Author: Aylin D. Miller

Locating Turkey among the G20…

Locating Turkey among the G20 Rising Powers in the South-South Development Cooperation

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emel Parlar DAL Marmara University
Dr. Samiratou DIPAMA Marmara University

This study aims to assess how Turkey has been located among the G20’s rising donors who have been actively engaged in the South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC). In doing so, it aims to compare Turkey’s and the selected G20 rising donors’ bilateral, multilateral, geographical and sectoral aid distribution by using OECD ODA Data, UN ECOSOC’s Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR), Aid data statistics and the relevant countries’ domestic development aid data. First, the study will try to explain the actorness of Turkey in the sphere of South-South Development Cooperation and question its role as a Southern donor. Second, it will compare the performance of Turkey’s rising donor status in terms of bilateral-multilateral, geographical and sectoral distribution of aid with that of other G20 rising donors. In the final analysis, it will present the weaknesses and the strengths of Turkey in the field of SSDC compared to its G20 peers.

Keywords: Turkey, G20 rising donors, ODA, South-South Development Cooperation, bilateral-multilateral aid.

INTRODUCTION

The US-led world order established in the post-Cold war era is currently going through deep challenges with the rise of new powers from the global south with significant material capabilities. These new types of rising powers including among other countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey have been at the core of the global shift of power. Although these rising powers have been active in almost all global issues, one of the most important domains where they seem to have been more assertive is development cooperation. Most of these emerging donors promote South- South development Cooperation (SSDC) as an alternative to the traditional North- South model of development cooperation. While individual development cooperation programs differ in terms of size, geographic orientation, and modalities, emerging donors all underline that their form of development cooperation is distinct from the traditional, asymmetric donor-recipient model and that their aid approach is likely to be more effective because of the cultural proximity and similitude in socio-economic development trajectories with the developing countries.

Their lobbying for an acknowledgement of the key role played by SSDC has led to increasing recognition by the international community of SSDC as an effective model of development cooperation, which needs to be strengthened to increase the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite the existence of a restricted number of studies dealing with rising powers’ development aid policies, the literature lacks studies on the analytical and empirical comparative assessment of rising powers’ actorness in the field of SSDC. This paper’s comparative analysis of Turkey’s and selected G20 rising powers’ actorness in SSDC aims to fulfil the lacunae in the existing literature and to diversify the G20 relevant studies in the context of development, most specifically.

Given this, this study aims to explore how Turkey has been located among the G20’s rising donors who have been actively engaged in the South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC). In doing so, it aims to compare Turkey’s and the selected G20 rising donors’ bilateral, multilateral, geographical and sectoral aid distribution by using OECD ODA Data, UN ECOSOC’s Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR), Aid data statistics and the relevant countries’ domestic development aid data. First, the study will try to explain the actorness of Turkey in the sphere of South-South Development Cooperation and question its role as a Southern donor. Second, it will compare the performance of Turkey’s rising donor status in terms of bilateral- multilateral, geographical and sectoral distribution of aid with that of other G20 rising donors. In the final analysis, it will present the weaknesses and the strengths of Turkey in the field of SSDC compared to its G20 peers.

⦁ ACTORNESS OF TURKEY IN THE SPHERE OF SOUTH-SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

⦁ Defining South-South Development Cooperation

There is no universally agreed understanding of the concept of South-South Cooperation (SSC). In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2010: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership’’, the authors define the concept of SSDC as ‘‘the processes, institutions and arrangements designed to promote political, economic and technical cooperation among developing countries in pursuit of common development goals’’1.

One of the main features of a south-south cooperation is that the recipient is generally a low-income country already benefiting from aid funds from other donors, and the aid provider is an emerging power which experienced a recent successful economic growth and development trajectory , aims to expand its international influence through widening ties with overseas countries, and is sometimes still receiving aid from other development partners2

Another key element of such cooperation is the idea of win-win partnership since South-south development providers reject the idea of the benevolent character of their development aid activities and rather put forwards the argument that their aid projects are based on mutual and win-win cooperation between the partners.

Another feature of SSDC is the important role played by the private sector partly because in south-south cooperation, “most aid is tied to goods and services provided by private firms” and “package deals consisting of aid, trade and investment flows are characteristic of such cooperation”3.

Furthermore, SSDC emphasizes the development and promotion of developing countries’ self-development and collective self-reliance capacity 4. They are opposed

1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ”Economic Development in Africa Report: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership’‘. UNCTAD 2010.
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ”Economic Development in Africa Report: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership’‘. UNCTAD 2010.
3 Dreher Axel et al, “The European Union, Africa and New Donors Moving Towards New Partnerships. Highlights”. European Union, May 2015, final_highlights_11052015_en.pdf
4 Huang, Meibo, “South-South Cooperation, North-South Aid and the Prospect of International Aid Architecture’’, Vestnik Rudn International Relations No1,2015,p.26.

to any kind of interference in the domestic politics of the recipient countries as well as to any form of conditionality in their development cooperation activities.

Lastly, SSDC is based on a larger understanding of the concept of development cooperation, which should not only be restricted to aid funding but extended to other sources of finance such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade that also contribute to tackle developing countries’ development issues.

Given these and others, which role has Turkey played so far in the field of SSDC as an aid provider?

⦁ On Turkey’s Actorness in the field of SSDC

Beforehand, it should be reminded that unlike other emerging donors, the case of Turkey is slightly different considering the hybrid nature of this country as a country in-between western and non-western culture.

On one hand, as a member of the OECD, Turkey adheres to the ODA definition provided by the OECD-DAC and therefore in principle the content of its development aid as well as the rules and modalities of providing aid to SSA fit into OECD-DAC pre-established rules and principles. Turkey also regularly reports its development assistance flows to DAC, which increases transparency in its official aid data and it regularly participates in the DAC committee meetings, although Turkey is not yet a member of the OECD-DAC. This proximity with western aid donors makes is likely to decrease its actorness as a SSDC provider with the likes of China for instance.

However, in the first half of the 2000s, the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) accompanied with Turkey’s rapid economic boom has significantly changed the foreign policy landscape of Turkey. Turkey has become more assertive and pro-active in international politics and has shifted its foreign policy from a western-oriented and passive perspective to a pro-active non-western one. In this context, Turkey has hold membership in non-western platform such as MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia) and Turkey is also gradually building its own image as a global power in overseas regions. In the last decade, increasing willingness of Turkey to play an important role in international development cooperation has been largely acknowledged. For instance, in 2016, Turkey won the title of the “most generous” country in the field of development cooperation when considering its ratio ODA disbursement/GDP. Turkey has also geographically expanded its aid disbursement to far-away regions in Africa and Latin America.

Like south-south development aid providers, Turkey also increasingly considers its aid activities in SSA as a project based on the solidarity with and fraternity to the

African continent, which has been victim of years of colonial exploitation. Turkish officials underscore that ‘SSC forms an important aspect of Turkish development cooperation’5. The principle of solidarity, one of the defining elements of the southern model of development cooperation, is visible in Turkey’s engagement in Somalia 6. Likewise, Turkey’s development cooperation towards SSA is also based on the premise that African people should find their own solutions to development challenges, known as the principle of ‘African solutions for African problems’7.

Turkish leaders also use the principles of equality and win-win partnership in their development aid discourses towards SSA. Turkish leaders in their development assistance discourses in SSA seek to avoid ‘new-imperialism’ accusations while proposing a ‘mutual-benefit’ discourse, which means that their development aid perspective contains idealistic and pragmatic aspects.

In this context, Turkey’s president Erdogan once said that “Turkey has never been a colonial power in Africa, and now we come here as equals who ask for cooperation, not as a colonial power that is coming to exploit your resources”8. Turkey also praises its development path as a successful example that might inspire the African countries it sees as its fellow’s brothers. From an aid-recipient country to a potential aid donor in the world, Turkey is generally presented as a country with ‘‘much success and experience to share with LDCs’’9.

Turkey’s development cooperation activities also ‘’share commonalities with SSC (South-South Cooperation) donors, such as its increasing preference to deliver aid through bilateral rather than multilateral channels, its rejection of aid conditionality, its emphasis on national ownership, and its relative inexperience in strategic analysis and co-ordination.’’10 .

One of the specificities of Turkey in its development aid approach that distinguishes Turkey from both traditional and non-western emerging aid donor is its reliance on humanitarian diplomacy as the cornerstone of its development aid policy towards SSA. Humanitarian diplomacy, from the understanding of Turkish foreign policy

5 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ”Turkey’s development cooperation”,
6 Nganje Fritze, ‘’Two-way socialization between traditional and emerging donors critical for effective development cooperation’’, Africa up Close ,6 January 2014.
7 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ”Turkey’s development cooperation”,
8 Al Jazeera, ‘‘Erdoğan: Türkiye’nin Afrika’da sömürgeci geçmişi olmadı”, June 1, 2016,
9 Korkut, Umut and Civelekoglu, Ilke, “Becoming a Regional Power while pursing Material Gains: The Case of Turkish Interest in Africa’’, International Journal, Vol.68, no1, Winter 2012, p.194.
10 Sucuoglu, Gizem and Jason Stearns, “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid”. South African Institute of International Affairs, Research report, No 24, November 2016, p.10-14.

makers is based on moral values and encompasses three dimensions, mainly – citizens of Turkey, policies toward crisis zones and global world order11. According to former Prime Minister Davutoglu, ‘‘Turkey has become deeply concerned with all forms of human inequality that exist in the world, especially those forms that impacts upon the dignity of the individual and the community’’12. The country’s most remarkable humanitarian feat has been its humanitarian engagement in Somalia at the height of the hunger crisis in 201113.

⦁ PERFORMANCE OF TURKEY AND G20 RISING POWERS IN SSDC: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW

⦁ Bilateral and Multilateral development aid

An analysis of the Table 1 below showcases that in average between 2006 and 2010, China ranks as the top provider of SSDC followed respectively by India, Turkey, South Africa and Brazil in terms of bilateral aid. The table further shows that Brazilian disbursement of development assistance tremendously increased in 2010 from 7.01 million USD in 2009 to 150.82 million USD in 2010 and that Chinese development aid significantly increased in 2009 and then sharply decreased in 2010. There has been a significant increase in India’s development aid in 2008 and 2009, which dramatically decreased in 2010.

Russia’s aid disbursement experienced a sharp decline in 2010 and an exponential increase in 2014 and 2015. Except for the years 2007 and 2009, South Africa’s aid provision kept increasing and the amount of its development aid almost tripled in the specific year of 2010. Since 2007 Turkey’s development aid provision has continuously increased and in 2012 there was a twofold increase in the amount compared to 2011. The reasons behind this tremendous increase of Turkey’s aid in 2012 lay in the fact that Turkey distributed 1.6 billion USD to the Syrian refugees and granted a loan of 1 billion USD to Egypt which was disbursed in equal parts in 2012 and 2013.

11 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects”,
Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol 41, no: 6,2013,p. 865-870.
12 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, “A New Vision for Least Developed Countries’’, Center for Strategic Research SAM Papers, Vision Papers,No4, July 2012,p.3
13 Dal, Parlar Emel, Samiratou Dipama & Ferit Belder, “Assessing Turkey’s Development Aid Policy towards Africa: a constructivist perspective’’, International Relations and Dialogue of Cultures No 3,2014, p.104-124.

Table 1: Estimates of Development Cooperation Flows (USD millions)

Source: OECD-DAC, AidData dashboard

*China’s data are about aid commitment and not aid disbursement

Regarding multilateral development aid data, it stems from the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA)’s 2016 report that in 2015 Turkey’s multilateral ODA was less than 2% of Turkish total ODA and that in 2016, bilateral ODA accounted for 6.327billion USD against 250.2 million USD for multilateral ODA14. The OECD specifically shows that Turkey’s contribution to multilateral institutions in 2016 went primarily to regional development agencies (68%), and then

14 Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), TIKA Development Assistance Report 2016.

to respectively UN institutions (21%), and the World Bank group (2%) (OCED Statistics).

Like the case of Turkey, it is also estimated that China uses bilateral channels in most of its development cooperation. (93% in 2013) (OECD 2015) and that half of Chinese multilateral flows is provided by the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank Group and the African Development Bank (see Table 2 below). In the same line, India also distributes 90% of its development aid via bilateral channels15. However, most of its multilateral aid is disbursed through the UN system (see Table 2 below).

In contrast to Turkey, India and China, Indonesia mostly uses multilateral channels, most specifically the UN channels. However, it must be reminded that as seen in the table 2 between 2011 and 2013 the biggest multilateral recipient of Indonesia’s multilateral funds is the Islamic Development Bank 16. The same trend can also be seen between 2005-2009 in the case of South Africa whose bilateral development cooperation is only about 10% of its total aid 17. As seen in the table 2 the African Development Bank and the African Union are the biggest multilateral recipients of its multilateral aid. Brazil also seems to prioritize multilateral development aid because the OECD data indicates that in 2013, Brazil’s multilateral ODA accounted for 66% (208 million USD) of total ODA and that in 2015 Brazil provided 96 million USD of multilateral ODA, of which 57% disbursed to the UN and 43% to the Inter-American development bank18. Brazil and Mexico come closer in this respect because in 2014 Mexico’s multilateral ODA also accounted for 63% of its total ODA19.

Russia seems to lay in the middle among our selected case studies because in 2015 Russia’s multilateral ODA was about 22% of its total ODA and the biggest share of its multilateral ODA belongs to the World Bank Group (about 53% of its multilateral ODA in 2015).In the same year it attributed 36% of its multilateral ODA to the United Nations and 1% to regional development banks and other multilateral organisations20.

15 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Co-operation by Countries Beyond the DAC: Towards a more complete picture of international development finance, OECD, May 2015.
16 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Co-operation by Countries Beyond the DAC: Towards a more complete picture of international development finance, OECD, May 2015.
17 Yanacopulos H, ‘The Janus Faces of a Middle Power: South Africa’s Emergence in International Development’, Journal of Southern African Studies 40, No1,2013,p.203–216.
18 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Co-operation Report 2017: Data for Development, Paris: OECD Publishing 2017.
19 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Co-operation Report 2017: Data for Development, Paris: OECD Publishing 2017.
20 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “The Russian Federation’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)”, assistance.htm

Table 2: Estimates of funds accorded to the multilateral system: Non-OECD providers of Development Cooperation beyond the DAC (2011-2013 three-year average, USD million, current prices

Source: OECD, Development Cooperation by Non-OECD Countries Beyond the DAC Towards a more complete picture of international development finance , OECD May 2015, operation%20by%20Countries%20beyond%20the%20DAC.pdf

The comparative assessment of Turkey and the other selected G20 rising powers’ development aid shows that whereas Turkey, China and India and Russia distribute most of their aid bilaterally, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and Mexico prefer using multilateral channels. Russia appears to adopt a middle-ground approach since although its bilateral ODA share seems to be bigger, the share of its multilateral ODA is relatively higher than the ones of Turkey, India and China. Apart from Turkey, China and South Africa, which prioritise regional development bank groups, the UN system still remains the main recipient of the multilateral aid from Brazil, India, Mexico and Indonesia. In addition to this, it must be underlined that as seen in Table 2 the UN’s specialised agencies on food security and agriculture are the main channels of funding used by the above-mentioned G20 rising powers choosing to contribute most of their aid through UN channels. Russia turns out to be particular in this context because the majority of its multilateral ODA goes primarily to the World Bank Group.

The table 3 below further ranks Turkey and the selected G20 rising powers in terms of their core and non-core multilateral contributions to the UN development system (UNDS). Core contributions are resources attributed to UN entities without restrictions, while non-core contributions are resources distributed to UN entities with some restrictions with regards to their use and application. In other words, with non- core multilateral contributions, states retain a margin of control with respect to the way the funding is spent. The table 3 below indicates that in terms of average contributions to the UN core development related activities, Turkey ranks as the 5th top contributor after Mexico, Brazil, Russia and China. Unlike China, Indonesia and Russia, Turkey with the likes of Brazil, Argentina, India, Mexico and South Africa provided more non-core contributions than core between 2014 and 2016.

Table 3: G20 Rising Powers’ 2014-2016 average contribution for UN- Development related operational activities in thousands US dollars

Core
Non-Core

Argentina
10,192,666.7
155,575,000

Brazil
29,856,333.3
258,658,667

China
63,379,666.7
55,797,000

India
15,916,666.7
27,202,666.7

Indonesia
9,661,333.33
8,307,333.33

Mexico
26,852,000
57,480,333.3

Russia
44,414,333.3
42,759,666.7

South Africa
6,779,333.33
7,355,333.33

Turkey
24,075,333.3
37,750,000

Source: Self-calculated data based on the UN ECOSOC’s Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR).

⦁ Sectoral and Geographical Distributions of Development aid

Regarding the sectoral distribution of development aid, TIKA’s 2016 report shows that Turkey spent respectively 780 million USD for the “Social Infrastructure and Services Sector”, 90 million USD for the “Economic Infrastructure and Services Sector”, 23 million USD for the “Manufacturing Sector” and lastly 4 million USD for “Multi-Sectoral activities”21.

In the case of Brazil, the AidData dashboard indicates that between 2000 and 2014, the top sectoral priorities of Brazil’s aid are respectively “Education” (36.11 million USD), “Agriculture” (19.59 million USD) and “Health” (17.65 million USD)22.

