The renown historians listed below, and all others who made the following thought-provoking scholarly compilation possible.
I find it important to mirror this work here to help truth-seekers gain one more access the information which is denied them by aggressive Armenian falsifiers, their usually anti-Turkish sympathizers, and other thinly veiled Turk-haters.
Hate-based-propaganda and intimidation should not be allowed to replace honest scholarship and reasoned debate. Nothing less than the freedom of speech of those who hold contra-genocide views are at stake. Tools most used to advance censorship of contra-genocide views are hearsay, forgeries, harassment, political resolutions, and concepts like “editorial freedom” and “consensus”, among others—please note that “The Wild West” town papers and lynch mobs of 19th Century had the last two concepts down path and hung anyone who was deemed worthy of hanging.)
The key to resolving this controversy, therefore, is more knowledge as in more honest research, more truthful education, and more freedom to debate… not less.
Those scholars who take Armenian claims at face value today urgently need to ponder these simple questions, as honestly as they possible can:
1) HOW CAN ONE STUDY A REGION’S OR A COUNTRY’S HISTORY WITHOUT RESEARCHING THAT REGION’S/COUNTRY’S ARCHIVES?
Can one study Europe’s history, for instance, without using European archives?
Or America’s history without researching American records?
Or Russia’s past without using Russian documents?
Or Ottoman Empire’s past without using Ottoman archives?
Why were the Ottoman archives almost never used in most current Armenian arguments and claims?
Are language barriers, bureaucratic hurdles, cost, or other reasons convincing enough excuses in scholarly studies that span a over decades or even centuries?
Or is it instant gratification that these, so-called, genocide scholars who insist on ignoring Turkish archives really seek, not really the whole truth?
2) HOW CAN ONE UNDERSTAND A CONTROVERSY IF ONE CONFINES ONE’S VIEWS TO ONLY ONE SIDE?
Can you argue that only one side of say, the abortion issue, is absolutely correct, flawless, settled, and worthy of knowing, and that the other side should be totally ignored and even censored?
How about gun control? Can you say one side is it; the other side to be dismissed, ignored, and/or censored?
Or immigration?
Taxes?
Iraq War?
Gay rights?
Or many other such controversial issues?
Can one be restricted, or asked/forced to be confined, in education or research, to only one side of the debate and categorically dismiss forever the other side(s) ?
Can this discrimination and censorship ever be built into a state’s public education policy, as it is shamefully attempted by the Armenian falsifiers and Turk-haters in Massachusetts and California, vis-a-vis the 1915 Turkish-Armenian conflict ?
Is the freedom of speech (of Turkish-Americans,), enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, a disposable right or a privilege, that can be trample upon by the Armenian lobby and their racist and dishonest politician friends like Schiff, Radanovich, Menendez, et. al.? (Racist because they only recognize Armenian dead, but ignore Turkish dead , and dishonest because they dismiss the six T’s of the 1915 conflict.)
If I, as an individual with contra-genocide views, am slandered, intimidated, harassed, and even threatened for my views by some “opinion thugs” and often censored by “consensus mobs” and “hate-editors”, then is this not a blatant attack on and destruction of my constitutional right to freedom of speech?
Does consensus mean correct? (After all, lynch mobs always had a pretty good consensus, too.)
Does might make right?
3) WHY DO THOSE GENOCIDE SCHOLARS SELECTIVELY REACT TO HUMAN TRAGEDY?
Why do those genocide scholars— most if not all paid by the Armenian lobby and related institutions directly or indirectly— who love to get on their high horses and preach perfect morals to others, fail to scream murder in the face of that terrible human tragedy in Azerbaijan that victimized a million Azeri women and children in Karabagh and western Azerbaijan?
Is it because the perpetrator of this inhumanity is Armenia, their client state and the Armenian genocide industry, their paymasters?
4) If the study of genocide is designed to teach humans how to recognize, prevent, and fight back against new genocides, then why do these genocide scholars not take their client, Armenia and Armenians, to task about the genocide in Khodjaly on 19 February 1992? (Since a genocide verdict by a competent tribunal, required by the 1948 UN Convention, does not exist, yet, for consistency, I should call it man’s inhumanity to man and pogrom for now. The question is why did all the genocide study fail to stop Armenia from committing one between 1992-1994? Can you see the heart wrenching irony here?
***
Here then is what honest scholars (not genocide scholars) say about the fraudulent Armenian genocide:
***
APPENDIX 5 A
What Can Be Done about Historical Atrocities? The Armenian Case
BERTIL DUNE´R,
International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 217–233, Summer 2004
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, PO Box 1253, S-111 82, Stockholm, Sweden.
ISSN 1364-2987 print; ISSN 1744-053X online # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd, DOI: 10.1080=1364298042000240870
ABSTRACT The global human rights regime is not equipped to deal with historical atrocities. When engaged politicians want to take matters in their own hands it is clear that this alternative is problematical. In the case of Armenia, the campaign for the recognition of the Armenian massacres in 1915 has addressed the questions involved in a simplistic way, both with respect to juridical points of departure such as definition of the crime and the status of the accused party, and with respect to the assessment of evidence. If proclamations which bear any similarity to juridical assessments are to be made at all the best alternative would be the creation of an international expert body representing both the history and the legal professions. Establishing the guidelines for this body to work, however, seems a daunting task. Can a generally accepted retrospective time limit be established? To what extent should court-like functions be performed for events which, at the time they happened, were not covered by international criminal law?
In 1914 Ottoman Turkey was drawn into the war between the European alliances and was soon engaged in a battle on four fronts. Russian troops marched in from the north, and Turkey maintained that the intervention was supported by Armenians and that an internal revolt was imminent. As the Ottoman army retreated a massive deportation of Armenians in the war zone started, degenerating into massacres. The number of dead is not known, but estimates generally varying between about half a million and two million, and much lower figures as well, have been presented.1
The allied powers pressured the Turkish authorities to arrest a considerable number of Turkish leaders but the consequences were modest, for many reasons, including the difficulty of obtaining evidence.2
Interestingly, in the final peace document, the Treaty of Lausanne, amnesty was given for all offences committed during the war and after.3
The Armenian massacres were strongly condemned in Western Europe at the time. In recent times condemnations have become a burning question again, and great efforts have been made in several countries to achieve some kind of official recognition of the massacres as genocide.
The dominant aspects of the discussion have concerned the historical circumstances and facts, the moral need to remember and to show sympathy, and the need for official recognition. It is typical that the distinguished French daily Le Monde, the day after the French Parliament adopted its Armenia bill, carried an editorial under the caption ‘Arme´nie, devoir de me´moire’ (Armenia, a duty to remember).4
It is surprising that the concept of human rights has appeared so little in this debate. A global human rights regime has been in place for many years and its significance is routinely hailed by leading representatives of state powers and civil societies the world over: human rights have variously been praised as the idea of our time, a new standard of civilisation, and a framework for a world order of human dignity. For the UN Secretary-General human rights are the ‘common thread’ running through all UN activities.5
Furthermore, there is a global human rights convention against genocide, of 1948, which is in fact the first and the seminal human rights treaty of the global regime, its approval preceding (although by only one day) the adoption of the landmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Thus, there is all the reason in the world for discussing the Armenian question in human rights terms. A number of questions suggest themselves. Is the ongoing campaign for the recognition of the Armenian massacres as genocide fully compatible with the tenets of the global regime? Is it a deviation from regime thinking – for instance, since it focuses on events that took place long before the convention was signed – but a positive widening of horizons which should be carried even further? Are there incompatibilities between the campaign and the concepts of the genocide convention, and, if so, how could these be resolved?
In order to analyze these questions we do not have to go into the issue that has come to the fore more than any other aspect: what really happened with the Armenians? We need a background for the analysis, however, which is what we will turn to first. It is only natural that this background will deal more with the history of the campaign than with the historical object of these campaigns. The word ‘campaign’ here means pressure or a drive towards an objective (recognition) with actions that are to a degree interconnected.
THE RISE OF DEMANDS FOR RECOGNITION
From time to time the Armenian massacres have been called genocide by political entities. However, in the 1990s a distinct upsurge took place. The Armenian National Institute, based in Washington, DC, documents ‘international affirmations’ of the Armenian genocide and lists several categories of these, which are posted on its home page: resolutions and declarations by parliaments (or part thereof), provincial governments (including US state governments), municipal governments, heads of state and international governmental organisations (IGOs) or non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Most striking, perhaps, is the increase in the number of resolutions and declarations by peoples’ representative bodies. In all, two dozen national parliamentary bodies are listed as having affirmed the genocide, more than half of them since the 1990s, and many Italian communes and North American cities have also done so in recent years. It should be noted that exact figures are not very important in this context, and the listings are probably inflated.6
A recognition of genocide can be understood as a goal in itself in faithfulness to historical truth. According to a French parliamentary report (for the Foreign Affairs Commission), ‘Reconnaıˆtre l’existence d’un ge´nocide s’impose a` tous, car un tel forfait interpelle l’humanite´ dans son ensemble. Nier son existence atteint directement les survivants, insulte la me´moire des victimes et les assassine une seconde fois’.7
However, recognition is clearly also thought to fulfil instrumental functions. It was stated in the discussion in the International Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives that: ‘What we are saying is that this time in history needs to be remembered because what has passed is often prologue, and failure to remember, failure to recognize, sweeping under the carpet of history is a mistake that ultimately we are doomed to repeat time and time again’. ‘If we believe that unrecognized genocide contributes to future genocides, don’t we have an obligation to assure that our diplomatic staff and those who advise our leaders learn about this history, learn about this genocide?’8
The inherent function of peacemaking in this argument can be given a much more contemporary touch. Parliamentarians in France and Italy have maintained that recognition would contribute to peace and stability in the Caucasus region, and in particular to lasting peaceful relations between Turkey and Armenia, which should be based on a solid foundation, not on denial.9
There may also be self-interest involved (which we will come back to) but let us here just point out that the peacemaking arguments do not seem very solid. Producing historical horrors from under the carpet seems a questionable prevention mechanism, precisely because the event in question lies far back in history: present genocide situations are generally generated by today’s complexities. The alleged peacemaking function in today’s world is no less questionable. If Turkey were to make an acknowledgement of its own free will, this might serve to build peace, but if Turkey is unwilling to take such a step and rather feels that it is being put under illegitimate pressure, this situation does not seem to add to a peace-building potential – more likely the contrary.
The term ‘campaign’ has been used here in order to emphasise a certain interconnectedness between declarations and resolutions in different fora. Thus, for instance, similar references and cross-references are found in bills introduced to parliaments, in parliamentary debates and in resolutions.10
Many actors – primarily, it seems, of Armenian origin – have been involved in efforts to increase the number of accusations. Needless to say, the Republic of Armenia is in favour of recognition of the genocide and has been so ever since it was founded. The issue is actually included in its Declaration of Independence, which states that: ‘The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia’.11
The Armenian lobby in the USA sees itself as an influential force, in fact as the second most powerful lobby in the country (after the Jewish lobby, which is beyond comparison more influential).12
Before Armenia achieved independence its main objective was to obtain recognition of the Armenian genocide. Following independence, the genocide has remained one of the main issues, but the activities of the US Congress concerning Azerbaijan and Turkey have been added. In spring 2000 the genocide issue became a hot topic for the Republican Party when the Armenian diaspora decided to make candidates for the US presidency recognise the genocide.13
Contributing to the success of the lobby is the fact that Armenian–Americans have reached high positions, mostly through the Republican Party.14
The Armenian lobby is also active in many other countries, including France and Italy, although less visibly so. The fact that the Armenian lobby was the driving force behind the French Senate’s recognition of the genocide in 2000 is acknowledged by the Armenian Foreign Ministry.15
Likewise, the French Ambassador to Armenia has spoken of the role of many Armenian-French organisations and private individuals who contributed to the adoption of the resolution.16
Armenia’s ambassador to Italy was reportedly very active in promoting the recognition by the Italian Parliament.17
Turkey does not deny the reality of the massacres, although it maintains that the campaign has seriously exaggerated the death toll. However, Ankara categorically refutes the What Can Be Done about Historical Atrocities 219 accusation of genocide. It maintains that the Armenians were victims of inter-communal conflict during the Ottoman Empire’s dying years in the midst of the First World War and stresses that Turks as well died en masse in this internecine war. Moreover, it maintains that there is no proof that the killings were organised or financed by the state: on the contrary, it suggests that the lack of central organisation was to blame.18
THE DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE
In the 1948 convention on genocide [ 19 ] the contracting states confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law and undertake to prevent and to punish it. Article II defines genocide as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III stipulates that not only the act of genocide shall be punishable but also conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempts to commit genocide; and complicity in genocide.
