Presidents Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, and Abdullah Gul of Turkey inaugurated on July 24 in Kars the construction work on the Turkish section of the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku (KTB) railroad. A project of inter-continental significance, connecting Europe and Asia through the South Caucasus, this “Iron Silk Road” is being built by the region’s countries through their own efforts.
Azerbaijan is the locomotive in the KTB railroad, as in the region-wide energy projects. Baku single-handedly finances the railroad’s construction on Georgian territory, drawing on early oil revenues to invest in this strategic railroad. Azerbaijan rescued the project after the European Union, international financial institutions, and Turkey for various reasons had declined to finance the Iron Silk Road. According to Turkish Transportation Minister Bineli Yildirim, “If Ilham Aliyev had not demonstrated resolve, this project would not have been possible. Azerbaijan’s decision to finance the Georgian section is the most important step in the implementation of this project” (Trend Capital, July 14).
The KTB project involves construction of 105 kilometers of new rail tracks from scratch, including 76 kilometers on Turkish territory to the Georgian border and 29 kilometers within Georgia. It also necessitates repair and upgrading of 183 kilometers of existing rail track on Georgian territory. The overall costs are estimated (in 2007 U.S. dollar terms) at $600 million, including $422 million for the railroad itself and nearly $200 million for associated infrastructure.
The International Bank of Azerbaijan has provided a $200 million loan for the project on uniquely preferential terms: 25-year repayment period, at only 1 percent annual interest. Georgia will repay the loan by using part of the revenue generated by the railroad on Georgian territory.
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey signed the intergovernmental agreement on KTB in February 2007. Construction work on the Georgian section started in November 2007, with Azerbaijan’s Azerinshaat Service company acting as general contractor.
Speaking at the inauguration of work on the Turkish section on July 24, Saakashvili remarked that Azerbaijan is acting in practical terms as a “guarantor of Georgia’s independence,” financing the railroad now after having supplied Georgia with low-cost gas during the Russian blockade of January-February 2006. “The Georgian people will never forget this,” Saakashvili commented (Kavkas-Press, July 24).
The railroad is scheduled for completion in 2011. It is expected to carry 1.5 million passengers and 6.5 million tons of cargo per year during the first three years of operation. Traffic is projected to increase to 3 million passengers and 15 million tons of cargo per year until 2015. This could stimulate a substantial expansion in the capacity of Turkish State Railways, which currently handles 19.5 million tons of cargo annually (Anatolia Agency, Turkish Daily News, July 20, 21).
Functionally interrelated with the KTB, though a distinct entity, is Turkey’s Marmaray project to build a railroad tunnel under the Bosporus. With completion expected by 2010, the tunnel will enhance the KTB railroad’s commercial attractiveness. Trains will be able to travel without interruption from any point in Europe (e.g., London) continuously to the Caspian Sea.
On the eastern Caspian shore, Kazakhstan is interested in a trans-Caspian linkup with KTB’s terminal in Baku. The KTB railroad will open direct access for Kazakhstan to European Union territory for the first time. Kazakhstan plans a massive increase in its commodity exports to Europe, including grain exports. With this in mind, Kazakhstan is completing an 800,000-ton grain-handling terminal near Baku, for trans-shipment from barges to the railroad.
Asked about Armenia’s absence from the KTB project, President Gul commented in general terms that countries wishing to participate in region-wide projects should respect the territorial integrity of their neighbors (Zaman, July 24). This diplomatic comment reflects the ongoing feelers between Turkey and Armenia about a possible high-level meeting to ameliorate relations (see article by Gareth Jenkins below). In fact, Yerevan had actively opposed the KTB project and worked with its allies in the United States and Europe to block international funding for it.
Yerevan had hoped to force a change of route, diverting the KTB line from Kars to Gyumri in Armenia. This would have made no economic sense inasmuch as the Kars-Gyumri line (existent, but closed by Turkey due to Yerevan’s occupation of Azerbaijani lands) is a sideline, of merely local interest. Earlier, and similarly, Yerevan and allied groups in the West had unsuccessfully opposed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
Thanks to KTB, Azerbaijan and Turkey will be linked with each other by railroad for the first time, albeit through Georgia. In addition, Baku and Ankara intend to connect Nakhchivan, the Azerbaijani exclave, with Turkey’s railroad system. President Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed during their recent meeting in Nakhchivan to go ahead with this project (Trend Capital, July 14).
In a related development, Turan Air company in Baku inaugurated on July 21 regular direct flights between Haidar Aliyev International Airport and Kars (Day.az, July 21). Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey are beginning to form what amounts to a common economic region, increasingly connected with Europe and potentially with Central Asia, on either side of this region’s territory.
TURKEY AND ARMENIA: FROM SECRET TALKS TO “SOCCER DIPLOMACY”?
