Author: Aylin D. Miller

  • One Island, Many Histories: Rethinking the Politics of the Past in Cyprus

    One Island, Many Histories: Rethinking the Politics of the Past in Cyprus

    From: Mark Stein <Mark.Stein@GW.MUHLENBERG.EDU>
    List Editor: Mark Stein <Mark.Stein@GW.MUHLENBERG.EDU>
    Editor’s Subject: H-TURK: CfP: One Island, Many Histories: Cyprus [R Bryant]
    Author’s Subject: H-TURK: CfP: One Island, Many Histories: Cyprus [R Bryant]
    Date Written: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 09:54:02 -0400
    Date Posted: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 09:54:02 -0400
    One Island, Many Histories:
    Rethinking the Politics of the Past in Cyprus
    A conference sponsored by Peace Research International Oslo (PRIO) Cyprus
    Centre
    21-24 November 2008, Nicosia, Cyprus
    
    One of the most divisive elements of the Cyprus conflict is the writing of
    Cyprus’ history.  That history has been dominated by the two main
    communities, Greek and Turkish, who have written very different versions of the
    past five hundred years in the island.  Those differing narrative strands have
    often come into conflict and have constituted one of the major impediments to
    reconciliation.  At the same time, the dominance of these nationalist
    narratives has led to the exclusion of other groups, of other histories, and of
    other narrative possibilities.  This conference aims to investigate how those
    narratives have emerged, how they are reproduced, and what questions we might
    ask about the production of those narratives that would help us reorient
    history writing from a form of division to a form of dialogue.
    
    With this aim in mind, the conference is organized around a set of
    methodological and historiographical questions.  Because the questions that
    historians ask shape the results that they find, this conference proposes that
    new questions are important for a new orientation.  Through this
    historiographical approach, we seek to investigate the ways in which history is
    and has been written in the island, as well as what new ways of thinking about
    the past may be productive for the future.
    
    Because the initial point of diversion for the island’s hegemonic histories
    is 1571, the conference concentrates on the Ottoman, British, and postcolonial
    periods.  We seek proposals from historians and social scientists working on
    the following themes:
    
    1.  Concepts of belonging: Beyond dichotomous identities?
    Histories of Cyprus have often questioned the emergence or transformation of
    identities in the island.  “Identity,” however, implies sameness and is
    defined by difference.  In the current context, this means that polls in both
    sides of the island attempt to measure the extent to which persons living in
    Cyprus feel “Turkish,” “Greek,” “Cypriot,” or a combination of
    these.  Such concepts of identity, furthermore, are often written back into
    Cyprus’ history to explain the meanings of difference even in the period
    before nationalisms became hegemonic in the island.  How might we rethink the
    meanings of identity and difference in a pre-nationalist period?  And can the
    concepts of identity currently in use in the academic literature about Cyprus
    really encompass or exhaust peoples’ senses of belonging to the island?  What
    other concepts might be employed to think, both historically and currently,
    about those senses of belonging?
    
    2.  Historical traumas and collective memory
    There are certain events in all communities of the island that may be
    considered “historical traumas,” or traumatic events that play an important
    role in their collective memory as a people.  These include, for instance, the
    hanging of the archbishop and clergy in 1821; the massacre of Muslims in Crete
    in 1897; and the Armenian Genocide of 1915.  This panel asks how we might
    understand the formation of such events as historical traumas; their
    reproduction in collective memory; and the influence of such historical traumas
    on the writing of history.
    
    3.  Other histories and “others’” histories
    The hegemony of the two main nationalist narratives in the island has left
    little historical space for other groups, whether linguistic, religious, or
    ideological.  The two primary histories have, moreover, been dominated by
    masculinist narratives that emphasize relations of power and moments of
    conflict.  In what way might other histories contribute to a rethinking of the
    politics of history, as well as the history of politics, in Cyprus?
    
    4.  Writing official histories
    This panel seeks to turn a historiographical gaze specifically to the 1960-74
    period, asking how the divisive official histories of that period have been
    written.  We seek here to investigate the conditions of those histories’
    production, looking at the specific moments in which what came to be the
    “official” versions of those histories emerged.  What are the particular
    conditions in which certain narratives appeared to reflect Cypriot realities? 
    How did those narratives take on institutional form?  And what forms of
    critique were brought at the moment of their emergence?
    
