Nick Griffin:Stop Turkey joining the EU.

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8 responses to “Nick Griffin:Stop Turkey joining the EU.”

1. 

   May 12, 2009

   John

   On Thursday 4th June the whole country will be electing its representatives to the European Parliament. Leeds is part of the Yorkshire and the Humber Region, where there is a very real and dangerous possibility that the BNP’s number one candidate will be elected.

   The BNP candidate is Andrew Brons, a vile, racist anti-semite, who has a history of involvement in far-right, nazi politics.

   Andrew Brons is a former member of the National Socialist Movement, a Nazi group which was founded on Hitler’s birthday and campaigned to “Free Britain From Jewish Control”.

   In the 1960s, members of the National Socialist Movement were involved in 34 arson attacks against Jewish buildings which left one Jewish student dead and many others seriously injured.

   Brons went to become leader of the National Front, another violent, racist group and in June 1984 received a criminal conviction after being arrested in a Leeds shopping centre for shouting slogans such as “Death to the Jews” and racially abusing an Asian policeman.

   Now the BNP have selected Andrew Brons as their candidate in Yorkshire and the Humber for the European Elections and he could be elected on 4th June with as little as 11% of the vote.
2. 

   May 12, 2009

   Tony

   Nazi BNP leader Griffin humiliated in Leeds again
   by Christian Hogsbjerg

   Over 600 people from across the north of England rallied in Leeds on Monday of this week as Nick Griffin, leader of the fascist BNP, and his sidekick Mark Collett went on trial on charges of incitement to racial hatred.

   The fascist BNP counter-protest was comprehensively outnumbered by the joint Unite Against Fascism and trade union demonstration.

   BNP members looked pretty miserable in the face of constant chanting from those who came to show they were against everything the BNP stands for.

   A lively anti-fascist demonstration humiliated the BNP in Leeds in November, after it had tried to organise a protest in support of Griffin and Collett when their trial proceedings began.

   The charges against Griffin and Collett follow the BBC Secret Agent documentary about the BNP in West Yorkshire.

   This week’s Unite Against Fascism protest was lined with banners from trade unions including the PCS civil service workers, the Unison public sector workers, Keighley trades council, the AUT lecturers and the GMB general union.

   Gavin Heppenstall, a PCS branch organiser, told Socialist Worker that PCS members were there “to demonstrate against the racism and the bigotry of the BNP and show support for our multiracial society.”

   Despite the pressure of exams, a separate student march behind a banners saying, “Leeds Students Stop the Fascist BNP”, “BN – P Off” and “Art Students Against Fascism” joined the main protest to cheers.

   Ruqayyah Collector, the education officer of Leeds University student union, said she felt, “it was important students showed solidarity with the anti-racist movement, and actively oppose the politics of racism and fascism.

   “This is especially the case since Mark Collett himself was once at student at Leeds University.”

   Anne Marie Watkinson, the president of Leeds Metropolitan University student union, echoed this, arguing that we had to “stand together united for equality. That’s why we are here.”

   http://www.socialistworker.co.uk
3. 

   May 13, 2009

   Rayatcov

   During a cabinet meeting in early February 1953:
   Winston Churchill considered blocking all immigration to Britain because he feared a growing “coloured population” was posing a threat to Britain’s social stability.
   Churchill, then 79, told Cabinet colleagues that he did not “want a parti-coloured UK”. At a Cabinet meeting on February 3, 1954, the prime minister told colleagues: “Problems will arise if many coloured people settle here. Are we to saddle ourselves with colour problems in UK?”
   Churchill said immigrants were attracted to Britain by the welfare state and he said:

   “Public opinion in UK won’t tolerate it once it gets beyond certain limits.”
   I wonder which party he would be allowed in now?
4. 

   May 17, 2009

   BritishandProud

   BNP have my vote how would Turkey like it if they got swamped with 60 million Christians and the anti-BNP smears on here are pathetic.
5. 