By Gareth Jenkins
Friday, July 25, 2008
On July 24, the presidents of Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan formally inaugurated the Turkish section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, which will eventually provide the first ever rail link between the three countries. Speaking at the groundbreaking ceremony, Turkish President Abdullah Gul declared, in an unmistakable reference to Armenia, that “this project is open to all countries in the region who wish to contribute to good, neighborly relations, peace and prosperity” (NTV, CNNTurk, July 24).
Armenia and Turkey do not have any official diplomatic relations and the border between the two countries has been closed since 1993, following the war in Nagorno Karabakh between ethnic Armenians and the Azeri government in Baku. In recent years, hopes of an improvement in relations between Turkey and Armenia have been frustrated by continuing differences over the status of Nagorno Karabakh and—more intractably—the treatment of ethnic Armenians during the final years of the Ottoman Empire, culminating in 1915-16 in the massacre and deportation of virtually the entire Armenian population of Anatolia.
As a result, Ankara has consistently excluded Armenia from its plans to make Turkey into an energy and transportation hub. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline both pointedly circumvent Armenia. The 76 kilometer (48 mile) Turkish section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad is currently expected to be completed in late 2010 or early 2011 at a total cost of $241 million. The initial target is for the railroad to carry 1.5 million passengers and 6.5 million tons of freight in the first year after it comes into service (Today’s Zaman, July 25).
In addition to connecting Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, Ankara hopes that the railroad will form another link in a rail network that will eventually connect, via Turkey, China and Central Asia to western Europe. The Marmaray Project to bore a rail tunnel under the Bosporus and connect the Asian and European shores of Istanbul is currently scheduled for completion in 2011.
Armenia opposed the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, pointing out that there is already a railway running from Tbilisi to Kars via the Armenian town of Gyumri, although it has been out of use since the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border in 1993.
It is currently unclear what concessions Gul envisaged when he apparently made Armenian participation in the new rail project conditional on Yerevan making a contribution to “good, neighborly relations, peace and prosperity.” For the moment at least, the respective positions of Turkey and Armenia on issues such as Nagorno Karabakh and the massacres and deportations of ethnic Armenians in the late Ottoman Empire appear so far apart as to be irreconcilable. Even if the two countries could reach some form of understanding over the latter, a solution to the problem of Nagorno Karabakh is beyond Turkey’s control as it depends on an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. There is currently no indication that one is imminent.
Nevertheless, there have recently been signs of a slight thaw between Turkey and Armenia. Even though the border between the two countries remains closed, there are now regular flights between Turkey and Armenia by both the privately-owned Turkish Atlas Jet and the Armenian state-owned carrier Armavia.
On July 18, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan appeared to confirm rumors in the Turkish media that diplomats from Turkey and Armenia had met in Switzerland for several days of informal talks about ways of improving ties. “Such talks are held from time to time,” said Babacan. “We have problems about current issues and disagreements about the events of 1915. It is essential that these problems are handled through dialogue” (Today’s Zaman, July 19).
The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also issued a statement admitting that in recent years there had been occasional informal contacts between Turkey and Armenia and noting that Turkey had been one of the first countries to recognize Armenia when it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. “Meetings between members of the foreign ministries of the two countries are part of these contacts. We believe that no different meaning should be attributed to these meetings,” said the MFA statement (Today’s Zaman, July 19).
A previous series of informal discussions in 2005 failed to produce any result. In recent years, hopes of an improvement in relations have been complicated by events such as the motion brought before the U.S. Congress in fall 2007 calling on the United States to recognize what happened to the Armenians in 1915 as a genocide and the racist murder in Istanbul in January 2007 of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink.
But, even if diplomats from Turkey and Armenia remain reluctant to be seen meeting with each other, the two countries will come together in the most public of ways later this year. On September 6, the Turkish and Armenian national soccer teams are due to meet in Yerevan in the first ever match between the countries after they were both drawn in the same group in the qualifying stages for the 2010 soccer World Cup in South Africa. Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan has already invited Gul to Yerevan to watch the match. Gul has yet to reply to the invitation. Given the often extreme mutual antagonism between nationalists in both countries, traveling to Yerevan would require Gul to display both personal and political courage; as it would for Sarksyan to attend the return match in Istanbul. But there is also little doubt that, even if it did not produce any immediate results, such “soccer diplomacy” could contribute to a further easing of tensions and perhaps lay the foundations for an eventual reconciliation.
Who’s captive now?
Jul 17th 2008
From Economist.com
A question about Russia
Each year since 1959, in the third full week of July, America has
marked Captive Nations Week. The original Congressional resolution is
worth reading. It highlights both what the drafter, the late Lev
Dobriansky, saw as the success of the United States in “e pluribus
unum” (making one nation out of many), and the failure of Communist
empires to do the same. The continued celebration of the week is
something of a totem for old cold warriors who believe that the
victories of 1989-91 are still sadly unconsummated.