    5.  Official vs. unofficial histories
    While official histories have often been studied and recognized as such, less
    attention has been given to the formation of “unofficial” histories,
    despite the fact that these are often histories that are as well known and well
    formulated as the “official” ones.  The history of the Left on both sides
    of the island, for instance, falls under the heading of “unofficial”
    history even as its stories are equally well known.  In addition, in the
    “official” vs. “unofficial” dichotomy, the “unofficial” often
    acquires the meaning of a hidden “truth” that “official” histories have
    denied.  Is this, in fact, what “unofficial” histories represent?  Might
    there also be other ways of thinking about histories that oppose the main
    nationalist narratives?
    
    6.  Popular histories
    Popular histories are those ways of explaining the past that may interweave
    with legends, myths, rumor, and other forms of folk narrative.  One
    particularly potent form of popular history in Cyprus has been the conspiracy
    theory, but urban legends and the power of rumor have been equally important in
    shaping the ways in which Cypriots perceive histories, especially local ones. 
    This panel asks what the role of such histories may be in shaping popular
    discourse, and how such popular histories may in turn influence the writing of
    academic histories in the island.
    
    7.  Social imagination in the post-74 period and its influence on history
    writing
    Apart from popular histories, one of the factors shaping academic history in
    Cyprus is what Charles Taylor has called “social imaginaries,” or “that
    largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation,
    within which particular features of our world show up for us in the sense they
    have.”  Such social imaginaries may include forms of discourse, as well as
    institutions that form the landscapes of daily life.  This panel asks what
    social imaginaries, or concepts naturalized as a type of social background,
    have shaped histories of Cyprus in the post-74 period.
    
    8.  Is there a space for subaltern studies in Cyprus?
    The past twenty years has seen the emergence of subaltern studies, a branch of
    historical theory that investigates the conditions of colonialism, including
    both colonial consciousness and the consciousness of the colonized.  In
    contrast to subaltern studies’ focus on the social history of the colonial
    period, Cyprus’ colonial history has been dominated by an elite history that
    leaves little room for investigation of the emergence of discourses, or forms
    of power and knowledge.  What are the reasons for this dominance of elite
    history?  How has it affected our understanding of social movements in the
    island?  And is there anything that we might learn from other colonial
    historians’ focus on forms of consciousness that emerge in the colonial
    period?
    
    Practical information:
    The conference will take place over in the buffer zone of Nicosia, Cyprus, over
    two days, 21-22 November, with a third day, 24 November, set aside for closed
    workshops amongst meeting participants.  We are currently seeking funding for
    participants’ travel and accommodation and hope to be able to cover most of
    participants’ expenses.
    
    In order to facilitate both workshop discussions and the later publication of
    an edited volume, participants will be required to send completed papers
    (approx. 7500 words) by 10 November.  Within the framework of the conference
    itself, participants will be expected to summarize those papers’ findings for
    a general audience.
    
    Please send abstracts of no more than 150 words to:
    
    Rebecca Bryant
    Associate Professor of Anthropology
    George Mason University
    Rbryant2@gmu.edu
    
    Deadline for receipt of abstracts is 10 August 2008.
  • New York Post – A leader in the world of terrorism / A Must READ

    New York Post – A leader in the world of terrorism / A Must READ


    New York Post – A leader in the world of terrorism / A Must READ

     

     

    GOTTI EX MARRIES TERROR PRINCESS

    By PERRY CHIARAMONTE and STEFANIE COHEN

    July 14, 2008

    Carmine Agnello has a thing for dangerous women – or at least dangerous fathers-in-law.

    The man who married and divorced Victoria Gotti, daughter of the late “Dapper Don” John Gotti, has a new bride – the daughter of a terrorist, The Post has learned.

    Agnello, 48, quietly married the beautiful, raven-haired daughter of Mourad “Moose” Topalian, a former leader in the world of Armenian terrorism.

    Agnello, nicknamed “The Bull,” wed Danielle Vangar, nee Topalian, on Feb. 19, according to court documents obtained by The Post.

    The lovebirds met about five years ago while Danielle, 35, was visiting her father in the same Ohio federal pen where Agnello was doing time on racketeering and tax-evasion raps.

     

     

    Topalian was convicted of weapons and explosives possession after authorities in 1996 found a locker filled with more than 100 pounds of dynamite and a cache of guns that they traced back to the high-profile Armenian nationalist from Cleveland.

    The feds claim Topalian helped plot the 1980 car bombing of the Turkish Mission to the United Nations in New York, which badly injured three passers-by.