In the case of China, between 2000 and 2014, the main sectors where China invest its financial aid are respectively “Energy Generation and Supply” (134.1 billion USD), “Transport and Storage” (88.8 billion USD) and “Industry, Mining and Construction” (30.3 billion USD)23.

The 2014 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid mentions that between 2010 and 2012, the main sectors of Chinese development aid (more than half went to Africa) were “economic infrastructure” (45% of bilateral funds) and “social and public infrastructure” (28% of bilateral funds)24.

In the case of India, between 2006 and 2014, “Energy generation and supply” (882.72 Million USD) followed by “Transport and Industry” (550.19 million USD) rank among the top first sectoral priorities of India in its development aid program25.

According to the OECD data, Russian Federation’s bilateral development cooperation mostly concentrated on the following sectors: public finance, nutrition, health, education and food security. While distributing its bilateral development aid, Russia prioritizes technical assistance projects, capacity building and scholarships, budget support and debt relief26.

21 Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), TIKA Development Assistance Report 2016.
22 AidData dashboard,
23 AidData dashboard,
24 Information Office of the State Council (2014) (the 2014 White Paper)
25 AidData dashboard,
26 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “The Russian Federation’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)”, assistance.htm

The main sectors of South Africa’s development aid between 2000 and 2014 are respectively “Government and Civil Society” (89.23 million USD), “Agriculture” (61.53 million USD) and “Education” (37.18 million USD)27.

In sum, this paper argues that in terms of sectoral priorities, like China and India, Turkey seems to focus more on economic and social infrastructures and to pursue in this context a win-win partnership. This means that Turkey follows one of the core principles of SSDC which is about using aid to consolidate economic relations between the two partners in the SSDC. In contrast to Turkey, China, and India, the other G20 rising powers, namely Brazil, Russia and South Africa seem to give priority to social sectors such as health and education and agriculture.

Coming to the geographical distribution, TIKA’s 2016 report shows that the top recipients of Turkish bilateral official development assistance in 2016 were respectively Syria, Somalia, Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Niger. Out of these 10 countries, 3 are located in the Middle East (Syria, Palestine and Afghanistan), 3 are in South- East Europe (Macedonia, Azerbaijan and Bosnia and Herzegovina), two are in Central Asia (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), 1 from West Africa (Niger) and 1 from East Africa (Somalia)28.

In the case of Brazil, an examination of the AidData dashboard showcases that between 20004 and 2014, Brazil ‘s main aid recipients include two west African countries ( Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde) , one north African country (Algeria) , 2 south African countries( Angola and Mozambique), one central African country ( Sao Tome and Principe), one Caribbean country ( Haiti), one South-east Asian country (Timor-Leste), and one south American country ( Paraguay)29. Here it must be noted that with the exception of Algeria and Haiti, all of the remaining top nine recipients of Brazil’s aid are, like Brazil, officially Lusophone. This distribution clearly shows that in development cooperation Brazil aims to strengthen its status as a regional power in a specific ‘region’ of the global South30.

In terms of ODA, between 2004 and 2014, China’s top recipients include: 1 Caribbean country (Cuba), 3 West African countries ( Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana), 2 east African countries(Ethiopia and Tanzania), 1 central African country

27 AidData dashboard,
28 Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), TIKA Development Assistance Report 2016.
29 AidData dashboard,
30 Cabral L, R Giuliano & J Weinstock, ‘Brazil and the Shifting Consensus on Development Co- operation: Salutary Diversions from the ‘Aid-effectiveness’ Trail?’, Development Policy Review, 32, no 2,2014, p.179–202.

(Cameroun), 1 south Africa country (Zimbabwe),1 South-East Asian country (Cambodia) and 1 South-Asian country (Sri Lanka)31.

Between 2006 and 2014, the top recipients of India’s aid include: 2 west African countries (Nigeria and Mali), one east African country (Ethiopia), one south African country (Mozambique), two Middle Eastern countries (Syria and Afghanistan), 3 South Asian countries (Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka) and one South-East Asian country (Myanmar)32.

In 2011, Eastern Europe and central Asia and SSA equally benefited each from 28% of Russian total ODA distribution while Latin America and Caribbean benefited each from 20% of Russian ODA. The same distribution is respectively 12% for South Asia, 9% for East Asia and 3% for Pacific and for the MENA region33.

With the exception of Timor-Leste (a south-east Asian country) and Haiti (Caribbean country), South Africa concentrates the most of its development assistance on the SSA continent (Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Cape Verde, DRC, Sao tome and Principe, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho)34. This is mainly due to the fact that South Africa prioritises Africa in its SSDC policies35.

All these comparative geographical distributions of the selected G20 rising powers’ bilateral development aid show that whereas Turkey, Brazil and South Africa concentrate their SSDC activities on specific regions with strong historical and/or linguistic ties, China, India and Russia reach more geographically and culturally diversified groups in their SSDC projects.

⦁ ASSESSING TURKEY ‘S PERFORMANCE IN THE FIELD OF SSDC COMPARED TO ITS G20 PEERS

This study argues that in recent years the importance of SSDC as an alternative model of development cooperation to the traditional north-south model has been increasingly acknowledged by both traditional and rising powers. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the UN General Assembly in September 2015 has further strengthened the importance of SSDC in the field of international development cooperation and one of the key models through which the delivery of the UN

31 AidData dashboard,
32 AidData dashboard,
33 Ministry of Finance, “The Russian Federation ODA: National Report”, 2012,Available at:
34 AidData dashboard,
35 Dirco, “White Paper on South African Foreign Policy – Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu”, Pretoria: South Africa: Department of International Relations and Cooperation,2011.

Sustainable Development Goals can be improved. This means that SSDC has already been benefiting from recognition by the international community, including Western donors. This explains why rising powers are actively engaged in SSDC.

This study has shown that Turkey, China and India give more preference to economic and social infrastructures and in this regard pursue a win-win partnership, one of the core principles of SSDC. Compared to Brazil, Russia and South Africa which seem to give priority to social sectors such as health and education and agriculture, Turkey appears to be a stronger SSDC actor with the like of China and India.

Like the cases of China and India, Turkey distributes most of their aid bilaterally. About 98% of Turkey’ s development aid is bilateral. The preference given to bilateral over multilateral development aid by Turkey, China and India lays in the fact that these countries seek to show their distinctiveness in the field of SSDC through following their own rules, principles and modalities in the formulation and disbursement of their aid activities. In this sense, like China and India, Turkey by prioritizing bilateral aid expressed its willingness to follow its own model of development cooperation, which as seen above presents strong similarities with SSDC. Bilateral development cooperation is likely to increase Turkey’s actorness in the field of SSDC as Turkey would have free-hand as to where and how to spend its money.

However, an extensive focus on bilateral development aid might have reverse negative impact on Turkey’s and the other G20 rising powers’ quest for actorness in the field of SSDC because If Turkey’s bilateral aid rules and modalities significantly contrast with the established rules of multilateral development aid, it is likely that international donors( especially western donors) might be reluctant to grant recognition of Turkey’s actorness-seeking policies in the field of SSDC and Turkey’s actions in the field of SSDC might be seen as illegitimate by the international community. This is why non-core multilateral development aid play a key role in terms of allowing rising powers willing to show their particularities in the field of SSDC to reach this objective without being taxed as “outsiders” of the current international order. An analysis of the above data has shown that with the likes of Brazil, Argentina, India, Mexico and South Africa, Turkey seems to prefer non-core multilateral contributions compared to the core ones. This is an indication of Turkey’s willingness to retain control over the modalities of the use of their financial contribution by multilateral institutions while remaining part of this multilateral development aid order. In this regard, this paper argue that Turkey should prioritize non-core multilateral development aid over bilateral one as the main channel through which Turkey can show its distinctiveness in the field of SSDC while remaining attached to the multilateral rules of development aid.

Similar to China and South Africa, Turkey prioritizes more regional development bank groups than UN Agencies for the channel of SSDC. More than half of Turkey’s

multilateral funding is provided through channels outside of the UN. An integrated overview of Turkey’s financing strategies towards UN and non-UN funds suggests that although Turkey’s financial contribution has been increasing, it should redress the imbalance by contributing more to the funds, agencies and programmes of the UN.

Geographical, cultural and historical connection is another element of SSDC. Like Brazilian and South African cases, Turkish aid concentrate on specific regions with strong historical and/or linguistics ties. In this sense, Turkey’s development path and experience is likely to be followed in an efficient manner by the recipient countries given that they share closer historical and linguistic ties. Turkish case differs from Chinese, Indian and Russia’s whose geographical reaches appear to be almost all encompassing, as the recipient countries are very diversified.

CONCLUSION

This article examined Turkey’s actorness in the field of SSDC in comparison with eight other G20 rising powers. The comparative task focused on a two -layered framework, namely bilateral vs multilateral aid and the geographical and sectoral distribution of development aid of the selected G20 rising powers.

Regarding our selected case studies, the comparative data used in this study have shown that whereas Turkey, China and India provide most of their flows bilaterally, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and Mexico channel a large share of their overall funding through multilateral organisations. This article argues that compared to Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Mexico, which prioritise multilateral channels over bilateral ones, China, India and Turkey give more preferences to bilateral development aid. Although bilateral channels provide donor countries with more flexibility opportunities over the rules and modalities of aid formulation and disbursement, it can negatively impact of the legitimacy of these countries’ aid projects vis-à-vis the international community of donors and ordinary citizens, especially when bilateral aid rules challenge the existing multilateral development aid norms. This leads to the point that Turkey is likely to consolidate its actorness in the sphere of SSDC through non-core multilateral aid because it would have the opportunity to show up its particularities as a SSDC actor while increasing international support and legitimacy of its aid activities. Non-core multilateral aid allows Turkey to retain some control over the use of the money given to multilateral institutions while remaining attached to the multilateral rules and as such would have more positive impact on Turkey’s actorness in the field of SSDC.

Furthermore, the data on geographical distribution have shown that compared to, China, Russia and India, Turkey is less e eager to pursue a geographically and culturally extended actorness policies through bilateral SSDC because its top aid recipients are mostly concentrated on countries with strong historical and cultural ties with Turkey.

In summary, Turkey and the selected G20 rising powers are more capable to achieve and consolidate their actorness in the field of SSDC through prioritizing non-core multilateral development aid because it provides rising powers with greater marge of maneuverer in terms of following the core principles of SSDC in the formulation and implementation of their development aid policies while widening international support of their actions.

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Nganje Fritze, ”Two-way socialization between traditional and emerging donors critical for effective development cooperation’’, Africa up Close ,6 January 2014, accessed on 28 October 2017, at, socialization-between-traditional-and-emerging-donors-criticalfor-effective- development-cooperation/,

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Yanacopulos H, ‘The Janus Faces of a Middle Power: South Africa’s Emergence in International Development’, Journal of Southern African Studies 40, No1,2013:203– 216.

November 8, 2021
UN Peacekeeping Operations

UN Peacekeeping Operations in Central African Republic: The Legality- Legitimacy Paradox

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gonca Oğuz GÖK Marmara Üniversitesi
Assist. Prof. Dr. Radiye Funda KARADENİZ Gaziantep Üniversitesi

UN Peacekeeping operations have been one of the most criticized missions of the United Nations since 1990’s. Blue Helmets’ role in humanitarian crises and civil wars have been widely discussed with reference to their structural limitations as well as their ineffectiveness in finding a workable solution to grave humanitarian crises. Yet, as the numbers of refugees are dramatically increasing in modern warfare, more people (especially women and children) became vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse and other crimes against humanity. The questions of UN peacekeepers’ accountability have always been problematic which further worsens the already problematic legitimacy of UN Peacekeepers in the eyes of the local population as well as global society for their respective missions. This paper attempts to analyze the “accountability” of Blue Helmets through the analyses of Peacekeeping Operation in the Africa region in 2000s and questions the possible judgement option by International Criminal Court (ICC) for their crimes against humanity.

Key Words: Accountability, UN Peacekeeping Operations, Sexual Abuse, ICC

⦁ Introduction

There has been a remarkable progress in terms of legalization in human rights field since the establishemnt of the UN. Especially after the Cold war, increasing number of human rights NGOs and their efforts challenged one of the strongest principles of the UN Charter: state sovereignity. Conceptualized by Katrene Sikking as “Justice Cascade”, in just three decades, state leaders in Latin America, Europe, and Africa have lost their “immunity” from any accountability for their human rights violations, becoming the subjects of highly publicized trials resulting in severe consequences.1 Furthermore, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine showcases a normative shift from “sovereignity as a right” towards “sovereignty as responsibility” for states. The establishment of a permanant court, International Criminal Court (ICC) has been a landmark event in the evolution of human rights norms in world politics. The normative evolution of human rights at the UN and the changing understanding of state sovereignity impose positive obligations on the state, thus promoting an understanding that the state and its rulers can do wrong. On the other hand, the UN has established a system of laws whereby the organization and its agents continue to enjoy “immunity” for crimes committed abroad.2 Although states have lost their immunity from any accountability for their human rights violations in changing world politics, the UN personel continues to enjoy irresponsibility and immunity from accountability, most notably the UN Peacekkepers3. UN’s Status of Forces Aggrement (SOFA) grants absolute immunity to peacekeepers—at least within the United Nations system—for crimes committed abroad. In other words, UN has no jurisdiction to conduct criminal investigations and prosecutions. Criminal investigation and prosecution of UN Peacekeepers are left up to states. Yet, the UN statistics and non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports demonstrate the number of offences committed by peacekeepers including human trafficking, rape and sexual slavery are widespread especially in Africa misions. This legal paradox, if not contradiction, of international human rights law increases the importance of “accountability” question as being one of the main sources of UN’s “illegitimacy” in world politics.

There seems to be an evolution in terms of legalization in human rights field, but the main research question this paper asks; has this resulted in a more legitimate and “humane” governance of the UN in world politics? In other words, although there is

1 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics, WW Norton Company, 2011
2 Nadia Abramson, “United Nations Paacekeepers Can Do No Wrong: How Blue Helmets Achieved Immunity for Sexual Abuse in Cote D’Ivore and How to Ensure Accountability in the Future”, Student International Law Papers p: 11. (available at: per.pdf)
3 Mara Pillinger, Ian Hurd, and Michael N. Barnett, “How to Get Away with Cholera: The UN, Haiti, and International Law”, Perspectives on Politics, March 2016, Vol. 14, No.1, p:70.

ample evidence showing an evolutionary trend towards “legalization” on human rights field in the UN platform after the Cold War with respect to states’ and their leaders responsibilities, is there enough evidence supporting a “progress” in terms of a more “humane” governance through the UN? What are the persisting sources of “illegitimacy” of the UN in changing world politics? In light of above questions, this paper attepts to analyze the sources of UN’s illegitimacy with reference to the “accountability” issue of the UN Peacekeepers for their sexual abuses during the African missions by questioning the possible judgement option by International Criminal Court (ICC) for their crimes. This study argues that the “accountability” debade lies at the heart of the discussion of the sources of illegitimacy of the UN in humanitarian governance. Yet, as with the ambigiuites with persecution of peacekeepers in the ICC showcaes, the evolution of “legalization” in human rights field has not, yet, necessarily ends up-or completed- with a genuine “progess” in terms of a more humane global governance through the United Nations.

