AKP’s 10 years: Are justice and development enough?

The Kurdish Globe

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been involved in Turkish political life since Aug. 14, 2001. Coming on the political scene during a tough time in Turkish politics and the period in which it has faced the most arduous economic crisis of the history of Turkish Republic, AKP came to power as a single party very quickly. It has been the strongest party and had the widest social base since the day it came to power. AKP broke new ground in Turkish politics by winning three general elections, two local elections and augmenting its votes and its effective power in two referendums. In the first election it participated in, on Nov. 3, 2002, it came into power as a single party by obtaining 34.3 percent of votes; winning over two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. In the July 22, 2007 elections, it became indisputable power by getting 46.6 percent; but its seats fell to 341. In the general elections on June 12, 2011, it took 50 percent of votes, showing it has become stronger over the years.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, Idris Naim Sahin, Binali Yildirim and Bulent Arinç, among the founders of AKP, are leading figures in the party. AKP organized as a party of the masses with a charismatic leader to combine members of different parties and differing views, both during its establishment and afterward. It has members who come from the National Salvation Party (MSP), the Welfare Party (RP), the Virtue Party (FP), National Vision Movement, Motherland Party (ANAVATAN), the Justice Party (AP), the True Path Party (DYP). As a 15-month party, it formed the 58th government under President Abdullah Gul by taking the highest vote rate in the selections made in November 2002. The ban imposed on general president Erdogan, who could not enter the cabinet and the Turkish National Grand Assembly (TBMM) because of this political ban, was removed with a constitutional amendment that was also approved by main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). Erdogan entered the Turkish parliament by being elected as deputy in the renovation elections in Siirt, a Kurdish city. So, after the resignation of 58th government under the presidency of Abdullah Gul on March 11, 2003, Erdogan founded the 59th government on March 15, 2003.

AKP whose founding staff had a political ban came to power before it had fully formed as a party and it also made its first ordinary congress after it came to power. When AKP declared its politic philosophy to the public as “conservative democracy,” 18 months had passed. Even though it came to power in its first period and the in the following two periods, AKP had huge success despite its unprepared and delayed experiment of becoming a party. It took advantage of the shortcomings of its rival secular political actors, and AKP’s slogans and policies created an excitement in society. The close relationship the party leader and staff developed with the public because of its municipal activities in the past, and the support it gave for liberal economic integration policies, are the AKP’s ammunition. In addition, AKP and the other conservative-Islamist parties, which preceded it, are always ahead of the secular parties in Turkish political life. One reason for this advantage is the partnership between conservative-Islamist parties and Turkish society in terms of “ideological positioning.” AKP took action with the statement, which embodies in the axis of two of its founding concepts “justice” and “development” and made two promises to Turkish public opinion. The first one is economic reform and relieving the destruction experienced after the crisis of 2001, and the second one is resolving the problem of fundamental rights and freedoms which still exist in Turkey.

Although the AKP has been accused by its opponents, especially in its early years, as being a part of the movement of the “national vision” (Turkish: milli görüs) and has been represented as the extension of FP or of related political tradition, the leading figures of the party vehemently reject this implication. The most explicit example of this is reflected in the statement by Erdogan, the party’s founder and the prime minister, in his speech saying that “we took off the national vision shirt.” AKP has come up against serious threats even though it had an indisputable power in the period it held power. In 2007, especially in large cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, anti-AKP demonstrations (“Republican Meetings”) were organized by some institutions and organizations such as the Kemalist Thought Association (ADD), the ultra-secularist Support for Modern Life Association (ÇYDD), the Istanbul Bar Association, the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers, Unions (DISK), the Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions (KESK). In 2008, within the Ergenekon Operation, it asserted that these meetings were arranged by a terrorist organization to provide basis for a coup. Investigations and arrests that put into practice then still continue. The party was on the verge of being closed down. It was the subject of a lawsuit with the request of closing it down by asserting that it was “the center of actions which were against secularism.” Six members of the Constitutional Court voted to close it down, five members voted the other way. On July 30, 2008, the decision was handed down to allow the party to remain open but to reduce its funding from the treasury. The main discourse of the opposition against the AKP was that the party was not a legitimate political power because of its founders, political pasts and they presented the AKP as a reactionary political movement against secularism. The opposition against the AKP has consisted of not only parties in the Turkish parliament but also a political opposition that has included media moguls and top-level commanders of Turkish army.

The relative impact of economic growth provided by AKP, which has been an undisputed power in its 10 years, and the foreign policies it has followed, have shown their impact throughout the region. The relative economic prosperity in Turkey, along with new capital and an empowered middle class, seem to have weakened the traditional and powerful ruling elites, including the army, the judiciary and the administrative bureaucracy. The constitutional amendments, accepted with margin of 58 percent on Sept. 12, 2010, have registered that change. The series of operations which started in Istanbul, Umraniye in 2007 against the “deep state” organization known as Ergenekon, included the shocking arrests of many ultra-nationalist attorneys, political leaders, members of the Turkish media and also Turkey’s military sphere. These were considered important steps in the goal of resembling Western democracies. Especially with the meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAS) in August, insistence of using authority not used by any other Turkish government, although they had the right to, can be seen as an interference which is designating the commanding rank of the Turkish Army for next 10 to 15 years. Some problems have still not been resolved, including Cyprus policy, the Armenian question and relations with Greece. More importantly, the new process of acceptance and recognition of the Kurdistan Regional Government is considered a serious deviation from the traditional Turkish foreign policy. Some practical steps taken include a solution in the issue of the headscarf, although not completely resolved; Kurdish opening; the new discourse in the Kurdish issue; such as the launch of TRT-6, Turkey’s first Kurdish-language channel run by the government. Additionally, institutes and programs on Kurdish language started in some universities though limited, which can be counted as limited steps to erase traditional Turkish domestic policy. However, although AKP has taken some important steps and changed certain conditions in the Kurdish issue, it didn’t manage to sustain these changes because AKP’s approach to the issue is not grounded on a systematical political philosophy and the bureaucratic tradition behind itself is also another burden in this failure.

Undoubtedly, AKP has been the most successful party in the history of Turkish politics. It is easy to see it will hold on to its achievements. However, the most crucial problem AKP has to face in the political arena is the Kurdish issue, which has its origins in the Ottoman Empire and cannot even be agreed on its name. Of course, we should not ignore the fact that such a historical question cannot be solved without following a certain process. But it must be admitted today that the AKP doesn’t have a paradigm that can distinguish it from the previous governments because AKP, like the other Turkish governments, is approaching the Kurds as a cultural group or diversity, not as a nation. The Kurdish issue will remain a bleeding wound as long as this paradigm is not changed.