Yet the resolution’s wording rings oddly. The list of “captive
nations” reads: “Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia,
Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria,
mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania,
Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Viet-Nam, and others
[sic, throughout]”.
It is hard to find rhyme or reason in that, even in its original
context. Cossacks are Russian patriots; their beastly treatment under
Soviet rule does not equate to a desire for national independence.
Others whose history gives them every cause for complaint, such as the
Circassians, don’t appear at all. Is the aim of the resolution ethnic
self-determination, or the destruction of communist rule? As it
stands, the two are conflated.
Moreover, the phrase “Communist Russia” is wince-making. Many Russians
find it unfair or outright racist to link Soviet rule, under which
more Russians perished than any other nationality, with Russia itself.
From a Russian point of view, it can be argued that the motherland was
the greatest captive nation of all, its destiny hijacked by murderous
ideologues (many of them, incidentally, not Russians).
A seminar this week in Moscow may mark the start of another push to
have the resolution revised. One of the initiators, the
Russian-American academic Edward Lozansky, believes that a differently
phrased resolution could be the start of a real rapprochement between
modern Russia and the countries of central and eastern Europe.
But there are two snags. One is that Soviet rule, particularly in its
latter decades, did indeed mix Russian chauvinism with proletarian
internationalism. The forcible Russification policies in the Caucasus,
the Baltic states and elsewhere have left lasting bitterness.
Secondly, the Russian Federation is a work in progress. Around a fifth
of the population are not ethnic Russians. Some are deeply integrated
and count themselves as patriotic citizens of a common state. But
others aren’t. The spectrum of discontent ranges from separatists
pursuing their cause by violent means (so far, thankfully, confined to
the Caucasus) to moderate demands for greater cultural autonomy.
Bad government stokes such grievances, just as the rule of law and
political freedom defuse them. America conquered the Sioux and the
Cherokee, and treated its aboriginal population abominably for
decades. But the political and legal systems at both state and federal
levels, albeit imperfect, now work well enough to make separatism both
fanciful and unnecessary.
The pervasive feeling of injustice and voicelessness in the Soviet
system stoked captives’ desire to be free, and fatally corroded a
system already vulnerable because of its economic failure. But if
Soviet legitimacy was based on phoney ideology, what of the new
Russian state’s identity? Is it a Swiss-style federation of equally
sovereign peoples? Or is it an ethnically Russian state in which
non-Russians are outsiders, guests or immigrants? The first would
require an unprecedented degree of tolerance from ethnic Russians. The
latter would relegate the 20% of the population to permanent
second-class status.
Ever since 1991, the answer, usually unspoken, has been “don’t know”.
Next week’s Europe.view will suggest some answers�”and, if anyone is
puzzled, have more on the mysterious country of “Idel-Ural”.
Europe View no 91
For your freedom and ours
Jul 24th 2008
From Economist.com
Captive nations inside Russia
Is Cornwall a “captive nation”? As last week’s Europe.view noted,
influential Russians are pushing for America to rewrite the resolution
that marks its Captive Nations Week (the third week in July), to make
it clear that communism, not Russia, is the target. An even trickier
question is not what other former Soviet-ruled countries make of this,
but of Russia’s own internal composition�”which includes places that
some might also count as “captive”.
Countries’ borders grow and shrink, partly by consent, but also by
conquest. Nations�”defined, loosely, as people sharing a common
language or culture�”may find themselves no longer masters in their own
house. Some may despair. Others start plotting.
Practicality is not the main determinant. In Cornwall, which lost its
independence around 875AD, a doughty band of campaigners has revived
the language and hopes to win back more rights. But compared to
Scotland, where the separatist tide is running strongly, theirs looks
like a lost cause. So does secession in Vermont, say, or Hawaii. In
Russia, at least for now, those reviving, say, the Siberian language,
or commemorating the short-lived and abortive independence of the
Siberian republic in 1918, look a lot closer to Cornish nationalism
than Scottish. But for how long?
Since 1991 the state calling itself the Russian Federation has been a
miniature, de-communised version of the Soviet Union, paying
lip-service to multi-ethnicity, but withholding actual cultural or
political freedom from non-Russians: when Tatarstan wanted to write
the national language in the orthographically better-suited Latin
alphabet, the Kremlin insisted that Cyrillic was the only script to be
used officially in the Russian Federation, regardless of practicality.
Since 1989, Russia’s Muslim population has increased by 40% to about
25m. By 2015, Muslims will by some estimates make up a majority of the
army, and by 2020 a fifth of the population�”by far the majority in
some regions.