   May 18, 2009

   Tolga Cakir

   Another article that may help me to illucidate you. Guys be real and honest.

   Obsolete ‘War on terror’ gone
   By Reza Aslan
   Los Angeles Times

   Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton let slip last week that the Obama administration has abandoned the phrase “war on terror.” Its absence had been noted by commentators. There was no directive, Clinton said, “it’s just not being used.”

   It might seem a trivial thing, but the change in rhetoric marks a significant turning point in the ideological contest with radical Islam. That is because the war on terror always has been a conflict more rhetorical than real. There is, of course, a very real, very bloody military component in the struggle against extremist forces in the Muslim world, although one can argue whether the U.S. and allied engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond are an integral part of that struggle, a distraction from it or, worse, evidence of its subversion and failure. But to the extent that the war on terror has been posited, from the start, as a war of ideology a clash of civilizations it is a rhetorical war, one fought more constructively with words and ideas than with guns and bombs.

   The truth is that the phrase “war on terror” always has been problematic, not just because “terror,” “terrorism” and “terrorist” are wastebasket terms that often convey as much about the person using them as they do about the events or people being described, but because this was never meant to be a war against terrorism per se. If it were, it would have involved the Basque separatists in Spain, the Hindu/Marxist Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Maoist rebels in eastern India, Israeli ultranationalists, the Kurdish PKK, remnants of the Irish Republican Army and the Sikh separatist movements, and so on.

   Rather, the war on terror, as conceived of by the Bush administration, was targeted at a particular brand of terrorism that employed exclusively by Islamic entities. Which is why the enemy in this ideological conflict was gradually and systematically expanded to include not just the people who attacked the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001, and the organizations that supported them, but an ever-widening conspiracy of disparate groups, such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the clerical regime in Iran, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, the Kashmiri militants, the Taliban and any other organization that declared itself Muslim and employed terrorism as a tactic.

   According to the master narrative of the war on terror, these were a monolithic enemy with a common agenda and a shared ideology. Never mind that many of these groups consider one another to be a graver threat than they consider America, that they have vastly different and sometimes irreconcilable political yearnings and religious beliefs, and that, until the war on terror, many had never thought of the United States as an enemy. Give this imaginary monolith a made-up name say, “Islamofascism” and an easily recognizable enemy is created, one that exists not so much as a force to be defeated but as an idea to be opposed, one whose chief attribute appears to be that “they” are not “us.”

   By lumping together the disparate forces, movements, armies, ideas and grievances of the greater Muslim world, from Morocco to Malaysia; by placing them in a single category (”enemy”), assigning them a single identity (”terrorist”); and by countering them with a single strategy (war), the Bush administration seemed to be making a blatant statement that the war on terror was, in fact, “a war against Islam.”

   That is certainly how the conflict has been viewed by a majority in four major Muslim countries Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Indonesia in a worldpublicopinion.org poll in 2007. Nearly two-thirds of respondents said they believe that the purpose of the war on terror is to “spread Christianity in the region” of the Middle East.

   Indeed, if the war on terror was meant to be an ideological battle against groups such as al-Qaida for the hearts and minds of Muslims, the consensus around the globe seems to be that the battle has been lost.

   A September 2008 BBC World Service survey of 23 countries, including Russia, Australia, Pakistan, Turkey, France, Germany, Britain, the U.S., China and Mexico, found that almost 60 percent of all respondents said the war on terror either has had no effect or that it has made al-Qaida stronger. Forty-seven percent said they think that neither side was winning; 56 percent of Americans have that view.

   It is time not just to abandon the phrase “war on terror” but to admit that the ideological struggle against radical Islam could never be won militarily. The battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims will take place not in the streets of Baghdad or in the mountains of Afghanistan but in the suburbs of Paris, the slums of East London and the cosmopolitan cities of Berlin and New York.

   In the end, the most effective weapon in countering the appeal of groups such as al-Qaida may be the words we use.

   Aslan is the author of “How To Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror.”

   Source: http://www.thecabin.net, 10.04.2009

   How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror by Reza Aslan
6. 