⦁ Sources of the Illegitimacy of the United Nations: The Accountablity Issue

In democratic countries, citizens delegate power to their governments by electing them as their representatives. By willingly holding them to office, citizens recognize their government’s right to rule.4 However, since power is always delegated for a reason, Grant and Keohane argues, it is legitimate only so long as it serves its original purposes, in the case of the nation, it could be argued the protection of the rights and the pursuit of the public good.5 To be legitimate, governments are not only given the right to rule by their citizens but also held responsible by them.6 Thus, citizens at the national level have a right to “hold their governments to a set of standards”- for instance their promises before elections-to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards and remove them from office if they do not think so in the end. 7 In other words, “people with power ought to be accountable to those who have entrusted them with it.”8

On the other hand, the idea of “accountability” at the international level is much less clear in many aspects. Compared to domestic societies, there is not a world government above states capable of enforcing its rules or laws, judging and punishing immediately if not obeyed. Given the strong voluntary element in rule creation and rule following in the international system, Steffek argues, global governance is even

4 Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p: 10
5 Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics”,
American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 1 February 2005, p: 32
6 Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p: 33
7 Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane’ ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’
American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 1 February 2005, p: 29
8 Grant and Keohane, p: 32

more dependent on legitimacy beliefs on the part of the ruled over than is any other.9 Furthermore, states remain the most prominent actors in world politics, but it is no longer even a reasonable simplification to think of world politics simply as politics among states. A larger variety of other organizations, from international organizations to multinational corporations as well as nongovernmental organizations exercise authority and engage in political action across state boundaries. As Keohane puts it, in a world of “interdependence without any organized government” or a world constitution, there are multiple audiences and subjects with respect to accountability. Keohane talks about, for instance, transnational accountability, in which demands are largely made by non-state actors and advocacy networks towards states.10 NGO’s and public opinion, Finnemore argues, has become consequential players in generating acceptance or rejection in international legitimacy claims including multilateral ones.11

Thus the identity of the “accountability holders”, at the international level is much more complicated and yet the manner of holding decision makers accountable is less certain.12 Individuals, Steffek argues, are increasingly conceived of as the addressees of international rules and obligations either directly or indirectly.13 Furthermore, as International Organizations grow in power and scope, not only states as actors delegating authority to IOs, but also more populations are becoming increasingly effected and therefore vulnerable to their policies. Concerning organizations like the United Nations, their decisions and missions affect the daily lives of individuals which makes very difficult to exclude them as the addresses of accountability claims. 14 As UN’s decisions intrude more deeply to the daily lives of individuals around the world questions about their accountability and legitimacy necessarily arise.15

In this regard, an important question is whether the UN should be held “accountable” for the violation of the international humanitarian law by forces under its command, namely the peacekeepers. Since Peacekeeping operations have been the main tasks of the UN especially after the Cold War Era, pressure continues to mount, especially from non-state actors, to make UN more “accountable” to domestic populations and

9 Jens Steffek, The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach, European Journal of International Relations, 9(2), p: 260
10 Robert O. Keohane, “Global Governanace and Democratic Accountability”,
11 Ian Johnstone, “Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Counsel: Bringing Down the Deliberatıve Deficit,” American Society of International Law, p: 277, 2008
12 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Power, Institutions and the Production of Inequality’ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.) Power in Global Governance p: 56-57
13 Jens Steffek, “Legitimacy in International Relations: From State Compliance to Citizen Consensus” (in), Hurrelmann, Schneider and Steffek (eds.) Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), P:186
14 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules For the World, Cornell University Press, 2004, p: 171
15 Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force”, p: 528.

transnational civil societies, as well as to increase access to participatory mechanisms for all affected actors.16 For instance, in 2010, United Nations peacekeepers accidentally brought cholera to Haiti. Nearly a million people were made sick and 8,500 died. Legal activists have sought to hold the UN responsible for the harms it caused and win compensation for the cholera victims. However, these efforts have been obstructed by the structures of public international law—particularly UN immunity—which effectively insulate the organization from accountability.17 Therefore, actors in global civil society increasingly demand setting up “new mechanisms” and norms of introducing accountability of the UN peacekkeping personel.18

⦁ UN Peacekeeping Operations and Immunity from Accountability: The Case of Africa

The “accountability” of peacekeeping personnel for crimes committed on mission is something that the UN has been struggling more with in the last two decades. Peacekeeping operations has been one of the main tasks of the UN, especially after the Cold war era in terms of humanitarian crises management. As of 2015, the United Nations reported a completed fifty-five missions and sixteen currently active missions, covering every region of the world. The approved budget for United Nations peacekeeping operations from July 2014 to June 2015 totaled 7.06 billion U.S. dollars.19 Furtherore, the UN Peacekeping operations has widened in both scope and the definition of the mission. Historically, the original mission of peacekeeping operations was to cool down the conflicts and allow the parties to reach a final peace agreement on their own. Eventually, the mandates became more ambitious, allowing UN peacekeeping staff to hold elections, engage in the peace process, and assist in humanitarian crisis management. In its most extreme form, the United Nations has assumed the role of the government in some states emerging from conflict such as the missions in Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo. 20 Yet, most of these UN missions were highly criticized on the ground of being “ineffective” and highly “expensive” ones. For instance, During the cource of Bosnian War, UN Security Council had adopted almost 60 resolutions that mostly deal with the Bosnian peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) which was the most expensive mission in the history of UN. Security Council veto powers which were unwilling to intervene to the war, issued very big missions to a peacekeeping force- UNPROFOR-which was not compatible with its resources. Ironically, Bosnian war has become both the most expensive misson in its

16 Stewen Bernstein, “Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance”, Journal of International Law and International Relations, Vol.1, No.1-2, p:142.
17 Mara Pillinger, Ian Hurd, and Michael N. Barnett, “How to Get Away with Cholera: The UN, Haiti, and International Law”, Perspectives on Politics, March 2016, Vol. 14, No.1, p:70.
18 Ibid, p:70.
19 Nadia Abramson ,p:6
20 Ibid, p:6

history and also one of the most criticized ones, especially with its Srebrenitza case in 1995.21

Apart from the important question of “effectiveness” due to structural limitations, UN Peacekkeping operations have been highly criticied on immunity from “accountability” with respect to criminal behaviour by Bluehelmets. Allegations of misconduct amounting to criminal behaviour have increased awareness of the problem of UN “immunity” especially in the last two decades.

In fact, the problem of sexual abuses committed by peacekeepers has been acknowledged by the United Nations (UN) and other international organisations since 1995. However, the Brahimi Report, published in 2000, and which was supposed to provide a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations, did not address this issue.22 Sexual abuse allegations against peacekeepers and aid workers became an international issue in late 2001 after the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Save the Children conducted a joint study on sexual exploitation of refugee communities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The study uncovered allegations of abuse by United Nations peacekeeping forces, international and local nongovernmental organizations, and government agencies. The majority of victims involved were girls between the ages of thirteen and eighteen years old. 23 Following that, the General Assembly passed a resolution 57/306 on 15 April 2003, titled “Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa”. Two years later, in 2005 the publication of “Zeid Report” was a turning point in terms of being the first comprehensive analysis of the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping personnel.24 In that report, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan clearly underlined the “responsibility” of UN Peacekkeping forces for their sexual exploitation during their mission on Democratic Republic of Congo:

“Sexual exploitation and abuse by a significant number of United Nations peacekeeping personnel in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have done great harm to the name of peacekeeping. Such abhorrent acts are a violation of the

21Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p: 186. One should note here, the history of UN peacekeeping operations were not always full of failures. In 1998, United Nations peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their valuable contributions as observers and negotiators in war-torn regions. See Abramson, p:11.
22 Marco Odello and Róisín Burke, “Between immunity and impunity: peacekeeping and sexual abuses and violence”, The International Journal of Human Rights, 2016, p: 1.
23 Abramson, p:4
24 UN General Assembly Document, 24 March 2005 A/59/710 (available at

fundamental duty of care that all United Nations peacekeeping personnel owe to the local population that they are sent to serve. 25 (emphasis edded)

Since the publication of the Zeid Report in 2005, the UN has adopted a series of documents and some initiatives have been taken, mainly with administrative and disciplinary consequences for personnel considered responsible of sexual abuses.26 In this regard, a Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) was established at UN Headquarters in 2005 to provide oversight on conduct and discipline issues in peacekeeping operations and special political missions. Yet, there is still little clarity on the outcomes of the procedures set up by the UN and by states, showing that they do not yet act properly to address this phenomenon.27 Furthermore, new allegations of sexual misconduct surfaced in the Africa region with the work of NGOs in the last couple of years.28 Most recently, new allegations of sexual misconduct were report by a Human Rights Watch on Central African Republic.29 The UN statistics with regard to sexual exploitation and abuse allegations per missions and per years are shown in the following two tables .

25 Ibid
26 See UN Conduct and Discipline Unit (available at
27 Odello and Burke, p: 2.
28 See Melanie O’Brien, “Protectors on trial? Prosecuting peacekeepers for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court”, ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University (available at
29 See https://www.hrw.org/africa/central-african-republic

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Allegations Per Mission Involving Minors

Source: UN Conduct and Discipline Unit

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Allegations Per Year Involving Minors

Source: UN Conduct and Discipline Unit

The table clearly illustrates that almost all of the allegations are on missions in the Africa region. (UNMIL, UNOCI, UNMISS, MONUC, MONUSCO) In fact, Africa has been a giant laboratory for UN peacekeeping and has repeatedly tested the capacity and political resolve of an often dysfunctional 15-member UN Security

Council.30 Several NGO Reports indicate that this is only the surface of the giant iceberg. Reports also emphasize that of the cases referred to states, few states respond to the referrals, and those that do rarely result in disciplinary action. Not all states have the legislative means to prosecute, and not all states take action to prosecute criminal conduct by their peacekeepers. It is also unclear from the UN reports what disciplinary action is taken, including whether or not prosecutions are held for criminal conduct. Confirmed cases of prosecution include the Canadian cases prosecuting nine defendants for torture and murder of a Somalian teenager; and the US case of Ronghi, found guilty of raping and murdering a ten-year-old girl in Kosovo.31 The UN has no standing army or police force available; consequently, it depends on the contributions of member states which may voluntarily contribute personnel for operations around the globe for accomplishing these broad missions.32

More importantly, the UN still has no jurisdiction to conduct criminal investigations and prosecutions. Criminal investigation and prosecution is left up to states. The United Nations has two permanent sources of law and one case-specific negotiation tool to exercise its “immunity privileges” in peacekeeping operations. These are the United Nations Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), respectively. According to Status of Forces Aggrement (SOFA) aggrement, if the host government believes that a foreign military member of the peacekeeping operation committed a criminal offense, the accused will be subject “to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating states.” This language grants absolute immunity to peacekeepers—at least within the United Nations system—for crimes committed abroad. In fact, these immunities are codified as being necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the organization. However, paradoxically, these immunities challenge the very legitimacy of UN peacekeeping as producing immunity from criminal accountibiliy33.

In sum, there ise considerable progress in human rights law with respect to the accountability of “states” on their violation of human rights. However, this is not true

30 Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, “Back to the future: UN peacekeeping in Africa”, International Peacekeeping, 7:4, 2000, pp: 161-188, p:161-162
31 Melanie O’Brien, “Protectors on trial? Prosecuting peacekeepers for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court”, ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University (available at
32 Abramson,p:6
33 In 1989, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a “model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations,” which the Secretary-General presented one year later. At the very beginning of the document, Article II of the Model SOFA states that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities applies to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Further, the document includes a provision on jurisdiction, which states, “All members of the United Nations peace-keeping operation including recruited personnel shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.” See Abramson, p: 20

for the world organization. State’s “sovereign immunity” norm is challenged with the advance of human rights norms and the establishment of International Criminal Court is one of the most influencial developments in human rights. The question is could this also be applied to Blue Helmets for their crimes commited abroad to overcome this accountability-immunity paradox which has increasingly become a real challenge to UN’s legitimacy and actorness in world politics?

⦁ Accountability of Blue Helmets: Prosecution Through International Criminal Court

ICC has juristiction over 4 types of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. However the abuses that the peacekeepers instigated do not seem to escalate to the level of either genocide, or crimes against humanity, as the Rome Statute, the authorizing treaty of the ICC, defines them.34 Firstly, it is difficult to imagine peacekeepers being actively involved in perpetrating genocidal acts, let alone being ascribed this type of special intention.35 The greatest difficulty in determining a crime by a peacekeeper to constitute a crime against humanity, on the other hand, lies in the fact that crimes by peacekeeping personnel ‘tend to be isolated and sporadic acts of military indiscipline or indifference’, rather than part of a widespread or systematic attack. A crime against humanity must be committed as part of the widespread or systematic attack. Furthermore, the aggressor’s act of murder, etc, must be pursuant to a “policy”. It is the existence of this policy that donates the criminal act with the character of a crime against humanity and excludes isolated acts of murder and so on from the court’s jurisdiction.36 Thus allegations against peacekeepers typically would not involve attacks against civilian populations involving such a widespread and systematic quality. A crime committed by a peacekeeper would most probably be considered an isolated incident and therefore would not amount to a crime against humanity.37

As yet, the recent accounts of UN peacekeepers’ involvement in ‘sex trafficking’ and ‘child prostitution rings’ in the Africa region suggests that not all criminal acts of these soldiers are isolated, personal events. If peacekkepers’ acts are proved to be a part of a consistent pattern of offences by a number of persons, he or she may be properly charged with crimes against humanity.38 The majority of peacekeeping personnel would not be aware of the details of a plan or policy of a widespread or systematic

34 Notar, Susan A. “Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law. 14, no. 2 (2006): 413-429, p:426.
35 Max Du Plesis and Stephen Pete, “Who Guards the Guardians: The ICC and serious crimes committed by United Nations peacekeepers in Africa”, African Security Review 13(4), 2004, p: 10.
36 Ibid, p:10.
37 Notar, p:413-429.
38 Plesis and Pete, p:11.

attack. Still it is something that those in superior positions within the mission may well be aware of, given their role in interacting directly with any leaders or commanders of parties to the conflict. The involvement of multiple peacekeeping personnel systematically in the sexual exploitation of the local population might be charged with crimes against humanity. 39

With regards to war crimes, Under Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute there is no absolute requirement that a war crime be committed on a large-scale. Article 8(1) states that the ‘Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’. Therefore a single occurrence of a war crime is sufficient for the ICC to establish jurisdiction. A war crime avoids any similar requirement like being “systematic”, and thus it will be far more likely that a crime by a peacekeeper is classified as a war crime. The argument here is that, peace support operations are located in places experiencing on-going conflict, or in a post-conflict situation. Their very presence is related to the armed conflict. A crime such as sexual exploitation takes advantage of the situation created by the fighting, as the conflict has created a society in which women and children are vulnerable and open to abuse. Thus, it can be argued that these crimes are committed in the context of an armed conflict, and are associated with an armed conflict, even if hostilities have ceased. Crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel may fall within this “expansive” interpretation. 40

On the other hand, it may be the case that the Court finds that the crime(s) in question do not have a direct link to armed conflict because it was committed after the cessation of hostilities, after the conclusion of peace, and thus might conclude that there is no jurisdiction under Statu of Rome, Article 8. Furthermore, there is no clear legal stance on the issue of peacekeeping personnel involvement in armed conflict, and whether and when they are considered to be “combatants” engaging in armed conflict or “civilians”. Thus, with regards to war crimes, the determination of the existence of an armed conflict and the status of such a conflict are the two biggest challenges.41 Ultimately, however, it would not be impossible to prosecute a peacekeeper under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. Once the existence of an armed conflict has been established, applying the broad interpretation of association with armed conflict established by the ICTY in the Foca case will enable the Prosecutor to argue that crimes committed by a peacekeeper are committed in the context of and are associated with an armed conflict, regardless of whether or not the peacekeeping personnel were engaged as combatants in that armed conflict. Another complication would be whether a peacekeeper’s crime can be linked to the attack or armed conflict. 42

39 Ibid
40 O’Brien, p: 12-25
41 Fort the details of the legal issue, see O’Brein p: 12-25.
42 Ibid.

According to Plesis and Pete, if it can be shown that a peacekeeper committed a war crime (such as murder, torture, or rape) as part of a large-scale commission of such a crime, that peacekeeper may be guilty of a war crime without any need to prove the special intention that would be required for genocide and crimes against h ICC may have a role to play, but this role is strictly limited by the nature of the crimes over which this court exercises jurisdiction, and by the doctrine of complementarity which restricts the jurisdiction of the court to a great extent. Prosecutions of peacekeepers will most likely to continue to be conducted largely by the national state of the peacekeeper concerned, and prosecutions of such soldiers by the ICC will remain a very distant exception to that norm. 43 Yet, as this paper tries to showcases, the allegations are very rare which further increases the pressure towards UN system on accountability and increasingly became one of the crutial sources of its illegitimacy in World Politics.

⦁ In Guise of Conclusion: Evolution without Progress?

UN’s legitimacy is the main source of its authority and power in world politics. To be powerful, it must be seen to serve some legitimate purpose- like preserving international peace and security, promoting human rights. More importantly, it must be perceveid to serve this “purpose” in an impartial, neutral and technocratic way, by using impersonal rules.44 As individuals are increasingly becoming the adresees of UN’s legitimacy claims, their beliefs about the legitimacy of the UN matters. As yet, there is ample evidence of harms caused by UN peacekeeping to people it is to serve. The United Nations has recently found itself accused of various kinds of harms, including exploiting weak and vulnerable people. Peacekeepers have repeatedly been accused of criminal activity and human rights violations, including trafficking, child abuse, and rape, and the UN has apparently been covering up this misbehavior, most recently in the Central African Republic. In many cases, rather than accepting responsibility the UN has relied on the law of immunity as a shield against accountability.45

Although there exists an undeniable “progress” in terms of legalization in human rights field with respect to states-since their leaders are not immune from human rights abuses and could be held accountable through many ways including International Criminal Court; this progress seems not to be true for the UN. In contrast, the law of immunity has increasingly become a barrier towards the advancement of human rights in which UN is to serve in its Charter as exemplified by the immunity from accountability for sexual abuse of the UN Peaceekers in the Africa Region. There is

43 Plesis and Pete, p: 12-15.
44 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World,Cornell University Press, 2004, p: 20-21
45 See Mara Pillinger, Ian Hurd, and Michael N. Barnett, “How to Get Away with Cholera: The UN, Haiti, and International Law”, Perspectives on Politics, March 2016, Vol. 14, No.1.

increasing pressure from civil society institutions to make UN more accountable to the people it is to serve. In sum, legalization is thought to serve “human beings” by limiting the ambitions and power struggles of states in world politics. The evolution in human rights field is the evindence of this, as yet the resistence of the UN for changing its structure and working methods is standing on the way towards that “progress”. This denotes to a legitimacy crises of the UN.

References

Abramson, Nadia, “United Nations Paacekeepers Can Do No Wrong: How Blue Helmets Achieved Immunity for Sexual Abuse in Cote D’Ivore and How to Ensure Accountability in the Future”, Student International Law Papers p: 11. (available at: uments/abramson.paper.pdf)

Adebajo, Adekeye and Chris Landsberg, “Back to the future: UN peacekeeping in Africa”, International Peacekeeping, 7:4, 2000, pp: 161-188, p:161-162

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World,Cornell University Press, 2004, p: 20-21

Bernstein, Stewen, “Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance”, Journal of International Law and International Relations, Vol.1, No.1-2, p:142.

Coicaud, Jean-Marc, Legitimacy and Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p: 10.