How many of those Muslims will look to the tolerant “Euroislam”
pioneered in the Tatar capital, Kazan, in the early years of the last
century, or to indigenous Sufi forms, and how many may look abroad for
more radical forms of Islam?
Added to ethnic and religious discontent is a growing regional
consciousness. The colossal bribe-collecting opportunities created by
Putinism have heightened the divide between big cities (particularly
Moscow) and the rest of the country.
Heightened resentment does not mean that Russia is going to fall apart
as the Soviet Union did. For now, no part of the Russian Federation
looks remotely like being a viable independent state. Even the most
ardent supporter of Captive Nations Week would not argue that the
“Idel-Ural” that it cites (present-day Tatarstan, Bashkiria and their
Finno-Ugric neighbours, briefly independent after 1917) has any chance
of a Baltic-style breakaway.
But if anything can upset the post-1991 apple cart it will be
ethnic-Russian chauvinism and heavy-handedness. As Paul Goble
chronicles in his “Window on Eurasia” bulletins (a must-read for
anyone interested in the politics of post-Soviet ethnicity), the Sochi
Olympics have fuelled the revival of national consciousness among the
Circassians. For this far-flung ethnic group, scattered throughout
Asia Minor and the Levant by near-genocidal Czarist brutality, seeing
the Olympics being planned at the site of their greatest historical
tragedy is hugely offensive: some compare it to how Jews would react
to a big international sporting festival being held at Ravensbrück or
Dachau.
Russian ethno-nationalism, coupled with bad government, may
disillusion Russians of all stripes with the lingering imperial
features of Russian statehood. If talk of “captive nations” jars
Russian sensibilities, the best answer is the great slogan of
freedom-lovers in the Czarist empire: “for your freedom and ours”.
Captive Nations Resolution (original)
The original Captive Nations resolution of the U.S. Congress
PUBLIC LAW 86-90
Whereas the greatness of the United States is in large part
attributable to its having been able, through the democratic process,
to achieve a harmonious national unit of its people, even though they
stem from the most diverse of racial, religious, and ethnic
backgrounds; and
Whereas this harmonious unification of the diverse elements of our
free society has led the people of the United States to possess a warm
understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of peoples everywhere
and to recognize the natural interdependency of the peoples and
nations of the world; and
Whereas the enslavement of a substantial part of the world’s
population by Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of
peaceful coexistence between nations and constitutes a detriment to
the natural bonds of understanding between the people of the United
States and other peoples; and
Whereas since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of
Russian communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which
poses a die threat to the security of the United States and of all the
free people of the world; and
Whereas the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led,
through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the
national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine,
Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East
Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North
Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North
Viet-Nam, and others; and
Whereas these submerged nations look to the United States, as the
citadel of human freedom, for leadership in bringing about their
liberation and independence and in restoring to them the enjoyment of
their Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other religious
freedoms, and of their individual liberties; and
Whereas it is vital to the national security of the United States that
the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of
these conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and
Whereas the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming
majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a
powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and
lasting peace; and
Whereas it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such peoples through
an appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of
the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery
of their freedom and independence:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That:
The President of the United States is authorized and requested to
issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as
“Captive Nations Week” and inviting the people of the United States to
observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities. The
President is further authorized and requested to issue a similar
proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence
shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world.
By Christopher Hudson
Last updated at 11:46 PM on 24th July 2008
Three days after the fall of France in 1940, Napoleon, lying in his marble tomb in Paris, received a visit from his greatest admirer.
Adolf Hitler, on his one and only visit to the French capital, made an unannounced trip to the tomb in Les Invalides.
In his white raincoat, surrounded by his generals, Hitler stood for a long time gazing down at his hero, his cap removed in deference.
He was said later to have described this moment as ‘one of the proudest of my life’.
The next day, during his official sightseeing tour of Paris, Hitler again visited Napoleon’s tomb to salute him.
Conscious that his hero was known to the world simply as Napoleon, Hitler boasted that he would not need a rank or title on his gravestone. ‘The German people would know who it was if the only word was Adolf.’
Throughout the war, Hitler had sandbags placed around Napoleon’s tomb to guard against bomb damage.
Wooden floorboards were laid across the marble floor of Les Invalides so that they would not be scarred by German jackboots.
Until recently, the French would have been incensed by any comparison between Napoleon and Hitler.
But to their rage and shame, new research has shown that France’s greatest hero presided over mass atrocities which bear comparison with some of Hitler’s worst crimes against humanity.
These reassessments of Napoleon have caused anguish in France. Top politicians backed out of official ceremonies to mark what was possibly Napoleon’s greatest victory, the battle of Austerlitz, when Napoleon’s Grande Armee defeated the combined armies of Austria and Russia in just six hours, killing 19,000 of their adversaries.
