Mr. Jeffrey Mankoff points out extremely important developments in Caucasus and Central Asia under different perspectives for followers of Strategic Outlook.
An exclusive interview by
Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU
Mr. Mankoff, first of all we can talk about a hot issue: Georgian elections. What has changed with the elections and what are your expectations for near future of Georgia?
Georgian Dream’s victory, and President Saakashvili’s willingness to accept the results, are both positive developments for Georgia. The idea of power sharing between a president and prime minister from different parties does not have much of a history in the former Soviet Union. If Saakashvili and Georgian Dream leader Bidzina Ivanishvili can make it work, they will go a long way toward restoring Georgia as a model for political development in the rest of the region. Ivanishvili has also made improved relations with Russia a priority (and Russian leaders, including both President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev have said relations will improve once Saakashvili is no longer leading Georgia). While the tone of relations may begin to shift, I would not anticipate any major changes—for one, Saakashvili remains president for another year, and two, even if Ivanishvili replaces him, the Russo-Georgian disputes are more about interests than personalities. South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions, and energy are all going to remain contentious, regardless of who is in power in Tbilisi.
If we compare the Bush and Obama administrations, we see today the US stance is not effective in Caucasus and Central Asia as much as Bush’s period. What do you think about the available policies for the region?
I don’t agree that U.S. policy is less effective today than during the Bush Administration. Less ambitious, perhaps, but, I would argue, more effective at actually achieving the goals the Obama Administration has set out. These goals have centered mainly on improving U.S.-Russian relations, which in turn has meant being more deferential towards Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. I think the Bush Administration’s mistake was thinking it could divorce its approach to the Caucasus and Central Asia from U.S.-Russian relations. That’s why Washington was so stunned by Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In terms of available policies right now, I think the short-term focus is very much on managing the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan (most of the coalition’s equipment will be withdrawn across the Northern Distribution Network, which crosses Central Asia and the Caucasus).
The Afghan war has provided the framework for U.S. engagement in Central Asia for the past decade. With U.S. involvement in that war coming to an end, Washington is struggling to ensure that its withdrawal will not plunge Afghanistan into chaos. The U.S. is trying to ensure that it will continue to have access to Central Asia in the event that the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates. It is also being forced to pay greater attention to Russian and Chinese interests, since it is Moscow and Beijing that will continue to have an extensive economic and (in Russia’s case) military presence in the region. Central Asia faces potentially serious instability in the years ahead, but U.S. options for addressing it are limited because of war fatigue and economic difficulties at home.
Nabucco Project has been failed because of some political reasons. Today Turkey and Azerbaijan created TANAP – Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline. How do you evaluate this initiative and what is the position of Russia?
Russia is in a difficult position right now. The Nabucco project collapsed less because of Russia’s competing South Stream project than because of its own poor economic fundamentals. TANAP appears more realistic; it is 80% owned by Azerbaijan’s SOCAR, which will provide the gas from its own Shah Deniz field, and will use largely existing pipeline infrastructure to move the gas to Turkey. There is still the question of moving the gas from Turkey to Europe, but politically, economically, and technically, that will be an easier task than what the Nabucco consortium was proposing to do. Russia says it will still build South Stream, but the economic rationale for doing so now appears even weaker than before TANAP was announced. Meanwhile, Gazprom is being investigated by the European Commission for antitrust violations, and the market has increasingly shifted against it with the North American gas glut and the availability of new LNG supplies. Gazprom’s European customers are demanding lower prices and an end to Gazprom’s practice of foisting long-term contracts with oil-linked prices on consumers. The end result is going to be lower demand for Gazprom’s gas, and lower prices paid for it.
What will change for Nagorno Karabakh conflict? Is it possible to realise a military operation by Azerbaijani forces to obtain new position in peace process?
The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh remains extremely tense, and the Minsk Group diplomatic process shows few signs of moving the conflict toward a solution. Azerbaijan’s military build-up in recent years changes the balance of power on the ground (Azeri military spending is now larger than Armenia’s entire state budget), but it seems unlikely leaders in Baku actually want a conflict, which could have very unpredictable results. At least in theory, Armenia has a security guarantee from Russia through the CSTO. While Moscow would be extremely reluctant to put that guarantee into practice, the possibility alone should be enough to give Azerbaijan pause, as should the sheer fact that Nagorno-Karabakh’s mountainous terrain clearly favors defensive operations. The danger is less that Baku will launch a war to improve its bargaining position than that local incidents along the line of contact could spin out of control.
Do you see Eurasian Union project as sustainable? Why does Russia need it and what happened to Shanghai Cooperation Organisation?
If the Eurasian Union is basically an upgraded version of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, then yes, it could be sustainable. Russia is putting a lot of pressure on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to join; given their political weakness, there is a good chance they will join too, though because so much of their economies depend on border trade with China, joining could actually prove damaging. In his original article discussing the concept, Putin spoke of the Eurasian Union as an analogue to the European Union, i.e. a stepping stone to political integration. Even before the depths of the EU’s own problems became clear, there was never much enthusiasm for deeper political integration among post-Soviet states that have only been independent for two decades. The more political flesh Russia tries to put onto the bones of the Eurasian Union, the less success it will have.
As for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the problem is that Russia and China have different visions for it. China wants to turn it into something like a free trade area, which would allow Chinese goods to completely dominate across the SCO space. The big loser would be Russia. For now, the former Soviet Union remains about the only area where Russian industrial and consumer goods have a competitive advantage (largely because of inertia and connections left over from the Soviet era). Moscow, understandably, does not want to cede that advantage to Beijing by opening up those markets to Chinese competition. Russia’s view of the SCO has always been more political. It was originally conceived as a way of balancing against NATO and keeping an eye on what the Chinese were up to in Central Asia. China was never interested in picking a fight with the West in an area it considers secondary (the South China Sea is another story). The SCO could play more of a role in the future, especially with the Americans out of Afghanistan. It’s the only organization in the region that includes all of the major players (including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India as observers, as well as Turkey as a dialogue partner). If Beijing and Moscow decide to give it real power, the SCO could become an important forum for managing regional instability. First, they would have to resolve their own disputes though.
What is the available situation of relations between the US and Uzbekistan?
The U.S. is paying quite a bit of attention to Uzbekistan right now. Despite the Uzbek government’s poor human rights record, Tashkent has emerged as a strategic partner of the United States, especially in the context of the war in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has been a critical node on the Northern Distribution Network, and has been responsive to U.S. requests to participate in development projects to bolter Afghanistan’s economy. Of course, Uzbekistan is quite concerned about instability across the border in Afghanistan, but it is also interested in having a robust U.S. presence in Central Asia to provide a hedge against Russian domination.
Relations between Moscow and Tashkent have never been close, and the Uzbeks worry that the departure of NATO forces from Afghanistan will allow Russia to play a larger role across the region. Already, Moscow has moved to cement its links with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan by extending its leases on military bases and pledging to invest in hydroelectric projects in both countries that Uzbekistan opposes. Even though Tashkent recently adopted a new national security concept pledging to keep foreign military bases off its soil, negotiations with the U.S. have been underway about some kind of post-2014 security partnership. The U.S. wants to have the ability to project (limited) power into Afghanistan in case of need, and to have at least some ability to respond to contingencies affecting its interests in Central Asia. With the new Kyrgyz government continuing to say that the U.S. military must leave Manas transit facility in two years, the U.S. is increasingly looking to Uzbekistan as the keystone of its post-2014 engagement with the region.
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