Turkish Forum

Author: Aylin D. Miller

  • THE OBJECTION TO ALLEGED ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

    THE OBJECTION TO ALLEGED ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

    ARCHIVE

    OBJECTION TO ALLEGED ARMANIAN GENOCIDE BEING IN THE HISTORY CLASS CURRICULUM OF THE STATE SCHOOLS IN WISCONSIN

    Dear Ladies, Dear Gentlemen, Dear Representatives:

    I am writing to register my deep objection to any mandating by the Wisconsin legislature of the alleged “Armenian genocide” as required study material of the history of the world curriculum in
    State’s school.

    The allegation has been hotly disputed among reputable American and other scholars, and has never been proven in a court of law or other impartial tribunal. World War I and its aftermath inflicted
    terrible suffering on hundreds of thousands of both Muslims and Armeniansin a virutal civil war within an international conflict. All the victims deserve equal official mourning and respect. Further, to single out Armenians for remembrance and Ottoman Muslims for demonization will only encourage hate crimes and other forms of intimidation on United States soil as corroborated by last month’s terrorist indictment of Armenian leader Mourad Topalian whose purported motivation was revenge for
    the alleged genocide. The state of Wisconsin should not lend its credibility to an unproven charge against an entire nation nor add incitement to would-be Armenian terrorists. But an official Remembrance Day would do just that. I remain,

    Sincerely yours’
    Capt. Onur Y. Uranli

    “Genocide Lies”:

    Once again Armenian lobby is pushing for their point of views in one of our state capitols. Once again they are doing so by using their well established lobbying organization throughout the nation. And once again they are presenting their version of the distorted history. It is absolutely crucial for our politicians to be able to discriminate between truth and fiction before they declare April 24th as the so-called “genocide Remembrance Day” for the Armenians.

    Turkish Americans and friends of Turkey do not agree with this fabricated history. The word “genocide” is absolutely a wrong term to describe what has transpired in eastern Anatolia. But we acknowledge that Ottoman Armenians have suffered heavy losses during World War I. The events
    that took place are very complex and cannot be solved in state capitols. It can only serve ill-minded politics and can cause harm to the objectivity of history.

    It was a war where Ottoman Empire was fighting Western allied powers in the West but also with Czarist Russia in the East. During the Russian campaigns the revolutionary Dashnak and Hunchak Armenian organizations have led inhumane campaigns against their long time neighbors Turks
    and Kurds and as a result slaughtered innumerable innocent people all under the protection of occupying Czarist armies. However, when the Russians were forced to pull back Armenian villagers were left behind unprotected. Hence, Turkish and Kurdish citizens of the empire who were literally raped by the brutalities of the Armenian anarchists striked back in vengeance. This led to
    the horrors of “blood feud”.

    There are in fact official documents created by the Ottoman government which explain that the state ordered and organized an involuntary exodus of Armenians to prevent further bloodshed between the involved groups. At the time it was thought that it would be easier to relocate the minority population of the region, the Armenians. No matter how honorable intentions the Ottomans intended to have this decision actually led to further losses by the Armenians. But again, it was not planned extermination of a nation.

    There are absolutely no written documents proven a well calculated so-called genocide of the Ottoman Armenians. The only documents that the Armenian lobby is basing their claim on, the well known Andonian documents are nothing but fabricated documents by French Armenians as
    demonstrated by the British Foreign Office. The proponents of the “genocide” are yet to produce irrefutable proof that Turks actually committed genocide.

    All the prominent historians well known to Armenian lobbyists unanimously agree that there was no genocide against the Armenian nation. But as usual once these people of conscious make their statement publicly they are being threatened to submission to their silence. These tactics are
    not new to the extremists.

    The Dashnaks have terrorized Turks and Kurds in the early part of this century. Then more recently they helped to rape and slaughter the Azerbaijanis in the famous Karabagh conflict.

    It was only couple of weeks ago when FBI has arrested Mr. Mourad Topalian for his alleged terrorist activities against the Turkish nation. As you know he is a well known Dashnak member and recent president of the major Armenian American lobby, namely ANCA. Again recent news have
    illustrated the same Dashnak terrorists have raided the Armenian parliament and killed many elected officials including the prime minister and the speaker of the house to stop the Armenian government from making a concession on the Karabagh issue with the Azerbaijanis.

    In short one needs to understand there were massacres that took place on both sides. It was never one-sided tragedy. Thus, the alleged history cannot be claimed as a history of a genocide. Certainly it cannot be even compared to the horrors experienced by the Jewish nation in the first half of this century.

    Again, to accept the so-called Armenian genocide will serve only the ill-minded politicians and the aspirations of the terrorist Dashnak organization. While it is absurd to even blame Turkey for the
    alleged events (1915) that took place before its birth (1923) it is equally absurd to claim genocide when Turks even have suffered heavier losses than Armenians did as history proves.

    You should know that Turkish Americans sympathize with the Armenian survivors of the horrors of eastern Anatolia. But Armenians should do the same for the Turkish and Kurdish survivors, whose voices cannot be heard in this great land of ours.