In the Armenian campaign, however, there is a considerable definitional frivolity. Some bodies unequivocally state that their resolutions are in accordance with the UN Convention, for instance, the Russian Duma (1995) and the European Parliament (1987).
Others make oblique references or seem to use their own definition. The Belgian Senate resolution (1998) mentions in a listing of introductory considerations that the UN convention provides a concept of genocide and also talks of the ‘organized and systematic murder of the Armenians’, suggesting that these definitions were synonymous. In a resolution by the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives (2000), an Armenian genocide during the period 1915–23 was affirmed. A definition suggested by an international law scholar, Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term ‘genocide’ and was one of the forces that inspired the development of the 1948 convention, was used, rather than the conventional definition.20
It certainly makes a difference if the definition given in the 1948 convention is strictly applied or not. As can be seen, the definition excludes political acts and mentions explicitly the existence of intent, not just any kind of destructive intent but the intent of destroying a group as such. If we apply, for instance, Belgium’s formulations, the set of properties or stipulations we have in mind will be much less restrictive and the number of potential situations that would merit the label ‘genocide’ will be considerably increased, and the matter of verification becomes much less complicated. Thus, if in scrutinising a horrendous situation it is not possible to establish whether a given group was (intentionally) massacred because of its ethnic characteristics or because of its political opposition, this is certainly a stumbling block in terms of the genocide convention, but not at all in terms of the Belgian formulation.
In practice, it may turn out to be very difficult to ascertain intentions in the conventional meaning, and it is therefore no surprise that the problem involved is frequently dodged. The mass killings in the former Soviet Union, in particular during the Stalin years, provide an illustration. In the enormous population mosaic that this communist empire constituted, death and terror seem to have struck most socio-economic, cultural or political strata, the nomenklatura itself not excluded. In a work that is frequently consulted, R.J. Rummel sets out to quantify the killings and finds that the regime was probably responsible for the deaths of no less than 62 million people. He quotes from the convention on genocide to underscore the relevance of the concept in this connection (also using it in the title of the book) but fails to adopt the definition provided by the convention. He resorts to a prior resolution on genocide by the UN General Assembly in which the nature of the motive for the killings is declared irrelevant.21
The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre dodges the problem in a different way. In connection with the so-called International War Crimes Tribunal arranged by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation to try the US warfare in Vietnam, Sartre maintains that the US government was guilty of genocide in the sense of the genocide convention.
Sartre’s method is to unveil the USA’s ‘hidden intention’ by making a Marxist-inspired analysis of societal and military history and their interconnectedness. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, he says, Western nations have had to choose between peaceful approaches towards their opponents or total war – tertium non datur – and in Vietnam the USA obviously opted for the liquidation of an entire people (to establish a Pax Americana).22
This method of identification of genocidal intent is more than questionable, and the flaws in his conclusion are striking.23
However, more often than not the political resolutions seem to avoid definitions altogether. Those passed by the Argentinean Senate (1993), the Italian Chamber of Deputies (2000), the Swedish Parliament (2000) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2001)24 are but a few examples. Generally speaking, when there is no mention of a definition, it seems reasonable to assume either that the actors for all practical purposes do not have a definition or that they have one (probably different from that contained in the convention) which for some reason they are not willing to disclose. In either case, silence on this point seems difficult to defend: an accusation is made about actions which are frequently called the worst of all crimes, and yet the meaning of the crime is not clarified.
The genocide convention has been variously evaluated and many negative opinions have been voiced concerning the specification of protected groups (the fact that it excludes political, economic and similar groups), the enumeration of punishable acts and several other aspects.25
However, these are well-known shortcomings, hardly more serious than shortcomings in other human rights instruments.26
We should be aware, of course, that no document of international law is likely to make full justice to all possible demands, since it is a product of negotiation between states.
The point to be made here is, quite simply, the following. The fact that a convention on genocide was adopted and, moreover, gained wide acceptance by the word’s states [27] makes problematical the neglect of the definition it provides. It seems strange, in fact arbitrary, to use other definitions or none at all.28
ARGUMENTS FOR DENUNCIATION
The major reason offered for resolutions on the genocide is often not an argumentum ad rem but references to the positions taken by others. For instance, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament argues in its proposal to the full Parliament: ‘An official statement and recognition of the genocide of the Armenians is important and necessary. In 1985 theUNand theEuropean Parliament established the fact that the Ottoman Empire had committed genocide against the Armenian people at the beginning of this century’.29 References to precisely these two bodies are common. Citing others’ decisions, however, is a valid argument only if these other sources are reliable authorities in the field under discussion.
Otherwise this reasoning only amounts to the well-known ad verecundiam fallacy.30
The European Parliament resolution the Swedish Parliamentary Committee refers to establishes that the ‘Armenian genocide’ is ‘historically proven’ and ‘believes that the tragic events in 1915–17 involving the Armenians living in the territory of the Ottoman Empire constitute genocide within the meaning of the convention on the prevention and the punishment of the crime of genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948’.31
However, the European Parliament is not known be a reliable authority in the matters under discussion here. Being a purely political body it does not have greater authority than the Swedish Parliament itself.
Reference to the UN could be much more relevant, since it is the Sub-Commission of Human Rights that is intended, in other words a body which is composed of experts and is not a purely political body (although it is certainly not free from political bias). However, what happened at the Sub-Commission meeting in 1985 was not a (UN) recognition of the Armenian genocide, although it is frequently portrayed that way – far from it.
A member of the Sub-Commission, appointed as special rapporteur, submitted a report on genocide which was debated.32
This debate, in which divergent views were expressed about the content of the report, did not result in any kind of recognition of individual human tragedies mentioned, nor even in the adoption of the report as such, but resulted in the Sub-Commission’s ‘taking note’ of the special rapporteur’s study. It should be emphasised that neither was there any recommendation to the superior Commission on Human Rights to adopt a resolution.33
The special rapporteur’s study also lacks weight for a different, perhaps even more important, reason. The special rapporteur does not seem to stick to the definition of genocide given by the 1948 convention. After listing a number of cases of genocide during the twentieth century, including the massacre of Armenians in 1915–16, he concludes: ‘It could seem pedantic to argue that some terrible mass-killings are legalistically not genocide, but on the other hand it could be counter-productive to devalue genocide through over-diluting its definition’.34
The inevitable conclusion is that we do not know which of the examples would be genocide within the meaning of the genocide convention.
The force of an argument, of course, all depends on the material evidence that can be demonstrated. The fact of the killings of Armenians is not at issue. The number of people slain is not known, but the exact dimensions of the disaster would not affect the substance of an accusation of genocide.35 The fundamental question relates to the intent behind the killings. Documentary evidence shows that the Ottoman government ordered a displacement of the Armenian population in Eastern Anatolia. Evacuations could of course be undertaken for different purposes, in particular to cripple the actual or assumed political or military role of a particular group. What has to be demonstrated in the first instance is the nature of the massacres – that these were designed to destroy the Armenians because of their nationality, or ethnic, racial or religious characteristics, rather than for politico-military considerations, purely ‘practical’ considerations and so on.
The main evidence to this effect is assertions by foreign observers, for instance, of the kind mentioned in the 1985 Sub-Commission report. The German Ambassador, Wangenheim, on 7 July 1915 wrote: ‘The government is indeed pursuing its goal of exterminating the Armenian race in the Ottoman Empire’.36
It is certainly a delicate question how such statements, typically based on the observation of patterns of action, can be a sufficient basis for us to draw indisputable or correct conclusions about intent within the meaning of the 1948 convention.
We should, moreover, be aware that the formulations used by eminent people at the time are not necessarily compatible with the terms and connotations that appear in the genocide convention: for natural reasons, the genocide convention was not known to them.
Tellingly, Turkish political leaders and ministers who were court-marshalled were found to be guilty to the crime of ‘massacre’.37
High expectations are sometimes entertained that more archive materials could become accessible, primarily in Turkey, which would considerably improve the possibility of drawing safe conclusions. However, the existence of relevant archives in Europe seems a rather obscure point. It has been claimed, for instance, that no materials from this period exist in the United Kingdom.38
It should also be kept in mind that the identification of intent presupposes that the identity of the accused is not shrouded in mystery. A notable development has taken place since the Second World War: the principle of individual criminal responsibility has been firmly established. The so-called Nuremberg Principles, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1946, are a landmark document in that respect. The first principle opens by stating that ‘Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment’.39
The genocide convention certainly reflects this thinking. Although genocide may be linked to state offices, only individuals are held responsible, as expressed in Article IV: ‘Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals’.
During the process of drafting the convention, the United Kingdom wanted to introduce the concept of state responsibility, but its amendment was defeated.40
In the Armenian campaign this principle for criminal responsibility has de facto been deserted since the responsibility is generally laid on a rather abstract and diffuse collectivity, or none at all.41
It is certainly a flaw in itself that the question of the identity of the respondent(s) tends to be obscured in the Armenian campaign. Moreover, since accusations which concern intent are generally not directed towards individuals they tend to become meaningless or at least non-logic. It is reasonable to guess that the perspective of individual responsibility has been neglected in the Armenian campaign because of the quality of the materials at hand.
UNIVERSALISM
The principle of universalism is of the utmost importance for the modern human rights regime – in fact, the key word ‘universal’ is to be found in the Human Rights Declaration of 1948. Universalism means that rules are the same everywhere and, ipso facto, that violations are uniformly assessed and addressed.
History is so full of horrors that the Armenians do not seem uniquely entitled to international campaigns on their behalf. Since the UN Sub-Commission report of 1985 has been so important in the Armenian campaign it is appropriate to mention other cases which it cites.42
The report lists, besides the Armenian case and, of course, the Holocaust, the German massacre of Hereros in South-West Africa in 1904; the Ukrainian pogrom against the Jews in 1919; the Tutsi massacre of Hutus in Burundi in 1965 and 1972; the Paraguayan massacre of Ache Indians prior to 1974; the Khmer Rouge massacre in Kampuchea between 1975 and 1978; and the Iranian killings of Baha’is.
