Between Fact And Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

Cem Ryan, Ph.D. Istanbul,

Between Fact And Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation
by Gareth H. Jenkins

Silk Road Paper
August 2009

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program –
A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center
Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, Stockholm-Nacka 13130, Sweden
www.silkroadstudies.org

Preface
Contemporary Turkish politics is striking for many reasons, not least the fundamentally opposing and mutually exclusive narratives by which domestic as well as foreign observers describe its major fault lines. Hence the irreconcilable descriptions of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, in power since 2002: its supporters describe it as a the Muslim world’s equivalent of Christian Democracy, the political force that is ridding Turkey of its authoritarian past and making it a European democracy. Its detractors, however, accuse it of seeking to islamicize the country’s state and society, muzzling independent media and criticism, moving it in the direction of authoritarianism, and in the process driving Turkey away from Europe. Descriptions of the mainly nationalist opposition to the AKP are equally divided, ranging from seeing these forces as well-intentioned supporters of Turkey’s secular republic to being authoritarian-minded, fascistoid groups that clamor for a return to military rule.

One issue that most observers of Turkish politics can agree on, however, is the murky nature of aspects of its recent history. For decades, the existence of shadowy networks with connections to state institutions has been common knowledge. These networks, known as the “deep state,” have been known to do the state’s “dirty work,” such as targeting terrorist sympathizers with extra-judicial killings; but they have also been known to collude with organized crime and to undermine Turkish democracy. This cabal was epitomized by a massive scandal that erupted following a 1996 car crash outside the hamlet of Susurluk in Western Turkey, in which a high-level politician, a wanted criminal and a police chief were found to have been traveling together.

Such shady connections do not make Turkey unique. Indeed, among countries that come to mind is Italy, where the deep connections between the political elite and the mafia were gradually unearthed by the 1990s, not least by a meticulous official investigation process known as “clean hands” or Mani Pulite. The launching by Turkish prosecutors of a far-reaching investigation into the “deep state” activities in 2007, therefore, seemed to present a historic opportunity to unearth the truth about the less flattering aspects of the country’s recent past. The investigation, soon dubbed “Ergenekon” after the alleged name of the network being investigated, appeared to provide a major chance for Turkey to take a major leap forward in its democratization process. The deep wounds of the past – felt especially by leftists, Kurds and pious Muslims, all of which had suffered at the hands of the state and its cronies – could now perhaps begin to be healed. As such, the Ergenekon investigation was widely welcomed both within Turkey and among its Western well-wishers.

The lack of trust in the judiciary’s independence and Turkey’s polarized political climate, however, made the investigation’s task delicate. From the outset, views of the investigation seemed to divide roughly into the categories described above: AKP supporters viewed it as the “cleaning of the century,” and urged prosecutors to leave no stone unturned; while the government’s detractors feared a politically motivated witch hunt of opponents of the AKP and, more broadly, the Islamic conservative camp. Much therefore rested on the prosecutors’ conduct – their following of due process, their respect for the rule of law, and their efforts to provide an evidence-based investigation.

Two years since its inception, the Ergenekon case has mushroomed beyond all expectations. In over a dozen predominantly pre-dawn raids, hundreds of suspects have been detained and/or questioned, and almost two hundred have been charged. Prosecutors have so far produced two indictments running a total of several thousand pages, and both a third and a fourth indictment are rumored to follow in coming months. But far from convincing its critics, the Ergenekon investigation has become ever more controversial. On the one hand, it has clearly uncovered information on wrongdoing on the part of some of the accused, and certainly on the prevalence of democratically questionable views among a section of the Turkish elite. But that said, the prosecution appears to have failed to live up to the high judicial standards that Turkey’s population were entitled to expect, leading to serious doubts concerning the investigation’s conduct, and ultimately, its motives.

Several factors have fed these concerns. Firstly, every pre-dawn raid appeared to net an increasingly unlikely batch of suspects. Gradually, a pattern emerged whereby prosecutors could show little or no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of a substantial proportion of the suspects, many of whom appeared to have nothing in common except their political opposition to the AKP in particular and to Islamic conservatism in general. Secondly, as the investigation dragged on, concerns mounted regarding the length of time suspects spent in detention without being formally charged with any crime. Third, it gradually became clear that the case not only made claims that defied reason – such as implicating the supposed Ergenekon organization in every act of political violence in Turkey’s modern history – but also that the investigation included deep inconsistencies and internal contradictions. Fourth, the systematic leaking of evidence from the investigation to the pro-AKP press, which appeared to serve the purpose of intimidating the opposition, had by mid-2008 become a serious concern that compromised the integrity of the investigation. In sum, at the time of writing, the Ergenekon investigation has led to a climate of fear spreading in the ranks of the substantial section of the Turkish population that is opposed to the AKP government and to Islamic conservatism.