Grant, Ruth W. and Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 1 February 2005, p: 32

Hurrell, Andrew, ‘Power, Institutions and the Production of Inequality’ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.) Power in Global Governance p: 56-57.

Johnstone, Ian, “Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Counsel: Bringing Down the Deliberatıve Deficit,” American Society of International Law, p: 277, 2008.

Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules For the World, Cornell University Press, 2004, p: 171.

Notar, Susan A. “Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law. 14, no. 2 (2006): 413-429, p:426.

O’Brien, Melanie, “Protectors on trial? Prosecuting peacekeepers for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court”, ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University (available at

quence=1)

Odello, Marco and Róisín Burke, “Between immunity and impunity: peacekeeping and sexual abuses and violence”, The International Journal of Human Rights, 2016, p: 1.

Pillinger Mara, Ian Hurd, and Michael N. Barnett, “How to Get Away with Cholera: The UN, Haiti, and International Law”, Perspectives on Politics, March 2016, Vol. 14, No.1, p:70.

Plesis, Max Du and Stephen Pete, “Who Guards the Guardians: The ICC and serious crimes committed by United Nations peacekeepers in Africa”, African Security Review 13(4), 2004, p: 10.

Ramsbotham, Oliver and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p: 186.

Sikkink, Kathryn, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics, WW Norton Company, 2011.

Steffek, Jens, The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach, European Journal of International Relations, 9(2), p: 260.

Steffek, Jens, “Legitimacy in International Relations: From State Compliance to Citizen Consensus” (in), Hurrelmann, Schneider and Steffek (eds.) Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, Palgrave Macmillian, 2007, p:186.

Voeten, Eric “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force”, p: 528.

UN Conduct and Discipline Unit (available at

UN General Assembly Document, 24 March 2005 A/59/710 (available at

https://www.hrw.org/africa/central-african-republic

November 8, 2021

Human Security

“Human Security” From Liberal Perspective: Is It a Comprehensive Model?

Res. Assist. Dr. Cansu Güleç ARAS MEF University

Classical liberal ideas were built on the concepts of equality, rationality, freedom and property. In the 18th century, Locke from England, David Hume and Adam Smith in Scotland, Montesque and Voltaire from France and Kant from Germany were the leading liberal thinkers. As an international theory that explained international politics and foreign policy, Liberalism emerged after the First World War. Names like Woodrow Wilson, Hobson, David Mitrany, Karl W. Deutsch, Michael Doyle, Francis Fukuyama, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane are among the most important representatives of liberal thought in international relations. According to Liberalism, world peace might occur with the residence of political and economic liberal norms at both national and international levels; the increase of interdependence and interaction; the international cooperation that carried out under the leadership of intergovernmental organizations; and the protection of human rights and governance. In security studies, the concept of human security is one of the most important concepts of the post-Cold War era that has been scholarly disputed. Indeed, the ethnic and religious-based conflicts after the Cold War led to evolution of the concept “national security” and the increase of the concerns about individual security in international relations. Since then, there have been attempts to “deepen and widen” the concept of security from the level of states to individuals. In that sense, the concept of “human security” considers human being as the reference object of security as well as it places the threats against human beings on the agenda. On the other hand, the mentioned concept objects the monopoly of the state in ensuring security through featuring the actors like international organizations and civil society. Accordingly, the concept of security will be discussed within the scope of liberal theory in this paper. Following the historical evolution, the conceptualizations about human security will be put forward. In addition, the criticisms toward the concept of human security will be analyzed. Finally, the evaluations regarding implementation and execution of human security will be discussed.

Key words: Security Studies, Liberalism, Human Security, Globalization

LİBERAL BAKIŞ AÇISIYLA “İNSAN GÜVENLİĞİ”: KAPSAYICI BİR MODEL Mİ?

ÖZET

Klasik liberal düşünce, eşitlik, rasyonellik, özgürlük ve mülkiyet kavramları üzerinde inşa edilmiştir. 18. Yüzyılda, İngiltere’den Locke, İskoçya’da David Hume ve Adam Smith, Fransa’dan Montesqueu, Voltaire ve Almanya’dan Kant önde gelen liberal düşünürler olmuşlardır. Liberalizmin uluslararası politika ve dış politikayı açıklamaya yönelik bir uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi olarak görülmesi ise I. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ortaya çıkmıştır. Woodrow Wilson, Hobson, David Mitrany, Karl W. Deutsch, Michael Doyle, Francis Fukuyama, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane gibi isimler liberal düşüncenin uluslararası ilişkilerde önemli temsilcileri arasındadır. Liberalizme göre dünya barışı; siyasi ve ekonomik liberal normların ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde yerleşik hale gelmesi, karşılıklı bağımlılığın ve etkileşimin artması, devletlerarası teşkilatların öncülüğünde gerçekleştirilecek uluslararası iş birliği, yönetişim ve insan haklarının korunmasıyla gerçekleşebilir. Güvenlik çalışmalarında insan güvenliği kavramı ise, etrafında pek çok kuramsal tartışmanın döndüğü Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin en önemli kavramlarından biridir. Zira, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ortaya çıkan etnik ve dini temelli çatışmalar “ulusal egemenlik” kavramının evrim geçirmesine ve bireyin güvenliğine yönelik endişelerin, uluslararası ilişkiler gündemine yerleşmesine neden olmuşlardır. Söz konusu dönemden itibaren, güvenlik çalışmaları hem “genişlemeye” hem “derinleşme” ye uğramıştır. İnsan güvenliği, hem güvenliğin referans nesnesi olarak insanı kabul etmiş, hem de insana yönelik tehditleri gündeme taşımıştır. Öte yandan kavram, güvenliğin sağlanmasında uluslararası örgütler ve sivil toplum kuruluşları gibi aktörlere de çeşitli roller biçerek devletin bu alandaki tekeline karşı çıkmaktadır. Bu bilgiler ışığında, bu çalışmada liberal teori kapsamında güvenlik kavramı ele alınacak ve “insan güvenliği” kavramının genişleyen ve derinleşen güvenlik anlayışı ile beraber söz konusu teorik çerçevede nasıl yorumlandığı incelenecektir. Ortaya konulan tarihsel gelişimin ardından, insan güvenliğine yönelik belirsizliğin giderilmesi için yapılan kavramsallaştırmalar ortaya konulacaktır. Bununla beraber, insan güvenliği kavramına yönelik eleştiriler de analiz edilecektir. Son olarak, insan güvenliğinin hayata geçirilmesi ve yürütülmesine yönelik değerlendirmeler ortaya konulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik Çalışmaları, Liberalizm, İnsan Güvenliği, Küreselleşme

INTRODUCTION

Security is an ambiguous concept and it is very open to different comments which include different dimensions. The actors in international relations usually consider the capabilities and the intentions of a possible rivals while making threat assessments, but it is also difficult for them to qualify and articulate the level of security. It can be argued that security consists of multiple elements some of which are shared by all actors and some of which are specific to a particular actor at a particular time.

The actors in international environment such as states, individuals, international organizations and many others have a number of values. These values may include physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, psychological well-being, and so on.1 It is argued that security points to some degree of protection of values acquired, and it has much in common with power or wealth. However, while wealth measures the amount of a nation’s material possessions and power is regarded as the ability to control the actions of others, security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.2

It can be claimed that the end of the Cold War has created an opportunity that the concept of security will be broadened, redefined or reconstituted. In that era, the definition of security as “the absence of existential threats to one state emanating from another” has been criticized by many reasons. First of all, the state is no accepted as the sole subject of security. Social, ethnic, religious minorities, individuals or humankind have been considered as objects that have security needs. Secondly, it has been argued that the attention devoted to the physical, territorial or political dimension of security is misplaced under conditions of complex interdependence. Other aspects are seen as significant in security terms which include economic resources, stability and institutions.3 Therefore, the narrowness of the military state-centric agenda was considered as politically and normatively problematic for those seeking to expand the concept of security.

The rise of intra-state conflicts, societies’ fear of immigration, environmental problems and the acceleration of the HIV/AIDS epidemic demonstrated that traditional understanding of security was unable to meet the challenges of the post- Cold War era.4 In that sense, the concept of “human security” is one of the most

1 David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Secuirty”, Review of International Studies ,23, (1997): 13.
2 Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec., 1952): 484-485.
3 Horald Müller, “Security Cooperation”, in Handbook of International Relations, Walter Carlsneas and others (ed.), (London: SAGE Publications, 2013), 607.
4 Barru Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),187.

important concepts of the post-Cold War era that has been scholarly disputed. Indeed, the ethnic and religious-based conflicts after the Cold War led to evolution of the concept “national security” and the increase of the concerns about individual security in international relations. Since then, there have been attempts to “deepen and widen” the concept of security from the level of states to individuals. In that sense, the concept of “human security” considers human being as the reference object of security as well as it places the threats against human beings on the agenda. On the other hand, the mentioned concept objects the monopoly of the state in ensuring security through featuring the actors like international organizations and civil society.

Accordingly, the concept of security will be discussed within the scope of liberal theory in this paper. Following the historical evolution, the conceptualizations about human security will be put forward. In addition, the criticisms toward the concept of human security will be analyzed. Finally, the evaluations regarding implementation and execution of human security will be discussed.

THE LIBERALIST PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY

The Liberalist perspective has its roots from the 18th century enlightenment, and as a tradition in political theory, it takes individuals as its units of analysis. In early 20th century, especially after the WWI, liberalism reached prominence in international politics. On the other hand, there emerged periods when liberalism was under its most severe attack particularly in the 1930s. The dominant narrative in International Relations field was that Realism routed liberalism after World War II and liberalism had little to say about security. Nevertheless, liberal scholars continued to challenge realism in the 1950s and 1960s. Some continued to argue for conceiving the units of world politics as individuals rather than states. In 20th century, liberalism’s focus on increasing security by international law and organizations continued as well.

Names like Woodrow Wilson, Hobson, David Mitrany Karl W. Deutsch, Michael Doyle, Francis Fukuyama, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane are among the most important representatives of liberal thought in international relations. According to Liberalism, world peace might occur with the residence of political and economic liberal norms at both national and international levels; the increase of interdependence and interaction; the international cooperation that carried out under the leadership of intergovernmental organizations; and the protection of human rights and governance.

The theoretical point of origin for liberalism is the individual rather than as state. Liberal theory has paid particular attention to the state as the institution defined by its ability to make individuals secure. By treating state action as a function of individual beliefs and interests, the state is seen as instrumental to the purposes of individuals. Individual influence on states and on security is mediated through groups and institutions within and across states. Individuals can create, sustain, and destroy

institutions and thereby enhance or degrade national and international security.5 Beside the individuals, a number of collectivities are the focus of analysis. Firstly states, but also corporations, organizations and associations are examples of these actors. Individual influence on states and on security is mediated through groups and institutions within and across states. Individuals can create and sustain institutions that may create conditions under which states will be more cooperative to their mutual benefit.6

Liberals regards international institutions as actors that have feedback effects by deepening cooperation among states. The institutions whose global development policy discourse and programmes are analyzed in order to advance the arguments made about liberal perspective of security and development debate. The Western based institutional actors such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank and the are emphasized as being at the core of global governance networks linking conflict and security.7 Accordingly, the security is regarded as an interdependent issue in which economic interactions provide greater gains for the countries. Moreover, international institutions take a global stance on the environment, terrorism, epidemics, disasters as the only practical basis for coping with those problems.8

One area of liberalism has developed arguments about democracies bearing on security cooperation. Beginning with Immanuel Kant, there has been a claim that democracies can behave differently than non-democracies in world affairs. Today, the emphasis on “democratic peace theory”, the notion that democracies are naturally peaceful among themselves. Accordingly, while democratic governments readily go to war with undemocratic ones, they do not plan for possible wars with each other since they do not see each other as threatening.9 Some analysts claim that combining democracy and an open economy and society produces this result. Others believe that democracies are more transparent in policies and policy making than non-democracies which makes for less suspicion, rivalry and conflict among them. According to another claim, democratic politics assumes compromise and the peaceful resolution of disputes through discussion. This brings dealings with other democracies in turn.10

5 John M. Owen IV, “Liberalism and Security”, 9780190846626-e-33?result=1&rskey=033iMn (2010).
6 Ibid.
7 Melita Lazell, “Liberalism(s) and the Critical Securitization of Development Debate”, Globalizations, 13:4
8 Patrick Morgan, “Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches”, in Contemporary security studies, Alan Collins (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 27.
9 Morgan, “Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches”, 28.
10 Ibid.

As it can be understood from these various forms of liberal understanding, the notion of security as a basic concept is applied in analysis of policy decisions via putting multiple dimensions. In sum, the main descriptors might be used for making assumptions from different perspectives of realist and liberal traditions.

Table 1. Different Security Concepts

Tradition	Form of Security	Focus	What is at risk?	Threats to Security
Realist-based	National	State	Sovereignty, territorial integrity	Other states and non-state actors
Liberal -based	Human	Individuals, mankind, human rights, rule of law	Survival, human development and governance	State itself, natural catastrophe and change

Source: P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security”, Security Dialogue vol. 33, no. 4, (December 2002): 475.

Although there are many counter arguments and criticisms against it, liberalism as a tradition in security studies continues to make contributions since its emergence during the Enlightenment. Liberalism seeks to guide to international security insofar as individuals and the groups they organize affect or, at a maximum, erode states.11 One of its branches concerns the democratic peace and related research on democratic advantages in international cooperation. In addition, through globalization, societal needs for security transcend the traditional realm of territorial integrity and extend to transnational issues, from organized crime to migration, all of which lead to demands for enhanced security. Responses require contributions from non-state actors if effective regulation is to be achieved. They are partially based on the normative commitment to “human security” with the individual as core subject of entitlements to security – an offspring of liberal normative theory.12 The concept of human security

11 Owen IV, “Liberalism and Security”.
12 Horald Müller, “Security Cooperation”, 619.

represents deepening and widening of the traditional notion of national security which is regarded as protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity from external military threats.

THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY

In traditional understanding, the concept of security is defined as protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states from external military threats. This is a realistic approach that based on national security. Accordingly, states are viewed as the only referent object of security, which needs to be protected. This approach dominated security understanding especially during the Cold War period.13 Nevertheless, the Realist School of security thought has been challenged by many thoughts after the end of the Cold War on the ground that it does not provide sufficient understanding to the contemporary changes and challenges.

Particularly, since the end of the Cold War, the subject matter of security studies has undergone both a “widening” and a “deepening.” The “widening” aspect of security has included consideration of non-military security threats, such as environmental scarcity and degradation, the spread of disease, overpopulation, migration, mass refugee movements, nationalism, economic and financial crises. The “deepening” aspect of security included the consideration of the security of individuals and groups, rather than focusing narrowly on external threats to states.14 In that framework, “human security” is containing common security, global security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security. The discussion of this concept encourages policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something more than the military defense of state interests and territory.15

Even though the concept of Human Security does not have a universally agreed upon definition, there are some elements shared by all definitions of Human Security. These include a shift to the individual as the referent object of security. In addition, the definition of a security threat has been regarded as a threat to the quality of life of individuals. In other words, human security is about security for the people rather than of states.16 Also, the role of non-state actors has been recognized as agents for the assure of security. Finally, the importance of security has been shifted away from the traditional and exclusive concern with military and armed conflict. In that sense,

13 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security”, in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 449.
14 Rolad Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001): 97.
15 Ibid., 87.
16 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security”,449.

traditional, and Realist conceptions and practices of security has started to be criticized.17

Although Human Security is treated as contested concept, the original formulation is conducted by UNDP with the publication of the Human Development Report of 1994. According to the UNDP, the potential threats to Human Security can be classified under seven central categories: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.

⦁ Economic security requires an assured basic income-usually from productive and remunerative work, or in the last resort from some publicly financed safety net.

⦁ Food security means that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food. This requires not just enough food to go round. It requires that people have ready access to food-that they have an “entitlement” to food, by growing it for themselves, by buying it or by taking advantage of a public food distribution system.

⦁ Health security means guaranteeing a minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles.

⦁ Environmental security means protecting people from the short-term and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature and deterioration of the natural environment.

⦁ Personal security requires protecting people from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals or sub-state actors, from domestic abuse and from predatory adults.

⦁ Community security means protecting people from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence.

⦁ Political Security means ensuring people live in a society that honours their basic human rights, and ensuring the freedom of individuals and groups from government attempts to exercise control over ideas and information. 18

17 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security”, Global Society, Vol. 16, No. 3, (2002): 279.
18 UN Human Development Report 1994, 24-32.

Table 2. Types of Human Security and Root Causes

TYPE OF INSECURITY
ROOT CAUSES

Economic insecurity
Persistent poverty, unemployment, lack of access to credit and other economic opportunities

Food insecurity
Hunger, famine, sudden rise in food prices

Health insecurity
Epidemics, malnutrition, poor sanitation, lack of access to basic health care

Environmental insecurity
Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters

Personal insecurity
Physical violence in all its forms, human trafficking, child labour

Community insecurity
Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions, crime, terrorism

Political insecurity
Political repression, human rights violations, lack of rule of law and justice

Source: UN Human Development Report 1994, 24-25.

