Georgia, Russia: Moscow’s Troop Checkmate

Stratfor.com

Summary

Russia has ratified treaties with the Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that will see 3,800 Russian troops stationed in the two territories. The decision puts the Georgian military in checkmate, and it sends a clear message to the West as Russia consolidates control of its periphery.

Analysis

The Russian Duma ratified treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Oct. 29 that provide for the stationing of 3,800 troops in both Georgian breakaway provinces. The deployment places Russian troops in key strategic positions, giving Moscow decisive control over the two regions and the ability to put Georgia at permanent risk.

The troops will be stationed at Russian bases. In South Ossetia, they will be located in Tskhinvali and Java, and in Abkhazia they will be stationed in Gudauta (a former Russian base) and Ochamchira. These bases are situated on strategic supply lines that run from Russia to the heart of Georgian territory.

From its position in South Ossetia, which juts halfway into the heart of Georgia, Russia will have rapid access to Georgia’s main transportation corridors and the strategic city of Gori. Russian proximity means Moscow can shut down the main road and rail routes through the country at will. The occupation of Gori and the transit corridor would isolate the Georgian capital of Tbilisi from ports on the Black Sea as well as from any meaningful transportation route to Turkey and Armenia, as Russia demonstrated briefly during the Russian-Georgian war. Gori also straddles Georgia’s three major pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa oil pipeline and the Shah Deniz natural gas pipeline. All three ship Azerbaijani energy resources to world markets via Georgia.

Russian logistical links in South Ossetia are entirely reliant on the vulnerable two-lane Roki Tunnel, but from Abkhazia, the Russians have a direct line of transport on the railway along the Black Sea. From here, Russian troops are poised to again sever Georgian connections to the outside world, this time from its Black Sea ports and from Western-oriented Turkey.

The Russian military is the undisputed power in the region. The Georgian military by contrast is small, weak and underprepared for substantial action. With a total of 7,600 Russian troops stationed on former Georgian territory (about 2,400 fewer than were used during the 2008 invasion), there is little the Georgian military can do to counter Russia. In short, Moscow is poised to permanently station a combined military force that is every bit as large as the active-duty Georgian ground forces, which number around 7,000 and are largely conscripted. Georgia’s small navy and air force (each numbering under 1,500) are supplemented by a comparably sized national guard and some 11,000 border guards and Interior Ministry troops. Although the U.S. military has actively trained the Georgian military over the past four years, Tbilisi is ill-trained and ill-equipped to stave off military aggression from even one of the 3,800-strong Russian contingents ­ much less move offe nsively against both of them.

With this treaty, Russia effectively has finished positioning enough forces in key locations to crush the Georgian military should the need arise. These troops will suffice to deter or block Georgian maneuvers at a moment’s notice in the near term.

But the decision to fully occupy South Ossetia is more than just a way to control Georgia. Russia has now made sure that no amount of Western financial aid or rhetorical support will be able to alter the military reality on the ground for Georgia. This is a well-crafted message, both to the West and to neighbors like Ukraine that are flirting with notions of aligning with the West, that Russia is not to be messed with ­ especially not on its periphery.