A street in Paris named Rue Richepanse (after Antoine Richepanse, a general responsible for atrocities in the Caribbean) has recently had its name changed to Rue Solitude.
Hitler
During his reign as Emperor, concentration camps were set up and gas was used to massacre large groups of people.
There were hit squads and mass deportations. And all this happened 140 years before Hitler and the Holocaust.
Claude Ribbe, a respected historian and philosopher and member of the French government’s human rights commission, has been researching Napoleon’s bloodcurdling record for some years.
He accuses him of being a racist and an anti-Semite who persecuted Jews and reintroduced widespread slavery just a few years after it had been abolished by the French government.
The most startling of these findings, the attempted massacre of an entire population over the age of 12 by methods which included gassing them in the holds of ships, relate to the French Caribbean colony of Haiti at the turn of the 19th century.
In Ribbe’s words, Napoleon, then First Consul, was the man who, for the first time in history, ‘asked himself rationally the question how to eliminate, in as short a time as possible, and with a minimum of cost and personnel, a maximum of people described as scientifically inferior’.
Haiti around 1800 was the world’s richest colony, a slave-powered export factory which produced almost two-thirds of the world’s coffee and almost half its sugar.
The black slaves were lashed and beaten to work and forced to wear tin muzzles to prevent them from eating the sugar cane.
If the slaves were fractious, they were roasted over slow fires, or filled with gunpowder and blown to pieces.
When the slaves began to fight for their freedom, under the leadership of a charismatic African military genius called Toussaint L’Ouverture, Napoleon sent 10,000 crack troops under the command of his brother-inlaw, General Leclerc, to crush Toussaint and restore slavery.
In 1802, a vast programme of ethnic cleansing was put in place. Napoleon banned inter-racial marriages and ordered that all white women who’d had any sort of relationship with a black or mulatto (person of mixed race) be shipped to France.
He further commanded the killing of as many blacks in Haiti as possible, to be replaced by new, more docile slaves from Africa.
The French troops were under orders to kill all blacks over the age of 12. However, younger children were also killed – stabbed to death, put in sandbags and dropped into the sea.
The Haitians fought to the death for independence, which they finally declared in 1804.
Prisoners on both sides were regularly tortured and killed, and their heads were mounted on the walls of stockades or on spikes beside the roads.
Non-combatants, too, were raped and slaughtered. According to contemporary accounts, the French used dogs to rip black prisoners to pieces before a crowd at an amphitheatre.
Allegdly on Napoleon’s orders, sulphur was extracted from Haitian volcanoes and burned to produce poisonous sulphur dioxide, which was then used to gas black Haitians in the holds of ships – more than 100,000 of them, according to records.
The use of these primitive gas chambers was confirmed by contemporaries. Antoine Metral, who in 1825 published his history of the French expedition to Haiti, writes of piles of dead bodies everywhere, stacked in charnel-houses.
‘We varied the methods of execution,’ wrote Metral. ‘At times, we pulled heads off; sometimes a ball and chain was put at the feet to allow drowning; sometimes they were gassed in the ships by sulphur.
‘When the cover of night was used to hide these outrages, those walking along the river could hear the noisy monotone of dead bodies being dropped into the sea.’
A contemporary historian, who sailed with the punitive expedition, wrote that: ‘We invented another type of ship where victims of both sexes were piled up, one against the other, suffocated by sulphur.’
These were prison ships with gas chambers called etouffiers, or ‘chokers’, which asphyxiated the blacks, causing them terrible suffering.
Even at the time, there were French naval officers who were appalled at this savagery, claiming they would rather have braved a court martial than have forgotten the laws of humanity.
But from the Emperor’s point of view, gassing was a way of cutting costs. Ships continued to transport prisoners out to sea to drown them, but corpses kept being washed up on beaches or tangled in ships’ hulls.
Toussaint, who called himself the Black Napoleon, was kidnapped after accepting an invitation to parlay with a French general and shipped back to France in chains, where he died of pneumonia after being imprisoned in a cold stone vault.
Guadeloupe, an island to the east, suffered a similar fate to Haiti’s.
Once again choosing not to recognise France’s abolition of slavery, Napoleon in 1802 promoted a comrade of his, Antoine Riche-panse, to the rank of General, and sent him with an expeditionary force of 3,000 men to put down a slave revolt on the island.
During his purge, General Richepanse slaughtered any men, women and children he encountered on his route to the capital. Then he worked through a plan of extermination apparently approved by the First Consul.
A military commission was set up to give what followed a veneer of legality. Some 250 ‘rebels’ were shot in Guadeloupe’s Victory Square. Another 500 were herded down to the beach and shot there.