  • The Problem With Europe

    The Problem With Europe

    June 17, 2008
    By George Friedman

    Related Special Topic Page

    • Europe

    The creation of a European state was severely wounded if not killed last week. The Irish voted against a proposed European Union treaty that included creation of a full-time president, increased power to pursue a European foreign policy and increased power for Europe’s parliament. Since the European constitutional process depends on unanimous consent by all 27 members, the Irish vote effectively sinks this version of the new constitution, much as Dutch and French voters sank the previous version in 2005.

    The Irish vote was not a landslide. Only 54 percent of the voters cast their ballots against the constitution. But that misses the point. Whether it had been 54 percent for or against the constitution, the point was that the Irish were deeply divided. In every country, there is at least a substantial minority that opposes the constitution. Given that all 27 EU countries must approve the constitution, the odds against some country not sinking it are pretty long. The Europeans are not going to get a strengthened constitution this way.

    But the deeper point is that you can’t create a constitution without a deep consensus about needing it. Even when there is — as the United States showed during its Civil War — critical details not settled by consensus can lead to conflict. In the case of the United States, the issues of the relative power of states and the federal government, along with the question of slavery, ripped the country apart. They could only be settled by war and a series of amendments to the U.S. Constitution forced through by the winning side after the war.

    The Constitutional Challenge

    Creating a constitution is not like passing a law — and this treaty was, in all practical terms, a constitution. Constitutions do not represent public policy, but a shared vision of the regime and the purpose of the nation. The U.S. Constitution was born in battle. It emerged from a long war of independence and from the lessons learned in that war about the need for a strong executive to wage war, a strong congress to allocate funds and raise revenue, and a judiciary to interpret the constitution. War, along with the teachings of John Locke, framed the discussions in Philadelphia, because the founders’ experience in a war where there was only a congress and no president convinced them of the need for a strong executive. And even that was not enough to prevent civil war over the issue of state sovereignty versus federal sovereignty. Making a constitution is hard.

    The European constitution was also born in battle, but in a different way. For centuries, the Europeans had engaged in increasingly savage wars. The question they wanted to address was how to banish war from Europe. In truth, that decision was not in their hands, but in the hands of Americans and Soviets. But the core issue remained: how to restrain European savagery. The core idea was relatively simple.

    European wars arose from European divisions; and, for centuries, those divisions ran along national lines. If a United States of Europe could be created on the order of the United States of America, then the endless battling of France, Germany and England would be eliminated.
    In the exhaustion of the postwar world — really lasting through the lives of the generation that endured World War II — the concept was deeply seductive. Europe after World War II was exhausted in every sense. It allowed its empires to slip away with a combination of indifference and relief. What Europeans wanted postwar was to make a living and be left alone by ideology and nationalism; they had experienced quite enough of those two. Even France under the influence of Charles de Gaulle, the champion of the idea of the nation-state and its interests, could not arouse a spirit of nationalism anywhere close to what had been.

    There is a saying that some people are exhausted and confuse their state with virtue. If that is true, then it is surely true of Europe in the last couple of generations. The European Union reflected these origins. It began as a pact — the European Community — of nations looking to reduce tariff barriers. It evolved into a nearly Europe-wide grouping of countries bound together in a trade bloc, with many of those countries sharing a common currency. Its goal was not the creation of a more perfect union, or, as the Americans put it, a “novus ordo seclorum.” It was not to be the city on the hill. Its commitment was to a more prosperous life, without genocide. Though not exactly inspiring, given the brutality of European history, it was not a trivial goal.
    The problem was that when push came to shove, the European Community evolved into the European Union, which consisted of four things:

    1. A free trade zone with somewhat synchronized economic polices, not infrequently overridden by the sovereign power of member states.
    2. A complex bureaucracy designed to oversee the harmonization of European economies. This was seen as impenetrable and engaged in intensive and intrusive work from the trivial to the extremely significant, charged with defining everything from when a salami may be called a salami and whether Microsoft was a monopoly.
    3. A single currency and central bank to which 15 of the 27 EU members subscribed.
    4. Had Ireland voted differently, a set of proto-institutions would have been created — complete with a presidency and foreign policy chief — which would have given the European Union the trappings of statehood. The president, who would rotate out of office after a short time, would have been the head of one of the EU member states.

    Rejecting a European Regime

    The Irish referendum was all about transforming the fourth category into a regime. The Irish rejected it not because they objected to the first three sets of solutions — they have become the second-wealthiest country in Europe per capita under their aegis. They objected to it because they did not want to create a European regime. As French and Dutch voters have said before, the Irish said they want a free trade zone. They will put up with the Brussels bureaucracy even though its intrusiveness and lack of accountability troubles them. They can live with a single currency so long as it does not simply become a prisoner of German and French economic policy. But they do not want to create a European state.

    The French and German governments do want to create such a state. As with the creation of the United States, the reasons have to do with war, past and future. Franco-German animosity helped created the two world wars of the 20th century. Those two powers now want a framework for preventing war within Europe. They also — particularly the French — want a vehicle for influencing the course of world events. In their view, the European Union, as a whole, has a gross domestic product comparable to that of the United States. It should be the equal of the United States in shaping the world. This isn’t simply a moral position, but a practical one. The United States throws its weight around because it can, frequently harming Europe’s interests. The French and Germans want to control the United States.

