Turkish Forum

Author: Aylin D. Miller

  • PRESS RELEASE: The European Armenian Federation inquires the EU French Pres

    PRESS RELEASE: The European Armenian Federation inquires the EU French Pres

    From: European Armenian Federation [mailto:contact@eafjd.eu]
    Sent: Monday, July 21, 2008 2:13 PM
    To: grassroots@turkishforum.com grassroots@turkishforum.com
    Subject: The European Armenian Federation inquires the EU French Pres

     

    PRESS RELEASE

    For immediate release

     

    Monday, 21 July 2008

    Contact : Varténie ECHO

    Tel. / Fax. : +32 (0) 2 732 70 27

     

    THE EUROPEAN ARMENIAN FEDERATION INQUIRIES THE EU FRENCH PRESIDENCY

    Turkey’s application for membership and genocide denial focused among the threats that « protective Europe » fostered by the French presidency should address.

    The European Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy said that it took the opportunity of the EU French presidency (July to December 2008) to draw the attention of M. Sarkozy, the French president and the new President of the EU, on the expectations and concerns of the European Armenian citizens.

    In a letter sent on the 3rd July, the European Armenian Federation addressed the big EU policies toward Turkey and the South Caucasus (Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy, and Black Sea Synergy) and, on the other hand, those related to genocide denial and racial hatred in the EU member States and in the applicant countries.

    About the Turkish problem, the Federation noticed in its mail that “the well-lubricated accession process steps forward without discontinuation, in contempt of the sovereign will of the European People as despite the refusal by Turkey to reform itself” and that this gives evidence of “a given leniency of the EU institutions towards the severe shortcomings of this candidate country”.

    Therefore, the Federation calls upon the new EU President to « shape its opposition to Turkey’s accession in clearly stating the unavoidable conditions that this country must fulfil”, among which the requisite acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide.

    Terming this recognition a “moral, juridical and political” obligation, the Federation said that such a momentum would be “emblematic” and would give evidence that Turkey can break her “aggressive State doctrine stemming from an ideology which disappeared in Europe since the end of World War II”.

    « About the EU policy toward the South Caucasus, the Federation commends the “ever-increasing integration” of Armenia and its region in the European multilateral cooperation structures. It calls upon the French presidency to support the “Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP-Est) and the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly project. It terms as a “good strategic choice for the EU” the direct dialog with the South Caucasus states rather than “through structures involving other regional players”.

    Tackling the EU Home policies, the Federation recalls the written pledge of presidential candidate Sarkozy (letter sent at the Federation on the 13 mars 2007) “to foster the emergence of a European consensus” on the pan European penalization of genocides denials, in the agenda of the then-to-be-adopted EU Framework-Decision fighting “against racism and xenophobia”.

    “During the elaboration period of this project, we worked with the European Commission, Council and Parliament to promote the inclusion of the Armenian Genocide in the final wordings of this Framework Decision; Nowadays, we have succeeded”, revealed Hilda Tchoboian, the chairperson of the European Armenian Federation.

    Recalling the French draft law on penalising denial « pending in the Senate”, the Federation urges President Sarkozy to keep this provision of the Framework Decision without restricting its scope, when it will be transposed in the French legislation, and to promote during the French presidency, a similar attitude for the transposition in the legislations of the 26 other member States.

    “In a nutshell, we ask the French Presidency to give a political and juridical content to its “Protective Europe” concept, in reinforcing the prevention and penalization measures against the genocide denial proliferation threat in European” concluded Tchoboian.

  • If the Turkish secularity goes, so go the Turkish women’s rights, par Ozer Aksoy, Turkish Forum, le 24 juillet 2008

    If the Turkish secularity goes, so go the Turkish women’s rights, par Ozer Aksoy, Turkish Forum, le 24 juillet 2008

    Si la laïcité recule en Turquie, les droits des femmes reculeront, par Ozer Aksoy

    dimanche 27 juillet 2008, par Annie Lessard, Marc Lebuis


    « Le monde occidental ne semble pas être au courant de la menace immédiate et grave qui pèse sur les droits des femmes en Turquie. Le foulard est un symbole indubitablement politique. Il n’y a pas un seul exemple d’un pays musulman où les droits des femmes ont progressé d’un iota après que la religion ait été politisée ».

