possible future operations towards south-west fronts are now easier since the city is secured by the Euphrates River on its east side and Turkey in the north. To create Turkey´s long-awaited security zone, DAESH could be attacked from the Azaz-Marea-al-Rai axis and from Jarabulus simultaneously.

    Jarabulus was taken by opposition forces on July 2012 and then captured by DAESH at the end of 2013. After the loss of Tal Abyad, DAESH held its last border gate at Jarabulus. Turkey arrested lots of people who tried to cross the border using illegal border-crosssings near the border gate of Jarabulus. In 2015, the PYD tried to take control of Jarabulus, so they could unite their self-declared cantons in Northern Syria. Jarabulus is important to Turkey for avoiding further threats to its border and for preventing the fusion of the PYD cantons.

    3. How will the regional dimensions be shaped after the operation?

    During his visit to Ankara, Joe Biden constantly emphasized that “The people of Turkey have no greater friend than the United States of America.” This could be understood as the USA expressing its wish to continue its cooperating relationship with Turkey. In this regard the U.S. demand that the PYD/YPG withdraw their forces back to the east side of the Euphrates could be interpreted as a positive step towards Turkey´s Syria policy. Furthermore, the weak response of the Assad regime could be seen as a result of the Turkish-Iranian talks. Added to this, the normalization process with Russia leads to the same enemy setting, namely of DAESH and PYD/YPG. The policy of Turkey from the very beginning to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria made it possible to reach an agreement on this base with the other sides. The common goal to fight against DAESH, which was created by the USA, now has developed into a fight also against the PYD/YPG to save the territorial integrity of Syria.

    On the other side, all developments until “Operation Euphrates Shield” on the northern countryside of Aleppo were in favor of the PYD/YPG. The SDF/PYD/YPG, which has gained the support of the US-led Internal Coalition lead, was able to make great progress against DAESH and the Syrian opposition. But with this operation, Turkey and the Turkish Air Force are now effective on the ground. This was the first time Turkish jets entered the Syrian airspace since the downing of a Russian jet. With this move Turkey also broke the aerial control of the International Coalition. As a result, this will also influence the situation on the ground in Syria. The PYD/YPG has made positive gains for its dream of a PYD corridor under the banner of the fight against DAESH, but now they have lost their role as the force fighting DAESH and given up their advantage as a result of the air support from the International Coalition. The opposition force will be able to advance against DAESH and to limit the countryside controlled by the PYD/YPG. After pushing back PYD/YPG and DAESH forces, the position of Turkey and the Syrian opposition will get stronger.

    4. How is the existence of the PYD/PKK in Northern Syria a threat to Turkey?

    The PYD gained dominance in the regions of Afrin, Ayn al-Arab and Jazira by creating a symbiotic relationship with the Assad regime during the Syrian revolution. Since 2003, they acted as the Syrian affiliate of the PKK. Finally, they took control of a region in the northwest and northeast of Syria with the aim of creating a corridor that went as far as Afrin. The PYD has been behind the ethnic cleansing of Turkmens and Arabs in the region in an effort to create a society dominated by its own population. The PYD also give the HPG logistic support for terrorist attacks in Turkey. The military alliance with the USA against DAESH gave them new power, as a result of which they declared the Northern Syrian Federation. In conclusion, the PYD is a threat to Turkey and to the territorial integrity of Syria.

    5. What are the next steps for Turkey?

    One can expect that Turkey will take steps to effectuate a safe zone after the “Operation Euphrates Shield,” which has been on its agenda for a long time. A buffer zone may be established, which covers an area between Azaz and Jarabulus of 90 km in length and 40 km in depth and which has been liberated from DAESH and PYD/PKK terrorist groups. Thus, while Turkey eliminates major threats to its national security, people who forcibly migrated from these areas, can now return to their homes safely. After “Operation Euphrates Shield,” Turkey will carry on the air support to opposition forces to enable them to progress firstly to al-Rai and then further south against DAESH. Turkey should take steps to secure its borderline as much as possible and provide the Syrian opposition forces the support to go deeper towards the southern countryside. With this change of the balance of power, Turkey can support the unification efforts of the Syrian opposition forces in Idlib and Aleppo and lead them toward becoming a powerful actor on the ground and at the negotiation tables with the regime. Turkey should also try to isolate the YPG and to win over other groups that are under the umbrella of the SDF. Finally, following this, Turkey should act together with local actors, groups and tribes to push the YPG towards the east of the Euphrates.