More examples could be found in the serious/professional genocide literature. In his well-known and esteemed book on the political use of genocide during the twentieth century, up to 1981, when it was first published, Leo Kuper includes, among others, the following cases: actions against the Chechens, Kalmyks, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and others in the Soviet Union in the 1940s; the genocide against the Serbs during the Second World War; the genocide between Hindus and Muslims in India after the Second World War; the actions in Pakistan in 1970–71; and the actions in Burundi in 1972.43
Whereas these are called genocide, others are being called genocidal massacres, [44] for instance, those in Sudan in 1955–72 and those during the decolonisation of Algeria in 1954–61.45
A case which deserves particular mention is the US decision to drop the atomic bomb on two Japanese cities at the end of the Second World War. Historians generally seem to accept the official US view that the bombs were dropped because the USA wanted a quick end to the war. However, so-called revisionist historians have maintained that there was an element of showing off the USA’s military potential. Irrespective of such military objectives, it seems difficult to deny that the actions must have included an intent to destroy Japanese populations precisely because they were Japanese. [46]
It would therefore not be far-fetched to conclude that these actions deserve just as much consideration as any others that are mentioned here – perhaps even more.
The use of nuclear weapons was later discussed by the International Court of Justice, which is the United Nations’ chief advisory organ on matters of international law. The ICJ concluded in 1996 that the genocide convention certainly was relevant in this context:
The Court would point out in that regard that the prohibition of genocide would be pertinent in this case if the recourse to nuclear weapons did indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision quoted above. In the view of the Court, it would only be possible to arrive at such a conclusion after having taken due account of the circumstances specific to each case.47
The list of possible cases of genocide can certainly be made far longer. In fact, Turkey could argue that genocide has also been directed against Turks.48
However, our purpose here is only to demonstrate that there are certainly many historical cases for which there is obviously or apparently no less reason for international castigation than in the Armenian case.
While the world takes much less interest in cases such as such as those mentioned above, the Armenian campaign seems to go against the principle of universality. Note that this is not to question that it is easier to exercise pressure on some, relatively weak, states than on others, and that the strength of the target and the power resources available have to be considered when the kind of action to take is decided upon.49
Here, we are talking only of manifested interest, in terms of resolutions and statements, which is not a matter of strength and resources available.
Could the objection be raised that in some of these cases the underlying conflicts were resolved a long time ago and, in fact, no demands or campaigns have been initiated by victims or later generations? This would seem to be a dubious argument for selecting cases. It is difficult to determine the degree of resentment or potential demands, particularly among the populations in general, since the dismantling of conflicts is by and large a matter for the state powers to handle.
Moreover, as, for instance, Richard Falk has pointed out, the generation of international concern frequently depends on the existence of a powerful transnational constituency. As examples of indifference Falk mentions allegations of genocidal behaviour on the part of the Indian government in its counterinsurgency actions against the Naga and Mizo peoples in 1956–64 and genocidal campaigns in Latin America.50
A more recent illustration of these problems is provided by disclosures in 2001 by a former French general concerning the war in Algeria in 1954–62. Although the general revealed that torture and execution were routine, the reaction from the French government (which expelled the ageing officer from the military reserves) was weak, and that from the Algerian side even weaker – probably not for the same reasons. A spokesman for the Committee Against Torture and Disappearances during the National Liberation War suggested that the current Algerian government did not want this question to come up since it is itself accused of severely maltreating its own people.51
It would seem morally devastating and quite unacceptable from a human rights regime point of view for the world’s concern for cases of genocide (historical or present) to be contingent on factors such as the political clout of the victim or the willingness of governments.
Why is it that precisely the historical tragedy in Turkey has been so decisively brought to the fore? It is beyond our aim in this article to answer this question, and a proper answer may be beyond reach. However, some relevant factors may the following:
. By and large, Turkey is not a highly esteemed country, nor is its history highly regarded. This would tend to lend accusations a priori credence.52
. The Armenian lobby is relatively strong, with influential emigrant societies, whereas the Turkish counter-lobby, and particularly its emigrant societies, seem relatively weak.
. Turkey is not considered a very important country: thus, for instance, the positive contribution it could make to the European Union (EU) as a future member is not often spelled out.53
Its strategic value is appreciated in the West considerably more by the USA than by the Europeans.
. Turkey is anxious for EU membership, and this has given the West Europeans a strong leverage for influencing it. EU demands on candidates for membership are generally motivated in terms of what are called the Copenhagen criteria, and pro-Armenian forces in West Europe are seeking to utilise this as leverage to get Turkey to acknowledge the genocide. The European Parliament, in its resolution in 1987, listed a number of conditions for Turkey’s joining the EU and believes that the ‘refusal by the present Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide against the Armenian people committed by the Young Turk government’ is an ‘insurmountable obstacle’ to consideration of Turkey’s accession.54
However, a link in the reverse direction should perhaps not be excluded, the Armenian question being an instrument rather than a goal. For instance, the president of the rightist Mouvement pour la France has stated that: ‘Le refus obstine´ de la Turquie de reconnaıˆtre les massacres de 1915 est un e´le´ment supple´mentaire pour refuser l’entre´e de la Turquie dans l’Union europe´enne.’55
It can be assumed that for this organisation the more pressing question is to keep Turkey out of the EU and the Armenian question is an instrument to this end.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIVERSALITY PRINCIPLE
The consistent use of the principle of universalism would seem to be potentially destabilising, making for an increased level of animosity in the international system. This is so first of all because attempts to bring up historical cases may become entangled with manifest or latent conflicts of interest of various kinds, as is well illustrated by the Armenian case. In October 2000 the International Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives passed a resolution which labelled the Armenian massacres as genocide. This resolution went to the House of Representatives for a full vote, which, however, never materialised, being cancelled by the Speaker of the House. It is generally understood that the genocide resolution came up in the first place because of politicking in the election race that was going on at the time and the endangered situation of a Republican in a district with a huge Armenian– American population.56
The reason for the cancellation was no less politically coloured.
The Speaker came under intense pressure from the President, the Secretary of State and What Can Be Done about Historical Atrocities 225 the Secretary for Defense as well as the military, who presented security policy arguments against the resolution (no doubt under the influence of Turkey, which had lobbied heavily against the resolution). Explaining his decision not to bring it to the floor, the Speaker said that he had little choice: ‘The President believes that passage of this resolution may adversely impact the situation in the Middle East and risk the lives of Americans’.57
To political concerns which were clearly manifest should be added suspicions about the role of political interests. In the Armenian case there are indeed suspicions in Turkey. It is widely thought that the campaign for recognition is intended to pave the way for certain demands on Turkey (which we will consider again below).
Can we demur that increasing animosity would perhaps be a reasonable price to be paid for truth and humanitarian principles?
Campaigns for the recognition of historical atrocities as genocide may risk upsetting sensitive processes of healing, which many would consider a much less reasonable price. As is well known, world history is full of lingering sensitivities, for instance, in East Asia, indicated by the strong reactions against Japan when its unwillingness to recognise historical misdeeds against its neighbours (such as the ‘Rape of Nanking’ in 1937) comes to the fore.58
There is even the possibility that accusations of genocide would add fuel to live conflicts which are difficult to resolve. Cyprus has been a dangerous hot spot in the Eastern Mediterranean. Countless efforts by the parties themselves and the international community to resolve the conflict there (which started in 1963 according to the Turkish side, in 1974 according to the Greek side) have been in vain. A number of intricate issues are involved, including security, popular representation and territory. Negotiations started again in early 2002 in what has been widely called a last-ditch effort. What consequences would a (possibly reciprocal) genocide recognition campaign concerning atrocities in the early 1960s have for peace in the region?
TRIBUNAL FUNCTIONS
The events in Ottoman Turkey have been discussed (by parliaments and other popular assemblies) in terms of crimes and culprits, not seldom with some reference to international law, and, of course, the resolutions passed are intended for international audience. Actions taken have, of course, no force in international law; nevertheless it seems accurate to say that parliaments and others de facto attribute themselves tribunal-like functions.
Is the global human rights regime well served by the fact that tribunal or quasi-tribunal functions are exercised with respect to historical events? Assuming that it is, although much could be said to the contrary, let me make some points on the appropriate way of meting out historical justice.
It follows from what has been said above that parliaments are less than suitable for the function because of the risk of inappropriate concerns intervening. The handling of the genocide bill in the US Congress is of course an example of political contamination. In the French parliamentary setting strong solidarity sentiments have manifested themselves.
The point has been made that recognition of the genocide would be a way of honouring the French engagement for the Armenian community living in France and a way of strengthening the bond of friendship between France and Armenia.59
Moreover, because parliamentarians are elected on their political merits rather than for their competence in matters of international politics – much less international law – their knowledge of the subject can be questioned, or at least should not be taken for granted, the more so as legislatures, typically, are not given a major role in the making of foreign policy. It is important to realise that juridical competence includes the competence to make appeal to authority.60
It is common in Turkish milieus to refer to historians. President Ahmed Necdet Sezer, hailed abroad for his concern for the rule of law and respect for human rights, has stated that ‘the question of genocide should be left to historians’.61
Professional Turkish historians agree, for instance, Halil Berktay of Sabanci University in Istanbul, who, moreover, maintains that by leaving it to the academics the Turkey of today could wash its hands of the question: republican Turkey is not a continuation of the Ottoman state.62
Not only Turkish historians have made this point, [63] and not only Turkish statesmen. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres is reported to have discussed the fate of Jews and Armenians during the Second and First World Wars, respectively, and maintained the following: ‘Genocide is a much wider term. It is not the business of a state to judge history. States create history, but should not judge (it). It should be left to the historians’.64
This position is sometimes viewed with greater or less scepticism, apparently because this issue is so politically loaded. In the Swedish Parliament’s resolution on the Armenian genocide the importance of ‘unbiased independent and international research’ on the Armenian massacre was underscored.65
This seems a rather weak recommendation since, at the same time, it was stated repeatedly that the genocide is a fact. It has been reported that Armenia showed distrust when the Turkish authorities took the initiative to set up a commission consisting of seven Turkish scholars to study the purported genocide.66
In fact, on the side of the Armenians this ‘historians thesis’ tends to be refuted altogether. President Robert Kocharian of Armenia, for one, has made clear that he does not agree that the Armenian massacre is a matter for historians. If there were any doubt regarding the genocide, he has said, then it could be a matter for historians; but it is a fact free from any doubts.67
A strong case can of course be made for genocide claims being left to historians. They would be much better equipped than parliamentarians, not only because of their command of historical method but also because of a professional ethic that helps to protect against political interests, considerations or bias. However, the limitations of historians must be stressed here. They may be helpful in providing data and documentation which bear on the case and in assessing the trustworthiness of documents. What is just as important, however, is the legal assessment of evidence, primarily with respect to the aspect of intent, which is fundamental in the genocide convention. This is a matter for professional juridical expertise. On that account historians can, at most, serve as consultants the jurists need.
We might think of situations when juridical and other expertise would perhaps do best to refrain from making a thorough investigation of a possible case of genocide. In a particular urgent situation demands for an investigation might possibly be mitigated if we consider that expressions of a belief that certain acts are of a criminal nature would have the force to prevent or halt a criminal policy.68
However, here we are discussing historical events for which such a point of view seems largely irrelevant.
COMPENSATION
It seems that accusations quite easily provide the seed of demands for compensation. Consider, for instance, the NGO declaration made at the World Congress against Racism in 2001. This document addresses grave crimes such as racism, crimes against humanity and genocide (which is mentioned 26 times). Culpability and compensation are twins. In a section entitled ‘Reparations’ (articles 238–47), dealing with crimes against humanity, particularly slavery, the declaration takes up far-reaching demands such as the return of land, monetary compensation and debt cancellation. However, demands for the public acknowledgement of these crimes and the correction of history are also included (articles 239, 244).69
Those who call for recognition of the Armenian genocide sometimes find it necessary to clarify that only the Turkey of the past is impugned. A well-known French political figure, Philippe Douste-Blazy, has stated: ‘Je crois qu’aujourd’hui il faut lever une ambiguı¨te´: la reconnaissance de la responsabilite´ du gouvernement de 1915, n’entraıˆne pas la culpabilite´ des Turcs de 1999. Il n’existe pas en matie`re criminelle, meˆme pour le plus odieux des crimes, celui contre l’humanite´, de culpabilite´ he´re´ditaire’.70
Another well-known French politician, Bertrand Delanoe¨, makes a similar point: ‘La Turquie moderne ne peut e´videmment eˆtre tenue pour responsable des faits survenus dans les convulsions de la fin de l’Empire Ottoman. Au contraire, la paix entre les peuples ne peut que reposer sur des fondements solides et jamais sur l’occultation du passe´’.71
If the Turkey of today is not held responsible for the imputed crime, can it then be held responsible for giving or having the duty to give compensation to later Armenian generations?