In turn, the growing controversies surrounding the Ergenekon case are making it increasingly likely that it will form a missed opportunity for Turkey to effectuate the cleansing and healing process that is so necessary for the country to move forward in its democratization process. indeed, if this opportunity is squandered, that would make the likelihood of any future reckoning with the crimes of the past ever more remote.

In view of the Ergenekon investigation’s massive impact on, and far-reaching implications for Turkey’s society and politics, it is all the more surprising that it has been subjected to so little analytical treatment. Indeed, studies of the case seldom go beyond newspaper-length articles that can at best highlight only limited aspects of the issue. This is in all likelihood a factor of the sensitive and infected nature of the case, as well as a result of the prohibitive size of the indictments, which has deterred even those scholars that do have a command of the Turkish language from acquiring a serious enough knowledge of the case to speak authoritatively on the subject.Yet that is exactly what Gareth Jenkins has done. A long-time and respected observer of Turkish politics and society, Jenkins is ideally placed to understand, as well as explain, the intricacies of the Ergenekon investigation. His published works to date include monographs both on the Turkish military and on Turkish political Islam, both key ingredients in the maze of relationships that make up the context of the Ergenekon investigation. Not standing at that, Jenkins is among the few to have studied both indictments in the case in detail. It was therefore natural for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program to commission Jenkins to conduct an in-depth analysis of the case. The result is the present paper, whose conclusions concerning the Ergenekon case should form essential reading for anyone seeking to understand contemporary Turkish politics.

Those conclusions, however, are not encouraging. They suggest, in fact, that the prevailing Western view of the Ergenekon investigation as a step forward in Turkey’s democratization process is misplaced. Indeed, they also imply that the Western tacit encouragement of the investigation – though diminishing in emphasis as concerns have mounted even there – should be tempered with a much more acute concern for the investigation’s breaches of the rule of law and due process. Coupled with other developments of concern in Turkish affairs, not least the growing intimidation of independent media, the Ergenekon investigation is certainly worthy of much closer monitoring and analysis. This study may constitute the first serious analysis of the Ergenekon case. However, that should not imply that this study aspires to be termed definitive. Indeed, given the substantial implications of the issue, it is to be hoped that the study will be followed by additional analyses from both legal and political perspectives, which are direly needed to help shed light on this very important aspect of modern Turkish life.

Svante E. Cornell
Research Director, Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center

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Posted by Cem Ryan, Ph.D. Istanbul, Turkey————————————————– godotawaits@gmail.com at 3:18 PM Labels: Erdoğan, ergenekon, Fethullah Gülen. Turkey

3 comments:

Anonymous said…

All of this has been known from the start of this scum but the supposedly enlightened and civilized intellectuals of our Western allies(!)turned their head away from the facts. How can an individual of any contemporary nation respect and tolerate the present medieval rulers of Turkey? How could their use of familiar terminologyy such as democracy, freedom and the like and their Western style outwear be convincing enough to regard them as civilized humans? Their minds are set to some fifteen hundred year old ideas, beliefs and practices of Islam. If not, they are using these outdated primitive values to fool the extremely ignorant and helpless people of Turkey. Should the gradual discovery by the Western intellectuals of the shameful acts of the fascist Turkish government encourage us that the tide will perhaps turn to the other side? I doubt it so long as greed prevails in the West more than in any other part of the world. Westerners are simply in the process of taking their revenge back from Turkey whose destiny, it appears, was reversed but temporarily by its legendary founder and leader Mustafa Kemal when he kicked out the greedy Westerners out of this land. But the West especailly the US and its European allies will never give up!

August 18, 2009 8:08 PM

Anonymous said…

Let’s face it if even a single atrocity of the kind the Turkish government and judiciary have been committing in the Ergenekon incident had been committed by a government which is an adversary of the Western governments, the West would have raised hell by now! No?
If you do not think so, you have no idea how much the rulers of the present Turkish government are alike the Taliban in Afghanistan! If you don’t believe see the photograph of Mr. Erdogan bowing to an Afghan religious leader at the level of his knee!

August 18, 2009 8:48 PM

Nevin said…

What Turkey needs is a cleansing process from both the military elites and the Islamic fundamentalists… For the last 60 odd years, these two powers have been struggling for internal power and finally it came to a end with the Ergenekon fiasco…Turkey needs “real” democracy not the fake AKP kind or coupes that destroyed the soul of the country….

PS: A great article!

August 18, 2009 9:53 PM

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