   May 18, 2009

   Tolga

   Hi Guys
   I am looking into the article and argument together.Oh my God.
   Firstly on this comment of Nick Griffin
   (
   Outlining his party’s anti-immigration stance, Mr Griffin said: “Not all immigrants are terrorists but all terrorists are immigrants or their immediate descendants.” )
   He dum enough to say such words. When all the world is running after fictious Terorist characters which we do not even know that if they exists.
   I strongly advice you to read this and educate your simple primitive brains
   here is the article:
   Where is Osama Bin Laden?

   By Angelo M. Codevilla from the March 2009 issue
   All the evidence suggests Elvis Presley is more alive today than Osama bin Laden. But tell that to the CIA and all the other misconceptualizers of the War on Terror.

   Seven years after Osama bin Laden’s last verifiable appearance among the living, there is more evidence for Elvis’s presence among us than for his. Hence there is reason to ask whether the paradigm of Osama bin Laden as terrorism’s deus ex machina and of al Qaeda as the prototype of terrorism may be an artifact of our Best and Brightest’s imagination, and whether investment in this paradigm has kept our national security establishment from thinking seriously about our troubles’ sources. So let us take a fresh look at the fundamentals.

   Dead or Alive?

   Negative evidence alone compels the conclusion that Osama is long since dead. Since October 2001, when Al Jazeera’s Tayseer Alouni interviewed him, no reputable person reports having seen him—not even after multiple-blind journeys through intermediaries. The audio and video tapes alleged to be Osama’s never convinced impartial observers. The guy just does not look like Osama. Some videos show him with a Semitic aquiline nose, while others show him with a shorter, broader one. Next to that, differences between colors and styles of beard are small stuff.

   Nor does the tapes’ Osama sound like Osama. In 2007 Switzerland’s Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence, which does computer voice recognition for bank security, compared the voices on 15 undisputed recordings of Osama with the voices on 15 subsequent ones attributed to Osama, to which they added two by native Arab speakers who had trained to imitate him and were reading his writings. All of the purported Osama recordings (with one falling into a gray area) differed clearly from one another as well as from the genuine ones. By contrast, the CIA found all the recordings authentic. It is hard to imagine what methodology might support this conclusion.

   Also in 2007, Professor Bruce Lawrence, who heads Duke University’s religious studies program, argued in a book on Osama’s messages that their increasingly secular language is inconsistent with Osama’s Wahhabism. Lawrence noted as well that the Osama figure in the December 2001 video, which many have taken as his assumption of responsibility for 9/11, wears golden rings—decidedly un-Wahhabi. He also writes with the wrong hand. Lawrence concluded that the messages are fakes, and not very good ones. The CIA has judged them all good.

   Above all, whereas Elvis impersonators at least sing the King’s signature song, “You ain’t nutin’ but a hound dawg,” the words on the Osama tapes differ substantively from what the real Osama used to say—especially about the most important matter. On September 16, 2001, on Al Jazeera, Osama said of 9/11: “I stress that I have not carried out this act, which appears to have been carried out by individuals with their own motivation.” Again, in the October interview with Tayseer Alouni, he limited his connection with 9/11 to ideology: “If they mean, or if you mean, that there is a link as a result of our incitement, then it is true. We incite…” But in the so-called “confession video” that the CIA found in December, the Osama figure acts like the chief conspirator. The fact that the video had been made for no self-evident purpose except perhaps to be found by the Americans should have raised suspicion. Its substance, the celebratory affirmation of a responsibility for 9/11 that Osama had denied, should also have weighed against the video’s authenticity. Why would he wait to indict himself until after U.S. forces and allies had secured Afghanistan? But the CIA acted as if it had caught Osama red-handed.