    Mme Ozer Aksoy est présidente de la Federation of the Turkish Canadian Associations et vice-présidente du Turkish World Congress. Elle répond à un récent article naïf du Globe and Mail sur la question du foulard en Turquie.

    If the Turkish secularity goes, so go the Turkish women’s rights, par Ozer Aksoy, Turkish Forum, le 24 juillet 2008

    J’ai lu avec intérêt l’article de Mark Mackinnon Traditional headscarf unveils new rifts in Turkey (Globe and Mail, le 22 juillet 2008). Il semble y avoir une confusion de concepts – et je dis cela de la manière la plus courtoise possible – impliquant les dichotomies laïcité et islam, droit moderne et canons islamiques (charia), les élites et les non éduqués, le centre et la périphérie, Turcs noirs et Turcs blancs, vieille garde contre réformateurs islamiques, et plus encore. Je demande instamment à vos lecteurs d’acquérir une meilleure compréhension des dichotomies avant de s’embarquer dans une analyse des enjeux récents concernant la Turquie. Voyons si je peux jeter un peu de lumière sur tout cela.

    Alors que le monde chrétien se caractérise par la séparation de l’église et de l’État, grâce à la période historique des Lumières, le monde islamique continue de traiter la démocratie et la laïcité comme les deux côtés d’une pièce de monnaie. Aujourd’hui encore, la plupart des pays musulmans enchâssent la charia dans leur constitution, laquelle n’est pas compatible avec la laïcité ou la démocratie.

    La Turquie, d’autre part, avec une population à 99% musulmane, a été fondée en 1923 comme république laïque. Ainsi, le développement de la démocratie en Turquie a été construit sur de solides fondations laïques. La laïcité ne signifie pas « être opposé à la religion ». La laïcité témoigne d’un profond respect pour toutes les confessions car elle garantit les libertés individuelles tout en rejetant la supériorité d’une religion sur les autres. Si les fondations laïques de la Turquie étaient sapées, sa structure démocratique s’effondrerait aussitôt. Que répond à cela le représentant de l’AKP dans votre reportage ?

    La population et les gouvernements turcs depuis 1923 ont toujours été fondamentalement pro-occidentaux, bien qu’entre 5% et 7% des électeurs, issus pour la plupart de divers milieux religieux, semblent toujours s’opposer à toute forme d’occidentalisation.

    La révolution iranienne de 1979 a eu un impact considérable dans l’ensemble du monde musulman. En outre, certains pays du Moyen-Orient (comme l’Arabie Saoudite) ont essayé très fort d’exporter leur version de l’islam et ont fourni un soutien financier à divers cercles islamiques en Turquie.

    La combinaison de ces deux facteurs a abouti à une explosion du religieux : des sociétés d’édition ont surgi, les publications islamiques se sont multipliées, des mosquées sont apparues à tous les coins de rues, se transformant rapidement en centres imposant le mode de vie islamique. Des femmes ont été « formées » et envoyées dans les maisons de chaque famille turque à faible revenu pour orienter et influencer d’autres femmes. Des cours sur le coran ont été organisés pour endoctriner les enfants à un âge précoce. Des étudiants universitaires et du secondaire ont été financièrement soutenus, sans condition. Des manifestations publiques ont été organisées pour exiger que les étudiantes se présentent à l’université avec des vêtements islamiques, y compris le foulard.

    La presse religieuse a souligné que les femmes devraient également couvrir leur corps en entier. La plupart des étudiantes universitaires militantes étaient bien payées et ont insisté pour assister aux cours en tchador (un vêtement traditionnel noir qui recouvre la femme de la tête aux pieds). Elles étaient soutenues par des étudiants islamistes extrémistes et des avocats. Tout cela, alors que le Coran ne fait que suggérer aux femmes de couvrir leurs cheveux, mais ne l’impose pas. La plupart des médias ont appuyé les étudiantes islamiques sans savoir que celles qui portaient le foulard étaient des recrues payées (Fatma Benli interviewée dans votre reportage me les rappelle).

