Turkey’s Syria Morass

By: Pinar Tremblay for Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse

Turkish soldiers block a road to Cilvegozu border gate near the town of Reyhanli on the Turkish-Syrian border in Hatay province, Feb. 11, 2013. (photo by REUTERS/Umit Bektas)

The legend goes that the Prophet Muhammad came all the way to the walls of Damascus, saw the luscious landscape and refused to enter the city, uttering “you can only enter paradise once.” Once you make a decision to intervene in another country, it is a game changer. This applies to Turkey’s Syria policy.

The easiest answer to the question of what Turkey wants in Syria would be what any country wants from another: to cooperate with it and the region in a stable manner. Turkey and Syria already had a mutually beneficial friendship, to the point that Turks have decided to demand more benefits from this relationship. I am convinced that Turks want a Syria which would produce not more, but different benefits. Turkey is struggling to undo the damages of the Iraq war, hoping that if Iraq could be reversed from Sunni-minority rule to a Shia-dominant rule strong influence from Iran in the post-US pullout, Syria could evolve from Alawite-minority rule to a Sunni-majority rule with a deep Turkish influence.

Let’s start with the first condition, the removal of al-Assad regime. For the anti-Assad coalition, we can include the EU, the US, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon’s March 14 Bloc and GCC countries, mostly Saudi and Qatar. Going into the third year of civil war, the regime has been much more persistent than many pundits predicted. A few crucial factors contribute to this: a strong and still-loyal army, the regime’s much ignored expertise in puppeteering different armed and non-armed groups, multiple countries involved with different goals and different degrees of support to the many factions. The Syrian regime still seems to have a better handle on intelligence gathering and analysis than others. I utilize the concept of factionalism, rather than sectarianism, for the opposition groups because divisions go beyond sectarian lines in Syria. Hence, overlooking these factions may indeed invite further escalation of the conflict. Hazem al-Amine has highlighted the fragility of the relationship between anti-Assad coalition and Syrian opposition very eloquently.

The next condition, breaking Syrian dependence on Iran — or curtailing Iranian influence on Syrian politics — also has some allure to the anti-Assad coalition. Yet the devil is indeed in details. While wishing for a Syria not imbued with Hezbollah and Iranian policies, the US would prefer not to see Syria fall into the hands of jihadists. Who would want Sinaization of the Golan Heights, especially when there is no central government to keep it in check? Here, Turkey proves to be a wild card.

So far, Turkey has deepened its relations with Hamas and many of the other Islamists groups in Gaza. Should we expect to see further fighting between Ikhwani and jihadi groups? Would a Syria under Ikhwan be a land more welcoming to armed groups? Would they be allowed to generate trouble on the Israeli border? If this scenario unfolds, wouldn’t Turkey and Israel clash in the power vacuum left behind the civil war?

Hence, leading from behind, the US government has to ensure all involved parties, particularly neighbors of Syria, continue to cooperate with the mission of UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi. The question of what shade of Sunni power under the vague umbrella of the “Friends of Syria” Turkey would like to see in Syria is a tricky one. Semih Idiz explained the intricacies of this quandary in his piece for al Monitor on March 12.

Right now, we can provide the generic answer of Ikhwan. Yet it is hard to gauge whether the post-civil war Syrian Ikhwan would be still in admiration of the Turkish Justice and Deveopment Party. The longer the civil war lasts, the more difficult it will be to predict the evolution of Ikhwan and other groups in Syria. Turkey has taken some missteps, making a re-evaluation of policy is essential. Andrew Parasiliti warned about some of these wrong steps as early as October. There is no guarantee that a Sunni or Arab government would not fall under the influence of Iran, with Hamas being one of the examples. With such a fragmented opposition, the quest for stability will be challenging.

Taking all these into consideration, here are a couple of steps the Turkish government may take for damage control:

1. Find ways to shorten the civil war. For example, lessen the anti-Assad rhetoric for a smoother transition period in Syria. A civil war is not a winner-take-all game if the players can negotiate a credible cease-fire. Keeping communication channels open with Iran and Russia and encouraging the opposition to compromise with the regime can help.
2. Strengthen Turkish-Syrian border security. Such a porous border can produce several layers of vulnerability. If penetrations from Syria to Turkey are not better scrutinized, major attacks will be inevitable in the near future. Careful vetting of the rebels is crucial, but insufficient with that high-risk border. I would not suggest a buffer zone, due to lack of international support for the idea and the Israeli experience in Lebanon between 1985 and 1990.
3. Accept and adapt to the recent condition of having another “weak state” on the border. Although a “weak state” might initially sound advantageous in realpolitik, it serves as an additional liability. Turkey needs to understand that it cannot solve Syria’s civil war alone. Therefore, Turkey must accept the undesirable task of managing the Syrian civil war with a focus on fragmented factions, rather than sectarian concerns. At the end of the civil war, Ikhwan might not be what Turkey prefers.
4. Prepare an exit plan. Turkey may never enter Syria with an official army, but the proxy war requires an end as well. An ambiguous Turkish presence in Syria cannot be sustained for long without serious payback. For example, a jihadist group may turn into a strategic issue for the southern border a decade later. Best to avoid grand words and grand approaches, which will most likely backfire.

In sum, Turkey has taken a major leap of faith in its foreign policy toward Syria. If its objective is to establish a regime that can cooperate smoothly, Turkey must first actively evaluate its own objectives. A well-managed crisis always presents good opportunities. The legend of Damascus says that you can only enter paradise once, yet it is wise to assume hell has wide-open gates.

Pinar Tremblay is a PhD candidate at UCLA in political science and an adjunct faculty member at Cal Poly Pomona. She has previously been published in the Hurriyet Daily News and Today’s Zaman. Follow her on Twitter: @pinartremblay.