   The CIA should also have taken seriously the accounts of Osama’s death. On December 26, 2001, Fox News interviewed a Taliban source who claimed that he had attended Osama’s funeral, along with some 30 associates. The cause of death, he said, had been pulmonary infection. The New York Times on July 11, 2002, reported the consensus of a story widespread in Pakistan that Osama had succumbed the previous year to his long-standing nephritis. Then, Benazir Bhutto—as well connected as anyone with sources of information on the Afghan-Pakistani border—mentioned casually in a BBC interview that Osama had been murdered by his associates. Murder is as likely as natural death. Osama’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is said to have murdered his own predecessor, Abdullah Azzam, Osama’s original mentor. Also, because Osama’s capture by the Americans would have endangered everyone with whom he had ever associated, any and all intelligence services who had ever worked with him had an interest in his death.

   New Osama, Real Osama

   We do not know what happened to Osama. But whatever happened, the original one, the guy who looked and sounded like a spoiled Saudi kid turned ideologue, is no more. The one who exists in the tapes is different: he is the world’s terror master, endowed with inexplicable influence. In short, whoever is making the post-November 2001 Osama tapes is pretending to far greater power than Osama ever claimed, much less exercised.

   The real Osama bin Laden, like the real al Qaeda over which he presided, was never as important as reports from Arab (especially Saudi) intelligence services led the CIA to believe. Osama’s (late) role in Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet resistance was to bring in a little money. Arab fighters in general, and particularly the few Osama brought, fought rarely and badly. In war, one Afghan is worth many Arabs. In 1990 Osama told Saudi regent Abdullah that his mujahideen could stop Saddam’s invasion of the kingdom. When Abdullah waved him away in favor of a half-million U.S. troops, Osama turned dissident, enough to have to move to Sudan, where he stayed until 1996 hatching sterile anti-Saudi plots until forced to move his forlorn band to Afghanistan.

   There is a good reason why neither Osama nor al Qaeda appeared on U.S. intelligence screens until 1998. They had done nothing noteworthy. Since the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, however, and especially after director of Central Intelligence George Tenet imputed responsibility for 9/11 to Osama “game, set, and match,” the CIA described him as terrorism’s prime mover. It refused to countenance the possibility that Osama’s associates might have been using him and his organization as a flag of convenience. As U.S. forces were taking over Afghanistan in 2001, the CIA was telling Time and Newsweek that it expected to find the high-tech headquarters from which Osama controlled terrorist activities in 50 countries. None existed. In November 2008, without factual basis and contrary to reason, the CIA continued to describe him and his organization as “the most clear and present danger to the United States.” It did not try to explain how this could be while, it said, Osama is “largely isolated from the day to day operations of the organization he nominally heads.” What organization?

   Axiom and Opposite

   Why such a focus on an organization that was never large, most of whose known associates have long since been killed or captured, and whose assets the CIA does not even try to catalogue? The CIA’s official explanation, that al Qaeda has “metastasized” by spreading its expertise, is an empty metaphor. But pursuant to it, the U.S. government accepted the self-designation as “al Qaeda” of persons fighting for Sunni-Baathist interests in Iraq, and has pinned the label gratuitously on sundry high-profile terrorists while acknowledging that their connection to Osama and Co. may be emotional at most. But why such gymnastics in the face of Osama’s incontrovertible irrelevance? Because focusing on Osama and al Qaeda affirms a CIA axiom dating from the Cold War, an axiom challenged during the Reagan years but that has been U.S. policy since 1993, namely: terrorism is the work of “rogue individuals and groups” that operate despite state authority. According to this axiom, the likes of Osama run rings around the intelligence services of Arab states—just like the Cold War terrorists who came through Eastern Europe to bomb in Germany and Italy and to shoot Pope John Paul II supposedly acted despite Bulgarian intelligence, despite East Germany’s Stasi, despite the KGB. This axiom is dear to many in the U.S. government because it leads logically to working with the countries whence terrorists come rather than to treating them as enemies.

