By Andrés Cala
Published: Dec 13, 2010 1:20 PM Updated: Dec 13, 2010 1:49 PM
Turkey and Iran have over the years forged a partnership defying expectations of how two seemingly competing and bordering regional powers might interact. And in the past few months, they have pledged to deepen their ties to the bewilderment of some and to the alarm of others. Despite qualms though, their quid pro quo ties could have a positive regional effect, starting with increased stability.
Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in September urged investors to triple bilateral trade by 2015 with Iran to $30 billion annually through bilateral business ventures, precisely when US-led Western governments are trying to strangle Iran with sanctions. Turkey will also remove Iran from its “enemy list” by the end of the year, and it is currently fighting Washington’s intention to single out Iran as a target of a NATO missile defense system that Turkey will likely host in its territory. For its part, Tehran has vowed to streamline Turkish investment in Iran and it has given Ankara a de-facto intermediary role with Western countries in shuttle diplomacy over its nuclear program.
The rapprochement between the two is the result of calculated self-interest, much like Germany and France after World War II. Turkey needs Iran to fulfill its strategic goal of reclaiming the regional powerhouse stature of yore, and Iran needs Turkey to survive diplomatically and economically. What remains to be seen is whether the tradeoff is successful.
Throughout most of last century, the two former empires were introspective, struggling to find their place in the world. Ankara considered its neighbor a threat after the Islamic Revolution, a position that began to change with Turkey’s voracious natural gas thirst. In 2000, bilateral trade was $1 billion; five years later it reached $4 billion; and last year it reached $10 billion, almost entirely energy-based.
The political turnaround from suspicious to symbiotic was the result of profound geopolitical shifts—more so than trade—that triggered strategic repositioning both in Ankara and Tehran. Most notably, the US invasion of Iraq, Iran’s standoff with the Western powers over its defiant uranium enrichment program, and Europe’s snub of Turkey’s EU membership aspirations.
For Turkey, the European rebuff coincided with its economic and military resurgence and ambitions. However, Russia was also blocking its eastern geopolitical aspirations toward the Caucasus. Thus, Turkey’s only option was to turn south, to the Middle East, while gathering the maturity to compete in Russia’s sphere by becoming the main alternative energy hub transferring oil and gas into Europe. Turkey is also the only country with the credentials, and military and economic muscle to fill the vacuum that US troops will one day leave.
But the Middle Eastern front required stable neighbors and good relations, starting with Iraq, where much of the oil and gas to make Turkey an energy hub would come from. Iraq is also the recent nucleus of regional instability that includes Kurdish independence aspirations.
Iran is the kingmaker in Iraq, which serves as its security buffer. That is why Tehran has been preoccupied there for the last decade. Tehran has the power to destabilize its neighbor and by extension, to give a lifeline to Kurdish PKK rebels, thus derailing Turkish goals. If Iran delivers stability in Iraq, then Turkey can deliver influence on the diplomatic and economic fronts.
Elsewhere, Iran is on survival mode, despite all the fear mongering going on in the region. It’s not competing with Turkey or any other to country simply because it can’t. It is of course a regional power by its own right, just not one that is able to expand. It is in no economic position to do so. It’s politically unstable internally and preoccupied with internal dissent. Iran can’t exert any offensive pressure and has built its entire strategy on defense; it relies on asymmetrical warfare through its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah for that. Its nuclear program is meant as a deterrent. And even if it had the will and muscle to expand outside Iraq, it would face hostility in Sunni majority countries, starting with Turkey.
Iranian and Turkish interests also collude in the Caucasus, although to a lesser degree, and only when faced with Russian encroachment. After the war with Georgia, Turkey saw its eastern plans dashed. Even if just temporary, Ankara and Tehran share objectives in the Caucasus, which is Turkey’s next target.
Of course, the opposite is also true. Iran has the power to destabilize Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan and the broader region, and could even turn to Russia, so it’s in Turkey’s interest to keep Tehran close. On the economic front, the Caucasus is also rich in oil and gas, but Turkey won’t be able to work as Europe’s connection to these resources without Iran’s help. Here lies another powerful incentive.
Perhaps the most imminent issue of contention is the Palestinian quagmire. It is in Turkey’s interest to reach a broad peaceful settlement as soon as possible, and it is in Iran’s interest to do the opposite.
With a foothold in Iraq, Turkey turned to mend ties with Syria and later failed to broker peace between Israel and Damascus. But the flotilla incident inadvertently cemented Ankara’s role as a regional power player, especially among Muslims who mistrusted Egypt’s half-hearted leadership, but were weary of Iranian intentions. Turkey’s uproar was about the killing of its nationals, more than defending Gaza, but Erdogan came out champion of the Palestinian cause.
Iran has traditionally claimed moral high ground on the Palestinian cause and Turkey has recently threatened Iran’s position, which explains why President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad traveled to the Israeli border with Lebanon during his recent visit. Still, this is secondary to both countries’ objectives.
The priority for Turkey and Iran is a peaceful resolution to the latter’s nuclear standoff. Indeed, the biggest risk to Ankara’s hegemonic aspirations is a military flare-up that would wreak havoc in the Middle East. That is why Turkey voted against the last sanctions in the UN Security Council and why it unsuccessfully tried brokering, along with Brazil, its own solution, to the ire of its NATO allies.
Regarding the missile shield, it appears that Turkey will impose its will on its NATO allies. President Abdullah Gül said a week ahead of the recently held summit in Lisbon that “mentioning one country, Iran…is wrong and will not happen. A particular country will not be targeted…We will definitely not accept that.”
Turkey has joined Tehran in betting its future on resolving this issue. Ankara is trying to avert war by simultaneously talking to Tehran and bargaining for time with its NATO allies. Tehran wants Turkey to use its position to negotiate on its behalf for security guarantees. But for the region as a whole, it could translate into stability.
Andrés Cala – Madrid-based freelance journalist. Mr. Cala contributes regularly to several publications, including TIME magazine, The New York Times and The Christian Science Monitor.
© Copyright 2010 Al Majalla