    Le gouvernement Erdogan a entamé l’érosion du système laïc en 2002. Aujourd’hui, la situation n’est pas aussi innocente que le portrait qu’en donnent certains médias occidentaux. Il y a 67.000 écoles laïques contre 85.000 mosquées. Comparez les 77.000 médecins qui tentent désespérément de dispenser des soins de santé à 75 millions de citoyens turcs, avec les 90.000 religieux (ou imams) bien rémunérés par l’État qui dispensent la foi avec bonheur, aux frais des contribuables.

    Bien qu’il y ait un seul hôpital pour desservir 60.000 personnes en Turquie, il n’y a pas de problème à trouver une mosquée pour chaque 350 personnes. Il y a 1435 bibliothèques publiques à travers la Turquie, mais 3852 classes sur le coran. Le budget des Affaires religieuses équivaut au coût de 22 universités. Le gouvernement Erdogan encourage ses partisans (et leurs entreprises) à stimuler le mode de vie islamique autour d’eux. Un nombre croissant d’hôtels et de municipalités offrent des piscines ségrégées, des maillots de bain de la tête à la cheville pour les femmes et le « hasema » pour les hommes.

    Des publicités laïques destinées aux femmes ont été altérées avec Photoshop par certains journaux pour allonger les manches et les jupes portées par les mannequins. Certains hôtels et restaurants ont cessé de servir de l’alcool. On signale que des licences d’alcool ont été refusées et des sites internet pornographiques interdits. Et les imams – des prédicateurs islamiques employés par le gouvernement – continuent de fustiger librement les femmes qui osent sortir et travailler pour leur subsistance.

    Tout aussi troublant, sont les différentes formes de pression exercées sur les femmes qui ne sont pas vêtues de manière suffisamment « islamique » ou qui partagent l’espace public avec les hommes. La presse islamique insiste qu’il n’est pas approprié pour les hommes médecins d’examiner les patients de sexe féminin, et vice versa. Certains étudiants en médecine ont mis beaucoup d’efforts pour tenter d’appliquer ces règles de la charia en Turquie, mais les autorités laïques les en ont empêchés.

    Tous ces exemples sortent directement du répertoire de l’Iran et de l’Arabie saoudite. Alors que nous observons des programmes officiels d’islamisation en Malaisie, au Maroc, en Algérie, en Indonésie et en Iran, nous pouvons clairement voir comment ces « pays musulmans » se transforment en « états islamiques ». Dans tous les cas, les femmes ont d’abord été forcées de couvrir leurs cheveux et leur corps, et des changements systématiques dans le mode de vie au quotidien ont ensuite été progressivement introduits. Est-ce que ça sonne familier ?

    Le foulard est plus qu’un bout de tissu. Attaché avec soin pour dissimuler le cou, la gorge et les cheveux, le foulard islamique est devenu le symbole indubitable de l’islam politique. C’est pourquoi les personnes laïques ont insisté pour l’exclure des universités et des institutions gouvernementales, comme l’exigent les lois laïques. S’ils ont encore des doutes, vos lecteurs doivent être informés que le Premier ministre turc a récemment fait une déclaration publique disant quelque chose à l’effet que « …le foulard est un symbole politique, et alors ?.. » Cette déclaration révèle ses intentions et aussi celles de son parti politique islamique.

    La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a statué en faveur de l’interdiction du foulard islamique dans les universités turques en novembre 2005, disant que « le foulard semble être imposé aux femmes en vertu d’un précepte religieux qu’il est difficile de concilier avec le principe de l’égalité des sexes ». La Cour constitutionnelle turque a aussi annulé une loi conçue par l’AKP islamiste qui aurait permis aux femmes de la république laïque de porter le foulard islamique dans les universités.

    Le monde occidental ne semble pas être au courant de la menace immédiate et grave qui pèse sur les droits des femmes en Turquie. Il n’y a pas un seul exemple d’un pays musulman où les droits des femmes ont progressé d’un iota après que la religion ait été politisée.

    L’alternative à l’extrémisme religieux n’est pas un coup d’État militaire. Je ne justifie pas une intervention militaire comme celle du 27 avril 2008. Bien qu’il soit souhaitable de préserver l’héritage laïc d’Atatürk, cela ne devrait pas se faire au détriment des processus démocratiques normaux.