UNDP proposed a concept of “human development” which focuses on building human capabilities to confront and overcome poverty, illiteracy, diseases, discrimination, restrictions on political freedom, and the threat of violent conflict. Accordingly, “every human being counts, and every human life is equally valuable. That universalism is at the core of the human development concept.”19

The 1994 Human Development Report highlighted two major components of human security. One is “freedom from fear” and the other one is “freedom from want”. “Freedom for fear” focuses on reducing the human costs of violent conflicts through measures such as a ban on landmines, using women and children in armed conflict, child soldiers, child labor, and small arms proliferation, the formation of an International Criminal Court, and promulgating human rights and international humanitarian law. From this perspective, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva Conventions are the ‘core elements’ of the doctrine of human security. “Freedom from want” view is closer to the original UNDP formulation. It underlines the ability of individuals and societies to be free from a broad range of non-military threats, such as poverty, disease, and environmental degradation. On the other hand, both components agree that human security is about security of the individuals rather than states and protecting people requires going beyond traditional principles of state sovereignty.20

Furthermore, the Human Security is considered as an inter-disciplinary concept that has some important features: “people-centered, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented”.

⦁ As a people-centered concept, human security places the individual at the center of analysis,

⦁ As a multi-sectoral concept, it includes causes of insecurity relating for instance to economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.

⦁ As a comprehensive concept, it stresses the need for cooperative and multi- sectoral responses that bring together the agendas of those dealing with security, development and human rights.

⦁ As a context-specific concept, human security acknowledges that insecurities vary considerably across different settings and as such advances contextualized solutions that are responsive to the particular situations they seek to address.

19 Human Development Indices and Indicators 2018 Statistical Update, 7.
20 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security”, 495-496.

⦁ As a prevention-oriented concept, it introduces a dual focus on protection and empowerment. Protection includes strategies, set up by states, international agencies, NGOs and the private sector. It recognizes that people face threats that are beyond their control (such as natural disasters, financial crises and conflicts). Thus, human security requires protecting people in a systematic, comprehensive and preventative way. Empowerment, on the other hand, aims at developing the capabilities of individuals and communities to make informed choices and to act on their own behalf. Empowering people enables them to find ways and to participate in solutions to ensure human security for themselves and others.21

The concept of Human security also points out the difference between “threat” and “vulnerability”. Firstly, a threat is considered as identifiable, often immediate, and requires an understandable response. For instance, military force has traditionally been sized against threats in order to defend a state against external aggression, to protect national interests and to enhance state security. Secondly, a threat is either clearly visible or commonly acknowledged. On the other hand, a vulnerability is often only an indicator, often not clearly identifiable, often linked to a complex interdependence among related issues, and does not always suggest a correct or even adequate response. Lioatta states that “while disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, terrorism, narco-trafficking, political repression, and environmental hazards are at least somewhat related issues and affect the security of states and individuals, the best response to these related issues, in terms of security, is not at all clear. Even though Canada emphasized the relevance of human and environmental security to ‘high politics’ and attempted to restructure its armed forces to meet these challenges, the relevance of state-centered military forces for addressing or ‘solving’ non- state-centered issues is questionable.”22

Moreover, a vulnerability is not clearly perceived, understood, and almost a source of debate. According to Liotta “…as a result of the 11 September 2001 attacks it is correct to suggest that the USA is vulnerable to terrorism in ways never previously understood or commonly acknowledged. Despite the USA’s isolated physical geography in relation to Europe, Asia, and the Greater Near East, its citizens are now vulnerable in ways never directly experienced before. Terrorism has become both a driving force and a critical uncertainty in security decisions.”23

It is argued that with the rise of new issues around the world which encompass both widening and broadening aspects of security, a threat-based security dilemma is going along with the rise of various vulnerability-based survival dilemmas in contemporary

21 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations, Human Security in Theory and Practice Application of The Human Security Concept And The United Nations Trust Fund For Human Security, (2009): 7-8.
22 Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security”, 478-479.
23 Ibid.

world.24 These shifts in the balance of threats and vulnerabilities require new strategies with more inclusive structures, missions, and budgets.

THE DEBATE ABOUT HUMAN SECURITY

Although Human Security has brought new actors and issues to the security agenda, it has also seen as problematic for a number of reasons. Most of these criticisms treat Human Security as a policy agenda, while many others are more critical of the main assumptions which Human Security is founded upon. For critics of human security, the concept is too broad to be analytically meaningful or useful as a tool of policy- making.

Accordingly, there are two problems that limit the usefulness of the human security concept for practitioners of international politics. Firstly, the concept lacks a precise definition. Existing definitions of human security encompass everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals. Second, the idea of human security holds together a coalition of states, development agencies, and NGOs. As a unifying concept for this coalition, human security lacks precision, and thus encompasses the diverse perspectives and objectives of all the members of the coalition. This ambiguity diminishes the concept’s usefulness as a guide for policymaking.25

Another criticism is concerned with Human Security as a security policy agenda. According to this critique, it is difficult to see how the Human Security approach could be “operationalized” particularly within present configurations of power and decision- making processes. In that sense, the work and implementation of Human Security are being questioned. Accordingly, setting the individual as the referent object of security causes some problems which Human Security sought in part to address. In that framework, the problem is the inability of Human Security to address adequately issues of identity if individuals constitute the set referent object of security. Accordingly, considering individuals as the referent object of security does not always represent the best means of understanding a particular situation of insecurity or redressing it. Issues of identity and ethnic difference may be ignored by a Human Security approach that effectively abstracts individuals, particularly if founded upon broadly universalized Western principles. For these critics, the reference object of

24 Ibid., 481.
25 Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2
(Fall 2001): 88.

security should be determined by the context in which a number of actors come to be threatened.26

Another area of concern related to Human Security is around the question “how it would allow for the adjudication between competing claims and objectives”. For example, much of the deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is caused by shifted cultivators and landless peasants, who cut down virgin tropical forest in order to sustain their families in the short term. In cases such as this, where different components of Human Security, such as environmental and economic, appear in opposition, whose security is to be addressed, and which types of concerns have priority? While the solution to both problems in this case may be related, judging between competing security claims may allow for an inability to create security.27

Furthermore, the fact that Human Security is concerned with its universalism and its foundation on Western values is also being questioned. The link between Human Security and universalism is made explicitly in the UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1994. In that report, Human Security is described as a “universal concern’’. Thus, the general description of security in the Human Development Report regard security as the same for people everywhere. This universalism is related with the question of identity, particularly collective identity and difference. Additionally, Human Security is predicated upon a Western conception of the importance of democracy and, of greater concern, a commitment to free market economics, which potentially underestimate the questions of identity and difference.28

Buzan also remains skeptical about human security, because it does not differentiate its agenda from that of human rights as regarding the referent object as the individual or humankind as a whole. According to him, this causes the danger that security is taken to be the desired end.29

Newman claims that human security is normatively attractive, but analytically weak concept. For him, human security brings questions about the relationship between the individual and the state and about state sovereignty. Traditionally, state sovereignty and sovereign legitimacy rest upon a government’s control of territory, state independence and recognition by other states. The international legitimacy of state sovereignty rests not only on control of territory, but also upon fulfilling certain standards of human rights and welfare for citizens. As a result, the sovereignty of states that are unwilling or unable to fulfil certain basic standards may be at risk. The

26 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security”, Global Society, Vol. 16, No. 3, (2002): 280-81.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 283.
29 Barry Buzan, “A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value”, Security Dialogue, 35(3), (2004): 369–370.

use of military force for human protection purposes is the powerful example of this concept.30

According to some arguments, human security discourses are used as a justification to intervene other states. For example, the USA invaded Iraq through adopting human security discourse. Therefore, some perception of human security might be a tool to intervene in internal affairs of developing countries and impose Western values. Finally, human security is intertwined with the responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention. For example, the international community intervened in Libya, but not Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. According to this critics, human security promotes national security and power politics because the discourse to fulfill human security and human rights mainly depends on great powers.31

CONCLUSION

In the first half of the 20th century, world wars killed thousands of people, and left whole continents in devastation. During the Cold War, proxy wars killed thousands of people, and the world feared that a nuclear war would cause complete annihilation of the world. In the early 21st century, wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have killed thousands of people again. Although there was no major war after 1945, minor wars and terrorist attacks may continue to kill thousands of people.32 Under these circumstances, there emerged a number of intellectual debates regarding the security in International Relations, its scope and dimensions as well.

It can be argued that human security is distinguished by three elements: its focus on the individual and human being as the referent object of security; its multidimensional nature; its universal or global scope, applying to states and societies of the North as well as the South. In addition, the concept of human security has been influenced by some developments: the rejection of economic growth as the main indicator of development and the accompanying notion of ‘human development’ as empowerment of people; the rising incidence of civil wars and intra-state conflicts involving huge loss of life, ethnic cleansing, displacement of people within and across borders, and disease out-breaks; the impact of globalization in spreading transnational dangers such as terrorism and pandemics; and the Post-Cold War emphasis on human rights and humanitarian intervention. The latter involves the principle that the international community is justified in intervening in the internal affairs of states accused of gross violation of human rights. This has led to the realization that while the concept of national security has not been rendered irrelevant, it no longer sufficiently accounts

30 Edward Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept”, Security Dialogue, 35(3), (2004): 358-359.
31 Hawre Hasan Hama, “State Security, Societal Security, and Human Security”, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 21(1), (2017): 16-17.
32 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations (10th Edition), (Pelgrave, 2014), 85.

for the kinds of danger that threaten the societies, states, and the international community.33

In conclusion, human security needs opportunities for creative synthesis and theoretical eclecticism. Liberal perspective might help the understanding of how human security can be promoted through interdependence, democracy and international institutions with its emphasis on non-state actors like international institutions and multinational corporations. However, it is also essential to put some insights about how human security notions are promoted by global power channels. Furthermore, the shifts in the global relations can help prospects for human security understanding. Otherwise, the concept will continue to be criticized by academics who carry out security studies due to the uncertainties regarding the definition and scope of human security.

33Amitav Acharya, “Human Security”,451.

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November 7, 2021

Poland’s Foreign Policy Towards Middle East

Poland’s Foreign Policy Towards Middle East After 1989

Dr. Magdalena KUMELSKA-KONIECKO University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn

Middle East in Polish foreign policy, after 1989, addressed secondary significance. The first priority of Poland’s diplomacy after 1989 was to pursue the return to Europe conception established by Polish prime minister – Tadeusz Mazowiecki and minister of foreign affairs – Krzysztof Skubiszewski. The main objective of the return to Europe conception was membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as in the European Union. Before the democratic transformation period, which was the effect of bipolar system dismantlement, Polish Middle East policy was conditioned ideological premises connected with affiliation to Eastern Block. Typical for Eastern approach to Middle East was isolation of Israel, advocate for Palestinian in their aspiration to build an independent state, favoring and developing cooperation with Arab counties of the region. In reality the relation with Arab countries limited to political support and scarce trade cooperation.

End of the cold war has brought some changes in Poland’s Middle East policy. First significant move was the normalization of Polish relations with Israel. The next step was to establish relations with Arab countries especially with those which Poland didn’t have yet. Among other goals of Polish foreign policy in the Middle East we can mention: promotion of democracy and human rights, reinforcing economic relations, humanitarian aid and institutionalization of cooperation in the broad sense. Important area of Polish activity in the Middle East, after 1989, was participation in American intervention in Iraq in 2003, as well as UN peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and in the Golan Heights.

Noticeable element of contemporary Polish Middle East policy is it’s convergence with the United States of America security strategy. These are: fight against terrorism, countering proliferation of weapon of massive destruction, promotion of democracy and human rights. Moreover, Poland as a member of European Union is also oblige to pursue common foreign and security policy. Unfortunately, Poland did not develop coherent, independent Middle East policy, which confirm the assumption that the Middle East is a region of low Polish interests.

Key Words: Poland, Middle East, the USA, Iran, the European Union, Russia, foreign policy, security strategy, international relations.

Introduction

Middle East is one of the crucial region in the contemporary international relations. The importance of Middle East comes form for expamle possessing 2/3 of world’s crude oil and almost a half of natural gas resources. Representative for Middle East region is it’s unpredictability and unstability, which is bringing attentions of powerfull interantional relations players. Beyond many security issues which afflict Middle East prime are: Israeli-Arab/Palestine militray conflict, war in Syria, Iran’s nuclear programme, terrorist therat provoked by Daesh, al-Qaeda, PKK and other terrorist group, instability in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and insecurities coming from refugees case.

Poland in the past has never proved special attention to Middle East, however Polish authorities related to some of the process coming there1. Before reclaming independence in 1989, Polish policy towards Middle East was conditioned to internal and external premises coming from affiliation to the Eastern Block2. For example in the 40’s Polish government, like the USSR, approved creation of Isreal state, and later analogously to Moscow, supported Arab states against Isreal. During the cold war Polish approach toward Middle East was characterized by hostility toward Israel, aiding Palestine, developing close, political realtions with Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Egypt.

After the collapse of the USSR and definitive end of cold war, Poland started to create its own foreign policy. Concerning Middle East, Polish government decided to redefine foregoing direction. First example of new approche was decison to normalize relations with Israel, simultaneously preserving relations with Arab states. Neverteless, domestic problems and conentration on priorities objectives, definitely weaken Poland’s intrest on Middle East.

Main Directions of Polish Foreign Policy after 1989

End of the cold war era, has brought significant changes in Polish foregin policy. After conducting, so called partly-free, parlimaentary elections on 4th of June 1989, newly establish government coming from the Solidarity Movement – Tadeusz Mazowiecki – as a Prime Minister proceeded to develope objectives of Polish foreign strategy. The biggest priorities for Poland after 1989 were finding new security guarantees and opportunities for economic development. In other words it meant the beginning of Polish efforts to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.

1 M. Szydzisz, Polityka zagraniczna RP wobec Bliskiego Wschodu – zmiana czy ciągłość?, “Dyplomacja i Bezpieczeństwo”, 2016, No 1(4), p. 185.
2 A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, Raport. Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,
“Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, 2008, No 7/8, Vol. 1/2, p. 147.

Polish authorities believed in Poland’s return to Europe concept, based on the confidence that Poland belong to Western civilization3. Prime Minister Mazowiecki was confident that traditional consolidated democratic states enable Poland fulfilling its objectives. Polish diplomacy under the guidance of professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski considered that Germany would play crucial role in Poland’s accesion to the European Union, whereas the United States of America would be pivotal for Polish aspiration to NATO.

The Polish government began to implement the strategy of reconciliation between the Polish and German nations, which might to lead to the normalization of bilateral relations based on the principles of friendly and equal cooperation4. Poland, despite concerns about vague German stance towards Polish-German border on Odra River and Nysa-Łużycka River, decided to grant full support for German reunite process. In Krzysztof Skubiszewski view Poland’s decision was coherent with Polish-German unity of interests5. The basis for this assumption was common thinking for Poland and Germany about the future of Europe and the world. They agreed with the idea of European unity, meaning a policy of consolidating a divided continent based on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law6. On 14th November 1990 Poland and Germany has signed Border Treaty which recognized the course of Polish- German border in accordance with the provisions of World War II peace conferences (Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam). Less than a year later states has signed a Treaty between Republic of Poland and Federal Republic of Germany on good neighborhood and friendly cooperation (14.11.1991). Polish-German cooperation was profitable for both sides – German became promoter of Polish interests in European area, Poland on the other hand became “linkage” between East and West. Moreover, putting Warsaw into Western security and cooperation zone has moved West border to the East, changing at the same time Berlin geopolitical location.

The priority objective of the Polish raison d’etat, since becoming independent of the USSR’s domination, was to base Polish security on allied relations with the most powerful country in the world, the winner of the Cold War confrontation – the United States of America. Poland form the very beginning of 1989 desired to give unique character of Polish-American relations. Polish authorities expected Washington to support the transformation process and embrace Poland with American security guarantees. The process of democratization in Central and Eastern European countries in the United States was received with great satisfaction, it perfectly entered into

3 R. Zięba, Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie, Warszawa 2010, p. 19.
4 M. Kumelska, Kierunek Waszyngton. Redefinicja polskiej polityki zagranicznej po wyborach czerwcowych, (w:) Polska – 25 lat po wyborach czerwcowych. Konsekwencje dla polityki wewnętrznej i pozycji międzynarodowej, T. Astramowicz-Leyk, W. Tomaszewski (ed.), Olsztyn 2014, p. 176.
5 See more: Polska – Niemcy 1945-2007. Od konfrontacji do współpracy i partnerstwa w Europie,
W.M. Góralski (ed.), Warszawa 2007.
6 R. Zięba, Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie, op. cit., p. 57.

America’s vision of New World Order based on the peaceful relations, democracy and free market economy7.

The TUSA perceived Poland as a leader of transformation among Middle-East European countries. Poland was the first country in the region, who was covered by the US system of general customs preferences; Washington transferred 200 M $ to Stabilization Fund for Poland and reduced Poland’s debt by 70%8. On 20th March 1990 Poland and the USA signed economic agreement and Declaration on relations between the Republic of Poland and the United States. From Warsaw’s perspective declaration of will was far from Polish expectations, but at the beginning of 90’s the US couldn’t offer more.

9 years later Poland as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic became new members of NATO. Without America’s will and of course changing geopolitical circumstances, enlarging NATO on East wouldn’t have been possible. Gaining membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (20.03.1999) and the European Union (1.05.2004) was capstone of Polish priorities launched at the beginning of the 90.