    To do this, they need to move beyond having an economic union. They need to have a European foreign and defense policy. But before they can have that, they need a European government that can carry out this policy. And before they can have a European government they must have a European regime, before which they must have a European constitution that enumerates the powers of the European president, parliament and courts. They also need to specify how these officials will be chosen.

    The French and Germans would welcome all this if they could get it. They know, given population, economic power and so on, that they would dominate the foreign policy created by a European state. Not so the Irish and Danes; they understand they would have little influence on the course of European foreign policy. They already feel the pain of having little influence on European economic policy, particularly the policies of the European Central Bank (ECB). Even the French public has expressed itself in the 2006 election about fears of Brussels and the ECB. But for countries like Ireland and Denmark, each of which fought very hard to create and retain their national sovereignty, merging into a Europe in which they would lose their veto power to a European parliamentary and presidential system is an appalling prospect.

    Economists always have trouble understanding nationalism. To an economist, all human beings are concerned with maximizing their own private wealth. Economists can never deal with the empirical fact that this simply isn’t true. Many Irish fought against being cogs in a multinational British Empire. The Danes fought against being absorbed by Germany. The prospect of abandoning the struggle for national sovereignty to Europe is not particularly pleasing, even if it means economic advantage.

    Europe is not going to become a nation-state in the way the United States is. It is increasingly clear that Europeans are not going to reach a consensus on a European constitution. They are not in agreement on what European institutions should look like, how elections should be held and, above all, about the relation between individual nations and a central government. The Europeans have achieved all they are going to achieve. They have achieved a free trade zone with a regulatory body managing it. They have created a currency that is optional to EU members, and from which we expect some members to withdraw from at times while others join in. There will be no collective European foreign or defense policy simply because the Europeans do not have a common interest in foreign and defense policy.

    Paris Reads the Writing on the Wall

    The French have realized this most clearly. Once the strongest advocates of a federated Europe, the French under President Nicolas Sarkozy have started moving toward new strategies. Certainly, they remain committed to the European Union in its current structure, but they no longer expect it to have a single integrated foreign and defense policy. Instead, the French are pursuing initiatives by themselves. One aspect of this involves drawing closer to the United States on some foreign policy issues. Rather than trying to construct a single Europe that might resist the United States — former President Jacques Chirac’s vision — the French are moving to align themselves to some degree with American policies. Iran is an example.

    The most intriguing initiative from France is the idea of a Mediterranean union drawing together the countries of the Mediterranean basin, from Algeria to Israel to Turkey. Apart from whether these nations could coexist in such a union, the idea raises the question of whether France (or Italy or Greece) can simultaneously belong to the European Union and another economic union. While questions — such as whether North African access to the French market would provide access to the rest of the European Union — remain to be answered, the Germans have strongly rejected this French vision.

    The vision derives directly from French geopolitical reality. To this point, the French focus has been on France as a European country whose primary commitment is to Europe. But France also is a Mediterranean country, with historical ties and interests in the Mediterranean basin. France’s geographical position gives it options, and it has begun examining those options independent of its European partners.

    The single most important consequence of the Irish vote is that it makes clear that European political union is not likely to happen. It therefore forces EU members to consider their own foreign and defense policies — and, therefore, their own geopolitical positions. Whether an economic union can survive in a region of political diversity really depends on whether the diversity evolves into rivalry. While that has been European history, it is not clear that Europe has the inclination to resurrect national rivalries.

    At the same time, if France does pursue interests independent of the Germans, the question will be this: Will the mutual interest in economic unity override the tendency toward political conflict? The idea was that Europe would moot the question by creating a federation. That isn’t going to happen, so the question is on the table. And that question can be framed simply: When speaking of political and military matters, is it reasonable any longer to use the term Europe to denote a single entity? Europe, as it once was envisioned, appears to have disappeared in Ireland.

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  • Lewis’ Rebuke of Armenian Allegations

    Lewis’ Rebuke of Armenian Allegations

    Princeton University Scholar Lewis’ Rebuke of Armenian Allegations Supported by French Daily Le Petit Journal

    “[T]hat the massacre of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was the same as what happened to Jews in Nazi Germany is a downright falsehood.  What happened to the Armenians was the result of a massive Armenian armed rebellion against the Turks, which began even before war broke out, and continued on a larger scale.

    But to make this a parallel with the holocaust in Germany, you would have to assume the Jews of Germany had been engaged in an armed rebellion against the German state, collaborating with the allies against Germany. That in the deportation order, the cities of Hamburg and Berlin were exempted, persons in the employment of the state were exempted, and the deportation only applied to the Jews of Germany proper, so that when they got to Poland they were welcomed and sheltered by the Polish Jews. This seems to me a rather absurd parallel”.
     