Richepanse and Lacrosse, the former colonial governor now restored to power, thought of piling up the dead in vast mounds to intimidate the islanders, but gave up the plan for fear of starting a disease epidemic.
Instead, using a technique which the French were to copy during the Algerian War, they sent death squads into every part of Guadeloupe to track down farmers who were absent from their homes.
These men were treated as rebels. A bounty was promised for each black man captured, and the rebels were summarily shot or hanged. The ferocity of the repression sparked another uprising, which Lacrosse subdued with the most barbarous methods yet.
‘Being hung is not enough for the crimes they have committed,’ he said. ‘It is necessary to cut them down alive and let them expire on the wheel [prisoners were bound to a cart wheel before having their arms and legs smashed with cudgels].
‘The jails are already full: it is necessary to empty them as quickly as possible.’ In this he was successful, hanging, garotting and burning the rebels and breaking their limbs on the wheel.
Lacrosse developed possibly the most fiendish instrument of slow execution ever created.
The prisoner was thrust into a tiny cage and had a razor-sharp blade suspended between his legs. In front of him was a bottle of water and bread, neither of which he could reach.
He was stood in stirrups, which kept him just above the blade, but if he fell asleep or his legs tired, he was sliced by the blade. Neither fast nor economical, it was pure sadism.
After four months in Guadeloupe, the French lost patience with the islanders, and the ferocity of their repression reached new heights.
Blacks with short hair were shot out of hand, since the expeditionary force considered short hair to be a sign of rebellion. Orders were given that ‘the type of execution should set a terrifying example’.
The soldiers were encouraged ‘to cut open insurgents, to strangle and to burn them’. French officers spoke proudly of creating ‘torture islands’.
In a letter to Napoleon, his brother-in-law Leclerc wrote: ‘It is necessary to destroy all the negroes of the mountain . . . do not leave children over the age of 12.’
Ribbe, in his work in progress, sees continual affinities between Napoleon and Hitler. He argues that many of Napoleon’s actions were later echoed in Nazi Germany, right down to his enthusiasm for slavery reflecting the grim message ‘Arbeit Macht Frei’ (‘Work Sets You Free’), which appeared over the gates of Auschwitz.
Napoleon, like Hitler, also used his own army like cannon fodder when the occasion demanded.
His retreat from Moscow in 1812 squandered the lives and courage of 450,000 soldiers of the Grande Armee; many of them were found frozen to death while embracing each other to harvest a last flicker of warmth, in what was one of the bitterest winters in living memory.
Nothing shows more clearly the contempt the Emperor showed for his minions than the bulletin announcing the destruction of his Army.
Napoleon blamed his horses and ended by declaring that his health had never been better.
As theatres for Napoleon’s callousness, Haiti and Guadeloupe were too far away to attract much public notice, let alone condemnation.
Syria was a different matter. In the war between France and the Ottoman Empire (most of it modern-day Turkey), Napoleon led the siege of the ancient walled city of Jaffa, whose harbour he needed as a vital shelter for his fleet.
The city fell on the fourth day, whereupon Napoleon’s troops ran amok through the town, slaughtering Christians, Jews and Muslims indiscriminately.
To escape the slaughter, part of the garrison locked themselves into a large keep.
Napoleon sent his officers, who negotiated their surrender and marched them back to the French camp.
Rations were short, so Napoleon now decided that he had been too magnanimous.
For three days he kept the 4,000 mostly Turkish prisoners with their arms tied behind their back; then the massacre began.
Somewhere between 2,500 and 4,000 men were slaughtered there and then, either by shooting them or by running them through with bayonets.
Shortly afterwards plague broke out, decimating the troops on both sides. With real courage, Napoleon led his general staff on a tour of the plague-infested hospitals.
It did not deter him from suggesting to the doctors that seriously ill French troops who could not be evacuated should be given a fatal dose of the opiate laudanum. The doctors forced him to back down.
From Jaffa, Napoleon marched to Acre, a city constructed on a peninsula and therefore impregnable, given that there was British control of the seas. Napoleon launched seven major assaults; each one failed. Marching back to Cairo, Napoleon left 2,200 of his troops dead, and 2,300 more seriously ill or wounded.
As far as Napoleon was concerned, these wounded were already dead men. Most of them he left behind, knowing that the Turks would cut off their heads as soon as his army left. They did their best to follow his retreat, crying out not to be abandoned.
They straggled along, their throats parched in the debilitating heat, which reduced their cries to a croak. Injured officers were thrown from their litters and left to die in the dunes.
Soldiers were abandoned in the cornfields, which were still smouldering in the devastation of crops and villages ordered by Napoleon. In all, some 5,000 Frenchmen lost their lives.
If Hitler learned any lessons from Napoleon, one must have been that victory required callousness, not just in the leader but in those around him.