    He has maintained his innocence, saying in published reports that he copped a plea only to keep his family from the ordeal of a trial.

    But a source told The Post that Topalian was the leader of a militant Armenian terrorist group dedicated to avenging his people’s genocide at the hands of Ottoman Turks in 1915.

    His daughter and Agnello are now the picture of suburban bliss, living in a trim white colonial at the end of a cul-de-sac in the posh Cleveland suburb of Bentleyville.

    Agnello has even opened a new business, Charity Towing, which hauls vehicles donated to nonprofit groups.

    But while he’s busy playing house with his new bride, Agnello’s three sons by Victoria – Carmine, John and Frank – weren’t even told about the nuptials, said his ex-wife, Victoria Gotti.

    “I wish him the best,” said Victoria, 46, when The Post broke the news to her. “But I can’t believe he didn’t tell the kids himself.”

    She said Agnello, who is still on supervised release, has only visited the three boys once since he’s been out of jail.

    “Like my mother always says, the government did me the biggest favor of my life,” Victoria said, referring to both Agnello’s arrest and the secret government recordings that revealed he’d been having a steamy affair with his bookkeeper, which led to the couple’s divorce in 2002.

    perry.chiaramonte@nypost.com

     



  • George Bush, Osama Bin Laden in MISSION ISTANBUL

    George Bush, Osama Bin Laden in MISSION ISTANBUL

    Joginder Tuteja, Bollywood Trade News Network  

    Apoorva Lakhia and Suneil Shetty are really thinking BIG for their upcoming project MISSION ISTANBUL.

    The film is being promoted extensively with each of the actors getting a fair dose of limelight for himself. While Zayed Khan is being the common factor amongst all the film’s promos (since he plays the central protagonist), even Nikiten Dheer (who did loose his share of pie in JODHAA AKBAR in spite of being pitted against Hrithik Roshan) has been making quite an impression with his physique standing tall over anyone else in the frame.

    Vivek Oberoi too doesn’t have a reason to complain since he has not just become much more prominent in the promotional plans of the film but now also has an item song all for himself. No wonder, he is giving tough competition to Abhishek Bachchan who has been roped in as an item boy for MISSION ISTANBUL.

    But are you aware that apart from Zayed Khan, Vivek Oberoi, Suneil Shetty and Nikiten Dheer, there are two more characters which form an integral part of this action packed thriller? And these two men are not fictional but belong to real life!

    We are talking about the characters of George W. Bush and Osama Bin Laden, who would feature in this most ambitious venture of Apoorva Lakhia.

    Of course, one can’t expect the two men to be facing the camera for a feature film and hence the makers of MISSION ISTANBUL have roped in look alikes of Bush and Osama for their film. While Brent Mendenhall, an exact look-alike of U.S President George W. Bush, appears in the film as Bush, the part of Osama Bin Laden would be enacted by Khalil Ahmed.

    In a film that has been shot in Turkey and exposes behind the scenes games of media and terrorism coming together, MISSION ISTANBUL is indeed generating quite some heat for itself. Also starring Shabbir Ahluwalia, Shriya Saran and Shweta Bhardwaj, MISSION ISTANBUL is a co-production of Popcorn Motion Pictures and Balaji Telefilms Ltd. and is all set for a 25th July.

  • PKK Says Kidnapped Tourists Well, Urges Germany to Back Kurds

    PKK Says Kidnapped Tourists Well, Urges Germany to Back Kurds

    By Ben Holland

    July 14 (Bloomberg) — The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, said the three German tourists it kidnapped last week are well, and urged Germany to end a crackdown on Kurdish groups.

    The three men, seized on July 8 while they were climbing Mount Ararat in eastern Turkey, “have no problem with their health,” the PKK said in a statement to the Kurdish Firat news agency yesterday.

    To ensure their safe return, Germany should press Turkey to stop military operations against the PKK in southeast Turkey, the group said. Germany’s “anti-Kurdish policies” make it likely that incidents such as the kidnapping will occur again, it said.

    The PKK has been fighting for autonomy in largely Kurdish southeast Turkey since 1984 in a conflict that has caused about 40,000 deaths. The group has been banned in Germany since 1993.

    To contact the reporter on this story: Ben Holland in Istanbul at bholland1@bloomberg.net.

    Last Updated: July 14, 2008 03:36 EDT

  • Beyond the veil….”The Economist”‘ten ilginc bir yorum.

    Beyond the veil….”The Economist”‘ten ilginc bir yorum.