    Professor Bernard Lewis
    April 14, 2002,
    National Press Club
    Also on C-Span 2

  • The Kosovo Syndrome

    The Kosovo Syndrome

    The Kosovo Syndrome and the Search for a Settlement in Cyprus
    by Sema Sezer

    From the early 1990’s to today, we have seen the formation of 9 new independent states in the south and east of Europe emerge from the break up of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia alone. On 1 January 1993, Czechoslovakia was divided into the “Czech Republic” and “Slovakia” through what was termed as a “velvet separation” as a result of a joint decision taken by the Czech and Slovakian Parliaments. On 1 May 2004, the two new states joined the European Union (EU). Disintegration in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia started in 1992 with the separation of four states – Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Finally, a total of seven independent states were born out of the former Yugoslavia with the separations of Montenegro from Serbia following a referendum on 21 May 2006, and then Kosovo, which was an autonomous region, after it declared its independence on 17 February 2008 from Serbia. Slovenia joined the EU with the 1 May 2004 enlargement process, while Croatia is in continued EU accession talks since October 2005, and Macedonia declared as a candidate country in December 2005. The winds of dissolution/separation were not limited to the east and south of Europe. In past years, debates on the issue of separation have arisen even in Belgium, despite its capital, Brussels, being central to the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Debates have increasingly intensified as to whether the separation of Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia could constitute an example for problematic regions in other parts of the world. Cyprus became the main focal point of these debates in Turkey.

    The reasons for mentioning the above events is to point out that every new-born state has been recognised by the international community, especially the EU states, and have taken their place in the international system within a short period of time despite the methods, and political and legal aspects of separation and independence processes all being different as in the examples of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

    Kosovo and Cyprus: Differences and Similarities

    Essentially, the Kosovo and Cyprus cases are both politically and legally different. However, some parallels can be drawn on the grounds of human rights violations, which were experienced by Kosovar Albanians and which are still being experienced by Turkish Cypriots today, behavioural similarities between Serbians and Greek Cypriots and military interventions in both regions . Comparisons between these two nations can even be made based on both having lived under Ottoman rule for centuries. For instance, the majority of the 7.5 million population of Serbia is Serb and Orthodox. In Kosovo, the population of 2 million consists of 95% Muslim, 90% being Albanian. In Cyprus, approximately 260 thousand Turkish Cypriots live in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), whereas 750 thousand Greek Cypriots live in the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC). The majority of Albanians and Turkish Cypriots are Muslim, whereas Serbs and Greek Cypriots are Orthodox Christian. A dominating sense of distrust between both the Serb and Albanian people in Serbia and Kosovo and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot population in Cyprus has led to a loss of will to live together.

    The de facto situation in both Kosovo and Cyprus started with the destruction of the existing constitutional system by the Serb and Greek Cypriot majority respectively. In this process, both Albanians and Turkish Cypriots experienced ethnic cleansing, human rights violations and forceful migration. The Serb and Greek Cypriot attacks only stopped following military interventions. The United Nations peace force that was sent to the island in 1964 failed to make any significant impact in preventing Greek Cypriot attacks from 1963-1974. The bloodshed on the island eventually stopped through Turkey’s military intervention in 1974 by using its rights from the 1960 Guarantee Agreement. The existence of a Turkish military presence on the island is the biggest guarantee preventing a return to 1974. The military intervention in Kosovo came in 1999 from the Kosovo Force (KFOR), or in other words NATO forces.

    Human rights violations and massacres orchestrated by the now deceased Serb leader Milosevic in Serbia and Papadopoulos in Cyprus, who was later to become the President of GASC during 2003-2008, presents another great similarity. The only difference being, while Milosevic was tried in front of the international community, Papadopoulos, who is known as the architect behind the ‘Akritas Plan’, the plan for the annihilation of Turkish Cypriots, was rewarded with Presidency. Furthermore, the disclosure of documents showing Papadopoulos as the person who was conducting money laundering for Milosevic in the GASC also shows another similarity between them.

    In the south of Cyprus, the United Kingdom has two military bases (Akrotiri and Dhekelia), which were retained in accordance with the international agreements of 1960 and were not registered as EU territory; it is also used by the United States. In Kosovo, the US has the biggest military base in the Balkans and Europe – “Camp Bondsteel”.

    After the military interventions of NATO in Kosovo and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in Cyprus, Serbs and Greek Cypriots lost control of territories where Albanians and Cypriot Turks lived. However, according to the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) decisions, Kosovo continued to be considered as “Serbian territory” (Resolution 1244, 1999), and the Greek Cypriot Administration as the “Legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus” (Resolution 186, 1964).
    Kosovo-Cyprus Precedent Debates and Double Standards of the International Community.

    The different approaches taken by the international community to the Kosovo and Cyprus issues demonstrates the double standards applied from the beginning. The different approaches to the issues demonstrated by the proposed resolutions, the UN’s “Annan Plan” for Cyprus and the “Ahtisaari Plan” for Kosovo, are total opposites. While one of them encourages the “reunification” of the island, the other encourages “separation” of Kosovo from Serbia. This attitude still applies after the independence of Kosovo. Another example was when, within a short period following the declaration of independence by the TRNC, the UNSC decided to define this declaration as “null and void”, taking a decision that “calls for non-recognition” (15 November 1983/541, 13 May 1984/550). However, the same UNSC did not take any such decision against Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

    The USA, the EU and NATO countries reached a consensus, with a few exceptions, on the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo, which declared its independence on 17 February 2008. While the USA was among the first states that recognised Kosovo, the EU declared that it has officially noted Kosovo’s independence on 18 February and left the decision of recognition to individual member states. Greece, GASC, Romania, Spain and Slovakia declared that they would not recognise the declaration of independence . The point of departure for these decisions is that independence can set a precedent for minorities in Romania, Slovakia and the Basque and Catalonia regions of Spain. The main concern of Greece and GASC is that this situation can pave the way for the recognition of TRNC’s independence. Moreover, Greece is concerned about Albanians and Macedonians. However, what almost all the states agree upon is that regardless of recognition, “Kosovo is not a precedent for Cyprus”.

