The recent war in the Caucasus has shifted Turkish geopolitical priorities. Given that the United States is in no position to counter Russian moves, Ankara is unilaterally trying to deal with the Russian resurgence and the threat it poses to Turkish interests in the region.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Aug. 20 made a one-day trip to Azerbaijan, where he met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss regional security issues in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war. Erdogan’s trip to Baku is the latest in a series of Turkish initiatives in the wake of the Russian resurgence. Ankara mooted the idea of a Caucasian Union on Aug. 11 to achieve regional stability. Separately, Turkey is reaching out to its (and Azerbaijan’s) regional foe, Armenia; talks reportedly are under way to get Yerevan on board with the Caucasian Union project.
The recent war in the Caucasus has shifted Turkish geopolitical priorities. After Turkey’s failure to secure entry into the European Union, the Turks decided to emerge as a player in the Middle East. The most significant manifestation of this has been its role as mediator in the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. The brief but extremely significant war in Georgia dramatically changed the Turkish calculus, however, and, in a matter of days, Turkey went from playing minor league in the Middle East to having to deal with what is essentially a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow.
Turkey cannot afford to view the resurgence of Russia in purely Cold War terms. It wants to emerge as a major player in what is essentially its front yard. But it cannot count on help from the United States, which is preoccupied with Iraqi-Iranian and Afghan-Pakistani issues and therefore is not in any position to counter Russian moves in the Caucasus at present. Unlike Washington, which has the luxury of addressing the situation in the longer term, Ankara must, in the short term, deal with the Russian invasion of the Caucasus — an area of core national security interest to the Turks.
The Russians have a deep interest in reconfiguring the energy infrastructure that bypasses their territory and supplies European energy needs through Turkey. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this is the key to ensuring European — and Turkish — dependence on Moscow for the continent’s energy requirements. Therefore, Turkey must deal with the Russian stranglehold of Georgia and Moscow’s moves to force the hand of Azerbaijan regarding Baku’s energy export options..
Judging from their behavior, the Turks are in no mood to confront the Russians and instead have chosen the diplomatic route (for their part, the Russians are not itching for a fight with Turkey either). Turkey knows it cannot succeed diplomatically with Russia by simply behaving as a U.S./NATO ally in the Caucasus, which would explain its efforts to distinguish its position from that of the United States. Under Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, Ankara has in general been trying to craft a more independent foreign policy.
A recent example is President Abdullah Gul’s statement that the conflict in Georgia showed that the United States could no longer shape global politics on its own and should begin sharing power with other countries. In an interview with the British daily The Guardian published Aug. 17, Gul called for common decisions rather than unilateral action, saying “a new world order, if I can say it, should emerge.”
The transformation of Turkish foreign policy notwithstanding, it is difficult for Russia to ignore Turkey’s reality as a NATO member state and hence not look at Turkish moves as part of a U.S. plan to counter Moscow. The Kremlin can afford not to seek a negotiated settlement with Turkey. After all, Russia controls the situation on the ground. Therefore, Turkish diplomacy could run into problems. Turkey must try the diplomatic work anyway, as the alternative raises specters of dark times long past.
Should diplomacy fail, Turkey’s only other option would be to confront Russia militarily. Turkey is well-positioned to deal with Russia; for example, its navy is in a good position to defend the Bosporus from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
But the critical missing element from the military option is the political will that would enable the Turks to return to their historic mode of dealing with Russians with force. Ankara is thus unlikely to readopt a course of action in a matter of weeks that it has not engaged in within some 90 years. Russia and Turkey (then known as the Ottoman Empire) fought several wars between the mid-16th century to the early 20th century, with the last one being fought in the Caucasus in 1917-1918.
Facing a choice between unsuccessful diplomacy and reluctance toward military option, Turkey is pretty much in the same situation the United States finds itself in with regards to the Russians. The critical difference between Washington and Ankara, however, is that Ankara must deal with the situation now.
Source : Stratfor
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