    “The Economist”‘ten ilginc bir yorum.
    Timur Sumer
    Beyond the veil
    Jun 12th 2008 | ANKARA
    From The Economist print edition

    The secular and the pious march towards a new collision, with unforeseeable consequences for democracy and Turkey’s chances in Europe

    Get article background

    WHEN Adnan Menderes, a right-wing politician who spoke up for pious Anatolians, swept to power as prime minister after Turkey’s first free parliamentary election 58 years ago, a group of officers began plotting a military coup within weeks. Ten years later, with the support of the secular intelligentsia and politicians, they overthrew the government, by then in its third term. A year later, in September 1961, Menderes was hanged.

    Yildiray Ogur, a young activist, sees worrying parallels between the 1960 coup and today’s campaign, spearheaded by Turkey’s generals and judges, to overthrow Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey has been in upheaval ever since the constitutional court began considering a case brought by the chief prosecutor to ban the AKP and to bar 71 named individuals, including Mr Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, from politics, on thinly documented charges that they are seeking to impose sharia law.

    The stakes were raised on June 5th, when the court overturned a law passed by a big majority in parliament to let young women wear the Islamic-style headscarf at universities. By voting 9-2 to quash the law the court sent a clear signal that it would vote to shut down the AKP. A verdict is expected by the autumn.

    To many the case is like a judicial coup: a last-ditch attempt to cling to power by an elite that refuses to share wealth and social space with a rising class of pious Turks, symbolised by the AKP. It may also further discredit the constitutional court. Above all, says Mr Ogur, the case reveals “an army that believes it should have the final say, not elected politicians.”

    A defiant Mr Erdogan vows to fight back. In a fiery speech in parliament this week, he declared that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction and would “need to explain itself to the people.” There is talk of changing the rules for appointing judges and limiting their ability to ban political parties. Some AKP officials dream of unleashing millions of supporters on to the streets. But they know that doing so would risk provoking a real military coup. “We are like lambs being taken to slaughter, we are resigned to our fate,” sighs one AKP deputy.

    A few hardy souls pin their hopes on Western support. The European Union has hinted that it would suspend membership talks if the AKP were banned. But thanks to the growing opposition to Turkish accession in countries such as France and Austria, few Turks believe they will ever get in anyway. “With no carrots left to offer, the EU has no stick to wield,” opines Cengiz Aktar, who follows EU affairs.

    The biggest deterrent to overthrowing the AKP may be Turkey’s wobbly economy. After six years of steady growth the economy is slowing down, inflation has crept back to double digits and this year’s current-account deficit is expected to rise to 7% of GDP. Faik Oztrak, a former treasury under-secretary and opposition parliamentarian, reckons that Turkey will need at least $135 billion in foreign inflows to plug the gap. As he asks pointedly, “where will it come from?”

    Investor confidence has been rattled by the government’s indecision over extending an IMF deal that expired in May. “With financial markets remaining jittery, Turkey is walking on a tightrope, making policy errors potentially costly. In particular, new initiatives that jeopardise the achievement of the announced fiscal targets, such as the planned reform of municipal finances, could tilt the balance of policies and should be avoided,” Lorenzo Giorgianni, the IMF’s mission chief for Turkey, says. He is referring to the government’s plans to boost local spending.

    Yet in Istanbul many financiers seem unfazed. They see no reason for alarm, even if the AKP is banned. A chastened, wiser AKP would simply regroup under a different name and it will be business as usual, the argument goes. Certainly, when a party is banned (they tend to be either pro-Kurdish or pro-Islamic) its members usually come together under a new banner. But Islamic parties often come back even stronger. The AKP itself is an offshoot of Virtue, a party that was banned in 2001. It romped to power in 2002 and won a second term last year with a bigger share of the vote.

    Even if it were disbanded, the AKP’s surviving parliamentarians would remain as independents in sufficient numbers to be able to force another snap election. Indeed, the million-dollar question, as one European diplomat puts it, is “whether those who are perpetrating this strategy against the AKP will let them come back even stronger. They are stuck between a coup and a hard place.”

    Not everyone thinks that the AKP will emerge unscathed. Even his allies agree that Mr Erdogan made a strategic blunder by passing the headscarf law instead of blending it into a package of broader reforms embodied in a new constitution. Instead of appeasing secular fears, some AKP members crowed that the headscarf would soon be allowed in government offices as well. Many say the void left by Mr Gul, who moved up from foreign minister to become president last August, is partly to blame for Mr Erdogan’s mistakes. As number two in the AKP, Mr Gul had often curbed Mr Erdogan’s rasher instincts.