   But what if terrorism were (as Thomas Friedman put it) “what states want to happen or let happen”? What if, in the real world, infiltrators from intelligence services—the professionals—use the amateur terrorists rather than the other way around? What is the logical consequence of noting the fact that the terrorist groups that make a difference on planet Earth—such as Hamas and Hezbollah, the PLO, Colombia’s FARC—are extensions of, respectively, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and Venezuela? It is the negation of the U.S. government’s favorite axiom. It means that when George W. Bush spoke, and when Barack Obama speaks, of America being “at war” against “extremism” or “extremists” they are either being stupid or acting stupid to avoid dealing with the nasty fact that many governments wage indirect warfare.

   In short, insisting on Osama’s supposed mastery of al Qaeda, and on equating terrorism with al Qaeda, is official U.S. policy because it forecloses questions about the role of states, and makes it possible to indict as warmongers whoever raises such questions. Osama’s de facto irrelevance for seven years, however, has undermined that policy’s intellectual legitimacy. How much longer can presidents or directors of the CIA wave the spectra of Osama and al Qaeda before people laugh at them?

   An Intellectual House of Cards

   Questioning osama’s relevance to today’s terrorism leads naturally to asking how relevant he ever was, and who might be more relevant. That in turn quickly shows how flimsy are the factual foundations on which rest the U.S. government’s axioms about the “war on terror.” Consider: We know that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) planned and carried out 9/11. But there is no independent support for KSM’s claim that he acted at Osama’s direction and under his supervision. On the contrary, we know for sure that the expertise and the financing for 9/11 came from KSM’s own group (the U.S. government has accepted but to my knowledge not verified that the group’s core is a biological family of Baluchs). This group carried out the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa and every other act for which al Qaeda became known. The KSM group included the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings Abdul Rahman Yasin, who came from, returned to, and vanished in Iraq, as well as Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of that bombing, who came to the U.S. from Iraq on an Iraqi passport and was known to his New York collaborators as “Rashid the Iraqi.” This group had planned the bombing of U.S. airliners over the Pacific in 1995. The core members are non-Arabs. They had no history of religiosity (and the religiosity they now display is unconvincing). They were not creatures of Osama. Only in 1996 did the group come to Osama’s no-account band, and make it count.

   In life, as in math, you must judge the function |of a factor in any equation by factoring it out and seeing if the equation still works. Factor out Osama. Chances are, 9/11 still happens. Factor out al Qaeda too. Maybe 9/11 still happens. The other bombing plots sure happened without it. But if you factor out the KSM group, surely there is no 9/11, and without the KSM group, there is no way al Qaeda would have become a household word.

   Who, precisely, are KSM and his reputed nephews? That is an interesting question to which we do not know the answer, and are not about to find out. Ramzi Yousef was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing after a trial that focused on his guilt and that abstracted from his associations. Were our military tribunal to accede to KSM’s plea of guilty, he would avoid any trial at all. Moreover, the sort of trial that would take place before the tribunal would focus on proving guilt rather than on getting at the whole truth. It would not feature the cross-examination of witnesses, the substantive proving and impeachment of evidence, and the exploration of alternative explanations of events. But real trials try all sides. Do we need such things given that KSM confessed? Yes. There is no excuse for confusing confessions with truth, especially confessions in which the prisoners confirm our agencies’ prejudices.

   The excuse for limiting the public scrutiny of evidence is the alleged need to protect intelligence sources. But my experience, as well as that of others who have been in a position to probe such claims, is that almost invariably they protect our intelligence agencies’ incompetence and bureaucratic interests. Anyhow, the public’s interest in understanding what it’s up against should override all others.

   Understanding the Past, Dealing With the Future

   Focusing on Osama bin Elvis is dangerous to America’s security precisely because it continues to substitute in our collective mind the soft myth that terrorism is the work of romantic rogues for the hard reality that it can happen only because certain states want it to happen or let it happen. KSM and company may not have started their careers as agents of Iraqi intelligence, or they may have quit the Iraqis and worked for others, or maybe they just worked for themselves. But surely they were a body unto themselves. As such they fit Osama’s description of those responsible for 9/11 as “individuals with their own motivation” far better than they fit the CIA’s description of them as Osama’s tools.