    The most striking comment in the precedent debate came from the former President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, towards the end of his 8-year term, making an accusative statement of “the EU for its double standards in Kosovo and Cyprus” on 15 February 2008. Putin’s statement of “Northern Cyprus has been independent for 40 years. Why don’t you recognise it? Europeans aren’t you ashamed of your double standards?” is actually not in support nor an expression of the necessity for the recognition of TRNC’s independence. However, criticism of the double standards displayed by EU members echoed in many circles . Moreover, the statement is significant since this is the first time that the President of a permanent member of the UNSC has mentioned it. Essentially, expecting a change in policy towards Kosovo and Cyprus from Russia, which is known for its established support of Serbian and GASC policies, would not be realistic. Especially when one considers the role played by Russia in the crisis, which gave rise to a potential armed conflict, by selling an S-300 long-range SAM system to GASC and prevented a discussion of the UN Secretary-General’s Cyprus Report following the referendum of 24 April 2004 at the UNSC.

    Consequently, what was the main aim of Putin’s statement? The following part of the statement has the answer. While Putin stated that they support a unified state in Cyprus and that the recognition of Kosovo is immoral and illegal, he also declared that Kosovo is not different from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whereby they were forced to change their policies in these regions. Consequently, Putin might be signalling to Europe via the case of the TRNC that four frozen conflict zones can be separated – Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Trans-Dniester from Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan – and that their declaration of independence can be recognised. However, while evaluating Putin’s statement, the possibility of Kosovo setting a precedent for the federal republics and provinces in the Russian Federation like Chechnya, Tatarstan, Sakha (Yakutia) and Kaliningrad should not be overlooked.
    At first glance, Kosovo cannot be taken as a precedent for the TRNC neither in terms of its declaration of independence nor the model applied following the declaration of independence. This is because the TRNC already declared its independence on 15 November 1983, 25 years before Kosovo. Although the TRNC is not recognised, except by Turkey, it has all the necessary institutions for a functioning state, and has a more improved sense of democracy than most Western states. Moreover, although many states recognised Kosovo, is it truly independent? Are we going to experience a new model for independence, independent from Serbia but dependent on the international community?

    Consequently, the issue of Kosovo being a precedent for others can only be examined to criticise the international community’s attitude based on the existence of contradictory policies. Because, as mentioned by Putin, the international community is constantly making efforts to unite Cyprus, which has been divided for 40 years, but supported the separation of 7 states from Yugoslavia, Kosovo being the latest example.
    Turkey’s guarantor status and the presence of TAF on the island seem to be the main influence behind the different international approaches to Kosovo and Cyprus. But when you examine this closely, the absence of a system like the Guarantee and Alliance Agreement of Cyprus and the continuation of KFOR for the security of Kosovo, allows the EU, UN and NATO to maintain greater influence over Kosovo. But in reality, according to article 3 of the 1960 Guarantee Agreement, in the case of a breach of any article of the Agreement, the guarantor countries, multilaterally, unilaterally or in cooperation, have the right to re-establish the state of affairs described by the Agreement. Turkey, whose Armed Forces are the second largest army in NATO as well as the most powerful and operationally capable in the region, intervened on the island based on its right to do so on 20 July 1974. In addition to this, provisional article 10 of the TRNC constitution grants its national defence and security to TAF. All of these factors not only provide a military deterrent but also a political one.

    Reflections of Kosovo’s Independence to the Cyprus Issue

    On 17 February 2008, while the first round of Presidency elections were held in GASC, Kosovo became the 49th state of Europe by declaring its independence. Kosovo’s independence has two effects on the Cyprus issue: the first and foremost being the rising discourse directed against Papadopoulos, initiated by the international community and his election rivals claiming that under his Presidency “the island will remain divided”. The EU and US kept this discourse on the agenda based on the idea that Papadopoulos’s rigid policies were restricting any area for movement and created an expectation that if Papadopoulos lost, then “a new period for resolution will start”. Putin’s accusing statement toward European states of “double standards regarding Kosovo and Cyprus” and Kosovo’s declaration of independence on the same day of the first round of elections reinforced Greek Cypriot voters’ fear of the international recognition of the TRNC and negatively affected votes for Papadopoulos. From this perspective, the international community had reached its aim after the first round of elections and was indifferent towards the remaining two candidates, Kasoulides and Christofias, in the second round. Both candidates based their campaign on “supporting a solution and negotiation with Turkish Cypriots”. Consequently, the uncompromising Greek Cypriot attitude in the referendum of 24 April 2004 was blamed on the losing party rather than the Greek Cypriot people. The electoral victory of Communist AKEL leader Christofias in the second round on 24 February enabled the restoration of GASC’s image in the international community as the side “who wants a solution”. Therefore, it was Papadopoulos himself that failed in the elections, not his policies.