    Meanwhile, support in the Kurdish south-east, where the AKP made big gains last year, has been waning ever since Mr Erdogan yielded to army pressure and authorised cross-border attacks on PKK terrorists in northern Iraq. He also snubbed members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (DTP) in parliament. Police brutality and mass arrests during a May 1st demonstration in Istanbul have not helped his image.

    Yet, for all his and the party’s failings, recent opinion polls suggest that the AKP retains a big lead over its rivals. “You may criticise us for going slow on reforms, but the truth is that we made more changes than Turkey was able to absorb,” says Abdurrahman Kurt, an AKP member from Diyarbakir. By giving pious Turks a political voice, the AKP has also bolstered their faith in democracy.

    By overturning the headscarf law, says Mazhar Bagli, a sociologist at Diyarbakir’s Dicle university, the court is running the risk that “radical groups will now seek their rights through illegal means.” In other words, the threat of radical Islam in Turkey may have increased thanks to the secularists’ attack on the AKP.

     

    YORUM

    From: サバ SAMATYA [sabasamatya@hotmail.com]

     

    The Economist’ten EKONOMIK VERILERIMIZ

     


    14.07.2008

     
        THE Economist, dünyaca ünlü ve yaygın bir ekonomi politik
    dergidir. Ama son birkaç yıldır Türkiye’nin AKP tarafından ne kadar da
    “harika” yöneltildiğini, Atatürk ve Cumhuriyet ilkelerinin ne kadar da
    “demode” olduğunu yazmaktan hiç bıkmadı. Hele, hele AKP kapatma
    davasına Talabani, Rumlar ve AB komiserlerinden bile çok üzüldü ve
    karşı çıktı.
    Ama The Economist’te yayınlanan toplu ekonomik veriler AKP iktidarının
    Türkiye’yi nasıl da kırılgan ve sıkıntılı bir noktaya sürüklediğini
    ayan-beyan gösteriyor.
    Gelin, The Economist’in siyasi makalelerde yücelttiği AKP iktidarının
    Türkiye’yi ekonomik verilerde dünyada kendi kategorisindeki ülkeler
    arasında getirdiği yerini birlikte görelim ve karşılaştıralım.
    Veriler 5 Temmuz 2008 tarihli 388 sayılı son The Economist’ten;

    işsizlik oranı:
    Türkiye %11.6
    Polonya %10
    Brezilya %7.9
    Hindistan %7.2
    Rusya %6.4
    İsrail %6.3
    Pakistan %6.2
    G.Afrika %3.2

    Dış Tic.Açığı(12 ay-milyar dolar)
    -85 Hindistan
    -69.7 Türkiye
    -22.2 Mısır
    -21.3 Avustralya
    -19.8 Pakistan
    -17.1 Polonya
    -13.2 İsrail

    Cari Açık(nisan 2008-12 ay-milyar dolar)

    -42 Türkiye
    -22.G.Afrika
    -17.5 Hindistan
    -15.2 Brezilya
    -10.5 Pakistan
    -5.0 Kolombiya
    -4.8 Meksika
    -0.1 Mısır

    Yukarıdaki tablolarda Türkiye’nin maalesef en negatif göstergelere
    sahip olduğu görülüyor.
    Tabi dünya borsaları arasında da 2007 yılsonu itibarı ile
    karşılaştırıldığında en çok kaybeden ve düşüş gösteren borsanın Çin
    ile beraber İMKB olduğunu da belirtmek gerekiyor.
    İngilizler, Rumlar, AB komiserleri ve Talabani’nin AKP’nin
    kapatılmasına neden böyle canla başla karşı çıktıklarını da yukarıdaki
    karşılaştırılmalı ekonomik veriler yeterince anlatıyor sanırım.
    The Economist’in sürekli övüp desteklediği AKP’nin, Türk ekonomisini
    nasıl dünyanın en kırılgan ekonomisi haline getirdiğini, yine aynı
    dergi son sayısının arka sayfalarında ilan etmek zorunda kalıyor.
    Ne diyelim Allah akıl, fikir versin.
     
     
    UFUK SÖYLEMEZ
    -TERCUMAN-

  • Iran vs. the West

    Iran vs. the West

    Iran vs. the West

    Source: Aljazeera.net