From a logical point of view a strong case can be made for an answer in the negative (although the matter is rather complex). From a political point of view this does not seem to be a dead issue. The European Parliament in the 1987 resolution cited above recognises ‘that the present Turkey cannot be held responsible for the tragedy experienced by the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire and stresses that neither political nor legal or material claims against present-day Turkey can be derived from the recognition of this historical event as an act of genocide’.72
However, the resolution also states that ‘the historically proven Armenian genocide has so far neither been the object of political condemnation nor received due compensation’.
Ambiguity with respect to the question of compensation is even more pronounced in the following examples. In its request to the Italian government to acknowledge the genocide of the Armenian people, the Commune of Milan states that Turkey ‘must assume the responsibility for this genocide, and that the recognition of the crime committed is also in the interest of the Turkish people, which will in that way free itself from an unbearable moral burden’. Furthermore it expresses its ‘full solidarity with the Armenian people in their fight for the acknowledgement of the historical truth and the defence of their inviolable rights’.73
The last two words seem to suggest something beyond mere recognition, possibly some kind of indemnification.
The position taken by Armenia in this matter is of course crucial. The Armenian President has asserted that Armenia and the Armenian diaspora around the world are more interested in Turkey’s recognition of the Ottoman massacre than in compensation. He has stated that Turkish recognition will not result in Armenian claims for compensation; there is no legal basis for this, since the state of Armenia did not exist at the time.74
However, such a statement must be put in context. First, we can certainly not ignore the existence of lingering, unexpressed territorial demands in Armenia. In any case, Armenia has given rise to suspicions about possible irredentism. Some fundamental documents make mention of Turkish territories; the Declaration of Independence – dubiously – mentions Western Armenia; and the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia describes the coat of arms with Mount Ararat in the centre.75
Second, linkages have been made between irredentist territories and the issue of compensation. In an interview for an Armenian news agency, an Armenian special envoy who has carried out important missions in the UN makes some reflections on the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide. One cannot expect Turkey to change its position, he states, unless it knows the consequences thereof. It has to know beforehand what territorial, financial and property consequences it would have to face. Therefore, Armenia should think of drawing up the rough outlines of possible agreements.76
This diplomat evidently presupposes that some form of compensation should ensue. It is also notable that he says that the territory where the Ararat Mountains are situated should under all circumstances be returned to Armenia; this is a separate issue, which does not refer to the territories of former West Armenia.77
It seems obvious that the recognition campaign is, nolens volens, part of a realpolitik setting and, given the murkiness of Armenian foreign policy ambitions, it cannot be excluded that the dynamics of the campaign will make this even more obvious. The workability of this realpolitik would, in fact, paradoxical though it may seem, be facilitated by a certain indistinctness in the genocide convention. Individual responsibility is not in focus in this campaign (although the convention makes it absolutely clear that only individuals own liability). At the same time, however, Article IX seems to attribute a diffuse ‘responsibility’ to the state. It seems that this discrepancy would make it easier for Armenia to pursue demands for compensation once it has been more generally accepted that Turkey has committed genocide, even though the principle of individual responsibility of international criminal law has been deserted.
HISTORY ON TRIAL
The global human rights regime is not equipped to deal with historical atrocities, and when engaged politicians want to take matters in their own hands it is clear that this alternative is problematical.
The Armenian campaign has addressed the questions involved in a simplistic way, both with respect to juridical points of departure such as definition of the crime and the status of the accused party, and with respect to the assessment of evidence. Moreover, this campaign is undermined by the apparent neglect of the universality principle which is fundamental in human rights thinking. On the other hand, a wider application of this principle would seem to open up a Pandora’s box, particularly since retrospective shaming can easily feed demands for compensation or retribution.
A laissez-faire approach may seem the best and most natural solution. Moreover, if proclamations which bear any similarity to juridical assessments are to be made at all, it seems evident that they should not be made by politicians. A much more palatable alternative would be the creation of an international body to deal with possible historical cases of genocide, composed by experts with solid expertise and reputation for their impartiality. Necessarily, both the history and the legal professions should be duly represented. While it would seem natural to link such an organ to central UN structures, such as the General Assembly, any such attachment to the world organisation would also create risks of political contamination.
Attachment to learned societies might be a better option. However, whatever affiliation is sought, funding would be a fundamental problem, given the need to heed the principle of universality.
Establishing the guidelines for this body to work may be no less problematical; can a generally-accepted time limit to the period its investigations are to cover be agreed on or established? If developments during the early years of the past century should be of concern, why not events at the end of the century before or even earlier?
Going backwards of course also raises the issue of nullum crimen sine lege. To what extent should court-like functions be performed for events which, at the time they happened, were not covered by international criminal law? The principle of non-retroactivity is a fundamental tenet in modern human rights thinking.78
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am indebted to Edward Deverell of the Swedish National Defence College for research assistance in the preparation of this article.
Notes
1For a valuable discussion of varying estimates, see Rudolph J. Rummel, Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900 (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1998). Professor Yusuf Halacoglu, President of the Turkish History Association, has stated that the true number was 57,610; see Turkish Daily News, 5 Feb. 2001. Rummel gives 300,000 as the lowest figure.
2William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.20ff.
3Ibid., p.22.
4Le Monde, 19 Jan. 2001.
5See Bertil Dune´r, The Global Human Rights Regime (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2002), p.169.
6For exaple, the list includes a statement by the Prime Minister of Canada in 1996. However, the Prime Minister only ‘recognizes and deplores the fact that a great number of Armenians were killed during the wars’ and ‘extends his sympathy to the Armenian Community’. Speech as reproduced at the Armenian National Institute home page, .
7Rene´ Rouquet, ‘Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires E ´ trange`res sur la Proposition de loi de M. Didier Migaud et Plusieurs de ses Colle`gues (no.895), relative a` la reconnaissance du ge´nocide arme´nien de 1915’, no.925, Assemble´e Nationale, Onzie`me Le´gislature, mis en distribution le 28 mai 1998, Introduction.
8‘Markups before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 2nd session, September 28 and October 3, 2000’, Serial no. 106–96 (accessed on the home page of the US Government Printing Office), quotations by Representatives Menendez and Rothman, respectively.
9Cf. Rouquet (note 7); Mozione Pagliarini ed altri n. 1-00303 concernente il riconoscimento del genocidio del popolo armeno, Allegato A, Seduta n. 707 del 3/4/2000; and Mozioni Fei ed altri n. 1-00481 e Giovanni Bianchini ed altri n. 1-00482 concernenti le vicende del popolo armeno durante la prima guerra mondiale, Allegato A, Seduta n.799 del 26/10/3000.
10References such as those made by the Swedish Parliament, cited here (see the section on Denunciation Arguments), are quite common and have also been made by the Italian and French parliaments, which, moreover, have referred to each other. Cf. the ‘Mozione Pagliarini e altri’ in the Italian Camera dei Deputati. Mr Pagliarini presents a long list of bodies that have recognised the Armenian genocide, including the Swedish and French parliaments. Resoconto Stenografico dell’Assemblea, Seduta n. 707 di lunedı` 3 aprile 2000.
11The Declaration of Independence of 1990 was accessed on the home page of the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, .
12Rooben Shoogharyan (Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), ‘The Armenian Lobby Abroad’, Newsletter of the Lecture Series Program, American University of Armenia, 25 May 2000.
13There are several important Armenian advocacy groups in the US, including the Armenian National Institute (ANI) in Washington, DC. Its overarching goal (presented on its home page) is proclaimed to be the ‘affirmation of the worldwide recognition of the Armenian Genocide’, and its formal founding in early 1997 happened to coincide with the most decisive phase of the recent upsurge of recognition.
14Shoogharyan (note 12).
15BBC Monitoring Service, ‘Armenian Foreign Minister Calls for Dialogue with Turkey without Preconditions’, 4 Oct. 2000.
16BBC Monitoring Service, ‘Armenian Foreign Ministry Welcomes French Senate’s Resolution on Genocide’, 9 Nov. 2000.
17‘Yerevan Urges Italy to Recognize Armenian Genocide’, from the home page of the SNARK news agency, Yerevan (as of 4 May 2000).
18See ‘The Armenian Allegation of Genocide: the Issue and the Facts’, from the home page of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, .
19Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.
20‘Markups before the Committee on International Relation, House of Representatives’ (note 8), pp.137ff.
21R.J. Rummel, Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp.xivff. and 243.
22Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘On Genocide’, in Prevent the Crime of Silence, Reports from the Sessions of the International War Crimes Tribunal founded by Bertrand Russell, selected and edited by Peter Limqueco and Peter Weiss, with additional material selected and edited by Ken Coates and a foreword by Noam Chomsky (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1971), part II, chapter 17, pp.350–65.
23The war prosecuted by the US cannot have been genocide within the meaning of the convention: for one thing, the US government was apparently not fighting a particular ethnic group since its Vietnamese allies belonged to the group in question.
24The resolution was what is called a Written Declaration, which commits only the members who have signed it. Recognition of the Armenian genocide, Doc. 9056, 2nd edn, 14 May 2001, Written Declaration no. 320, 2nd edn, originally tabled on 24 April 2001.
25Cf. the discussion of omitted groups in Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, World Jewish Congress, 1960), part V. 26Cf. Dune´r (note 5).
27The United Nations reported 133 parties to the convention as of 9 Oct. 2001.
28Substituting an earlier UN resolution for the convention (as Rummel does) is of course also arbitrary. UN resolutions may be stepping-stones for the subsequent hammering out of international law instruments, but of course a piece of law which has been widely adopted and ratified by UN member states takes precedence over prior resolutions. Two researchers have complained that ‘although it marked a milestone in international law, the UN definition is of little use to scholars’. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonasshon, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), p.10. This sounds somewhat presumptuous given the widely diverging views taken by different scholars. An inverse formulation would not seem to be exaggerated: whereas the conventional definition marked a milestone, scholarly definitions are of little practical importance.
29Swedish Parliament, Utrikesutskottet (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs), Utrikesutskottets Beta¨nkande [Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs] 1999/2000:UU1The European Parliament meeting was in fact in 1987, not 1985.
30Cf. James D. Carney and Richard K. Scheer, Fundamentals of Logic, 3rd edn (New York: Macmillan, 1980), pp.41ff.
31European Parliament, ‘resolution on a political solution to the armenian question’, doc. a2-33/87, 18 june 1987.
32United Nations, ‘Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Comission has been Concerned’, UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985.
33United Nations, ‘Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its 38th Session’, UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/57, 4 November 1985, Resolution 1985/9, pp.88ff.
34Ibid., article 24.
35Cf. the discussion in Tim Dunne and Daniela Kroslak, ‘Genocide: Knowing What It Is that We Want to Remember, or Forget, or Forgive’, International Journal of Human Rights, Special Issue, Vol.4, Nos3/4 (autumn/winter 2000), pp.31ff.
36United Nations, ‘Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned’ (note 32 above), para. 24, note 13.
37Schabas (note 2), p.21.