  • EU wants Turkey’s Erdogan to be the next ‘Yanukovych’

    EU wants Turkey’s Erdogan to be the next ‘Yanukovych’

     

    Very interesting perspective from Pravda.
    Pulat Tacar
    EU wants Turkey’s Erdogan to be the next ‘Yanukovych’World » Asia » Turkey. The latest and breaking news from Turkey

    When discussing the recent scandal in the relations between Turkey and the European Union, many pay attention to the electoral aspect of this conflict – the forthcoming elections in Germany and France and a referendum in Turkey. However, it remains unclear why Turkish President Erdogan has decided to go to the length of the conflict.

    Many Russian and not only Russian political analysts or teachers of political science do not understand, for some reason, the difference between making and developing decisions in big politics. This is an aspect of paramount importance in understanding the very nature of democracy. For example, many say that we can not change anything in foreign policy, because it is the president, who makes decisions at this point. This is a wrong point of view, because there are many people, who analyze various issues, elaborate decisions and show influence on the president.

    Naturally, there are people, who make decisions, form medium and long-term policy in the European Union.

    Turkish President Recep Erdogan is a very smart and experienced politician, who has an amazing, and I would even say, phenomenal political instinct. Erdogan has a remarkable sense of danger, which allows him to stay in power for so long despite intricate intrigues in the Turkish policy. He has felt something and decided to aggravate the relations with the European Union.

    There are reasons to believe that Erdogan understood that the EU was going to launch the process that could be referred to as the “Ukrainization” of Turkey, in which Erdogan would have to play the role of the Turkish Yanukovych or even Ceausescu or Gaddafi.

    Let’s take a look at the recent history of the European Union. The machine of German and French capital constantly needs the process of EU expansion. When expanding the European Union, the German-French capital destroys productions on newly acquired territories and captures new markets at the same time.

    At first, Germany and France (as well as small countries of the “old” EU) destroyed production in Southern Europe. Spain still has Seat and Italy has Fiat, but there is practically no machine-building in these countries, nor are there shipyards in Greece). Afterwards, having seized and digested the economy and production sector of those countries, the German capital turned to Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.

    Turkey next after Ukraine

    The EU needs to constantly expand by destroying productions in new territories and conquering new markets. Otherwise, the EU will simply disappear in competition with Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Indian, and even Russian and American producers. The European competition will not be able to stand fair competition. Ukraine is the most recent victim of the German-French capital. The German capital has not been able to fully digest it, but the destruction of the Ukrainian national economy is only a matter of time, and the capital will need to expand further. Turkey appears to be next on the line.

    It is important to understand here that capital is not malevolent or insidious. It destroys the Ukrainian economy not because Germany wants the Ukrainians to live worse and worse. On the contrary, German masters of life want the Ukrainian “untermenschen” to live well under the German “ordnung”, gradually turning them into law-abiding and obedient Europeans. I think that when Ukraine recognizes the will of the people of the Crimea and people’s republics of Donbass, Ukraine will become a member of the European Union.

    Simply put, capital is indifferent to everything except its profit. It needs to capture new markets and destroy their production. German and French entrepreneurs naturally assume that selling Volkswagen and Peugeot vehicles in Ukraine is much more profitable than letting Ukraine make its own cars. Therefore, they have decided to let the Ukrainian Zaporozhye Automobile Plant die in peace.

    After digesting the Ukrainian economy that used to be Europe’s fifth largest economy in 1991, German planners and strategists will turn to Turkey as the next candidate for the “European integration.” Similarly, Turkey may become a member of the European Union, if Turkey lets European giants destroy its national industry and agriculture.

    Turkey’s future depends on relations with Russia

    Needless to say that Erdogan does not like the idea. Of course, Turkey is not Ukraine. Yet, Turkey already has its fifth column. This is the old Istanbul commercial capital, which has little to do with the manufacturing sector, but is very interested in Turkey’s accession to the European Union. Representatives of the Istanbul capital despise Erdogan, who relies on industrialists of Anatolia (the Asian part of Turkey).

    Yet, the Anatolian capital that has made Erdogan become the Erdogan he is today, can easily become the comprador capital in nature, because production has reached new stages, when financial services (for example, export services, export insurance, banking services, lending, etc.) play a more important role in terms of profit than production itself. To crown it all, no one knows who is stronger: the Istanbul trade capital or the Anatolian industrial capital.