    Pour parler clairement, le foulard est la tyrannie des hommes sur les femmes. Toute tentative visant à justifier cette agression directe et brutale sur les droits des femmes, que ce soit au nom de la démocratie, des droits de l’Homme, de la liberté d’expression, ou d’autres principes, revient tout simplement à prendre part à cette tyrannie.

    Voir aussi :

    Du voile, de la charia et de la démocratie

    Turquie – Demande d’interdiction du parti au pouvoir pour activités anti-laïques

    Turquie -« L’immoralité nous vient de l’Occident »

    Turquie – Manifestation contre la levée de l’interdiction du voile dans les universités

    Turquie – Signes d’islamisation croissante

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  • Blood and Belief – Kurdish Identity

    Blood and Belief – Kurdish Identity

    The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence

    by Aliza Marcus
    New York: New York University Press, 2007. 349 pp. $35

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    Most writers on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, best known by its Kurdish language acronym, the PKK, substitute advocacy for accuracy, so their books about the PKK tend to have limited practical use for policymakers. But Marcus, a former international correspondent for The Boston Globe who spent several years covering the PKK, has done important work in Blood and Belief. While sympathetic to her subject—the substitution of “militant” for “terrorist” grates—she retains professional integrity and does not skip over inconvenient parts of the PKK narrative such as its predilection to target Kurdish and leftist competitors rather than the Turks; the patronage it has received from the Syrian government; and the important role of European states and the Kurdish diaspora in its funding.

    Blood and Belief has four sections: on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s life and the PKK’s beginnings; the PKK’s consolidation of power; the civil war; and the aftermath of Öcalan’s 1999 capture.

    The Kurds inhabit a region that spans Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and Marcus does not let national borders constrain her analysis. Events in Iraq—such as the squabbling between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani—influenced Öcalan, who concluded that he should tolerate no dissent. “We believed in socialism, and it was a Stalin-type of socialism we believed in,” one early PKK member relates.

    Steeped in Kurdish and Turkish history, Marcus provides better context than many other journalists who have tackled this subject. The PKK took hold, she shows, largely because of the weakness of the Turkish state in the 1970s. Between 1975 and 1980, the Turkish government barely functioned. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military restored order. But when Barzani offered the PKK shelter in northern Iraq, the group remained beyond reach, allowing it to plan and launch a full-scale guerilla war against Turkey. Marcus concludes that the group’s continued survival in Turkey is because, at some level and among some constituents, it remains popular; its support is not all driven by intimidation as some Turkish analysts claim.

    Marcus impressively covers the civil war years (1984-99), and her narrative, combining dialogue and context, is rich and accessible. While many journalists and authors satisfy themselves with a single round of interviews, Marcus concentrates not on active PKK members, who she realizes do not enjoy the freedom to speak, but rather on past members, villagers, and family members whose accounts she cross-checks. She also incorporates Turkish language press accounts and interviews with Turkish officials.

    It is unfortunate, though, that her coverage of PKK resurgence, between 1999 and 2007, is just thirteen pages long. An exploration of how Öcalan has retained control while in prison and where he and his henchmen might take the PKK has seldom been more relevant. One hopes that this new chapter of PKK history will become the basis for a sequel.

     

    ***********************************************************************

     

    Kurdish Identity

    Human Rights and Political Status

    Edited by Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 336 pp. $65

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    The reader of Kurdish Identity, published in 2007, will find himself reading such timely insights as former State Department Iraq coordinator Francis Ricciardone explaining that, “Of course, we have no relations at all with [Baghdad],” and former deputy assistant secretary of state David Mack writing that he understands both Kurdish aspirations and “the potential danger that a ruthless regime in Baghdad poses,” as though Saddam Hussein’s regime had not ceased to exist in 2003.

    The collection of articles published by MacDonald and O’Leary, Kurdish experts at, respectively, Florida International University and American University, might have been useful to practitioners in April 2000, the date of the conference for which they were written, but the articles are now out-of-date.

    Some chapters are useful to historians. Robert W. Olson’s essay on Turkish-Iranian relations between 1997 and 2001 capably reviews that period. Kurdistan Regional Government financial advisor Stafford Clarry’s analysis of the U.N.’s humanitarian program retains value because of his precision and attention to detail, all the more so in the wake of the Oil-for-Food program scandal, which he helped expose. Michael Gunter’s apt analysis of how the capture of Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan catalyzed Turkey’s EU accession drive stands the test of time.