38According to Justin McCarthy; see Turkish Daily News, 16 March 2001.
39For the evolution of the application of individual criminal responsibility, see, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, 2nd rev. edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), chapter 10. The Nuremberg Principles are reproduced on pp.538ff.
40One of the delegations stated that the UK proposal was superfluous since it gave ‘the impression that a State could be held guilty of the commission of a crime’. See Schabas (note 2), pp.419ff.
41The Swedish resolution speaks of massacres on Armenians ‘in the collapsing Ottoman Empire’ but no guilty party is identified. Utrikesutskottets Beta¨nkande 1999/2000:UU11 (note 33).
42United Nations, ‘Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Comission has been Concerned’ (note 32), para. 2.
43Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican Books, 1981).
44The line drawn between ‘genocide’ and ‘genocidal massacre’ is obscure; by the latter concept Kuper probably intends massacres with fewer victims. Ibid., p.32.
45New revelations about French atrocities in Algeria in 1954–62 made in 2001 by a retired French general might lead to a more exact assessment of French behaviour during the conflict.
46It has been suggested that US President was not informed about the decision to drop the second bomb, which he did not want because of the consequences for innocent civilians. Stanley Goldberg, ‘What Did Truman Know, and When Did He Know It?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.54 (May/June 1998), p.3.
47International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.
48Primarily in Cyprus in 1963. See, e.g., Harry Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files (London: Charles Bravos, 1997).
49Cf. K. Anthony Appiah, ‘Grounding Human Rights’, in Michael Ignatieff et al., Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton, N.J. and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp.101–16, pp.103ff. What Can Be Done about Historical Atrocities 231
50Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1981), pp.159ff.
51International Herald Tribune, 19 June 2001. In both countries, however, political parties and NGOs reacted vigorously: cf Le Monde, 8 May 2001.
52For an unusually clearcut example of this lack of estimation see a statement made in the Swedish Parliament by the chairperson of the Swedish Support Committee for Human Rights in Turkey (which includes members from all the political parties represented in the Parliament) on 1 Feb. 2001: ‘We should be aware that Turkey almost always speaks with a double tongue’.
53Cf. Bertil Dune´r, ‘Why Let Turkey In?’, in Bertil Dune´r (ed.), Turkey: The Road Ahead? (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002).
54European Parliament, ‘Resolution on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question’ (note 31), article 4.
55Philippe de Villiers, ‘Le Blocage au Se´nat Est De Fait Imputable au Gouvernement Jospin’, Nouvelles d’Armenie En Ligne, .
56The Republicans had hopes of keeping control of the House. ‘Were it not for Jim Rogan that resolution would never be coming up’, the head of the Republican campaign committee told reporters, adding that the resolution was ‘part of the process’. Reuters, ‘Political Fallout for US House Vote on Armenia’, 27 Sept. 2000.
57Reuters, 20 Oct. 2000, reporting from the Washington Post that same day.
58Relations with South Korea improved considerably after 1988, when Kim Dae Jung accepted Japan’s apology for its occupation of Korea (1910–45), but this did not stop the flaring up of passions in 2001 when a nonapologetic Japanese history textbook was published; South Korea recalled its ambassador to Tokyo and cancelled official visits. International Herald Tribune, 19 April 2001.
59Rouquet (note 7), Conclusion.
60Cf. above on the evaluation of the Sub-Commission report of 1985 made by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament. The full Parliament later confirmed the Committee’s evaluation.
61Time Europe, 11 June 2001.
62Neshe Düzel, ‘Ermenileri O ¨ zel O ¨ rgüt O¨ ldürdü’, Radikal, 9 Oct. 2000 (interview).
63Cf. Justine McCharty, ‘Let Historians Decide on So-Called Genocide’, Turkish Daily News, 10 April 2001.
64‘Holocaust Yes, Armenian Genocide No!’ Cyprus Weekly (Nicosia), posted on the Internet 27 April 100Cf. also interview with Günter Verheugen, EU Commissioner for Enlargement: ‘I must say that I prefer leaving that to the historians’, Turkish Daily News, 7 Feb. 2001.
65Utrikesutskottets Beta¨nkande 1999/2000:UU11 (note 29).
66BBC Monitoring Service, ‘Armenia Hails Setting Up of Turkish Genocide Commission, But Doubtful of Aim’, 31 Oct. 2000.
67Interview by Mehmet Ali Birand under the title ‘Armenia Has No Land Demand from Turkey’, Turkish Daily News, 1 Feb. 2001.
68See also Adriaan Bos, ‘The International Criminal Court: A Perspective’, in Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), chapter 17, pp.463–70.
69World Congress against Racism (WCAR) NGO Forum Declaration, 3 Sept. 200This document is described as the outcome of an international process before and during the NGO forum of the WCAR held in Durban, South Africa, 28 Aug.–1 Sept. 2001.
70Philippe Douste-Blazy, ‘Pour Rejoindre l’Union, la Turquie Devra Reconnaıˆtre le Ge´nocide Arme´nien’, Nouvelles d’Arme´nie. En Ligne, .
71Bertrand Delanoe¨, ‘Au Nom de l’Avenir’, Nouvelles d’Arme´nie En ligne, .
72European Parliament Resolution, 18 July 1987: European Parliament resolution on a political solution to the Armenian question, Doc. A2-33/87.
73Mozione del Cons. Massimo de Carolis ed altri: Genocidio del popolo armeno, Consiglio Communale Di Milano (submitted and accepted in November 1997).
74‘Armenia Won’t Ask for Compensation If Turkey Recognizes “Genocide”’, CIS Online, 2 Feb. 2001.
75A considerable number of articles with references to the Armenian territorial claims have been published by the Turkish press (e.g., by Milliyet, Hürriyet and the Turkish Daily News). Cf. in particular ‘Two Ambassadors Discuss Armenian Question’, Turkish Daily News, 22 Oct. 2001.
76‘Recognition of Armenian Genocide Is A Matter of Time’, interview with Ashot Melik-Shakhnazarian, from the home page of the SNARK news agency, Yerevan (as of 4 May 2000).
77The question of material compensation can also be brought up in civil society. An Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister has urged Armenians to take up the issue with American insurance companies and fight for compensation in courts worldwide. See Shoogharyan (note 12).
78There is no consensus on the legal status of the crime of genocide before the 1948 convention. The Charter of the Nuremberg trials (1945–46), included a provision on ‘crimes against humanity’ (article 6(c)), which is closely related, but not identical, to genocide. The legality of Article 6 has been very much discussed and it is frequently seen as innovative rather than a reflection of international law at the time. See, e.g., Bassiouni (note 39), Concluding Assessment; and Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, ‘The Road From Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes Against Humanity’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.22 (2000), pp.335–403, at 344.
Interestingly, in 1945, before the start of the trials, the US government recognised that the pre-war atrocities committed by the Nazis were not offences against international law. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace: A Documentary History and Analysis (London, Rome and New York: Oceana Publications, 1980), Volume I, document 12.
. . .
APPENDIX 5 B
The Ombudsman Column
DOCUMENTING AND DEBATING A ‘GENOCIDE’
By Michael Getler
April 21, 2006
The year 2015 will mark the 100th anniversary of what many, but not all, historians and many, but not all, countries describe as the genocide against the Armenians carried out by the Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Perhaps by then there will be somewhat greater agreement and acknowledgement about what happened in the years around 1915 than there has been until now. Perhaps. But don’t count on it.
For the American audience, which is a central battleground for both Armenians and Turks in the struggle over how public opinion views the horrors of that time, the Public Broadcasting Service took a bold — and controversial — step last Monday night, April 17, with the airing of a one-hour documentary called “The Armenian Genocide.”
This was a powerful and skillfully-edited production. It included some comments from a couple of Turkish officials denying that what happened to the Armenian people was a genocide. Rather, they described it, as they have for many decades, as a tragedy linked to deportations during a brutal civil war, with lots of Muslims killed as well. It was not, they said, a planned, systematic extinction of a million or more Armenian Christians.
Yet, as the title of the documentary implied, this was no on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand account. This was a film that sought to validate the genocide and nail down the issue with the best evidence the producers could bring to the screen and into American households.
Here are the opening lines: “During World War One, the Ottoman Empire carried out what most international experts and historians have concluded was one of the largest Genocides in the world’s history, slaughtering huge portions of its minority Armenian population. In all, over one million Armenians were put to death. To this day, Turkey denies the Genocidal intent of these mass murders.”
About 93 percent of the more than 340 PBS-affiliated stations around the country aired the program, most at 10 pm local time. Within the 54 so-called “metered markets” measured by the Nielsen rating service, 35 stations carried it and it was watched in about two percent of all the households who had their TVs on in those markets at the time. PBS officials said the showing was “pretty decent” for a 10 pm broadcast, slightly above average for that time period.
In addition to the documentary, however, PBS also commissioned a follow-up, 25-minute panel discussion labeled “Armenian Genocide: Exploring the Issues.” The panel included two scholars, one American and one Turkish, who support the theme of the documentary, and two, one American and one Turkish, who do not and who have been labeled “genocide deniers” by their Armenian critics. The commissioning of a panel discussion to follow a documentary added even more controversy to the situation because it suggested, to many Armenian critics of the decision, that PBS, having stated publicly that it “acknowledges and accepts that there was a genocide,” was questioning that acknowledgement by providing a platform for those who disagree with the claim that a genocide took place.
NOW YOU SEE IT, NOW YOU DON’T
Only about 60 percent of PBS affiliates aired the follow-up panel, mostly at 11 pm local time, and many of the biggest stations in the biggest markets — New York, Los Angeles, Boston and Washington, D.C, for example — and with the biggest Armenian American audiences, did not air it. Only stations in two of the top ten PBS markets — in Chicago and Houston — broadcast the panel. The viewing audience for the panel, officials here say, was about half the size of that for the documentary.
This is the third ombudsman’s column addressed in whole or part to this combination of programs. On March 17, I wrote a preliminary column about the controversy and press coverage that had already sprung up around these programs many weeks before they were actually broadcast. I had not seen them at the time nor had those who were commenting. On April 14, a sizeable collection of letters from viewers and online readers was also featured as part of an ombudsman’s mailbag column.
One of those letters excerpted in the April 14 column was from David Saltzman, the Counsel for the Assembly of Turkish American Associations. Among other things, Saltzman sought to remind PBS, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, of CPB’s mandate to ensure “strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature.” And he cited a portion of PBS’s editorial standards assuring “that its overall content offerings contain a broad range of opinions and points of view, including those from outside society’s existing consensus, presented in a responsible manner. . .” Saltzman, writing before the programs aired, said he believed those standards have not been met “in the case of controversial Armenian allegation of genocide.”
First of all, this is not just an Armenian allegation. As pointed out in the documentary, this is a charge affirmed by The International Association of Genocide Scholars, by Turkish military tribunals after the war, by the U.S. ambassador at the time, Henry Morgenthau, and several U.S. consuls stationed around the country. It was reported by other diplomats and missionaries, by press reports in The New York Times of 90 years ago, by a small but growing number of outspoken and courageous Turkish historians, and by some two dozen other countries. So, while there is a passionate, raw and enduring debate and challenge to whether the actions constituted genocide, it is mostly mounted by Turkey and a relatively small number of other historians, some of whom are Americans.
It seems to me that while there are two sides to this issue, it is not a balanced issue. There is a more substantial body of evidence and historical assessment on the side of what happened to the Armenians, and so I don’t feel that PBS — when the documentary and the panel are taken as a package — was violating its own guidelines.
The documentary, on its own, also seemed persuasive to an independent viewer, and also illuminating about the emerging struggle over whether Turkey will face its own history more openly, including allowing the right to challenge the official denials.