Poland’s foreign policy after 1989, beyond Euro-Atlantic vector, was also concentrated on Eastern vector. While the implementation of the strategy for Poland’s return to Europe became a priority, it was also important to shape relations with the Soviet Union/Russia Federation and states formed as a result of its disintegration behind Poland’s eastern border9. One of the priority of the Polish raison d’etat was full recognition of Poland’s sovereignty by the Soviet Union, followed by the arrangement of bilateral relations on a partnership basis and good neighborly cooperation. Polish authorities were extremely cautious in contact with Moscow, including indubitability of the Soviet Union superpower position, nor did make violent attempts to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact or the Council for Cooperation and Economic Aid, although Poland pointed the need to democratize both organizations. Polish eastern policy of the beginning of the 1990 was based on the concept of two-track strategy, which meant the simultaneous development of rebuilt relations with the USSR and union republics10. Polish diplomacy till 1994 signed with all Eastern neighbors Border Treaties and Treaty on good neighborhood and friendly cooperation including: the Russia Federation (1992), Belarus (1992), Ukraine (1992) and Lithuania (1994). Furthermore, regulating border courses was one of many criteria NATO set for the candidate countries.

7 See more: H. Kissinger, Dyplomacja, Warszawa 2004.
8 See more: L. Pastusiak, Prezydenci amerykańscy wobec spraw polskich, Warszawa 2003, p. 280-331.
9 M. Kumelska, Kierunek wschodni w polskiej polityce zagranicznej po 1989 roku, (w:) Polska – 25 lat transformacji systemowej. Polityka. Gospodarka. Bezpieczeństwo, T. Astramowicz-Leyk, W. Tomaszewski (ed.), Olsztyn 2014, p. 177.
10 Ibidem, p. 180.

Undoubtedly, the success of Polish diplomacy of this period was the popularization of the belief that in the name of the future good relations with neighbors one should strive to give up creating a balance of historical past and urge partners to adopt a similar attitude.

Poland’s Approach towards Middle East after Cold War

Regaining independence by Poland after 1989 allowed it to conduct foreign policy autonomously, also towards Middle East.

At the beginning of the 90’s Polish diplomacy decided to normalize relations with Israel. It is worth emphasizing that in 1967 due to outbreak of 6-days war Poland severed diplomatic relations with Israel as did the USSR. The renewal of diplomatic relations took place in February 1990, but already in 1986 the so-called interest representatives were opened in Tel Aviv and Warsaw11. Rebuilding Polish-Israeli relations was important in view of joint history and diasporas living in both countries. In May 1991 Polish president – Lech Wałęsa – came to Tel-Aviv and gave a speech in Knesset concerning future bilateral relations. The lasting and deep relations that currently connect Poland and Israel include close cooperation in the areas of politics, defense, economy, culture and education. These relationships are based on mutual interests, shared values and a similar assessment of the international situation, but are also a natural continuation of almost 1000 years of common Polish-Jewish history12. Since 1990 Poland and Israel has signed 19 agreements and understandings. The importance of mutual Polish-Israeli contacts is also emphasized by the fact joint government meetings, so-called intergovernmental consultations, that take place continuously since 2011; the only country beside Israel involved in such cooperation with Poland is Germany13.

Between 1990 and 1991 Poland participated in the implementation of Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations, which gave Polish authorities wider perspective on Middle East problems14. Beyond opening to Middle East issues, Poland pursued the US vision on regional order in this part of the world. In some sense it was a strategic decision aimed at gaining the USA favor for Polish case vide membership in NATO.

11
12 Ibidem.
13 M. Szydzisz, Polityka zagraniczna RP wobec Bliskiego Wschodu – zmiana czy ciągłość?, op. cit., p. 187.
14 A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, Raport. Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,
op. cit., p. 148.

Generally, at Polish approach towards Middle East, after 1989, we can distinguish 3 consistent elements15:

⦁ Involvement in activities concerning development of democratic system and protecting human rights.
⦁ Restoring or establishing new diplomatic relations with Middle East countries.
⦁ Institutionalization of existed cooperation and enhancing economic ties.

Until the beginning of the new century, Poland foreign activity was submitted to fulfilling the return to Europe concept. Hence, interest in Middle East has weakened considerably. According to Renata Włoch, Polish foreign policy towards developing countries, including Middle East, can be specifies as parochial run by uninfluential country16. This opinion is not without reason, indeed Poland as a subject of international relations at the turn of 20th and 21st centuries had little, international significance. Poland’s interests in the Middle East were limited as it was it recognizability. Situation has changed after 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States of America. The beginning of American war against global terrorism and its supporters had influenced greatly Poland foreign and security strategy. Form the very beginning Poland provided full support to American ally. Referring to allied loyalty and obligations arising from NATO membership, Poland took part in the military operation against Afghanistan and later Iraq. The Iraqi operation had all the advantages and disadvantages, but form its strategic importance had significant meaning for Warsaw; Poland has emerged internationally as independent strategic entity, capable of making decisions instead of just following other major allies in the European Union such as France and Germany, who were pursing anti-American policy17.

In 2004 Polish government adopted a document called Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries. According to the strategy Poland as member of the European Union would implement obligations coming from The Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and Wider Europe – New Neighborhood Strategy with regard to cooperation with Middle East states.

Poland as a member of the European Union, consequently participant of the globalization process had to start making more contributions to development aid,

15 See more: J. Bury, A. Kołakowska, A. Szymański, Polska a Szerzy Bliski Wschód. Stosunki i perspektywy współpracy (BMENA), “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, 2006, No 2.
16 R. Włoch, Polska a polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec krajów rozwijających się, (w:)
17 R. Lewandowski, W. Lewandowski, Konsekwencje zaangażowania Polski w Iraku, “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, 2009, No 9/10, Vol. I-II, p. 37.

aimed at modernization and socio-economic development countries from non- European areas, including the Middle East; Engagement was one of Poland’s new tasks within the EU structures in efforts to guarantee peace and security, and supporting democratization initiatives of individual countries18.

Polish development aid is directed mainly to Palestine as well as Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in the framework of little grant system. Assistance activities for the Palestinian under the development cooperation program focus on improving access to education, equalizing educational opportunities and raising the level of education , improving water and sanitation infrastructure, including better access to water and municipal waste management, professional activation in the field of agriculture, trade and services as well as supporting business activity and strengthening the self-government of entrepreneurs 19. The total value of development assistance provided by Poland to Palestine in the period 2005-2016 exceeded PLN 25 M. The aid was intended for20:

⦁ Human capital – improving the quality of health care, inclusive education and universal access to high-level education, civic education, social integration of people from groups at risk of exclusion.

⦁ Agriculture and rural development – food security, productivity and competitiveness of agricultural production, access to markets, use of modern technologies in agriculture, modernization of local infrastructure.

⦁ Entrepreneurship and the private sector – the competitiveness and innovation of micro- and small enterprises, social economy, entrepreneurship, especially women and youth, vocational education and training.

In Multiannual Development Aid Program 2016-2020 Poland confirmed the priority of Palestine in the distribution of development assistance21. The objectives towards Palestine remained as mentioned above. An important change in the document was placing, for the first time, Lebanon as a priority state for Polish development cooperation. Since 2012, Poland has been continuously providing humanitarian aid to Lebanon in the areas of shelter, health protection and education. In order to ensure the most effective response to the protracted crisis, Poland adopts an approach in which it seeks to link humanitarian and development activities. As a result, it allows to supplement the most urgent humanitarian needs with development activities of permanent and structural character22.

18 A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, Raport. Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,
op. cit.,p. 168.
19
20 See more:
21 Multiannual Development Aid Program 2016-2020, p.10.
22 Ibidem, p. 10.

According to Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries the most important priority for Poland in relations with Middle East counties is economy. Besides reinforcing economic ties Poland had set such goals as23:

1- Fulfilling the obligations coming from Iraq Mission. 2- Supporting peace between Israel and Palestine.
⦁ Sustaining dialog with Arabs states, Israel and Iran.
⦁ Seeking cooperation with The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. 5- Explaining objectives of Poland’s involvement in Iraq (especially on society level). 6- Strive to achieve the status of responsible partner of the region.
In compliance with Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries internal and external conditions of a given country, e.g. political destabilization, conflicts, religious fundamentalism will have an impact on undertaking cooperation or failure to do so24. Incontestably, this approach restrict potential cooperation. More importantly term religious fundamentalism is not very clear, strategy doesn’t explain what does it really mean.

The strategy states that Polish government contacting with Middle East countries will use: political dialog, diplomatic presence, cooperation and development aid, promotion of Polish culture and science. According to the document the most effective tool of Polish foreign policy in the region are agreements and understandings25. Between 2003 and 2007 Republic of Poland has signed with several Middle East counties: 6 bilateral agreements, 2 bilateral memorandums, 5 bilateral deals, 2 bilateral cooperation agreement and 1 bilateral protocol.

Among the most important countries in the Middle East, the document has highlighted: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait26. Poland wished to develop close economic relations with those countries, especially in the field of energy resources. This is dictated by the need to diversify supplies from the Russia Federation27. Qatar turn out to be a country that really supports Poland in the process of its diversification of Russian gas supplies. In 2009 Polish Oil and Gas Mining (Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo – PGNiG) has signed a 20-year contract with Qatar for gas supplies. The first delivery of Qatari gas to the Polish terminal in Świnoujście took place in November 2015 and is supplied regularly.

23 Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries, November 2004, p. 32-39.
24 Ibidem.
25 Ibidem.
26 Ibidem.
27 See more: D. Boćkowski, Polska polityka zagraniczna wobec świata muzułmańskiego. Próba definicji problemu, (w:) Polityka zagraniczna RP. 20 lat po przełomie. Tom 1: Koncepcje, bezpieczeństwo, kwestie prawne i polonijne, A. Jarosz, K. Olszewski (ed.), Toruń 2011, p. 111-119.

Despite Polish authorities will to boost economic cooperation with Middle East states, its effects are still insufficient. The reasons for this situation should be seen in28:

⦁ Lack of a governmental agency providing assistance outside the country.
⦁ Reluctance of some Polish business entities and educational institutions afraid of taking risk.
⦁ Limited material and financial possibilities for example insufficient number of diplomatic missions.
⦁ No mutual information and no direct contacts between entrepreneurs. 5- Cultural differences.
⦁ Inability of using by Polish authorities Middle East expert knowledge and experience.
⦁ Uneffective promotion of Polish cultural and scientific institutions in the region. 8- Scarce knowledge about partner culture and customs.

American Factor in Polish Middle East Policy

Since the beginning of the 90′ in Polish approach towards Middle East region noticeable element was presence of the American strategic thinking, especially after September 11 2001. After that it became clear that Polish and American objectives towards Middle East are convergent.

Before al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the USA, Poland despite very good economic relations with Iraq (commercial exchanges between $ 200-250 M per year)29 supported the US actions against Iraq between 1990 a 1991. Except political support Polish authorities decided to sent to Iraq military contingent and medical personnel. In the following weeks, negotiations were conducted with the government of Saudi Arabia regarding the rules for the participation of Polish soldiers and civilian employees within the anti-Iraqi coalition. In the end they decided to send a contingent carrying humanitarian aid – included two Polish Navy vessels, rescue and evacuation and medical personnel who stationed in the territory of Saudi Arabia.

The participation of Polish Marines in operations in the Persian Gulf region proved to be a great challenge, because for the first time after the end of World War II, they were to perform combat operations; of course Polish navy previously performed tasks outside the Baltic Sea basin, but these were mainly navigation and training cruises,

28 A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, Raport. Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,
op. cit., p. 174-175.
29 1991/pdf/.

rescue exercises and tasks resulting from membership in the Warsaw Pact30. The participation of the Polish Contingent in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a part of the anti-Iraqi coalition forces was governed by the Agreement of 16 December 1990 between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the document stated that the members of the Polish contingent stationed in Saudi Arabia and at sea were to enjoy the immunity belonging to the administrative and technical staff of diplomatic missions. It is worth emphasizing that the costs associated with sending and staying Polish staff were covered by the Saudi side. Alongside with marines, in accordance with the agreement: 14 doctors, 38 medical technicians, 98 nurses and 2 liaison officers were also part of the Polish Contingent31.

In the 90′ and later Polish military forces were also present in peacekeeping missions under the assistance of the United Nation Organization in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Syria (UNDOF), which was a symptom of responsibility for the stability of international order, established after the end of cold war era32. The USA according to president George H.W. Bush and his New World Order Strategy regional conflicts were considered as a predominant military threat which need to be resolved33. Although the US is ambivalent about UN peacekeeping missions, stabilization activities in the Middle East were coherent with American security strategy. Therefore, one may risk a statement that Poland’s participation in peacekeeping missions in the Middle East entered into American foreign policy.

Analyzing strategic documents of Poland and the USA one can see convergence of international objectives as well as common perception of security challenges34. Both countries identify the Middle East region as a biggest challenge for contemporary international relations. What is more, the USA as well as Poland believe that vast majority of security threats comes from Middle East. Among both countries strategic goals there is promotion of democracy, fee market, human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are the basic elements of the US strategies since their independence. Another common thing for Poland and US is perception of contemporary security threats. Among the biggest modern security threats both states include: international terrorism, proliferation of weapon of massive destruction, failed states and authoritarian regimes, religious extremism. All of these threats occur in the Middle East. The USA as well as Poland give priority to diplomatic instruments, but in exceptional circumstances use of force is also foreseen. And here comes the prime

30 Ibidem.
31 Ibidem.
32 Polacy w służbie pokoju 1953-2003, Agencja Wydawnicza CB, Warszawa 2002.
33 See: National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991.
34 Compare: Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2014; Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2013; Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2003; National Security Strategy, 1991, National Security Strategy, 1996; National Security Strategy, 2002; National Security Strategy, 2006; National Security Strategy, 2009.

difference. Poland’s resources only allow it to participate in military operations. US military capabilities do not require additional commentary.

Basically, since Poland regained independence, it’s Middle East approach is consistent with American security strategies. On the one hand, this line is an element of the wider West strategic vision, and after all Poland belongs to the West, but on the other hand it is an example of a lack of assertiveness. In situation of pursuing non-assertive foreign policy a matter of national interests is thrown into doubts. Thereupon, a basic question arises – does the non-objective entity pursue its own or other country’s interests? In case of Poland some decisions made by Polish authorities have been questionable for instance sending Polish Contingent to Iraq in 2003 and organizing in Warsaw in 2019 Middle East Conference Peace and Security. In both cases Polish interests unfortunately were of secondary importance. Warsaw’s military and political support given to Washington is mostly conditioned by the need to increase American security guarantees. Despite political affiliation most of Polish governments presented those approach. This is a consequence of Polish historical experience and geopolitical location. The issue of Poland’s border security, especially eastern border, has become particularly relevant after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The priority of contemporary Polish government is to establish American military base in Poland to counter Russia’s regional ambitions35, but for now American soldiers will stay on Polish territory only temporarily.

Polish authorities’ support of the American strategy in the Middle East implies consequences for Poland’s relations with other entities of international relations. It is particularly apparent in Poland’s relations with the European Union. For instance, American intervention in Iraq in 2003 led to the deepest crisis in the transatlantic relations, and Poland became an object of numerous attacks, especially from German and France side. It is worth emphasizing that during this period of time Poland was at the finish line of its accession to the EU. There were some concerns that dispute around Iraqi war could negatively impact on the whole process.

Poland’s participation in military actions against Iraq, apart from gaining valuable combat experience, was negatively assessed by the majority of Polish scientific community as well as Poles36. According to Maria Wągrowska: participation in the

35 J. Smolenski, V. Pietromarchi, US lead Middle East conference in Warsaw: All you need to know, 13.02.2019, (w:) 190212230343271.html
36 Compere: Uwarunkowania i kierunki polskiej polityki zagranicznej w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku, M. Wolański (ed.), Toruń 2004; O. Osica, Irak – i co dalej?, “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, 2006, No1;
J. Bartkiewicz, Zaangażowanie Polski w wojnę i stabilizację w Iraku, “Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej”, 2004; R. Kuźniar, Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczpospolitej, Warszawa 2008; R. Kuźniar, Jeszcze możemy zachować twarz, “Tygodnik Powszechny”,11.01.2004 No 2;
R. Zięba, Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej, Warszawa 2013; M. Strzeszewski, Stosunek do obecności żołnierzy polskich w Iraku i Afganistanie, October 2007, (w:)

Iraqi operation was the most controversial undertaking in Poland’s foreign and security policy for 15 years. It wasn’t preceded enough in depth analysis of profits and losses for foreign and internal policy, as well as argumentation convincing majority of citizens37. Even more explicitly explained this Roman Kuźniar: Poland’s participation in the war and the stabilization of Iraq was an example of badwagoning strategy understood as what is good for the United States will be also beneficial for Poland. Unfortunately, it was a wishful thinking, based on the wrong perception of American policy and the failure to calculate the profits achieved thanks to this war by the Polish side38.

It was difficult for the Polish authorities to convince, in particular skeptical European countries, about the Polish position on Iraq. A similar misunderstanding (not only among EU countries) accompanied organization in Warsaw the Middle East Conference. Officially, the purpose of the conference was peace and stability in the Middle East. But how this can be achieved without crucial actors like Iran, Palestine, or Turkey39? It happened because the real goal of the Trump administration was to isolate Iran and strengthen Israel’s security. Moreover, the conference aim was also to persuade the Arab countries of the Gulf region to create a common front against Iran perceived by the current American administration as the main factor of destabilization in the region40. It is interesting that Arab countries and Israel met in Warsaw for the first time since 1991 (Madrid Peace Conference), which may indicate the construction of anti-Iranian front, at least in political sphere.