    The editors conclude with an essay updating the reader on world events. Both are academics well worth reading, but they provide no insights in this collection not already published elsewhere. Their comments in passing on the dire situation of Syrian Kurds, who do not enjoy equal protection under the law, raises the question why Kurdish Identity does not address this subject.

    Had MacDonald and O’Leary reassembled their April 2000 conference participants to reconsider their contributions seven years later and analyze where they were right and wrong, Kurdish Identity would have advanced scholarship in a novel way. As it stands, however, their book offers too little and much too late, suggesting that academics live in a world of publish or perish with the content of those publications sometimes a secondary consideration.

  • Top of the Agenda: Turkey Court Ruling

    Top of the Agenda: Turkey Court Ruling

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    – Turkey’s top court to rule on AKP; suicide bombs in Istanbul.
    – Bombings at Iraqi Shiite pilgrimage; separate attack in Kirkuk.
    – Philippines strikes deal with rebel group.
    – Pakistani PM in Washington for talks.
        
    Top of the Agenda: Turkey Court Ruling

    Turkey’s top court today begins deliberations on whether to shut down the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), in a decision with major implications for a country that has long sought to balance a secularist constitution and majority Muslim population. The court is considering whether the AKP’s decision to lift a ban on headscarves at universities constitutes a violation of Turkey’s constitution, and thus is grounds for banning the party (al-Jazeera).

    Turkey’s Hurriyet says the political conflict has wrought financial turmoil and has thrust Turkey into a new period of political instability. A day before the court deliberations, two bombings in Istanbul (Turkish Daily News) killed sixteen and injured at least 150 others in a crowded shopping area.

    Experts have warned Turkey’s secularists, whose power is felt most strongly among the country’s military elite, against trying to shut down the AKP, saying such a move could wind up isolating Turkey and could prove an obstacle to EU accession (Today’s Zaman). CFR’s Steven A. Cook, in an essay published on bitterlemons-international.org, says the events in Turkey represent a radicalization of the national dialogue between secularists and moderates.

    Background:

    – A Foreign Affairs article from November 2007 takes an in-depth look at the roots of Turkey’s constitutional conflict and says the dispute has “exposed the illiberal nature of Turkish secularism.”

  • Turkish court deciding AKP’s fate

    Turkish court deciding AKP’s fate

    Turkey’s Constitutional Court is meeting to consider if the governing AK Party should be banned for alleged anti-secular activities.

    It is the culmination of a series of clashes between the party, which has Islamist roots, and the secular elite.

    The AKP, which won a huge poll victory last year, denies it wants to create an Islamist state by stealth and calls the case an attack on democracy.

    Hours before the court opened, bomb attacks in Istanbul killed 17 people.

    Five of those killed were children, the governor of Istanbul said, while more than 150 people were wounded in the twin bombings, six of whom remained in hospital with serious injuries.

    It was not immediately clear who was behind the attacks – security services said they had similarities with previous attacks by the Kurdish separatist PKK, although the group itself denied any involvement.

    The country has also been attacked in the past by other leftist radical groups and Islamists.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the bombings only strengthened Turkey’s determination in its fight against terrorism.

    ‘Judicial coup’

    It was not clear if the attacks were timed to coincide with the controversial court case, which represents a clash between powerful forces.

    Turkey’s PM has said the bombing overshadows the court case

    But Mr Erdogan insisted his thoughts were with those affected by the bombings.

    He cancelled a Monday morning cabinet meeting to travel to Istanbul and visit the site of the attacks.

    At the scene, Mr Erdogan downplayed the courtroom drama unfolding in Ankara, Turkey’s capital.

    “Our problem is not whether or not AK Party will be closed,” Reuters news agency reported him as saying.

    “Our problem at the moment is to keep our unity so our country will go in a different direction.”

    Secular ideals

    The modern Turkish republic was founded in 1923 as a secular and unitary state.

    COURT’S OPTIONS
    Dismiss case against AKP
    Impose financial penalty, cutting state aid to AKP; implying wrongdoing but not sufficient for ban
    Ban AKP but not individuals; would probably allow AKP to re-form and continue under new name
    Ban AKP and individuals; would probably lead to new elections; political future for PM and president unclear

    Since the 1960s, more than 20 parties – mostly pro-Islamist or pro-Kurdish – have been shut down by the courts for allegedly posing a threat to those principles.