   More important, focusing on Osama and al Qaeda distorts our understanding of what is happening in Afghanistan. The latter-day Taliban are fielding forces better paid and armed than any in the region except America’s. Does anyone suggest seriously that Osama or al-Zawahiri are providing the equipment, the money, or the moral incentives? Such amounts of money can come only from the super wealthy of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The equipment can come only through dealers who work at the sufferance of states, and can reach the front only through Pakistan by leave of Pakistani authorities. Moreover, the moral incentives for large-scale fighting in Pushtunistan can come only as part of the politics of Pushtun identity. Hence sending troops to Afghanistan to fight Pushtuns financed by Saudis, supported by Pakistanis, and disposing of equipment purchased throughout the world, with the objective of “building an Afghan nation” capable of preventing Osama and al Qaeda from messing up the world from their mountain caves, is an errand built on intellectual self-indulgence.

   Intellectual Authority

   The CIA had as much basis for deeming Osama the world’s terror master “game, set, and match” in 2001 as it had in 2003 for verifying as a “slam dunk” the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and as it had in 2007 for determining that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons program. Mutatis mutandis, it was on such bases that the CIA determined in 1962 that the Soviets would not put missiles in Cuba; that the CIA was certain from 1963 to 1978 that the USSR would not build the first strike missile force that it was building before its very eyes; that the CIA convinced Bush 41 that the Soviet Union was not falling apart and that he should help hold it together; that the CIA assured the U.S. government in 1990 that Iraq would not invade Kuwait, and in 1996 that neither India nor Pakistan would test nuclear weapons. In these and countless other instances, the CIA has provided the US government and the media with authoritative bases for denying realities over which America was tripping.

   The force of the CIA’s judgments, its authority, has always come from the congruence between its prejudices and those of America’s ruling class. When you tell people what they want to hear, you don’t have to be too careful about premises, facts, and conclusions. Our problem, in short, is not the CIA’s mentality so much as the unwillingness of persons in government and the “attentive public” to exercise intellectual due diligence about international affairs. Osama bin Laden’s role may be as good a place as any to start.

   Angelo M. Codevilla, a professor of international relations at Boston University, a fellow of the Claremont Institute, and a senior editor of The American Spectator, was a Foreign Service officer and served on the staff of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee between 1977 and 1985. He was the principal author of the 1980 presidential transition report on intelligence. He is the author of The Character of Nations: How Politics Makes and Breaks Prosperity, Family, and Civility.

   Source: The American Spectator, March 2009

   Link:http: //www.turkishforum.com.tr/en/content/2009/03/17/osama-bin-elvis/
7. 

   May 18, 2009

   Robert

   To Britishandproud…Since you state that the BNP has your vote, you equate and affiliate yourself with a racist, Nazi organization. What does that really say about you and your one-sided, biased opinion? Once one considers the source, your opinion can easily be cancelled out! As for your question about Turkey and how she would like it if it were “swamped” with Christians…Well, actually it has been, and continues to be “swamped’ with Christians! For your edification, thousands of Armenians every month, in their mass exodus from their own corrupt, oppressive, facistly purified and religiously intollerent country of Armenia, flee to Turkey (many of which decide to remain to start a new life there) as they determine which country to immigrate to. After the fall of the Soviet Union and communism in 1990, thousands upon thousands of immigrants poured into Turkey from Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, several Balkan States, etc. to escape the economic disater in the collapsing Russia at that time. The vast majority are still there, making their homes and raising their families there. Turkey had to absorb the costs to take care of this flood of new immigrants. We didn’t bitch. gripe and moan like “certain other nations” who shamelessly have played the religion card for centuries in their racist attempts for national purity! In the future, it may behoove you to learn a little something about a topic before you make stupid comments about it. Doing so may prevent you from looking foolish the next time!
8. 

   May 29, 2009

   FeesBussymide

   Hi,

   I am new to this forum and want to introduce myself

   🙂