    In addition, there is the so-called “military” sector of the Turkish economy that remains under the control of the military. First and foremost, it goes about heavy and mining industries, as well as shipbuilding and similar industries. There are many Europe-oriented people among the Turkish military, and those people may support those, who may wish to topple Erdogan like Yanukovych.

    One may say that Erdogan is a lot stronger than Yanukovych. Yet, Yanukovych managed to organize his supporters after the first Maidan in Ukraine and thus win both presidential and parliamentary elections in the country. In 2012-2013, many considered his removal from power absolutely impossible. Similarly, many think that it is impossible to topple Turkish President Erdogan.

    Erdogan understands that Yanukovych’s attempts to sit between two chairs – be nice to both the European Union and Russia – have taken him to the shameful fiasco. Probably, Erdogan correctly assesses the current situation and understands that he needs to be more sincere, more open with Russia. Hopefully, he understands that his political future and, most importantly, the future of Turkey depends on relations with Russia.

    Said Gafurov
    Pravda.Ru

    Read article on the Russian version of Pravda.Ru

  • Is Turkey Still a Democracy?

    Is Turkey Still a Democracy?

    An upcoming referendum and a vicious war of words with Europe could end up making Erdogan more powerful — and isolated — than ever. By david.kenner

    ANKARA, Turkey — In a half-destroyed temple overlooking the Turkish capital, there is a carved inscription of a text known as “The Deeds of the Divine Augustus.” It is the most complete surviving version of the funerary inscription of the first Roman emperor, Augustus. Following its hagiographic accounts of wars won, gladiatorial spectacles commissioned, and money showered upon the populace, it concludes with a line that would later be echoed by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: Augustus, it says, was considered by the people of Rome as the “father of the country.” Two millennia after Augustus, the conspiracies and political machinations of ancient Rome have nothing on modern Turkey. Today, the debate revolves around whether its current ruler, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is echoing Augustus once again — this time by gutting the country’s democratic institutions and concentrating all power in his own hands. On April 16, Turks will vote in a referendum over a package of constitutional amendments meant to concentrate more power in the office of the presidency, the position currently held by Erdogan.

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    The vote serves as a stand-in for the country’s views on Erdogan’s 14 years of rule. The rest of the world, meanwhile, is staging its own informal referendum on Erdogan. Over three days of meetings last week in Ankara, government officials defended the amendments as commonsense measures to ensure administrative stability and reform an undemocratic constitution devised by the country’s former military dictators. The opposition leaders spearheading the “no” campaign in the referendum, meanwhile, warned that the country was sliding into authoritarianism — in some cases, comparing Erdogan’s style of governance to dictators like Saddam Hussein. It’s too soon to predict whether Erdogan will win the upcoming referendum, but his government is already proving incapable of making its case to the West. The referendum has already sparked a new rift between Turkey and several European states. Both Germany and the Netherlands, which are both approaching their own elections amid rising anti-immigrant sentiment, recently banned demonstrations by Turkish officials seeking to drum up the “yes” vote among expatriate Turks. Erdogan responded by accusing both countries of NazismErdogan responded by accusing both countries of Nazism, warning that the Netherlands will “pay the price” for its decision. The spat with Germany and the Netherlands is just one example. On a range of issues — from the state of Turkey’s democracy to the Turkish role in Syria to Turkey’s extradition request for the U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom it accuses of planning last summer’s coup attempt — Western countries have refused to adopt Ankara’s views. Ankara is partially responsible for its own alienation. Consider last week’s trip to Turkey organized for more than a dozen American journalists from outlets such as the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal by Ankara Mayor Melih Gokcek. The event was billed as a chance to meet with the country’s top officials, including President Erdogan, to hear their narrative of the coup attempt and why the United States should extradite Gulen. The meetings, however, failed to materialize, and reporters were treated to a four-hour meeting with Gokcek himself. The majority of reporters left the meeting in protest. During the talk, Gokcek failed to present a single piece of evidence implicating Gulen in the coup and instead laid out his own conspiratorial worldview. “A recent earthquake in the gulf [off Turkey’s western coast] was triggered by the United States and Israel with a ship.… With a little bit of energy, they tried to trigger the fault line,” Gokcek said. The Ankara mayor, a member of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), has warned before that foreign and domestic enemies were causing earthquakes in Turkey. He also mused that Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton had founded the Islamic State, citing the statements of U.S.