What was the role of Poland in this event? Certainly, a country with medium potential, which is a co-organizer of a large international event, strengthens its global visibility. Poland by part of members of international community might be seen as a promoter of American vision of Middle East order. Such international image has been attributed to Poland since its military engagement in the war against Iraq. As with the war in Iraq, the Warsaw summit revealed a clear divide between the US and the European Union. The largest differences between the USA and the European Union are seen in the background of Iran. The EU remains strongly supportive of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) that was abandoned by the US, even if it criticizes Iran’s ballistic missile programme41. According to International Agency of Nuclear Energy Iran

37 M. Wągrowska, Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i stabilizacyjnej w Iraku, “Raporty i Analizy”, 2004, No 12, p. 2.
38 R. Kuźniar, Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki, Warszawa 2006, p. 345-346.
39 Iran was uninvited whereas Palestine refused the invitation; Turkey, Lebanon and Qatar also did not attend to the conference – M.K.K.
40 T. Zalewski, Co się uda osiągnąć (a czego nie) na konferencji bliskowschodniej w Warszawie?, “Polityka”, 12.02.2019, (w:) osiagnac-a-czego-nie-na-konferencji-bliskowschodniej-w-warszawie.read
41 P. Wintour, European powers to present cool front at Warsaw summit, 12.02.2019, (w:) on-middle-east.

carries out each of the points included in the agreement42, amid the USA had no valid reasons to withdraw JCPOA.

In regard of Iran, Polish stance is unfortunately vague. The Polish authorities are again putting themselves between Brussels and Washington, which neither serves Poland nor the transatlantic alliance. What is more, this unclearness in Poland’s position also reflects on its international image. Some may fault Poland for being untrustworthy. The effects of Polish confusing policy are already known. Iran has withdrawn from the agreement regarding the supply of liquefied gas to Poland. Additionally, Polish national energy companies such as PGNiG and Orlen, which signed an cooperation agreement with Iranian counterpart won’t be able to proceeded it. On another note it is worth knowing that since 2013 Polish-Iranian trade has increased sixfold43. Reaction from European countries may occur during next European budget negotiations.

Conclusions

The Middle East region has never been a priority for Poland. This is a result of Polish geopolitical location, the hierarchy of national interests and its medium international potential. Poland’s average international importance procure Warsaw to choose bandwagon strategy, which also suggest lack of own vision. Despite Polish ambitions to play a more important role in global international relations, no comprehensive strategy regarding Polish activity in the Middle East has been developed yet. It is an example of the provinciality of Polish foreign policy and at the same time a conscious resignation from the opportunities offered by the region. And the Middle East region offers a lot, not only in economic sphere, but also social, scientific or cultural. Poland possess professional scientific resources that should be used in preparing a comprehensive strategy for the development of bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. The starting point for the Polish Middle East concept could be reliance it on historical, mostly positive relations, between Poland and region countries. A good example that can serve as a model are Polish-Turkish relations, which last continuously 605 years, even during the lack of Polish subjectivity; Turkey was the only country in the world that did not recognize the Partitions of Poland.

If Poland really wants to play more important role in the Middle East, first of all must to correct its foreign policy and define own national interests, as well as instruments enabling its implementation. Moreover, in order to avoid the impression of promoting the American vision of the Middle East, Polish foreign policy should be much more assertive towards the American ally. The execution of Polish foreign

42 USAIran.
43 M. Zaborowski, Konferencja bliskowschodnia, czyli jak zostać podwykonawcą USA, 12.02.2019, (w:) zostac-podwykonawca-usa.read.

policy by the current government calls into question the correction of the Middle East strategy, much less adopting an assertive attitude towards the USA.

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November 2, 2021
China’s Man-Made Islands

China’s Man-Made Islands in the Spratly’s and Why It’s Rising Concern Throughout the Region

Sümeyra Betül COŞKUN Bursa Uludağ University

The South China Sea is believed to be rich in oil and gas and is important for fishing reasons for the countries surrounding it. It is also crucial for its strategic location, as it is one of the world’s busiest waterways. For these reasons, it is subject to several overlapping territorial disputes which include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Among all these countries, China is seen as the most aggressive state among them. It is believed that China is aiming to create a strategic triangle within the South China Sea which could result in China gaining full control over the region. Such control is perceived as a direct threat for the US, most of the South China Sea states and US allies within the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, China’s man-made islands located in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratly archipelago, has raised attention both regionally and worldwide. At first, China started off with land reclamation in the area which started raising questions and caused tension on some level. These man-made islands are the result of China’s salami- slicing tactics at which it is very successful at. Then, China militarized its artificial islands and turned them into advanced military bases. As of today, China has 7 artificial islands located in the Spratly archipelago. When added to the islands in the area in which China has seized control over, it is possible to say that China has emerged as a serious strategic force in the region and is seen as a threat to mostly all whom directly have interest in the South China Sea.

KEY WORDS: China, South China Sea, Man-made Islands, Soil Reclamation, Spratly Islands

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to put forth a general introduction on China’a man-made islands in the Spratly’s and why these islands are raising concern both in the region and beyond the region. To better understand this topic, the importance of the South China Sea was touched upon first. In this part of the study, the importance of energy resources, fishing and shipping lanes in the South China Sea were briefly mentioned. After a brief introduction of the region, how China achieved building and militarizing these seven man-made islands in the Spratly’s are discussed followed by a general evaluation of these artificial islands according to international law. Lastly, why these islands are raising concern both in the region and beyond the region were touched upon.

The Importance of the South China Sea, Both On A Regional and Global Level

⦁ The South China Sea

The South China Sea is the largest body of water after the five oceans. It is estimated to be around 3.700.000 square kilometers. It connects to the East China Sea with the Taiwan Strait and the Philippine Sea with the Luzon Strait. It also connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean with the Strait of Malacca, which also is the regions most important waterway. The South China Sea is important for it’s energy resources, which consist of oil and gas, for fishing and for it’s shipping lanes. Generally speaking, it is important in terms of economic and strategic factors, which form the basis of the South China Sea conflicts.

Figure 1. The South China Sea

Energy Resources

The South China Sea is believed to contain important amounts of energy resources, although when the regions estimated energy reserves are taken into consideration, the region does not contain energy resources as much as other oil and natural gas-rich regions. Even so, it is still considered to be a crucial aspect for states within the region, hence is of great importance for the economies and policies of the states in the region. Therefore, energy resources are among the elements that form the basis of South China Sea conflicts. It is possible to say that these disagreements will become even

⦁ South China Sea.org, Hydrographic Boundaries of the South China Sea, http://www.southchinasea.org/files/2013/02/South-China-Sea-hydrographic-boundaries.png⦁ ,⦁ 27.07.2019.

more important as the energy consumption of developing Asian countries is expected to double by 2030, and half of this growth is expected to be generated by China alone.1

⦁ Oil

There is believed to be around 11 billion barrels of oil in the South China Sea, although this amount can vary from state to state. For example, according to the US, there are around 15.6 billion barrels of oil while according to China, there around 105- 213 billion barrels of oil.2 As one can see, the the amount increases massively, which is why the South China Sea is also sometimes referred to as “The Second Persian Gulf”. Chinese researchers hope to increase drilling investment interest in the region may be a possible explanation for the difference in claims. Another reason for the changing claims could be the media’s misunderstood interpretation of “resource estimates” (which predict the total amount of oil) and the “reserve estimates” (the generally recoverable amount, which is typically estimated at 10%).3 Lastly, the increasing tension between the South Sea states could be another reason researchers and potential oil drilling companies face, which may be a deterrent for investment.4 Thus, the question of how much oil is found in the South China Sea may continue to remain unanswered for the time being. If China’s estimates are correct, China and other South China Sea states energy demand from the Middle East and through the Strait of Malacca will be reduced.

⦁ Gas

Gas is another important energy resource in the region. In fact, according to estimations, the region is believed to be richer in gas reserves than oil reserves. It is believed that there is a total of 266 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the open sea basins of the South China Sea.5 It is also estimated that natural gas consumption in the region will increase by 5% per year compared to other fuels and reach 20 trillion cubic feet per year in the next 20 years. 6 This makes gas reserves in the region even more crucial for region states. When we examine the chart below (Figure 2), we can see that the South China Sea is nearly 5 times richer in gas than the Gulf of Mexico and very close to the amount of gas reserves found in the North Sea Region. However,

1 Robert D. Kaplan, “Why the South China Sea is so crucial”, Business Insider Austrailia, 20.02.2015, , 30.05.2019.
2 Matthew R. Costlow, Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea, (MSU Graduate Thesis), Springfield: Defense and Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 5.
3 Matthew R. Costlow, Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea, (MSU Graduate Thesis), Springfield: Defense and Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 5.
4 Costlow, op.cit, pp. 5-6.
5 Tim Daiss, “South China Sea Energy Politics Heat Up”, Oil Price, 02.03.2019, , 30.05.2019.
6 Global Security, South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas, , 30.05.2019.

if we were to take a closer look, we see that the South China Sea’s gas production is half of what the Gulf of Mexico produces and a fourth of what is produces in the North Sea Region. This result shows the lack of infrastructure within the South China Sea region.

Figure 2. Comparison of Energy Reserves by Region

⦁ Fishing

Fishing is important both on a regional and global level for both economic and military reasons. Economically, about 50% of fishing ships in the world pass through the South China Sea which come to show how important just fishing is for the region.7 A large portion of the income of region states rely on fishing which has led to an overfishing problem. This is why in 1995, The United Nations (UN) formed the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. This agreement has opened the door to a number of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) to cope with the excessive use of highly valuable but also highly mobile fish stocks that cross EEZ boundaries. This is the importance of fishing ecconomically. On the other hand, the importance of fishing militarily is due to Chinese fishermen carrying out paramilitary activities on behalf of

⦁ Ibid.
7 Gregory B. Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets”, Stephenson Ocean Security Project, 09.01.2019, fishing-fleets/, 31.05.2019.

their state; these fishermen are also referred to as “fishermen soldiers”.8 These fishermen soldiers have emerged as the largest power at sea (within the region), especially around the Spratly Islands. These fishermen carry the possibility of triggering at least as severe a conflict as the armed forces of China within the region; in fact, it is even more likely because a significant number of fishing boats in the region that are engaged in full-day handline fishing to function are a direct branch of the state through official marine militants.9 This is why these soldiers are a big threat to everyone who has interest in the region.

⦁ Shipping Lanes

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 80% of global trade is carried out by the sea, and 60% of this trade passes through Asia; of this percentage (80%), the South China Sea carries out a third of global maritime trade, and China carries out 60% of its trade by sea.10 The Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait are some of the important strait in the region. Of these straits, the Strait of Malacca is the most important. The reason this strait is the most important is because it provides the shortest, therefore, the most economical transition between the Pacific and Indian Ocean. To better comprehend the importance of this strait, a comparision with the Suez Canal and Panama Canal can be made. The Strait of Malacca carries out three times the amount of oil carried out by the Suez Canal and fifteen times more than the Panama Canal, and this is only an example of oil carried out through the strait.11 When the amount of other goods and energy resources that are carried out through the canal are taken into consideration, it is possible to say that the Strait of Malacca is not just important on a regional level, but also on a global level.

⦁ China’s Man-made Islands in the Spratly’s

⦁ China’s Salami-Slicing Tactics

Salami-slicing tactics, also known as the “cabbage strategy” in the military, was first used in the 1950’s by the Communist Party in Hungary. It was used as a strategy by the communist party for non-communist parties in Hungary. Today, China is amoung, if not the most, the most successful user of this strategy. China is the only state that

8 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia”, CNA, S. 7, , 22.06.2019.
9 Yamaguchi, “Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea: A Coordinated Plan under the Leadership of Xi Jinping?”, p. 24.
10 China Power, How much trade transits the South China Sea?, transits-south-china-sea/, 31.05.2019.
11 Robert D. Kaplan, “Why the South China Sea is so crucial”, Business Insider Austrailia, 20.02.2015, , 30.05.2019.

has expanded its borders in the region after World War II, both on land and at sea, despite of its neighbors.12 China has used these tactics in 1974, when it occupied the Paracel Islands, right after the US withdrew from Vietnam. It also used the same tactics on the Spratly’s in 1988. During that time, both the US and the Soviet Union had other things on their agenda. China used this towards its own benefit and occupied some land in the Spratly archipelago. Another example that could be given is when China occupied Mischief Reef in 1995; however, this time China actually attracted unwanted attention from the US. This unwanted attention led to the first US South China Sea policy, however, this attraction is not significat at all when compared to the 2011 US South China Sea (Rebalance) policy.

China not only uses this strategy in the South China Sea but also the East China Sea, Taiwan and the border of India. So how does China use this strategy? First of all, it starts off by claiming rights over a region and repeats its claim on the region on all the possible platforms. Subsequently, it propagates in response to the claim of the other party, this way the region in question is considered to carry a dispute between China and the other party; at this point, China then uses its military and diplomatic power to resolve the conflict.13 This way China can constantly repeat and increase the power of its actions and have a permanent presence in the claimed region.

⦁ China’s Man-made Islands in the Spratly’s

Although China first occupied the majority of its seven reefs in 1988, it first started building its man-made islands in the Spratly’s in December of 2013. China drained sand from the bottom of the ocean and piled the drained sand on top of the reef, hence forming an artificial island. China continued its soil reclamation activities in 2014. Towards the end of 2014 and in 2015, it started militarizing the islands. The main reason China started militarizing the islands were due to the US control of international trade in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. As of today, there are seven artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago; Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson South Reef, Hughes Reef and Cuarteron Reef (see Figure 3). China built short-range air defense systems with large anti-aircraft guns on each of these islands. The distance of these reefs/man-made islands to mainland China is more than 800 km. It is estimated that 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 cubic meters of gas are in the waters surrounding these artificial islands.14 Subi Reef, Fiery Cross

12 Prabhash K Dutta, “What is China’s salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?”, India Today, 07.09.2017, general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07, 25.06.2019.
13 Prabhash K Dutta, “What is China’s salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?”, India Today, 07.09.2017, general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07, 25.06.2019.
14 David Brennan, “U.S. Could ‘Take Down’ Man-Made Islands In South China Sea If It Needed To Says Pentagon Official”, Newsweek, 06.01.2018, islands-south-china-sea-if-it-needed-says-pentagon-952451, 24.05.2019.

Reef and Mischief Reef are amoung the biggest and most equipped of these seven artificial islands. These three islands also form a triangle. Subi Reef is located in the North part of the Spratly archipelago, while Fiery Cross Reef is located in the southwest and Mischief Reef is located in the southeast of the archipelago. Together, it can be said that they form a strategic triangle in the Spratly archipelago. Gaven Reef is located in the center of this triangle while both Johsnon South and Hughes Reef are located amoung the south border of the triangle. Cuarteron Reef is located to the southwest, outside of the triangle but holds great importance strategically.

Figure 3. China’s Artificial Islands in the Spratly Archipelago

Subi Reef is one of the three big and advanced artificial reefs in the are. It is located on the North part of the Spratly archipelago and is 25 nautical miles (nm) from the

⦁ BBC News, China media denounce US warship in South China Sea, 28.10.2015, ⦁ https://www.bbc.com/new⦁ s/world-asia⦁ -china-34655845, 24.05.2019.

Philippines.15 It is a low-tide island that is normally under sea level. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, Philippines and Vietnam. It was first occupied by China in 1988. Later, in 1990, China started construction on the island. In 2014, China started soil reclamation. As of today, the island is home to an access channel, eleven temporary loading piers, a 3000 meter airfield, a large facility, seven possible satellite communication antennas, a possible security watchtower with a radome, reinforced sea walls, a helipad, a pre-existing military facility and three power plants.16

Figure 4. Subi Reef

Fiery Cross Reef is the second of the three advanced artificial islands. It is located on the West part of the Spratly archipelago. It happens to be the most advanced artificial reef in the area. It is estimated to be around 2.740.000 m² and is claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. China started the islands soil reclamation in 2014. The same year, it started the construction of an airfield and completed it by 2015. To better protect the navigation and transportation security in the South China Sea, China also announced it had established a South China Sea Rescue Center in 2019.17 Currently on the reef there is an airfield, a port (630,000 square meters) large enough to accommodate tankers and large surface fighters, multiple cement plants, multiple support buildings, nine temporary loading piers and a pre-existing pier, pre-existing air defense weapons, a possible radar tower under construction, eight possible weapon sites, anti-frogman defense systems, communication equipment, a greenhouse, two heliports, a military facility, a new multi-storey administrative facility adjacent to the airstrip, two lighthouses and ten possible satellite communication antennas.18

15 The Strait Times, Before and after satellite images: What has been built on the reefs that China occupies in the Spratlys, 29.02.2016, images-what-has-been-built-on-disputed-islands-in-the-south, 25.05.2019.
16 Southfront, Island Building in South China Sea, china-sea-review/, 25.05.2019.
⦁ Subi Reef, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, , 05.25.2019.
17 MAREX, “China Establishes South China Sea Rescue Center”, The Maritime Executive, 29.01.2019, , 25.05.2019.
18 Southfront, ibid.