‘Like those working in the Nazi system, the French carrying out Napoleon’s killing did so with little thought to morality,’ Claude Ribbe says today. ‘There was no sense of good or evil: it was just a matter of getting a difficult job done. In the end, the killing methods had to be efficient and cheap.’
So is Napoleon to be feted as a great leader or denounced as a dictator? A poll published in Le Figaro in 2005 found that nearly 40 per cent of Frenchmen regarded Napoleon as ‘a dictator who had used all means to satisfy his thirst for power’.
However, considering what was done in Napoleon’s name in Haiti and Guadeloupe, there is one memorial which deserves to be added.
Next to the unknown soldier at the Arc de Triomphe should be erected the Tomb of the Unknown Slave.
• Le Crime de Napoleon, by Claude Ribbe (Editions Priv & Egrave;).
Bulgaria’s Nationalist “Ataka” (Attack) Party is to leave parliament in protest against the ruling “criminal majority,” MP Desislav Chukolov reported Thursday.
“We do not wish to become accomplices to the government and the laws and decisions it makes,” the party member added in an interview.
“We are not running away but getting closer to the voters. We call on all opposition parties to follow our example and join us in the boycott. We are to start meeting with the people and try to deprive this cabinet of the possibility to rule,” Chukolov said.
On Wednesday opposition political forces in Bulgaria filed the sixth no confidence vote against the governing three-way ruling coalition, comprised of socialists, centrists and the ethnic Turkish party, over its failure in adhering to the rules of the EU and in the absorption of EU funds.
The move came along with a harsh report from the EC over Bulgaria’s progress in the judicial sphere and EU funds absorption.
July 25, 2008 Sofia News Agency
Source: The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 25 July 2008
As the closure case against the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) is moving towards a verdict in the Constitutional Court, the Turkish political agenda has become even more complicated with the arrest of a number of prominent individuals allegedly associated with a coup plot against the government. Although the JDP was able to win a decisive victory in the July 2007 elections following a serious dispute over the election of a new president, Turkish society has become even more polarized during the past year and tension is rising in an alarming manner. The gravity and implications of the crisis had been examined by Bulent Aliriza, the Director of the CSIS Turkey Project. Mark Parris, former Ambassador to Turkey in 1997-2000, who is currently a Visiting Fellows at Brookings Institution, then provided a commentary.
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Mark Parris Ne Diyordu?
ABD’ nin Ankara eski Büyükelçisi Mark Parris’ in Türkiye ile ilgili bir değerlendirmesi özet olarak Türk medyasında yer almıştı. Bugün, Cumhuriyet Gazetesinde yayımlanan ve bu konuda daha detaylı bilgi içeren Ergin YIldızoğlu’ nun köşe yazısını aşağıda gönderiyorum. Yabancı dili ingilizce olanlar, arzu ederlerse, aşağıdaki linkten M.Parris’ in konuşmasını kendi sesinden dinleyebilirler. Saygılar,
Bedii Nezih Oz
ERGİN YILDIZOĞLU
Mark Parris Ne Diyordu?
ABD’nin eski Ankara Büyükelçisi Mark Parris’in, Türkiye’deki siyasi krizle ilgili yorumları geçen hafta medyaya yansıdı. İlgiler daha çok, Parris’in Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin kararına ilişkin adeta bir tarih veren öngörüsü üzerinde odaklandı. Ama Türkiye’den döndükten sonra Stratejik ve Uluslararası Çalışmalar Merkezi’nde (CSIS) yaptığı ilginç konuşmanın içeriği, sanırım, yeterince irdelenmedi. Haberin üzerinden yaklaşık bir hafta geçmiş olmasına karşın konuşmada ilgimi çeken noktaları sizlerle paylaşmak istiyorum.
Mark Parris Türkiye’ye, bir ABD – AB ortak kuruluşu olan Atlantik Konseyi’nden bir heyetin parçası olarak gelmiş. Türkiye’de olup bitenleri anlamak, büyük olasılıkla etkilemek amacıyla gelen bu heyetin diğer üyeleriyle birlikte Türkiye’de yaygın temaslarda bulunmuş. Parris, dönüşünde CSIS’de yaptığı ve basında aktarılan toplantıdaki (kuruluşun web sitesinden dinlemek olanaklı) yaklaşık 20 dakikalık sunuşunda ve izleyen “Soru-Cevap” bölümünde, özellikle üç noktaya yaptığı vurgunun çok önemli olduğunu düşünüyorum: AKP’ye yönelik eleştiriler, “3. Güç” dediği bir yapılanmaya ilişkin saptamalar, Türkiye’de siyasetin içinde askerin rolünün artacağına ilişkin beklenti.
