Israel’s navy couldn’t get the “Freedom Flotilla” to do a U-turn in international waters last week. Now it’s Israel’s turn to change course — or risk drowning in a political tsunami of its own making.
The Jewish state has badly confused strategy and tactics, international law and pragmatic diplomacy, vital interests and national hubris.
Israelis have a long tradition of ignoring international conventions as a matter of sheer survival or existential angst. From defying British blockades on Zionist emigration to improperly acquiring nuclear weapons, Israel has never felt the need to play by the rules if the cause was just and the reward was worth the risk.
That’s why Mossad agents kidnapped Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann from Argentina without recrimination. That’s why Israel launched the Six Day War when Arab war drums were beating. That’s why it mounted an ambitious rescue mission at Entebbe and destroyed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactors. Israel even got away with knocking out a mysterious Syrian nuclear installation in 2007 with barely a peep of protest.
They all passed the “sniff test” — and were translated into diplomatic victories. Now, Israel faces near-universal opprobrium. Blinded by its own sense of infallibility, Israel stayed on a collision course with the Freedom Flotilla. The Turkish boat was blocked, but the embargo was effectively breached.
How did Israel lose its way? Emboldened by past successes, it keeps fighting the last battle. Obsessing about a history of victimhood, it remains oblivious to long-term interests. Rather than picking its fights, Israel too often fights a losing battle.
When I heard about the hapless naval commandos rappelling from a helicopter to be set upon by a boatload of hostile activists last week, I was reminded of another doomed mission in the late 1990s, during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first stint as prime minister. Back then, 16 naval commandos were despatched to South Lebanon to ambush Hezbollah commanders.
But before they could begin booby-trapping a dirt road, they walked into a trap laid down for them. The hunters became the hunted: Eleven commandos, including two doctors, were evacuated in body bags. One of the dead was left behind.
A few weeks later I retraced their steps with a local translator, making the arduous trek uphill past ripening pomegranate trees and a citrus grove. Residents recalled the ghoulish celebration when an unidentified fighter had held aloft the decapitated head of the abandoned commando.
The battleground soon became a shrine for the South Lebanese, who savoured the ignominious Israeli retreat. An ice cream vendor appeared nearby. Delegations of Iranians, Syrians and Sudanese paid official visits.
What were the Israelis doing there? Trying to secure their fledgling 15-kilometre wide “security zone” — a military euphemism for occupied Lebanese territory — set up to ward off Hezbollah attacks. But it had become an albatross — with the Israelis hunkering down in isolated bases or huddling in convoys against roadside bombs.
For Hezbollah, the ambush of commandos was seen as a turning point. For the Israelis, the withdrawal from South Lebanon was only a matter of time and in 2000 they pulled out. They reached the same conclusion about Gaza in 2005.
But there is unfinished business in Gaza. While the Jewish settlers are long gone, the blockade that began three years ago endures.
Whatever the rationale for choking off the supply of weapons and materials that Hamas could use to bombard civilian targets, this blockade is long past its best before date. The siege is a tactic that has been turned against the Jewish state.
Israel has used it as a form of collective punishment in hopes of forcing regime change, or at least prompting the release of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. On the pretext of barring dual-use imports that could be used by Hamas, Israel continues to block not only cement, but chocolate and jam. It is a transparent ploy to give the sanctions extra bite — the goal being to sap the morale of 1.5 million Gazans who may not be starving but are surely wanting.
The flotilla fiasco has ruptured historical alliances with Egypt and Turkey, and alienated supporters in Europe and the U.S. Long complicit in Israel’s blockade of Gaza, Egypt has now declared it will let Palestinians through its Rafah crossing indefinitely. Jordan is disgusted, just as it was 15 years ago when the Mossad, on Netanyahu’s orders, tried to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Meshal on its territory.
Israel should have eased the restrictions on Gaza long ago to focus on purely military materials. Instead of staring down the Freedom Flotilla, it could have looked the other way. But Netanyahu, who has never backed down from a fight he couldn’t win, has bloodied his nose once again. How much longer until Israel cuts its losses?
Martin Regg Cohn writes Tuesday.