The film included denials and explanations by Turkish diplomats and the head of the Turkish Historical Society. And it supplied context for the greater unfolding carnage, including references to sporadic uprisings by Armenians against the Turks in some villages, the killing of perhaps 100 Turkish officials in scattered attacks, and a contingent of five to six thousand Armenians who were fighting for the Russians against the Ottomans and causing the Young Turk leaders at the time to see all the Armenians of the Empire as a threat to the state. But aside from those moments, which are relatively brief, the documentary presented essentially a relentless case that what took place in the aftermath was a genocide. And that was the point and the historical conclusion of the program.
ON THE OTHER HAND. . .
Still, there were a number of things about this combination of programs that bothered me.
One is that a sizeable chunk of the funding for the documentary appeared to come from American Armenian individuals or foundations. I have been unable to determine exactly how much. PBS executives say about 60 percent of the funds came from foundations “of broad interests” and the rest from individuals, and that the network does not get into the business of assessing the interests of individual donors. Yet the list of foundations and individuals that appears on the television screen is loaded with names that seem to be of Armenian origin, something that large numbers of viewers noted in letters to me.
Both PBS and the New York-based filmmaker, Andrew Goldberg, who produced and directed the documentary in conjunction with Oregon Public Broadcasting, emphasize that all funders were scrutinized and approved by PBS before accepting the film and that, as Goldberg says, “funders had no involvement in any editorial decisions. And no funder saw the film before it was completed.” I have no reason to doubt that.
Still, that list of contributors on the screen was jarring and one wishes, naively I suppose, that PBS did not put itself in such a position with such a controversial and important film and that funds for this relatively low-cost (roughly $650,000) production could have been provided by the CPB or some more clearly identified non-partisan foundations. PBS provided the funds for the panel discussion.
Another is that I thought those stations, especially the big ones with big American Armenian populations, should have gone the whole route and aired the follow-up panel. Many of these stations said, beforehand, essentially that the panel, which was moderated by National Public Radio correspondent Scott Simon, didn’t add anything substantive to the points made in the documentary. That may be true because a 25-minute debate with four people and a moderator doesn’t allow much time for real exploration, and much of the time was dominated by the two scholars who were featured in the documentary and who are the most articulate historians making the case for genocide — Peter Balakian, a professor of the humanities at Colgate University, and Taner Akcam, a Turkish sociologist and historian who is a visiting professor at the University of Minnesota.
On the other side was Justin McCarthy, a professor of history at the University of Louisville, who is probably the American historian most identified with challenging the notion that while this was a disaster and there were massacres, it was not a planned genocide. And there was a Turkish associate professor, Omer Turan, from Ankara, Turkey. Turan, with halting English in the company of three fast-talking and articulate other panelists, made little, if any impact. I thought he tried to make one interesting observation about material in the archives that, he said, indicated that many of the reports about the Armenian death toll in Swiss, American, French and British newspapers at the time were from the same single source. But the moderator said he wasn’t sure he followed that. *
TWO AGAINST ONE
So it was McCarthy basically on his own facing questions from the moderator that put him on the defensive, and accused a couple of times by Balakian of having “worked for the Turkish government to help that government deny the Armenian genocide,” which McCarthy said was a lie but which ate further into his time and impact.
As his source, Balakian cited a Reuters news agency story of a year ago. It was never read on the panel but I looked it up and the lead said that, “Turkey has enlisted the help of a United States historian today as part of its campaign to counter damaging, decades-old claims Armenians suffered genocide at Ottoman Turkish hands during and after World War I.” It went on to say only that McCarthy had been “invited to address the Ankara parliament today” and he argued that “a complex historical tragedy had been manipulated for ideological reasons, becoming a vehicle for anti-Muslim, anti-Turkish prejudice.”
Personally, I thought that being able to watch and witness the face-to-face confrontation and personal sense of only slightly restrained animosity between McCarthy and Balakian was worth the price of the panel. It was better than some of the popular TV talk shows. It was worth hearing McCarthy’s side of this debate and to get a sense of the emotions surrounding this issue. I don’t think it would change anybody’s mind. But McCarthy was able to at least say some things from a different perspective — with more resonance to an American audience than Turan or the Turkish officials in the documentary — including criticizing Turkey for a law that is meant to stop people from defaming the Turkish government by questioning the genocide issue.
There are other American academics who dispute the genocide label, including Guenter Lewy, a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, and Bernard Lewis, a well-known professor of Middle Eastern history at Princeton University. Lewis, for example, has argued that “the issue is not whether the massacres happened or not, but rather if these massacres were as a result of a deliberate preconceived decision of the Turkish government,” adding that “there is no evidence for such a decision.” Lewy has said that “a large number of Western students of Ottoman history reject the appropriateness of the genocide label,” mentioning Roderic Davison, J.C. Hurewitz and Andrew Mango, along with Lewis. Whether any of these contrarians would have appeared on a panel, I don’t know. But it would have evened the level of discourse for viewers, at least.
Both the Armenian Americans and the Turks have big and aggressive lobbying machines in Washington and around the country. The Armenians, and several congressmen in New York, California and elsewhere, lobbied extensively to have the local TV station not air the follow-up panel. They claimed it was a platform for the Turkish equivalent of holocaust deniers. The Turks argued forcefully against what they saw as bias in the documentary, and for the panel discussion to be aired.
DID PBS ‘CAVE’ AND ‘CENSOR’ ITSELF?
In her preview of the program and panel in The New York Times last Monday, April 17, the paper’s chief television critic Alessandra Stanley wrote that “the fact that so many (PBS) stations caved (by not showing the panel) is a measure of something else: PBS’s growing vulnerability to pressure and, perhaps accordingly, the erosion of viewers’ trust in public television.”
In response, the station manager of the local PBS affiliate in Detroit sent a letter to The Times, with copies to PBS officials, stating that, “It is surprising to have a journalist like Alessandra Stanley allege that many public television stations ‘caved’ when they made the decision that there was no need to run a follow-up panel show after what she acknowledges to be a journalistically sound documentary. Is Ms. Stanley therefore saying that even if a journalist presents the different sides, we must add on forums for further discussion, and if we don’t we’re caving to pressure?”
Stanley, in her article, concluded by saying that, “The documentary honors the victims of the Armenian genocide and also pays tribute to dissidents in Turkey who are brave enough to speak out despite government censorship. And that makes it all the odder that so many public television stations here censored the follow-up program as soon as a few lobby groups complained.”
I have no evidence that PBS stations “caved” or engaged in self-censorship because of lobby groups, and Stanley doesn’t present any. Nevertheless, the decision to add a panel of follow-up debate after a highly-regarded documentary involving a hot-button subject that is guaranteed to produce intensive lobbying and pressure from Armenian and Turkish groups and interested lawmakers, and then have a large number of stations not use the panel, is a formula that at least invites suspicion, including mine.
The PBS stations are all independent and make their own judgments, and those can certainly be defended on journalistic grounds, as the letter from Detroit illustrates. But it is also fair game for Stanley to note the contrast, which was also obvious to many viewers.
NOT THE HOLOCAUST
Many people who wrote to me and to PBS who opposed airing of the panel discussion argued that it was the equivalent of putting deniers of the Holocaust against the Jews on a major TV platform. This is an understandable argument but not a good one, in my view. There is an enormous amount of incontrovertible evidence and documentation of the Holocaust from the Germans, from the allies and their liberating armies, from trials and from many survivors. Germany has documented its own history well and made reparations.
The subject of the PBS documentary deals with events 90 years ago, for which there is evidence but not the kind that accompanies the events of World War II. Furthermore, the action is strongly denied and refuted by the country involved, Turkey, and there are historians, as has been shown, who question not whether terrible things happened but whether there is enough evidence to use that powerful descriptor, Genocide.
Turkey is a Muslim country that is also part of NATO, that is battling to be admitted to the European Union, that is viewed as important strategically and economic ally by the United States, Britain and Israel. Those countries have shied away from using the genocide word in official proclamations when it comes to the tragic events of the 1915 period. The last American president to use it in an official remembrance proclamation was Ronald Reagan in 1981.
So the showing of this documentary, and the panel, at this time was an important event; a reminder about a very important event that is probably on the most remote edge of awareness, if that, for millions of Americans who don’t happen to be of Armenian or Turkish origin.
______________________________
* This sentence was in the original draft for this column but was inadvertently dropped from the initially-posted version.
Posted by Michael Getler on April 21, 2006
. . .
APPENDIX 6
ANATOLIA 1915:TURKS DIED, TOO
By Justin McCarthy
University of Louisville
Published in the Boston Globe, April 25, 1998
During World War 1, Anatolia, the Asiatic section of modern Turkey, was the scene of horrible acts of inhumanity between Armenians and Turks. For many decades, the history of the conflict between the Turks and the Armenians has primarily been written from the viewpoint of the Armenians. It is a viewpoint that emphasizes the deaths of Armenians but completely ignores the deaths of Turks. The Armenian position has been effectively publicized. Every year in Congress, a group of representatives attempts to pass a bill that says the Turks were guilty of genocide. Newspapers feature articles on events in Turkey in 1915 as if they were today’s news. Over the weekend, the Public Broadcasting System carried the historical visions of Armenian producers all across the country. Unfortunately, effective publicity does not ensure accurate history. What has been presented as truth is, in fact, only one side of a complicated history that began more than 100 years before World War 1.
LANDS OCCUPIED ONE BY ONE
In the late 1700s, Russia embarked on the conquest of all the peoples around it. Those who stood in the way of expansion to the south were Turks and other Moslems. One by one, their lands were occupied by the Russians. In the Crimea and in the Caucasus region, the Moslems were forced to emigrate. Those who resisted, especially in the Caucasus, were slaughtered. The czar wished to have a loyal population in the new lands. Therefore, Russians and other Slavs were imported into lands newly emptied of their Moslem inhabitants. It was not possible to populate all of the conquered lands with Slavs. The Russian population was hard pressed even in filling the more northerly lands. A different policy had to be adopted south of the Caucasus Mountains.
The Russians took the southern Caucasus region from two Moslem powers Persia and the Ottoman Empire. They had reason to fear that the Turks in the provinces that bordered the Ottoman Empire would rebel against their rule. To meet the threat, they adopted native Christians as their proxies. The Armenians, who were scattered throughout the Caucasus and in Anatolia and Persia, were to be used much as the Slavs had been used farther north, as a Christian group that would replace expelled Moslem Turks.
The Russians could promise many benefits to the Armenians. Those who sided with the Russians could hope for better economic conditions as part of a European empire. Like other Middle Eastern peoples, the primary identification of the Armenians was religious. They were convinced of the superiority and ultimate triumph of their Christian faith, and the opportunity to side with a great Christian power was seductive. Perhaps later there would be a chance for independence.
Armenian cooperation with the Russians began when Armenian armed units assisted the invading armies of Peter the Great and acted as spies against their Moslem rulers. Armenians were subsequently to become Russian soldiers and even generals who lead the Russian conquests.
The best example of the effects of Russian Armenian cooperation was seen in the province of Erivan (today the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic). Before the Russian invasion of Erivan, the majority of the population was Moslem. As the Russians defeated the Turks and Persians in 1827 29, 30 percent of the Moslems of Erivan either died or emigrated. They were replaced with greater numbers of Armenians from Anatolia and Persia. Many more Armenians came to Erivan in the years to come, creating what today is Armenia.
EXCHANGE CONTINUED FOR A CENTURY
The exchange of Armenian and Turkish populations continued for a century. With each war between the Russians and the Ottomans, more Moslems died, more fled, and more Armenians came. By 1922, more than 1 1/2 million Moslems had emigrated from the conquered lands.