    The second effect is that rather than push for the international recognition of the TRNC, as was the case with Kosovo, efforts at unification for the island were intensified by the international community. In other words, Kosovo’s independence created an opposite effect in Cyprus. Following the Christofias – Talat meeting on 21 March 2008, study groups and technical committees were established for a three month period in preparation for comprehensive negotiations. The reports, which will be presented to the respective Presidents at the end of June, will determine the initiation of comprehensive negotiations.

    When analysing the current political situation in Southern Cyprus, AKEL’s policies and the influence of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church, it appears very doubtful that the Christofias administration have enough will for a solution with possible negotiations. The most significant reason for this is that the Greek Cypriot National Council, which is composed of all the Greek Cypriot political party leaders, decides policies on the Cyprus issue. The signing of all Council decisions by the leader of AKEL, i.e. Christofias, during Papadopoulos’s presidency can be taken as a sign that the Greek Cypriot policy of 2003-2008 will continue. During Papadopoulos’ presidency an agreement had been reached where part of these negotiations were to continue with a coalition government model with policies towards the Cyprus issue and to never put the Annan Plan on the agenda. In fact, we can now see that after his election, Christofias seems to be sticking to this agreement.

    Christofias talks about a two region – two nation federal solution. However, he employs a “unitary” state discourse with statements calling for “one state, one sovereignty and one citizenship”. He proposes the annulment of the 1960 Guarantee Agreement, withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from the island, the return of Turkish migrants to Turkey and Greek Cypriots to their estates in northern Cyprus as preliminary conditions. Like Papadopoulos, AKEL defends the use of Turkey’s EU accession process in the Cyprus issue. All of the above show that when Christofias and Papadopoulos are compared, the expected change is not evident and only that the “terminology” and “methodology” has changed rather than the core principles. Moreover, by using the phrase “Cypriot Solution”, and stating that the solution can only be found by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots we can see that he is trying to move away from the UN framework and push out the guarantor states from the process.

    However, the election of a Greek Cypriot candidate, who favours a solution, be it sincere or not, means an increase of pressure on the Turkish side. With a “Now” solution prone administration in office in the GASC, there will be increased demands for some facilitative action from Turkey. These demands will focus upon Cyprus’s obligations in accession talks, Turkey’s guarantor status and TAF’s presence on the island. Actually, Greek Cypriot and Greek officials state that “there is no need for the 1960 Guarantor Agreement, the guarantee of the EU will be sufficient.” They do not pay attention to the fact that the agreement, which was signed by Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, cannot be annulled without the mutual agreement of all signatory states. Naturally, nobody asks how the EU can provide a guarantee for Turkish Cypriots, while Greece and GASC are members of the EU and Turkey is not.
    The goal of the Greek Cypriots is possibly to gain time by employing diversionary tactics rather than reaching a solution. In December 2006, the EU suspended accession talks in eight chapters with Turkey, deciding to monitor Turkey’s Cyprus obligations until 2009. If Turkey does not meet these demands, a crisis may arise between the EU and Turkey toward the end of 2009. If Turkey meets the demands for the “normalisation of relations with the Republic of Cyprus, opening of ports and airports and application of supplementary protocol” without reaching a lasting-comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, this would mean “the end of the Cyprus issue” for the Greek Cypriot side. It is possible that the Greek Cypriot Administration is trying to buy time with diversion tactics until the Kosovo issue dies down from the international agenda. This is because, suitable conditions for the TRNC to demand recognition have arisen following Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, just as it had after the 24 April Referendum. However, the international community, which promised the “removal of isolations” after the referendum, is trying to prevent the rising voices of Turkish demands with statements of “finding a solution in Cyprus” while at the same time recognising Kosovo’s independence.

    Conclusion

    Even if comprehensive negotiations are initiated on the island, reaching a settlement seems unlikely because both sides have a different understanding of a “settlement” and “expectations” from the process. Despite administrations and leaders from different political spectrums coming to office throughout the years on both sides, a settlement could not be reached. Although former President Denktas has been accused of being uncompromising, no settlement has been reached during Talat’s presidency either. If GASC continues with the same attitude, the infertility of this process will be realised. Consequently, this new initiative on the island, which started after Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the presidential elections in GASC, would be the “last initiative” for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. However, the EU membership of GASC, the proposed Cyprus obligations in the Turkey-EU accession talks and the isolation of the TRNC will decrease the possibility of GASC accepting a solution under the auspices of the UN.
    For now, the significant issues are, what would be the parameters of a possible solution in Cyprus and in case of the failure of efforts for a resolution, what kind of alternatives can arise for the TRNC in light of Kosovo setting a precedent? Since “independence” was never mentioned in the Ahtisaari Report, the independence model for Kosovo means being independent from Serbia but dependent on the international community. In fact, after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the UN passed its control to the EU and the EU’s representative in Kosovo declared it will continue to work under the name of “International Civilian Representative”. To further demonstrate this point, approximately a total of 2000 police and judges from EU member states are operating in Kosovo. Regardless of how many states recognise Kosovo, its UN membership is impossible in the near future while GASC, Greece, Spain, Romania and Slovakia continue to oppose it; similarly Kosovo’s membership to the EU and NATO also cannot happen. Unfortunately, the story does not end there; Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is expected to create new political and legal problems even if Kosovo is recognised by various states.