AKP başarılı olamadı
Parris’in AKP’ye, ikinci dönemi bağlamında yönelttiği eleştiriler oldukça kapsamlı. Bunlardan en önemlileri şöyle: AB sürecini canlandıramadı, anayasayı değiştiremedi, varlığından kaygı duyulan İslamcı gündemin/projenin (“agenda” sözcüğünü kullanıyor) keskin yanlarını törpüleyemedi, tüm ülkenin başbakanı olamadı. Nihayet yolsuzluk sorunu AKP grubunu da etkisi altına aldı.
AB sürecinin aksamasının tek sorumlusunun AKP olmadığını, AB’nin değişen tutumunun süreci fiilen öldürdüğünü göz önüne alırsak, Parris’in, aslında AKP’nin kendisinden istenenleri veremediğinden yakındığını düşünebiliriz. Bence daha önemli eleştiriler AKP’nin toplumda birleştirici olamadığına, dolayısıyla bölücü olduğuna, yolsuzluklara bulaştığına ilişkin saptamalarda yatıyor. Böylece Parris, diplomatik bir dille, AKP’nin meşruiyeti üzerine bir soru işareti koyuyor. Dahası, sermaye sınıfı ve Batı yanlısı liberal seçkinlerle AKP arasındaki ilişkinin bozulmasına yaptığı gönderme, AKP’nin Batı yanlısı tutumunun, liberal demokrat olma iddialarının hakikiliğine ilişkin kaygıların bir yansıması olarak görülebilir. Bu saptamalara karşılık konuşmasında sık sık Tayyip Bey’i övmesini, “Yeri doldurulamaz” demesini “Hatalarından öğrenmiyor” saptamasıyla birlikte okuyunca, aklıma efsanevi Kızılderili Şefi Jeronimo’nun “Beyaz adam çatal dillidir” sözleri geldi, ister istemez.
‘3. Güç’e dikkat
Bence, konuşmada çok az yer verilmekle birlikte, Parris’in karşı karşıya olan güçleri sıralarken bir “3. Güç”ten söz etmesi çok önemli. Parris, bugünkü kriz içinde, Tayyip Bey’den yana tutum alan bu “3. Güç”ün sivil güvenlik güçleri, istihbarat örgütleri içinde çok etkin olduğunu ve kendi savcılarına sahip olduğunu söylüyor. Diğer bir deyişle Parris, devlet içinde, şiddet organlarında ve yasama içinde, kaynağı belirsiz (“biz bile bilmiyoruz” demeye getiriyor) karanlık bir güç var diyor. Bu gücün “cemaat” olduğu artık herkesin malumudur. Öyleyse Parris, bu güce işaret ederken “cemaat”in etkisiyle, devletin elindeki şiddet tekelinin parçalanmaya başladığını da söylemiş oluyor. Böylece, Parris, devlet içinde bir “tırmanan darbe” (devleti ele geçirme) olgusuna dikkat çekmiş olmuyor mu?
Askerin siyasi rolü artacak
Bence, Parris’in, askerin siyasi etkisi artacak öngörüsü, AKP’yi destekleyerek akıllarınca “militarizme karşı” mücadele ettiklerini hayal eden şaşkın liberallerin üzerinde şok etkisi yapmalıdır. Tabii duyduklarını anlayacak kadar akılları kaldıysa. Parris son dönemde en “aklıselim” yorumların ordu üst kademesinden geldiğine inanıyor. Parris’e göre, önümüzdeki dönemde, “asker-siyasetçi” olarak nitelediği bir kategorinin sivil siyaset içindeki rolü özellikle, Özkök gibi emekli komutanların aracılığıyla artacak. Yine Parris’e göre ordu üst kademesinin, asker siyasetçilerin, sivil siyaset içindeki etkisinin artmasıysa, AKP’yi geriletmeye çalışanlara karşı mücadele eden güçleri daha da güçlendirecek, onlar için bir nevi koruyucu etken olacak. Bu da “başkalarını” düş kırıklığına uğratacak gibi görünüyor.
Tam bu noktada Parris’in; “Taraflar bir çıkış yolu bulamazlarsa uçuruma birlikte yuvarlanacaklar”, “Ancak görünürde bir taviz verme ya da anlaşma eğilimi yok”. “Birileri bu sorunu çözmeli” yorumu üzerinde düşünmeye başlayabiliriz. Düşünürken benim aklıma, İngiltere dış politikasının önemli düşünce kuruluşu Chatam House’dan Fadi Hakura’nın, bir saptaması geldi “Erdoğan ve AKP’ye ne olursa olsun, Türkiye, ideologların geçmiş dönemdeki kavgalarının biriken küllerinden doğacak yeni bir tarz siyasetin eşiğinde” (17/07/08). Hımm.