In the late 19th century, Armenian revolutionary movements sprang up in the Ottoman Empire. They sought to create an independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia, in lands that were three quarters Moslem in population. The Russians gave their support whenever they felt they could use the revolutionaries.
After unsuccessful bloody uprisings in 1895 and 1909, the revolutionaries’ chance came in 1914, when Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire. Armenian rebellions broke out all over the empire, and Russian arms and even Russian uniforms appeared from hidden caches. Tens of thousands of Armenians formed themselves into guerrilla bands. The largest city of southeastern Anatolia, Van, was captured by the Armenian rebels in April 1915, and many Moslems in the city and surrounding villages were killed.
The city was held until it could be turned over to the invading Russian army. Throughout eastern Anatolia, Armenian bands attacked villagers wherever they found them. In turn, Turks and especially Kurdish tribesmen attacked Armenian villages. It was the beginning of a bloody war.
For five years, Armenian peasants and the Russian army battled Turkish peasants and the Ottoman army. Most of the peasants undoubtedly wanted no part of the fighting but were forced by circumstances to take sides. Starvation and epidemic disease killed many times more people than bullets or knives did. Because of the rebellion, the Ottoman government decided that it could not trust the Armenians. Orders went out to deport all Armenians from dangerous areas. The Ottomans, who were fighting a Russian invasion and vainly trying to defend Moslem villages from Armenian guerrillas, spared few soldiers to defend the columns of Armenian refugees moving to Syria. Many of the columns were attacked and many Armenians were robbed and killed by Kurdish tribes or corrupt officials. However, to put the suffering of Armenian refugees into perspective, twice as many Moslems as Armenians were forced from their homes because of attacks by Russian soldiers and Armenian guerrillas.
When the Russian Revolution destroyed the czar’s power in Anatolia, a new Armenian Republic attempted to hold the territory that the Russians had conquered. They were defeated by the Turks, and as the Armenians retreated, they killed the Turks who fell into their hands. Cities such as Erzincan were left in ruins, with Turkish bodies filling the streets. Armenians who failed to escape with their retreating army were killed as well.
In Erivan and other parts of the Caucasus under the control of the Armenian Republic, Turkish villages were destroyed. and the inhabitants were forced to flee or die. Two thirds of the Moslems who had lived in the province of Erivan in 1914 were gone at war’s end. A similar fate met Armenians in Turkish Azerbaijan.
In the end, almost 600,000 of the Anatolian Armenians had died. Almost 3 million Anatolian Moslems had died, more than one third of them in eastern Anatolia. Mortality in the Caucasus was similarly proportioned.
WHY ONE-SIDED?
Why have we in the West formed such a one sided view of the Armenian question? It is a matter of sources and prejudice.
The events of World War I in Turkey were seen in the West only through the eyes of American missionaries and Armenian propagandists. American Protestant missionaries had worked extensively with Armenians and had been instrumental in creating Armenian nationalism. The missionaries reported the murders of Armenians by Turks. They did not report the murders of Turks by Armenians that were occurring at the same time.
Their reports were collected by the US ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau, who disseminated them. Morgenthau believed that the Turks were an inferior race and openly printed his view that Turks had “inferior blood.” It is no wonder that his observations were colored by his prejudices. Yet it is his reports and the reports of others like him that have formed our histories.
If it seems odd that Americans of that time were so deeply prejudiced, we should reflect on the general attitude of our ancestors toward non Europeans and non-Christians. Asiatics and Africans were routinely described as inherently inferior to Europeans and Americans. Respect for and knowledge of non-Christian religions and peoples was virtually nonexistent.
Only in recent years have scholars begun to examine other evidence. There are Ottoman military records that tell of massacres of Turks and Kurds by Armenians, eyewitness accounts by Russian military men of Armenian atrocities against Turks, evidence of Americans who saw the destruction of the Ottoman East by Armenians. Most important, there is demographic evidence that tells us, for example, that 60 percent of the Moslems of the province of Van, where the Armenians began their rebellion, died in war. Such evidence belies claims of a one sided massacre. It does very accurately describe an awful war, one in which both sides were heroes and both sides were villains.
Those who bring forth such evidence are often vilified as unobjective and pro Turkish. But is it less than objective to state that both Turks and Armenians were killers and that both were victims? Can such be called a pro Turkish view?
Unfortunately, we have not yet reached a time when the Armenian-Turkish conflict is studied as we would study any other historical event.
A search is on
Today, a search is on for proof that the Ottoman government ordered genocide for the Armenians. What has appeared so far would be unacceptable in any other historical inquiry such as a few telegrams in poorly forged handwriting produced by an Armenian and entered in no telegraph records; reports from trials in which no objective evidence was produced and the accused were not allowed to defend themselves. Evidence that indicates the Ottomans intended no genocide is, like the deaths of the Turks, ignored. Yet the accusations will continue as long as nationalist sentiment guides the studies.
It would be better, I believe, to approach the Armenian-Turkish conflict as a study of the sufferings of the Armenians and the Turks. The nationalist feelings of today, whether Armenian or Turkish, have no place in the study. We should examine the fate of the millions who died in Russia’s expansions efforts and consider the effects of revolutionary movements that pursued an ideal over the bodies of their own people and of others. We should study what occurs when a government is too weak to defend its people. The important questions are human questions, not national questions.
On April 24 of ever year, Armenians gather to remember their dead. They grieve for lost family and the lost homes of their grandfathers, as is proper. It should be remembered that Turks, too, grieve for their dead.
. . .
APPENDIX 7
THE DANGERS OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE RESOLUTION
By Michael Radu
March 2007
Michael Radu, Ph.D., is Co-Chair of FPRI’s Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security. He is currently at work on a book on Islamism in Europe.
The European Union has told Turkey that in order to become a “true democracy” worth joining it, it must acknowledge responsibility for the 1915 Armenian “genocide,” even if the Republic of Turkey as such did not exist until 1923.
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi has now decided to bring to a vote a non-binding resolution declaring the events of 1915 in Eastern Anatolia a “genocide.” Despite its moralistic claims, this is a dangerous—indeed, in the present circumstances, a highly irresponsible—assault on U.S. national interests in Iraq and elsewhere.
The issue is both clear in terms of whose interests are at stake and complex as to the events themselves. For many Armenians in the U.S. (concentrated in California—Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., was the bill’s sponsor), the issue is hate for everything Turkish and an attempt to rewrite history for emotional fulfillment. For Armenians in Armenia, it is the hoped-for beginning of a process leading to compensation, including financial, from Ankara, and a welcome diversion from their domestic difficulties.
Central to the issue is the definition of events during World War I in the Ottoman Empire. A few key facts are clear. One is that many hundreds of thousands (over a million, according to the Armenian lobby) Armenians in Eastern Anatolia died at that time, of exhaustion and famine as well as killed by Kurdish villagers and Ottoman soldiers. It is also a fact that the Armenian community and its leadership in Anatolia at the time took arms against the Ottomans, in open alliance with the latter’s traditional enemy, Russia. Invading Russian troops and Armenian irregulars, whose occupation of the city of Van was the immediate cause of the deportation of Armenians, also engaged in indiscriminate violence, albeit on a smaller scale, against the mostly Kurdish population of the area; and all that during a war in which the very fate of the Ottoman Empire was being decided.
Whether the Ottoman authorities were guilty of “genocide” in a legal sense is doubtful, since the term itself did not exist in international law until after World War II; in a moral sense, doubts could also be raised, since if “genocide” means intentional destruction of a specific group because of its nationality, religion, race, etc., the survival of the Armenian community of Istanbul, outside the conflict area, is hard to explain. But leaving all this aside, there is one reality that cannot be ignored. That is that whatever happened in 1915 happened under the Ottoman Empire, not under the Turkish Republic, established in 1923. Thus contemporary Turkey is no more responsible for the events of 1915 than Russia is for Stalin’s annexation of the Baltic states or the Federal Republic of Germany for the pre-1914 colonial abuses of the Wilhelmine Empire.
In regional terms, any form of open American support for Armenian claims against Turkey would only encourage Yerevan to persist in its destabilizing role.
Not only does Armenia continue to occupy a large part of Azerbaijan’s territory, much beyond its admittedly legitimate claims to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, but is serves as the cat’s paw of Moscow, the former colonial power in the Caucasus and still the main threat to its stability.
The main problem, however, is still Turkey. Turkish nationalism, on the rise as it is and now with a disturbing new element of anti-Americanism, reaches hysterical levels when the Armenian issue is mentioned. Although most elites may not share it yet, it is unlikely that they could control a wave of anti-Americanism if the U.S. House of Representatives considers the proposed resolution. And it cost the French billions in lost or cancelled contracts with Turkey when the lower house of their parliament passed a resolution last year making it a crime to deny that genocide occurred.
France had no strategic interests in Turkey, nor is Paris known for its traditional pro-Turkish sympathies. The United States, however, has a vital interest in a friendly Turkey, a NATO ally of long standing, Israel’s only friend in the region, and a neighbor of Iran, Syria, and Iraq. The latter is particularly important now.
As it is, Ankara has a legitimate complaint against our main Iraqi allies, the Kurds, for their inaction or implicit tolerance of the terrorist PKK organization, which is safely ensconced in Iraqi Kurdistan. So far, the Turks have demonstrated, most of the time, an admirable patience with PKK terrorist attacks across the border, but a less than friendly Turkish military could not be counted on to continue on that path. Nor could Ankara be expected, if it is insulted by Washington, to stand by if Kirkuk, with its large Turkoman minority, is annexed by the Iraqi Kurds. Are those likely consequences worth paying for the sake of the emotional satisfaction of the Armenian lobby?
The answer is clearly negative, which is why Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and now George W. Bush all opposed such attempts. The House leadership does not seem to mind doing damage to our relations with the only democratic and secular Muslim state in the region at a crucial time. Although the intended measure is non-binding, and thus it avoids a presidential veto, that does not make it harmless or intelligent.
. . .
APPENDIX 8
Dr. Brian Williams,
Associate Professor of History, History Department,
University of Mass. Dartmouth
285 Old Westport Road, Dartmouth, MA 02747
January 31, 2008
Dear TDSB Associate Director,
I am a historian with a specialization on ethnic and religious violence in Eurasia who has written a book on hidden genocides in the region. In this context I have also been a member of the Association of Genocide Scholars and have carried out considerable work on the issue of educating students on the issue of genocide in various contexts. For this reason I was delighted to see that the Toronto District School Board is commencing a program that aims to educate students on this important issue.
Having published widely on the issue of genocide in the Ottoman and post‐Ottoman Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, I am also interested in learning how the Armenian genocide will be covered in your program. As someone who has spent considerable time probing the background, surrounding events, and results of this tragedy I find that this case of genocide has all too often been politicized by those
who have their own nationalist agendas. I am, for example, dismayed when I encounter Turks who go against global opinion and shrilly argue that nothing happened to Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Such efforts to erase an internationally recognized slaughter of tens of thousands are as transparent as efforts by Serbs to reject their people’s well known slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. To deny the killing of the Armenians is to revise history and to fly in the face of global opinion.
I am equally dismayed when I encounter Armenians who provide a historically contextless version of history which overlooks the fact that their people were engaged in an armed uprising which aimed to ‘cleanse’ (i.e. slaughter) the Turks of eastern Anatolia from a planned ‘Greater Armenia.’ Such Armenian revisionists deliberately downplay their own people’s attacks on Turks which led to the Turkish
authorities’ deadly over‐reaction in 1915.