    President Donald Trump as corroboration. “I investigate a lot,” he said, when asked for further evidence. “I have the largest intelligence service in the world. You know what it is? Google.” Other officials made the government’s case more successfully. Several argued for a “yes” vote by pointing to the instability of governing coalitions — the republic has had 65 governments in its 94-year history — as a key factor in blocking much-needed reforms and empowering a cadre of unelected bureaucrats and army officers. “I genuinely believe that the current system is not sustainable.… [It] is prone to crises and conflicts,” said Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek. “I would fully recommend that instead of just focusing on fears and theories about President Erdogan, just look at the text.”“I would fully recommend that instead of just focusing on fears and theories about President Erdogan, just look at the text.” The constitutional amendments would concentrate executive power in the hands of the president, a position that until now has been largely ceremonial. The amendments would give him the power to appoint and fire ministers, as well as design state budgets. The president would be able to serve two five-year terms and, unlike now, continue to serve as the head of a political party. With the changes going into effect in 2019, this would potentially allow Erdogan to stay in power until 2029.

    Government officials, however, contend that the package would actually enhance the separation of powers in Turkey by dividing parliament’s existing powers with the office of the presidency. Parliament would maintain the power to approve the president’s budget, ratify international treaties and declarations of war, and overrule a presidential decree through legislation. The legal merits of the constitutional changes aside, government officials also portray a “yes” vote as a victory against their domestic opponents — most prominently, the supporters of Gulen and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged a decades-long insurgency against the state. “I’m convinced that April 16 may serve as a closure,” Simsek said. “Because Turkey’s efforts against the religious cult [the Gulenists] are largely done. The cases are at the court; it’s up to the courts to decide. And the PKK, their strategy once they got emboldened with gains in Syria, it backfired, because Turkey is no ordinary country.” But “closure” is precisely what Turkey’s opposition fears. They think it means they would lose any remaining political influence they have held on to since last summer’s coup attempt, and Erdogan’s subsequent domestic crackdown, by entrenching his position as the country’s preeminent political figure. “We don’t want one-man rule, which is an authoritarian regime,” Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the largest opposition party, told Foreign Policy from his office in parliament. “The authority to enact laws will be given to one man with this draft change, and we find it very dangerous.”“The authority to enact laws will be given to one man with this draft change, and we find it very dangerous.” Kilicdaroglu, the head of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), is leading the campaign for the “no” vote. But he argues that he is doing so while the playing field is tilted against him. The state of emergency governing Turkey since last summer’s coup attempt has had a chilling effect on public debate, he said, preventing civil society and business associations from expressing their opinion on the referendum for fear of the government. He also contended that the vast majority of Turkey’s media is sympathetic to Erdogan after a crackdown on the press over the past year. Amnesty International recently reported that more than 160 press outlets have been shuttered since the coup attempt and more than 120 journalists are currently imprisoned, making Turkey “the biggest jailer of journalists in the world.” “There is no press freedom in Turkey,” Kilicdaroglu said bluntly. Erdogan, he said, had brought the country “to the edge of the abyss.” The second-largest opposition party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), has the most reason to fear a post-referendum government crackdown. Thirteen of the pro-Kurdish party’s parliamentarians are currently imprisoned, accused of links to the PKK. The party’s co-leaders, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, have both been jailed, and Yuksekdag was stripped from her seat in parliament after being convicted on terrorism charges. Among those arrested was the party’s spokesman, Ayhan Bilgen. At the HDP headquarters in Ankara, Osman Baydemir, a former mayor of the majority-Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, has been thrust into the role. “If you come here next month, I’m not sure who you will meet as a party speaker. I hope Ayhan Bilgen gets out of jail.… But it looks like, unfortunately, I will go to prison, too,” Baydemir said. “This is actually Figen Yuksekdag’s room we are using now. I’m pretty sure that in just this hour, at just this time, [Turkey’s security services] are listening to this room.” However the referendum turns out, the war between Erdogan and his domestic and international foes only seems poised to escalate. As Turkey’s president accuses his antagonists in Europe of Nazism, his political enemies at home are only too happy to throw equally bombastic accusations back at him. “Erdogan’s political style looks like Saddam Hussein’s or Bashar al-Assad’s style,” Baydemir said. “They want to make a one-party state — this is like the example of North Korea.” ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images