Figure 5. Fiery Cross Reef

Mischief Reef is the last of the three advanced artificial islands that form the triangle and is 129 nm from the Philippines. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was first occupied by China in 1995, as mentioned before, when it’s salami tactics first attracted unwanted international attention. It is located on the east of the Spratly archipelago. China started soil reclamation on the island in 2015. The island is around 5.580.000 m² and is believed that China is expanding the entrance of the reef to build an naval air station on top of it.19 There is currently an access channel, a fortified sea wall, nine temporary loading docks, nine cement plants, two pre- existing military facilities, a pre-existing shelter for fishermen, and three possible satellite communications antennas on the Mischief Reef.20 Frigate and coast guard ships have also been identified in the surrounding waters, and a huge array of antennas have been established, which is thought to enhance China’s ability to monitor the environment.21

⦁ BBC News, Flying close to Beijing’s new South China Sea islands, 14.12.2015, ⦁ https://www.bbc.com/news/⦁ magazine-35031313⦁ , 24.05.2019; New York Times, What China has been building in the South China Sea, 27.10.2015, ⦁ https://www.nytimes.co⦁ m/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south- china-sea.html,10.05.2018.
19 Southfront, ibid.
20 Southfront, ibid.
21 CNBC, China builds new military facilities on South China Sea islands: think tank, 30.06.2017, , 24.05.2019.

Figure 6. Mischief Reef

Cuarteron Reef is located to the southeast of the “triangle” in the Spratly archipelago. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was occupied by China in 1988, construction on the island started in 1990 and soil reclamation started in 2014. Although Cuarteron Reef is located outside of the triangle, it is believed to be strategically important. Experts believe that Cuarteron Reef improves China’s abitility to monitor air and sea traffic in the South China Sea, especially in the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Cuarteron Reef is considered to be strategically significant for the South China Sea. Currently, the reef is equipped with a 125-meter wide access channel, breakwaters, multiple support buildings, three power stations, two heliports and reinforced sea walls.22 Although it is not certain, it is assumed that there are five possible communication antennas, a radar facility, two radar towers under construction, missile sites, a pre-existing large multi-level military facility and a satellite communication antenna.23 It is also thought to contain some kind of short- range ship air defense system with an anti-aircraft.24

⦁ BBC News, https⦁ ://www.bbc.com⦁ /news/⦁ magazine-35031313 and Daniel Bishton, Mischief-Reef- Analysis-1, Spatial Source, 06.03.2018, ⦁ https://www.spatialsource.com.⦁ au/gis-data/satellite-images- reveal-completed-military-bases-spratly-islands/attachment/mischief-reef-analysis-1. 25.05.2019.
22 Southfront, ibid.
23 Amanda Macias, “This satellite image of Chinese construction in South China Sea is a wake-up call to us all”, Business Insider, 14.07.2016, 2016-7, 24.05.2019.
24 AMTI, China’s New Spratly Island Defenses, 13.12.2016, island-defenses/, 25.05.2019.

Figure 7. Cuateron Reef

Gaven Reef is located in the middle of the “triangle”. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It is located on the Tizard Banks. It was occupied by China in 1988. There used to just be an old and small facility on the reef but after China’s soil reclamation on the island, it built an artifical island on the bank and connected it with the small facility (see Figure 8.). The reef is believed to contain an anti-aircraft defense system and other small objects; although the objects cannot be identified, they are thought to be a kind of short-range ship air defense system that provides protection against cruise missile attacks.25

Figure 8. Gaven Reef

Johnson South Reef is the sixth reef and is located along the south line of the “triangle”. It is located on Union Bank and is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was occupied by China in 1988 after a battle with Vietnam. On the reef there is a 125 meter wide access channel, a concrete plant, defense towers, desalination pumps, a fuel tank, a multi-level military facility, a possible radar facility, a small port and two loading stations, a 3,000 m² port area, four possible gun towers, a lighthouse and a possible solar power farm that contains 44 panels, a pre-existing communication facility, a pre-existing garrison building, two heliports, Ro-ro (roll on, roll off) ports, a large pre-existing military multi-level military facility, a pre-existing pier, reinforced sea walls, three possible satellite

⦁ ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, Cuarteron Reef, reef/, 05.25.2019.
25 AMTI, ibid.
⦁ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Gaven Reefs, , 24.05.2019.

communication antennas, two possible radar towers under construction and two wind turbines.26

Figure 9. Johnson South Reef. The red area indicated in the first photo is the area focused on in the subsequent photos.

The last of the seven reefs is Hughes Reef. Hughes Reef is also located on Union Bank and is to the east of Johnson South Reef. Like Johnson South Reef, it is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam but unlike Johnson South, it is also claimed by Malaysia. It is normally a low-tide reef and is around 76.000 m². It was occupied by China in 1988 and soil reclamation started in 2014. On the reef there is an access channel, coastal walls, four defense towers, a port of 292,000 m², a 35,350 m² pier, a multi-level military facility, a possible radar facility, a pre-existing helicopter runway, a pre-existing lighthouse, reinforced sea walls and a cement factory.27

Figure 10. Hughes Reef

26 Southfront, ibid.
⦁ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Johnson Reef, , 05.25.2019.
27 Southfront, ibid.
⦁ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Hughes Reef, , 05.26.2019.

⦁ The Evaluation of China’s Artificial Islands in terms of International Law

If we were to evaluate China’s man-made islands according to international law, in this case The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), we can see that these artificial islands are not considered as islands and cannot benefit from an islands legal status. Article 121. Regime of Islands, subparagraph 1 of UNCLOS states that an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide.28 China’s artificial islands are not naturally formed and is not above water at high-tide. Before moving on to the second subparagraph of this article, it is better to move on to subparagraph three to better comprehend subparagraph two of Article 121. Subparagraph three of Regime of Islands state that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own should not have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.29 From this subparagraph we understand that an island needs to sustain human habitation or have an economic life of their own. Since the word ‘or’ here instead of ‘and’, it indicates that one is enough for a piece of land to be considered as an island. Although China’s man-made islands do not sustain human habitation or economic life on their own, therefore they do not have the right to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The second subparagraph of Articile 121 states that “Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory”.30 The notions of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf are important here. From this, we can understand that an island has the same marine jurisdictions as any land area, including 12 nm of territorial waters, 200 nm of EEZ and a continental shelf that can exceed 200 nm.31 On the other hand, while it states that states dominating the islands may declare EEZ around the island, artificial islands do not have any rights to maritimes zones besides the 500 meters of security.32

⦁ Why China’s Man-made Islands are Raising Concern
⦁ Conflicts within the Region with South China Sea States

As we mentioned before, the South China Sea is important for its energy resources, fishing and shipping lanes. These are all factors that are both economically and

28 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, PART VIII. REGIME OF ISLANDS, Article 121 (1), p. 66.
29 Ibid., Art. 121 (3).
30 Ibid., Art. 121 (2).
31 Robert C. Beckman, et.al., Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the Joint Developement of Hydrocarbon Resources, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013, p. 55.
32 Cemre Pekcan, “Uluslararası Hukuk Çerçevesinde GÇD Krizinin Değerlendirilmesi”, ANKASAM, Vol. 1 (3) , December 2017, p. 59.

strategically important for South China Sea states, hence they form the basis of the South China Sea territorial conflicts. The five big islands that are located in the South China Sea and are subject to these conflicts are the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Pratas Island and Macclesfield Bank. China claims sovereignity on all of these islands and the waters surrounding them. In fact China claims to have rights on almost all of the South China Sea with it’s “nine-dash line” policy (see Figure 11). Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea are exactly the same as China’s claims, as it’s claims are based on the same elements as China’s claims. Vietnam also claims to have rights on all islands, but unlike China and Taiwan, it doesn’t claim any rightson Pratas Island. The Philippines and Malaysia claim rights on only some features located in the South China Sea. Currently, Brunei doesn’t claim any of the features except for Louisa Reef located in the Spratly archipelago which actually falls within it’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The South China Sea conflicts are and have been a hot topic for awhile within the region between region states, and because China’s man-made islands are located in such a strategic point that gives China the upperhand, China’s man-made islands raise a big concern for region states.

Figure 11. Controversial islands in the South China Sea

If we were to look at these claims accordingly with international law, we can see that the Spratly archipelago only falls within the EEZ zone of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam (see Figure 12). Some of the islands in the Spratly archipelago actually isn’t located in any states EEZ zone and falls under international waters. China on the

⦁ Some changes were made on map, for original map, see: Craig HILL, “America warns China about South China Sea claims”, China Daily Mail, 03.06.2017, warns-china-about-south-china-sea-claims/, 03.03.2018.

other hand claims to have rights on all of the Spratly archipelago and most of the South China Sea based on it’s “nine-dash line” policy. Some of the South China Sea states openly objected to China’s historical claims and nine-dash line policy and brought this subject to the UN Arbitration Court. On July 1 of 2016, The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague came to decision that China’s nine-dash line policy, which China used to determine the boundaries of China’s claims in the South China Sea, were not based on a legal basis and China’s actions are contrary to international law.33 However, China rejected the court’s decision and although China is a party to UNCLOS, it had refused to participate in arbitration from the beginning, so the court’s decision does not directly have any binding on China.34

Figure 12. EEZ zones in the South China Sea and China’s Nine-Dash Line Policy

33 Euan Graham, “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?”, Council on Foreign Affairs, 18.08.2016, , 23.05.2019.
34 Ibid.
⦁ DW, China keeps building infrastructure on disputed islands in South China Sea, 15.12.2017, ⦁ https://www.dw.com/e⦁ n/china-keeps-⦁ building-infras⦁ tructure-on-disputed-islands-in-south-china-sea/a- 41805980, 17.05.2018.

⦁ China’s Man-made Islands on a Global Level

⦁ China’s ‘Strategic Triangle’ in the South China Sea

The Spratly archipelago consists of 12 island groups with a total of over 100 islands. Half of these islands have been occupied by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam.35 As we mentioned above, China has seven man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago and these seven man-made islands are all located in a way that benefits China. China has also occupied the Paracel Islands and has established 20 advanced outpost on the islands. The biggest island in the Paracel Islands is Woody Island, which China first occupied in 1955. China started soil reclamation activities on the island in 2014 and started militarizing the island in 2015; that being said, China’s military activities on the Paracel Islands are no where near as advanced as it’s military activities in the Spratly Islands. China also has a general control over the Scarborough Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a high-tide reef claimed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines. There are no building built on the reef, but China, which has consistently maintained a coast guard around the reef since 2012, effectively controls the reef.36 The biggest concern here for global dominant states and region states, is the fear of the South China Sea becoming a huge “Chinese Lake”.37 If China were to militarize all three of these island groups, the Spratly’s, Paracels and Scarborough Shoal, then it could form a “strategic triangle” in the South China Sea (see Figure 13). In this case, China would have the ability to control the region under an air defense identity that would cover most of the South China Sea, effectively transforming the sea into a “Chinese lake”, which would pose a serious threat to all region states and global dominant powers such as the US.

35 CIA, The World Factbook, Spratly Islands, world-factbook/geos/pg.html, 03.03.2018.
36 AMTI, Scarborough Shoal, , 02.06.2019.
37 Jesse Johnson, “China planning ‘monitoring station’ on hotly contested South China Sea shoal”, The Japan Times, 17.03.2017, monitoring-station-hotly-contested-south-china-sea-shoal/#.XPfrf4gzY2w, 02.06.2019.

Figure 13. The Strategic Triangle in the South China Sea

⦁ The Strait of Malacca

Another important matter globally is the Strait of Malacca. It is believed that China is building a new strategic maritime route by building artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago and installing land-to-air missiles on the Paracel Islands. The importance of the Strait of Malacca globally for both economic and strategic matters was mentioned earlier. After passing the Strait of Malacca, ships would have to pass by Spratly Archipelago and the Paracel Islands in order to pass through the South China Sea. Therefore, the dominant power or state controlling this region would be the dominant power of the South China Sea in general. The dominant power of the South China Sea would also be considered a global power at seas, as a third of the world’s

⦁ Kōda Yōji, Confronting China’s Island-Building Campaign, Nippon, 15.09.2015, ⦁ https://www.nippon.com/⦁ en/currents/⦁ d00190/confronting-china%E2%80%99s-island-building- campaign.html, 10.30.2019.

maritime trade passes through it. This is why China’s man-made islands in the Spratly’s, especially Cuarteron Reef for this matter, is important for the future of the Strait of Malacca.

⦁ China’s Progress in the Region

Last of all, China’s man-made islands raise a global concern for the island chains in the Asia-Pacific. China currently has a general control over the Spratly archipelago and the Scarborough Shoal which are along the south part of the First Island Chain. If China were to have control over Taiwan too, it would be the dominant power within the First Island Chain (see Figure 14). This is something the US and Japan especially want to prevent because then China would move on to the Second Island Chain. This is why both countries are closely involved with China’s actions towards Taiwan.

Figure 14. The Island Chains in the Asia-Pacific

⦁ Right Side News, The United States Should Lead with Power and Purpose on China, 29.12.2013, ⦁ https://www.rightsidenews.com/us/hom⦁ eland-security/the-united-states-should-lead-with-power-and- purpose-on-china/, 25.06.2019.

Conclusion

China’s man-made islands are a concern both regionally, for South China Sea states, and globally, for dominant powers at sea. These artificial islands are a result of China’s successful salami-slicing tactics. The artificial islands are strategically located in an area which gives China a great advantage for both economical and strategical reasons and complete China’s wish to gain control over the South China Sea, which it sees as it’s own ‘backyard’. These islands give China the mobility it desires in the Spratly archipelago. Combined with other islands China has control over, they form the South China Sea into what can be referred to as a “Chinese Lake”. Because of this control, China is currently the dominant power in the South China Sea and it’s man-made islands are one of the main reasons China is where it is.

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November 2, 2021
Will China Turn to Maritime Great Power Politics in Pacific Sea?

Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı CAŞIN İstinye Üniversitesi

China is at once a continental power and a maritime power (haiyang daguo) and it possesses broad maritime strategic interests…These achievements have laid a solid foundation for building a strong maritime power (haiyang qiangguo).
Xi Jinping

International community and scholar’s discussion now the post-Cold War world as we know it is coming to an end that great power politics is back, consequently the role of naval forces national navies will continue to grow. Indeed, the XXI st century will be the rise of China’s dramatic economic growth over the past two decades has fundamentally changed the global and regional geo-economic and geo-political landscapes its wider implications for international politics form the most important issue in our time. The main goal of Xi’s signature initiative- Belt and Road Initiative- BRI, with current estimates ranging between $1 to $8 trillion and some 70 countries involved -is to expand Chinese global political and economic networks and to secure a more active position in “global governance” without waiting for the West to give China more roles and responsibilities in existing institutions. In spite of historical Chinese foreign policy objectives mainly focused on land territories; new strategic doctrine of the Chinese is organized around the will to make the Pacific Sea and to expand its immediate maritime interests. Beijing has been serious changing policy objectives recently toward solidifying a sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific. China also has expanded its maritime reach as it modernizes its navy and air force. China’s ongoing maritime transformation from a traditional land power to a sea power. As Andrew Erickson argues, “China’s naval build-up is only part of an extraordinary maritime transformation-modern history’s sole example of a land power becoming a hybrid land-sea power and sustaining such an exceptional status. Underwriting this transition are a vast network of ports, shipping lines and financial systems, and-of course-increasingly advanced ships.” At the beginning of 2017, the Chinese Navy had 328 ships. It now possesses nearly 350 ships and is already larger than the U.S. Navy. China is the largest ship-producing country in the world and at current production rates could soon operate 400 ships. Its commissions nearly three submarines each year, and in two years will have more than 70 in its fleet. The Chinese Navy also operates growing numbers of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, all equipped with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Between 2013 and 2016, China commissioned more than 30 modern corvettes. At current rates, China could have 430 surface ships and 100 submarines within the next 15 years. China’s leaders are laying both the intellectual and material groundwork for out-of-area ventures. As a result,

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chiefs aim to guaranteed passage about access from the time a ship leaves harbor China sea and the Pacific in East Asia until the time it docks in an Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, or European seaport. Unfortunately for Chinese leaders and national-level documents characterize the goal of becoming a maritime power as essential to China’s national development strategy. China making a quick move to secure a military or strategic advantage in the Pacific region. The international community has been viewing China’s recent moves challenge the status quo relating to the seas as representing “maritime expansion,” and the Chinese themselves have come to talk about making their country a maritime power. The 18th Party Congress thus marks an important defining moment. China’s future is to be a haiyang qiangguo-that is, a strong or great maritime power. However, China has also been cooperating with neighbors to establish codes of conduct to reduce conflict in the maritime arena.

The Chinese navy justifies itself to its neighbors, necessarily worried, by the necessity of escorting the commercial vessels essential to the economy of the country; but it is known that the priority of the new strategies. Beijing considers the majority of the South China Sea to be its sovereign territory, a claim that is disputed by international law. China’s military have been turning what were once small rocks and reefs into heavily fortified remote military installations. These installations give China a strategic advantage. The installation on the Spratly Islands, for example, has the capacity to deploy fighter aircraft that could control key shipping lanes. The commander of US forces in the Indo-Pacific, Admiral Philip Davidson, said during his confirmation hearing that China is capable of dominating the South China Sea in “all scenarios short of war.” This academic article aim to briefly analysis that will transition China’s passivity naval modernization policy into maritime power.

October 30, 2021