    However, this is the first time that a closure case has been brought against a governing party with a huge parliamentary majority, the BBC’s Pam O’Toole says.

    The stakes are high, she adds, with the AKP fighting for its political survival and the secularists viewing the case as their last opportunity to block what they allege are attempts to turn Turkey into an Islamic state.

    More than 70 AKP members, including President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, could be banned from political activities for five years.

    The party argues that it is facing a “judicial coup”.

    Fault lines

    The Constitutional Court has said it will convene on a daily basis until the 11 judge-panel reaches one of three verdicts – to shut down the party and impose political bans on its members; to cut treasury aid to it; or to throw out the case.

    Turkish secularists have staged huge anti-AKP rallies

    If the party is closed down or large numbers of its senior members are banned from politics, it will deepen the political fault lines between AKP supporters and secularists, our reporter says.

    This could lead to a period of political instability or even another general election, with the AKP’s deputies regrouping under a different name, she adds.

    Last week, an adviser to the court recommended that it should not shut down the AKP, arguing its decision to lift a ban on Islamic headscarves in universities had not challenged the constitution.

    The case has already caused uncertainty in Turkey’s stock market.

    There is also speculation that a ban could harm Ankara’s long-running bid to join the European Union, which has expressed concern.

    During its first term in office, the AKP pushed through major reforms aimed at EU membership.

    But critics allege that, in its second term, it has focused more on policies aimed at its conservative supporters.

  • Cyprus – A divided island

    Cyprus – A divided island

    ”]

    1960 – Britain grants independence to Cyprus under power-sharing constitution between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Archbishop Makarios becomes first post- independence president.

    Treaty of Guarantee allows Greece, Turkey and Britain to intervene in disputes. Britain has sovereignty of two bases on the island.

    1963 – Makarios worries Turks by proposing constitutional changes which would abolish power-sharing agreements.

    1964 – Power sharing crumbles amid fighting between paramilitary factions. United Nations sends peacekeeping force to help British troops patrolling the “Green Line” set up to divide the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sectors of Nicosia, the capital.

    1967 – Military government seizes power in Greece, relations between Makarios and the generals in Athens are increasingly strained.

    1974 – Military government in Greece backs coup against Makarious, seeking to unify Cyprus with Greece.

    Makarios flees and five days later Turkish troops land in the north to protect Turkish Cypriot community.

    The coup quickly ends and Greece’s military government collapses. Turkish forces occupy one third of the island and it effectively becomes partitioned.

    1975 – Turkish Cypriots establish independent administration with Rauf Denktash becoming president.

    1980 – UN-sponsored peace talks resume.

    1983 – Turkish Cypriots proclaim independence as Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus – but it is only recognised by Turkey.

    1985 – No agreement at talks between Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou, the Greek Cypriot president.

    1993 – Glafcos Clerides becomes Greek Cypriot president.

    1997 – UN-hosted talks between Denktask and Clerides fail.

    2002 – Kofi Annan, the UN secretary general, presents a comprehensive peace plan involving a federation of two parts, with a rotating presidency.

    2003 – Turkish and Greek Cypriots cross “Green Line” for first time in 30 years after Turkish side eases border restrictions.

    2004 – In referendums, Turkish Cypriots accept UN power-sharing plan but Greek Cypriots reject it. Cyprus joins the European Union, still partitioned.

    2006 – Greek Cypriots endorse ruling coalition in elections, reaffirming opposition to reunification.

    2006 – Turkey’s EU entry negotitations break down over Turkey’s continued resistance to opening its ports to traffic from Cyprus.

    2007 – Communist party quits Cyprus’ governing coalition.

    2008

    February – Communist party leader Demetris Christofias wins Cyprus’ presidential election and agrees to immediately reive reunification efforts.

    March – Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, agree to reopen the symbolic Ledra Street crossing in Nicosia.

    April – Ledra Street is opened for first time since 1964.

    July – Christofias and Talat agree enter direct peace negotiations on September 3, with a solution to be put to simultaneous referendums.

    Source: Al Jazeera