    Every regional conflict has its own specific conditions and these conditions should be considered for any settlement. Consequently, in the case where the Greek Cypriot side takes preventative actions against a resolution, instead of a “contrivable unification”, other alternatives may arise. The most rational way for a lasting solution on the island is the initiation of the negotiation process to reach an understanding for the “agreed separation” of the “TRNC” and the “GASC” in line with the de facto status created by the events of 1963. The initiation of such a process, which will test the international community’s sincerity, will have a positive impact on peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean, in addition to preparing a proper basis for the settlement of Turko-Greek disputes. The preliminary condition is that the international community should face both politically and legally the reality of the state that they recognised in Cyprus, GASC, is not the “1960 Republic of Cyprus”, which was crafted in the Agreements of 1959-1960.

    Endnotes
    1 for a deeper anaylsis see, Sema Sezer “Kosova Sorunu ve Kıbrıs Meselesi Üzerine Bir Karşılaştırma”, Stratejik Analiz, No: 91,November2007,pp.40-48.
    2 “Kosova’yı Tanıyan Ülke Sayısı 23 Oldu”,26February2008,
    3 Putin: Europe has double standards against N. Cypres, 15 February 2008

  • Iraqi Forces Mass Outside Southern City of Amara

    Iraqi Forces Mass Outside Southern City of Amara

    Monday 16 June 2008
    by: Andrew E. Kramer and Alissa J. Rubin, The New York Times

    Editor’s Note: This story describes a military operation by, “Iraqi forces”. Scant mention is made of support for the operation by US military forces. In fact the so called Iraqi military is organized, funded and often backed in operations directly by US military forces. This fact omitted by The New York Times is conspicuous by it’s absence. ma/TO

        Baghdad – The Iraqi Army continued to mass troops outside the southern city of Amara on Sunday and Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, offered a three-day amnesty and weapons buyback program to militants willing to surrender.

        Similar offers in the past few months have presaged other military operations, in Basra, the Sadr City slum of Baghdad and in Mosul in northern Iraq.

        This time, Mr. Maliki is preparing for an operation against the capital of a rural marsh region in southern Iraq, on the Iranian border, where Iraqi officials say a poisonous blend of militia lawlessness and weapons smuggling from Iran has created a chaotic situation.

        The city is also the capital of the only province in Iraq dominated politically by followers of the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, a political rival for Mr. Maliki.

        In the city Sunday, traffic thinned on the streets. Those who did venture out in cars said they feared American air strikes.

        Some residents said the militiamen Mr. Maliki’s government is focusing on, and who Iraqi commanders say include leaders who fled from earlier fighting in nearby Basra, had again fled.

        Still, Iraqi army patrols were setting up checkpoints in the city Sunday and searching cars, some driven by residents moving to neighborhoods they believed would be safer during the anticipated fighting.

        “We are very scared of the waves of military moving into Maysan,” Abdul Ameer Abbas, a 41-year-old high school teacher, said, referring to Iraqi army troops who have been staging outside of town and in a sports stadium.

        Haider Karim, a 35-year-old Taxi driver, said the militiamen had already fled and that the civilians would bear the brunt of the military operation.

        “The security forces must follow these criminals wherever they go because they terrified innocent people,” he said. “We don’t want to be terrified again by the warplanes and troops.”

        The operation is the Iraqi army’s fourth this year to regain control over militia-dominated cities. Though disparate in their specific blend of violence and ethnic and sectarian divides, in all three cities the army has followed a template including offers of amnesty backed by military force.

        Mr. Maliki, in a statement, said militias in the city had three days to take advantage of the amnesty and surrender heavy weapons, such as rocket propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, mortars and rockets. The government, he said, would “give the outlaws and the members of the organized crime groups a last chance to review their stance.”

        The statement also promised rewards for residents who reveal the locations of militia arms caches in the city.

        The Maysan province, rural and remote from Baghdad, lies amid vast marshes. The dozen or so tribes in the area have an independent streak; even Saddam Hussein could not force them into submission.

        After an uprising in the marshes after the 1991 Gulf War, Mr. Hussein sought to stamp out the way of life of the marsh Arabs, as they are known, by digging giant canals to drain the wetlands. Outside of Amara, the capital on the Tigris River, the province of about 920,000 people includes settlements built of reed huts.

        Meanwhile a spokesman for the movement loyal to Mr. Sadr clarified statements made earlier in the weekend that suggested that Sadrists would not participate in the upcoming elections.

        On the contrary, said cleric Lua’a Smaysim, the head of the Sadr movement’s political committee, Sadrists will run, but not under the Sadr banner. They will run as independents or possibly as part of other groups, he said.