Armenian nationalist historians also overlook the fact that the Ottoman Balkan provinces (the lands that would eventually become Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Romania) were ‘cleansed’ of their Turkish Muslim populations in the 19th century in a series of well‐documented slaughters. This process—which was not labeled ‘ethnic cleansing’ until the Serbian slaughter of Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s—cost tens of thousands of 19th century Ottoman Muslim their lives. Should your work overlook this crucial historical context it will come off as pro‐Armenian propaganda and will have no historical balance.
And it is this aspect of the work you are engaged in that I am most interested in. As an educator and a scholar I was hoping you might be able to give me and my colleagues who are devoted to this issue some sort of insight into how you will address the background context to the Armenian genocide (i.e. the Ottoman Muslims’ own experience with genocide in the Balkans and the efforts by Armenian insurgents to work with Russia to carve out a Greater Armenia in Anatolia), the efforts by Turks to ignore or downplay the Ottoman government’s genocidal response, and the nuanced history of this event that has few similarities with say the Nazi Holocaust (the Jews were not trying to carve out a pure Jewish republic in Germany).
If I can offer any historical information on this specific case of genocide based upon my historical research in the lands of the former Ottoman Empire please do not hesitate to ask. In particular, please let me know if there is anything I can do to make sure that biased Turkish and Armenian interpretations of this contested event do not somehow enter your curriculum as ‘historical fact.’ And any information you might be able to share on how you might be using this case study in genocide as a means to teach students critical history skills I would very much appreciate it.
Sincerely,
/s/
Brian Williams
Associate Professor of History
…
APPENDIX 9
TURKEY’S AL-QAEDA BLOWBACK
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 2 Issue: 8
May 19, 2005 03:40 PM Age: 4 yrs
Category: Terrorism Monitor, Middle East
By: Brian Glyn Williams
In the 1980’s the CIA commenced a vast covert operation to arm the anti-Soviet Mujahideen factions in Afghanistan as a means of turning the Soviet Fortieth Expeditionary Army’s invasion of this Central Asian country into a Vietnam-style quagmire. In forging this dangerous new transnational holy warrior movement, the CIA brought together such unlikely comrades in arms as the Islamic Brotherhood, Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, the Israeli Mossad, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, the Saudi royal family, and Islamic charities such as the International Islamic Relief Organization. In overcoming the differences that had long divided them, tens of thousands of Arabs from Algeria to Arabia left their homes to fight shoulder to shoulder against the Soviet-atheist invaders of the Dar al-Islam (Realm of Islam), often with logistic support from such strange bedfellows as the Israeli Mossad and American CIA.
Absent from this list of Middle Eastern co-sponsors of the 1980’s Jihad movement, however, was NATO member Turkey, a nation that had proven its allegiance to America on other Cold War battlefields (most notably by sending 5,000 troops to North Korea to assist the United States in 1950).
Turkey’s reluctance to partake in the mobilization of its citizens for the purpose of waging an Islamic holy war stemmed from its own decades-long struggle to crush Islamist militant movements at home. Turkey’s military had suppressed domestic Islamic militant movements, such as the Turkish Hezbollah (a fundamentalist movement unrelated to the Shiite organization in Lebanon), as well as the Islamic Great Eastern Raider Front (a diffuse group that still seeks to overthrow Turkey’s secular constitution and reestablish a Caliphate-theocracy), and considered the notion of arming Islamists to wage Jihad to be playing with fire. As the guardians of secularism in Turkey, the army presciently feared that these Islamist elements might threaten the foundations of the Turkish Republic should they be armed and trained for holy combat.
Because it avoided the CIA-sponsored call for jihad, the Turkish Republic was later branded Dar al Munafiqin (a hypocritical irreligious Muslim state) by the Taliban theocracy and the brotherhood of jihadis who were forged on the Afghan battlefields. But Turkey also avoided the boomerang effect that befell the Arab states of the Middle East when thousands of Arab veterans of the Afghan Jihad returned home and redirected their struggle against the “apostate” regimes of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco and Egypt.
Turkey’s cautious policy of avoiding involvement in the unsavory business of jihadism in distant Afghanistan was cast by the wayside, however, when the call for defensive combat to defend threatened front line Muslim groups closer to home began to be heard in Turkey. In the early 1990’s the Turkish people, who are far from being homogenous (millions of “Turks” are actually of Balkan or Caucasian origin – the result of the ethnic cleansing of their Ottoman-Muslim ancestors by nineteenth century Orthodox Christians), began to rediscover their former vatans (homelands). This happened as the Serbs, Armenians, and Russians instigated ethnic wars against the Azerbaijanis, Bosnians, Chechens, and Kosovar Albanians. Thus, as Bosnians were slaughtered by the thousands in Srebrenica by Republika Srbska paramilitaries, so Albanians were massacred in places such as Racak, Kosovo, by Milosevic’s security forces, Azeris were cleansed by victorious Armenian forces in Nagorno Karabakh, and Chechens were butchered in such towns as Samaskhi by Russian Federal forces. And in Turkey, moderate secularist-nationalists throughout the country (that is, those Turks who supported the secularist Turkish constitution) began to call for the defense of these irkdashlar (ethnic kin).
The images of toppled Ottoman minarets in Bosnia, of mass burials in Kosovo, and of fleeing refugees in the Caucasus also provided a sense of déjà vu for those “Turks” whose ancestors had fled their homes to the Turkish-Anatolian core of the sultan’s state in the nineteenth century to escape Serbian, Bulgarian and Russian ethnic cleansers. In the process, the ethnic, religious and historical ties that bound these former Ottoman Muslims (collectively known as Evlad-i Fatih Han, the descendents of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror) to those Turks of Balkan and Caucasian ancestry were rediscovered throughout Turkey.
As this was going on, the trans-national brotherhood of Afghan-Arabs began to look for new fields of Jihad following the collapse of the Najibullah-Communist government in Afghanistan in 1992. As members of the Afghan-Arab alumni traveled to Zenica, Bosnia, to create a volunteer Jihad corps to defend the outgunned Bosnians from the Serbs in 1992, the Turkish government turned a blind eye to those Turks who wished to join this “Mujahideen Brigade.” Together with Iran, Turkey also sent funds to the jihadi volunteers who formed a shock unit – one that was feared by the Serbs for its fanatical ferocity – in the Bosnian conflict of 1992-95. In addition, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller gained considerable domestic support in Turkey from both Turkish nationalists and the rising Turkish Islamist movement by traveling to Sarajevo, Bosnia, to demonstrate her solidarity with the besieged Bosnians.
In a rare convergence of opposing ideologies, the perceived threat to Turkish-Muslim kin groups in the former Ottoman lands united such disparate forces as the Islamist Refah-Welfare Party, the Boz-Kurt nationalists and the Evlad-i Fatih Han (millions of “Turks” with sub-national attachments to their former homelands of a sort that resemble the links between the Boston-Irish and Ireland). In the process, Turkey joined a vast covert operation, one that had the tacit support of the CIA and U.S. military, to send hundreds of Afghan-Arabs to Bosnia to assist the outgunned Bosnian Muslims against the powerful Serbs.
Many analysts feel that it was the arrival of Arab-Afghans in Europe that globalized the operations of the Afghan brotherhoods and led to the eventual formation of the al-Qaeda transnational terrorist network. In Turkey itself it created a growing network of Turkish Islamists who supported oppressed front-line Muslims with links to the Ottoman Empire (there was less interest in other causes such as those of Palestinian or Kashmir). This support came in the form of zakat (Muslim tithe) funds and a small number of volunteer fighters.
With Russia’s subsequent invasion of Chechnya in 1994, thousands of Turks of Caucasian descent (known collectively as Cerkez-Circassians in Turkey) as well as Turkish Islamists came to identify with the cause of the hard pressed Chechen rebels. At this time, hundreds of Chechen rebels wounded in conflict with the Russian Federal forces were allowed to convalesce in Turkish hospitals, while charities such as the Kafkafasya Yardimlasma Dernegi (Caucasian Assistance Organization) sent aid to the Chechens, and many Turks went to fight in the Chechnya-based version of the earlier Bosnian International Mujahideen volunteer brigade. Several of those who fought for the Chechens in this international jihadi unit, which was led by Amir bin Khattab, an Afghan-Arab from Saudi Arabia, were “martyred” while fighting for the Chechens, who were seen as either fellow Muslims (by those Turkish volunteers with an Islamist agenda) or fellow Caucasians (by those with a nationalist background).
One can find the martyrdom epitaphs of Turks who died fighting Jihad in Chechnya online at: (www.islamicaweb.com/archive/showthread/t-16293) or (www.as-sahwah.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=422 ).
Those interested in the Turkish jihadi movement that has gradually taken on the anti-Western and anti-Zionist rhetoric of al-Qaeda will also find the Turkish website cihad.net/main.htm to be of particular interest. This website documents such events as the recent “martyrdom” of three Turks waging Jihad in Chechnya and has videos of bloody attacks on Russian forces by international jihadi volunteers.
The radicalization of Turks engaged in jihad, including even those espousing a nationalist platform calling for the defense of kin groups in the Balkans and Caucasus, is evident on such websites and in underground Islamist circles in Turkey. Turkish Islamists who support the notion of Jihad increasingly call for severing Turkey’s strategic military ties to Israel and the United States, as well as a lifting of the ban on hijab-veils and the return of Sharia`h law to Turkey. Clearly this Islamist-jihadist platform – which once dovetailed with the agenda of the Turkish military/secular nationalists in the Balkans and Caucasus – represents a threat to the very foundations of the Turkish secular state.
The clear and present nature of this danger to Turkey’s secular order was vividly demonstrated in 2003 by the November 15 bombings of two synagogues in Istanbul and the November 20 bombing of the London-based HSBC bank and British consulate in Istanbul. As the stunned Turkish intelligence services launched mass police sweeps to arrest those who were guilty, their searches quickly took them to the Turkish brotherhood of jihadis who had, like the Afghan-Arabs of the 1980s, been radicalized by their experience in the Balkans and Caucasus. On November 28 Turkey’s Justice Minister, Cemil Cecik, announced the arrest of several militants, claiming that “There are people with Chechen roots among them.”
This reference to “Chechen roots” did not, of course, refer to the largely secular-nationalist-Chechen rebels themselves, who have long held Turkey in high esteem, but to Turkish citizens who waged Jihad in Chechnya. Among those “Chechen-Turks” who had fought in Chechnya prior to drifting into al-Qaeda-linked terrorism against Western targets in Turkey in November of 2003 were the suicide bombers’ two leaders, Azad Ekinci and Feridun Ugurlu. Ekinci, who led the attacks on the Jewish targets in Istanbul, has been traced to jihadi training camps in Pakistan and is known to have fought in both Bosnia and Chechnya. Ugurlu, among those involved in the November 20 bombings of British targets in Istanbul, also fought in the Chechen and Afghan jihads.
As the Turkish authorities launch further investigations of the approximately 1,000 Turks who waged Jihad in Chechnya and Bosnia, analysts believe that they may well disrupt additional sleeper cells. The ongoing investigation clearly reveals, however, that Turkey may well be sitting on a jihadi/al-Qaeda time bomb. The earlier example of the Afghan-Arabs’ creation of al-Qaeda clearly reveals that those Islamist fighters who move in jihadi circles are prone to engage in anti-Western terrorism. Sadly, however, Turkey woke up to this dangerous example of “blowback” too late to save the lives of scores of innocent Jews, Turks and British citizens killed in the November 2003 bombing spree. But Turkey is a largely moderate Muslim country that prides itself on its links to the West. And in the final analysis, this unprecedented bloodshed in Turkey appears to have turned the public there away from supporting jihadi ventures in the lands of the former Ottoman irkdashlar-kin, including in such war zones as Chechnya.