by Ferruh Demirmen
After the signing of Turkish-Armenian normalization protocols in Zurich on October 10, the Washington-based ATAA (Assembly of Turkish American Associations) issued an analysis of the protocols to clarify the reasons for its earlier endorsement of the normalization process. The announcement was issued by President Gunay Evinch.
Relying on the language in the protocols that refer to “territorial integrity,” “inviolability of frontiers,” “foreign sovereignty,” “refrain from the use of force,” and “recognition of the existing border,” the ATAA analysis draws the conclusion that, once the protocols take effect, Armenia would no longer have territorial claims against Turkey.
It further infers that Armenia would withdraw from the occupied Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, account for its human violations in the territory, and allow the return of over one million Azeri refugees.
Based on another clause that condemns terrorism, it is argued that ASALA-type terrorism and other acts of violence against Turks and Turkish interests would henceforth come to an end.
ATAA believes that the establishment of historical commission as envisioned in the protocols would prevent US Congressional resolutions on genocide allegations.
After making cross linkages between several clauses, the ATAA analysis further concludes, in a quasi-legal manner, that the opening of the common border between Turkey and Armenia should logically lead to the realization of goals embraced by the Turkish side noted above.
But the ATAA’s analysis is far from convincing. The conclusions reached are not based on any concrete steps that the protocols call for Armenia to implement. Rather, the analysis relies on the goodwill of Armenia, on expectations that a well-intentioned Armenia would deliver.
And herein lies the problem: counting on the sincerity and goodwill of Armenia. Considering Armenia’s past hostility toward Turkey, the instruments contained in its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and the Armenian officials’ public pronouncements, e.g., on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and genocide allegations, prior to the signing of the protocols, it is naive to rely on the goodwill of Armenia.
The fact that the Armenian side objected to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s prepared statement to be delivered after the signing of the protocols in Zurich, says much about the supposed goodwill of Armenia. Without naming the conflict, Davutoğlu was going to make only an indirect reference to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, expressing the hope that the signing of protocols would lead to the resolution of the conflict. The Armenian side demurred, arguing behind doors that the statement would unnecessarily draw linkage between the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the normalization process.
So much about good intentions!
Judging from the language in the protocols, there are also serious reservations as to the usefulness of a historical commission to resolve, once and for all, the thorny issue of genocide allegations.(1)
If Armenia is to be believed in its good intentions, the protocols would contain unambiguous clauses as to the steps Armenia would take, e.g., amend its Constitution, withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh, in return for the opening of the border. The protocols contain no such quid pro quo.
In contrast, the language in the protocols on the opening of the common border is clear and unmistakable: Once the protocols are ratified, the common border would be opened within two months.
The open border, of course, would overwhelmingly benefit Armenia.
For all it cares, Armenia can easily stonewall for years the implementation of steps it is expected to take, prevaricating on its acts, while in the meantime the Turkey-Armenia border remains open. It can maintain, for example, that it is not making (overt) territorial claims on Turkey while at the same time refusing to amend its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, or change the design of its national flag.
Or it can claim it is not actively pursuing “genocide” claims while winking at, and even secretly encouraging, genocide recognition efforts by the Armenian diaspora.
Or it can make a cosmetic withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabagh, arguing that it has fulfilled its obligations as far as “promoting peace in the region.”
And should Turkey contemplate re-closing the border because Armenia has not “delivered,” volleys of criticism from the American and European sympathizers of Armenia would surely follow.
Further, should the Turkish Parliament refuse to ratify the protocols for lack of progress on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue, as Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has inexplicably suggested recently, Turkey would surely be singled out for having bad faith in the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.
(Diplomatically, Erdoğan’s suggestion is a major faux pas, because there is no linkage in the protocols between the Nagorno-Karabagh issue and the normalization process. After giving repeated assurances to the Azeris on Nagorno-Karabagh, yet without any backing from the protocols, the PM has forced himself into a corner. Now he is expecting the Turkish Parliament to bail him out).
In conclusion, ATAA’s analysis, no doubt reflecting an idealistic outlook, is based on presumptive logic, or wishful thinking, and cannot be supported. ATAA says the normalization protocols are based on the concept of “constructive ambiguity” by which each side interprets the language as it sees fit. This is an interesting approach, but offers no comfort for the Turkish side – or, for that matter, the Azeri side.
ATAA should ponder: Would it ever sign a binding contract based pre-eminently on “constructive ambiguity,” wherein the only expressed certainty is for the advantage of the other side, but everything else is predicated on goodwill?
Nations signing intergovernmental agreements should be held to the same standards of credibility and accountability as persons who conclude private or business transactions.
ATAA issued its analysis on behalf of its Board of Directors. But ATAA also claimed in its announcement that it spoke on behalf of the Turkish-American community. A relevant question is: Has ATAA polled its members on the issue?
It is worth noting that almost all opposition parties in Turkey, certainly the major ones, are opposed to the Turkish-Armenian normalization process in its present form. They remember what happened in Cyprus.
(1) Current Turkish “opening” to Armenia cannot be supported: by Ferruh Demirmen, “Turkish Forum,” October 9, 2009.
ferruh@demirmen.com
Note to Turkish Forum readers: On October 10, the Azeri news outlet Trend News (http://en.trend.az)/ published on its website excerpts from my article cited above. The excerpted article, “Normalization of Ankara -Yerevan relations cannot be supported: Turkish expert,” was also published on the same day in Turkish Forum. The article contained a photo, purportedly depicting me. Turkish Forum readers are advised that the person depicted in that photo is not me. F. Demirmen.