        “We will participate in the next elections, but there is no Sadrist list,” said Mr. Smaysim. “We will participate as individuals. Also we will support a lot of independent nominations from another lists.”

        Mr. Sadr, a protean force on the Iraqi political scene, in recent days appeared to be redesigning his movement to avoid being affected by a new election law expected to be approved this month that will govern elections in the fall for provincial council members. The law will outlaw the participation of parties or movements that have an armed wing.

        The ban on parties that have militias is clearly aimed at Mr. Sadr’s followers because his movement is affiliated with the Jaish al-Mahdi, an armed group, said Saad al-Hadithy, a political science professor at Baghdad University.

        “Therefore the Sadr movement decided to participate in this election through individuals who represent this movement and still have loyalty to it, but who are using their own names,” he said. “Those independent politicians will say that they are independents, but they are related to the Sadr movement in one way or another,’ he said

        Some may participate by joining the new political alliance created by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaferi, also a Shiite, said Mr. Hadithy as well as Shiite politicians.” The Sadr movement declared that they will participate with new entities or with independent individuals and this of course is to avoid being banned from the next elections because of their militia, ” said Basim Sharif, a parliament member from the Shiite Fadhila Party,

        Mr. Sadr had announced on Friday that he was splitting his movement in two and that the political wing would no longer be involved in any military operations. By the end of the weekend, it appeared that when it came to fielding candidates, it would no longer carry the Sadr name.

        The Sadr movement has broad popularity among the poor and had been predicted to garner more seats in the upcoming provincial elections. Such an outcome would almost certainly mean fewer seats for members of Shiite parties loyal to Mr. Maliki.

        Recent operations by government forces in Basra and Sadr City have weakened Mr. Sadr, said a western diplomat who is closely watching the situation, but Iraqi political commentators say he remains a unique populist force in Iraq.

        “Most of the places targeted by the government military operations are widely popular with the Sadr movement,” said Mr. Sharif.

        “The government says that it’s not targeting a specific party but the most targeted is the Sadr movement because of its popularity and its resistance to the occupation.”

        ——–

        Suadad al-Salhy and Mudhafer al-Husaini contributed reporting from Baghdad, and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times from Amara.

  • Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the U.S.

    Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the U.S.

    TURKEY, AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA AND THE U.S. HAVE BEEN WORKING
    TOGETHER TO DIVERSIFY ENERGY RESOURCES AND ACHIEVE
    ENERGY SECURITY IN THE CASPIAN REGION FOR ALMOST TWO DECADES

    • At the epicenter of Eurasian energy and transport routes, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are bolstering global energy security by providing for the safe and secure flow of goods, services, and energy resources to world markets.
       
      Since the “Contract of the Century” was signed in 1994, Azerbaijan has extensively developed its energy resources to diversify western energy supplies.  The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline became fully operational in July 2006, and will provide one third of new oil to international markets.  
    • Turkey and Israel are jointly working for the realization of the Turkey-Israel Multi-Pipeline System which will support global energy security as the North-South energy corridor becomes as important as the East-West energy corridor.
    • New opportunities have emerged in Turkmenistan for the realization of the Turkmenistan-Trans Caspian-Turkey-Europe Gas Pipeline Project (TCP).

    THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT

    • Armenia occupies 20 percent of neighboring Azerbaijan, including the Nagorno Karabakh region and seven additional regions.
    • The State Department’s 2008 fact sheet on the region states: “The United States does not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent country, and its leadership is not recognized internationally or by the United States.  The United States supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and holds that the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh is a matter of negotiation between the parties with the aim of achieving a lasting and comprehensive political resolution of the conflict. The United States remains committed to finding a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the Minsk Group process.”  The United States mediates the peace process as a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group which was established in 1992.
    • From a total population of eight million, there are nearly one million refugees and internally displaced Azerbaijanis.
    • According to the U.S. Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave is “blockaded by neighboring Armenia.”
    • Four U.N. Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, 884) adopted in 1992 and 1993 call for the unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories.
    • Armenia has not recognized the Armenian-Turkish border.

    ARMENIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN

    • Iran is one of Armenia’s largest trading partners.  The two countries are working on a trade agreement.
    • An Iran-Armenia gas pipeline was opened by President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Armenian President Robert Kocharian on March 19, 2007.
    • Russia and Iran are planning to construct a refinery in Armenia with an annual capacity to refine 53 million barrels of oil and produce gasoline and diesel fuel.  Armenia will only use 1 million tons of refined oil; the vast majority will be exported.
    • The State Department expressed concern about relations between Armenia and Iran in its 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism
      “Armenia’s warming relations with neighboring Iran continued, with Armenia hosting official visits by Iranian President Ahmadinejad (October) and Iranian Defense Minister Najjar (November).  In addition to fostering closer diplomatic ties, these visits served to solidify previous bilateral commitments to develop joint energy and transportation projects.  This closer cooperation has made Armenia more reluctant to criticize publicly objectionable Iranian conduct or join other UN member states in advocating for sanctions on the Iranian regime.”

    June 2008,
    Mustafa Nevruz SINACI
    TURKISH FORUM ADVISORY BOARD
    Ankara, TÜRKİYE